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I n P l a t o Today, R.H. Crossman c o n c l u d e d t h a t P l a t o w o u l d have a b j u r e d t h e 
t h r e e m a j o r forms o f government on w h i c h t h e Greek p h i l o s o p h e r was i n v i t e d 
t o comment d u r i n g h i s i m a g i n a r y t o u r o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . P l a t o 
was seen t o r e j e c t Anglo-American democracy, S o v i e t communism, and 
European f a s c i s m . He r e j e c t e d t h e s e i d e a l s f o r one b a s i c r e a s o n ; t h e y 
a l l assumed t h a t h a p p i n e s s and s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g were a t t a i n e d b y a l l men 
i n m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y and p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y . A " d i c t a t o r s h i p o f t h e b e s t " 
w h i c h d i s p l a c e d p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y by b e n e v o l e n t p a t e r n a l i s m was more i n 
k e e p i n g w i t h P l a t o ' s own i d e a l . Crossman i m p l i e d t h a t P l a t o ' s model f o r 
s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g was more a k i n t o t h e E n g l i s h s q u i r e a r c h y o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h 
c e n t u r y , o r , i n d e e d , t o f e u d a l models t h a n t o a n y t h i n g we know i n p r e s e n t 
h i s t o r y . P l a t o ' s ' s q u i r e a r c h y ' , o f c o u r s e , w o u l d n o t be a l a n d e d g e n t r y . 
I t w o u l d be an a r i s t o c r a c y , - b u t an a r i s t o c r a c y o f t h e mind. B u t - w e h e a r 
Crossman w o n d e r i n g - a r e we t h e n f o r b i d d e n f r o m i d e n t i f y i n g P l a t o ' s model 
w i t h a n y t h i n g we know f r o m o u r own past ? W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t P l a t o ' s 
i d e a l i s m f o r c e s us t o p l a c e h i s model o u t s i d e a c t u a l h i s t o r y , i t i s a l s o 
t r u e t h a t he l i t t l e supposed t h a t h i s i d e a l a r i s t o c r a c y c o u l d emerge f r o m 
any s o c i a l c l a s s b u t t h e o l d A t h e n i a n ' g e n t r y ' whose p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e 
had been eroded away by t h e r i s e o f d e m o c r a c t i c l i f e and t h e i n s t a b i l i t y 
t h a t marked i t . 
Crossman t h u s o bserved an element i n P l a t o ' s t h i n k i n g t h a t w o u l d be r o o t 
and b r a n c h o f K.R. Popper's i n d i c t m e n t : P l a t o ' s unwonted d i s t r u s t o f t h e 
o r d i n a r y man. B u t what Crossman saw as a r o m a n t i c pessimism a k i n t o t h e 
w o r s t f e a r s o f W.B. Y e a t s , Popper saw as a h i g h f l o w n c y n i c i s m , h a t e f u l t o 
f e l l o w f e e l i n g and d e t e s t a b l e t o a l l m o r a l goodness. Crossman w r o t e on t h e 
eve o f t h e s t o r m t h a t was t o b r e a k i n Europe i n t h e l a t e 1930's. Popper, 
d r i v e n by r a c i a l mania f r o m h i s own l a n d , w r o t e a t t h e h e i g h t o f t h e storm's 
v i o l e n c e . I n The Open S o c i e t y and I t s Enemies, Popper saw P l a t o as t h e 
avowed enemy o f t h e m o r a l s a n c t i o n and t r u s t t h a t must u n d e r l i e a r e s p o n s i b l e 
and f r e e s o c i e t y . He saw P l a t o as one who s a c r i f i c e d i n d i v i d u a l d i g n i t y t o 
a g r o u n d l e s s t h e o r y o f ' n a t u r a l k i n d s ' . I n so d o i n g , Popper b e l i e v e d , 
P l a t o was s e t t i n g up a w h o l l y u n v e r i f i a b l e t h e o r y o f h i s t o r i c a l d e s t i n y -
a t h e o r y t h a t was n o t o n l y u n v e r i f i a b l e b u t m o r a l l y r e p u g n a n t as w e l l . 
Popper's c r i t i q u e was i n c i s i v e , t o p i c a l , and p a s s i o n a t e . What Crossman 
had seen as an out-moded p a t e r n a l i s m w h i c h was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o t h e needs 
e i t h e r o f P l a t o ' s t i m e o r o f our own, Popper condemned as t h e f e r o c i o u s 
megalomania b o r n o f a s m a l l man's d i s t r u s t and s e l f i s h c o n c e i t . I n t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n t ways, b o t h a u t h o r s b e l i e v e d t h a t P l a t o had w h o l l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d 
t h e p i e t y and t h e p r o f o u n d b r a v e r y o f S o c r a t e s , a man whom b o t h r e g a r d e d 
as a m a r t y r t o m o r a l c o n s c i e n c e . I n t h e deepest sense p o s s i b l e , S o c r a t e s 
was i n d e e d b o t h m a r t y r and r e b e l . He was a man who p u t p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y 
and s m a l l minded p r e j u d i c e t o shame. For Crossman he was an i n e v i t a b l e 
f i g u r e , a h e r o who w i l l always be w i t h us. For Popper he was a s t a l w a r t 
and u n f l i n c h i n g man whose v e r y goodness was d i s g r a c e f u l l y c o n v e r t e d by 
P l a t o t o t h e v i l e s t o f ends. 
T h i s t h e s i s does n o t i n t e n d e i t h e r t o d i s p o s e o f o r t o p r o v e t h e w e l l 
c o n s i d e r e d b e l i e f s o f e i t h e r Crossman o r Popper, two o f t h i s c e n t u r y ' s 
most i n c i s i v e c r i t i c s o f P l a t o . My o b j e c t i n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i s 
more humble. I i n t e n d o n l y t o c o n s i d e r t h e g r o w t h and t h e S o c r a t i c 
provenance o f P l a t o ' s d o c t r i n e o f p o l i t i c a l c o nsent. P l a t o ' s d o c t r i n e 
o f t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e governed w i l l be seen t o grow f r o m an i d e a l o f 
p e r s o n a l commitment t o m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n t o an i d e a l o f t h e p e r f e c t e d 
s t a t e . I b e l i e v e t h a t we f i n d i n S o c r a t e s ' n o t i o n o f consent e v e r y 
element b a s i c t o t h e c h o i c e a f r e e man makes i n o b e y i n g l a w s . But t h e 
S o c r a t i c t e a c h i n g w o u l d , w i t h w h a t e v e r r e s u l t , i n s p i r e P l a t o toward a 
t h e o r y o f p o l i t i c a l i d e a l i s m w h i c h e x a l t s t h e f r e e man, i n i m a g i n e d 
h i s t o r i c a l t i m e , above h i s f e l l o w s . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l have a c c o m p l i s h e d 
i t s purpose i f we can t r a c e o u t P l a t o ' s metamorphosis o f S o c r a t e s f r o m 
c i t i z e n t o r u l e r , w h i l e g i v i n g due a t t e n t i o n a t t h e same time t o the 
t h e o r y o f p o l i t i c a l consent w h i c h accompanied t h e change we m e n t i o n h e r e . 
W h i l e no s u b j e c t i n t h e P l a t o n i c corpus r e c e i v e s more a t t e n t i o n t h a n t h e 
h u m a n i t y o r t h e i n h u m a n i t y o f P l a t o ' s p o l i t i c s , I know o f no s u s t a i n e d 
a t t e m p t s t o d e s c r i b e t h e g r o w t h and development o f h i s d o c t r i n e o f 
p o l i t i c a l c o n s e n t . That d o c t r i n e must be b a s i c t o a l l judgements o f 
v a l u e we choose t o pass upon i t s a u t h o r . 
T.G.O. 
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UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
". . . V i o l e n c e , l e s s and l e s s r e s t r i c t e d 
by a system o f laws b u i l t up o v e r t h e 
c e n t u r i e s , s t r i d e s naked and v i c t o r i o u s 
o v e r t h e e a r t h , c a r i n g n o t one j o t t h a t 
i t s s t e r i l i t y has been d e m o n s t r a t e d and 
p r o v e d many tim e s b e f o r e i n h i s t o r y . 
I t i s n o t j u s t c o u rse v i o l e n c e i t s e l f 
t h a t i s t r i u m p h a n t , b u t a l s o i t s s h r i e k s 
o f s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The w o r l d i s 
o v e r r u n by t h e b r a z e n c o n v i c t i o n t h a t 
f o r c e can do e v e r y t h i n g , w h i l e j u s t i c e 
can do n o t h i n g . . . . " 
A l e x a n d e r S o l z h e n i t s y n 
N o b e l A d d r e s s , 1970 
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1 . 
C hapter I 
The Problem o f P o l i t i c a l Consent i n P l a t o G e n e r a l l y C o n s i d e r e d 
I n t h i s c h a p t e r I s h a l l p r o v i d e o n l y a g e n e r a l o u t l i n e o f P l a t o ' s t h e o r y 
o f p o l i t i c a l c o n s e n t . I s h a l l a l s o p r o v i d e a summary s t a t e m e n t o f 
problems t h a t a r e common t o h i s own and o t h e r t h e o r i e s . 
I n Book I V o f t h e R e p u b l i c S o c r a t e s speaks o f sophrosune as u n a n i m i t y 
o r harmony ( 5 " / / f u/v<U. tdf^e\/U. ) . By s p e a k i n g o f sophrosune i n t h i s way 
he ex t e n d s i t s p o p u l a r meaning o f obedience t o r u l e r s and c o n t r o l o f 
a p p e t i t e ( £f tri ces ... <<sr*7» ) ^ t o i n c l u d e h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l 
a rgreement o r c o n s e n t . We l e a r n a t 431E 7 t h a t sophrosune i s common 
t o r u l e r s and r u l e d . I t extends t h r o u g h o u t t h e whole o f s o c i e t y , b e i n g 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f no one c l a s s . I t i s , r a t h e r , oneness o f mind o r 
u n a n i m i t y o f mind between t h e n a t u r a l l y s u p e r i o r and i n f e r i o r e l e m e n t s , 
b o t h i n s o c i e t y and i n d i v i d u a l , c o n c e r n i n g t h e c l a s s and t h e c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c o f s o u l r e s p e c t i v e l y t h a t s h o u l d r u l e b o t h t h e i d e a l community and 
i t s c i t i z e n s . P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f sophrosune t h e r e f o r e i n d i c a t e s 
agreement between r u l e r s and r u l e d . We f u r t h e r l e a r n ( I b i d . ) t h a t i f t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e o f agreement e x i s t s i n any s o c i e t y i t i s t o be f o u n d i n t h e one 
w h i c h S o c r a t e s and Glaucon a r e d e s c r i b i n g , a s o c i e t y w h i c h i s founded on 
p r i n c i p l e s o f n a t u r e ( 4 2 8 E ) . Such a s o c i e t y w i l l be amenable t o t h e 
d i s t i n c t c l a s s i n t e r e s t s o f i t s c i t i z e n s . The end t o be a c h i e v e d by t h i s 
s o c i e t y i s j u s t i c e ( Si- /trfc orJvy ) , w h i c h o b t a i n s i n t h e presence o f 
sophrosune. We may say t h a t j u s t i c e , t h e end t o be a c h i e v e d , denotes 
th e p resence o f sophrosune, where t h e l a t t e r means agreement between t h e 
t h r e e p a r t s o f t h e s o u l and t h e t h r e e c l a s s e s o f t h e community. 
1 James Adam, The R e p u b l i c o f P l a t o , (London, 1969) V o l 1 , p. 233 n 30 
On what p h i l o s o p h i c a l grounds does P l a t o base h i s t h e o r y ? We m i g h t 
r e p h r a s e t h i s q u e s t i o n and ask: t o what f o r m o f government w o u l d men 
consent g i v e n t h a t t h e n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n o f s o u l o b t a i n e d ? When S o c r a t e s 
speaks o f u n a n i m i t y w i t h i n s o u l and community he i s s p e a k i n g o f a 
c o n d i t i o n t h a t i s n a t u r a l t o men, a c o n d i t i o n t o w h i c h men have a p r o c l i v i t y 
w h e t h e r i n f a c t t h e i r p r e s e n t l i v e s c o n f o r m t o i t . P l a t o develops h i s 
d o c t r i n e , t h e n , w i t h i n a t e l e o l o g i c a l framework. We may o f f s e t t h e 
S o c r a t i c paradox, <?vft<) J.jvtpcA.i'ec- no man commits wrong w i l l i n g l y -
w i t h a c o r o l l a r y : a l l men w i s h t h e good. The p r a c t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n o f 
t h i s d i c t u m , i n p o l i t i c a l t e r m s , i s t h e achievement o f sophrosune i n 
community and i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s , t h e n , t o membership o f a community w h i c h 
r e f l e c t s sophrosune i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l s o u l t h a t P l a t o b e l i e v e s a l l men 
wo u l d w i l l i n g l y c o n s e n t . 
The r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t sophrosune s h o u l d be t h e b a s i s o f consent i n d i c a t e s 
P l a t o ' s b e l i e f t h a t man's n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n i s one i n w h i c h reason and 
human temperament conform t o n a t u r e . The Timaeus (90A) p r o v i d e s us w i t h 
a s u c c i n c t s t a t e m e n t o f t h i s c o n c e p t i o n . I t i s s a i d t h e r e t h a t o u r n o b l e s t 
s o u l ( t h e r a t i o n a l a s p e c t o f man) has a k i n s h i p w i t h t h e heavens, t h a t man 
i s n o t an e a r t h l y b u t a h e a v e n l y g r o w t h . T h i s s t a t e m e n t c a p t u r e s t h e 
e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r o f P l a t o ' s t h e o r y o f man: t h a t human l i f e i s c o n t i n u o u s 
w i t h n a t u r e , t h a t t h e u n i v e r s e has a p u r p o s i v e , r a t i o n a l b a s i s i n c o n f o r m i t y 
w i t h w h i c h i t i s man's i n h e r e n t n a t u r e t o l i v e . P l a t o assumes t h a t s o c i e t y 
w i t h government i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h i s scheme. The presence o f 
sophrosune i n s o u l and community e n t a i l s t h e c o n f o r m i t y o f reason w i t h 
n a t u r e , o r , w h i c h i s t o say t h e same t h i n g , t h e agreement o f reason and w i l l . 
A c c o r d between t h e s e , as exp r e s s e d i n t h e t r i p a r t i t e d o c t r i n e o f s o u l and 
s t a t e , i s t h e mark o f men's l i v i n g i n accordance w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l o r d e r o f 
n a t u r e . A government t o w h i c h men w o u l d w i l l i n g l y c onsent w o u l d be one 
w h i c h would f o s t e r t h e n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n o f s o u l , t he e x p r e s s i o n o f w h i c h 
w o u l d be sophrosune and t h e e f f e c t o f w h i c h w o u l d be a community founded 
on p r i n c i p l e s o f n a t u r e . ( R e p u b l i c 428 E ) . We s h o u l d mark t h a t t h e presence 
o f sophrosune i n s o u l and s t a t e denotes t h e c i t i z e n s ' acceptance t h a t 
s o c i e t y w i t h government ( t h e p o l i s ) i s i n t e g r a l t o t h e scheme o f n a t u r e . 
We s h o u l d n o t e t h a t membership o f t h e community P l a t o d e s c r i b e s denotes 
th e r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e i r needs and i n t e r e s t s by i t s c i t i z e n s . 
T h i s w i l l s e r v e as a v e r y g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t o f t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t 
u n d e r l i e s P l a t o ' s p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y . I t w i l l be u s e f u l a t t h i s p o i n t t o 
expand on t h e method t h a t P l a t o uses t o d e s c r i b e c o n s e n t . What b e a r i n g 
does h i s t e l e p l o g i c a l framework have on t h i s s u b j e c t ? T h e o r i e s o f consent 
have f r e q u e n t l y assumed t h a t p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s p r i n g s f r o m a covenant 
by w h i c h some l e g i t i m a t e f o r m o f r u l e i s e s t a b l i s h e d . T h e o r i e s w h i c h 
t r a c e l e g i t i m a c y o f r u l e t o a covenant may o r may n o t assume t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e i s n a t u r a l t o man. B u t t h e y share a common d i f f e r e n c e w i t h P l a t o n i c 
t h e o r y . They a r e concerned, p r i m a r i l y , t o e x p l a i n t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f 
p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , i t b e i n g assumed t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s r e q u i r e d o f 
man i n consequence o f h i s n a t u r e c o n c e i v e d i n i t i a l l y as p r e - p o l i t i c a l . They 
ar e n o t concerned w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n : w hat s i n g l e f o r m o f r u l e would r e a l i z e 
man's ends, t o what f o r m o f r u l e do men t h e r e f o r e have a p o t e n t i a l d u t y 
t o s u b j e c t themselves? The t h e o r i e s w h i c h we a r e r e f e r r i n g t o here a r i s e 
i n p o s t a n t i q u i t y f r o m the C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e o f t h e c o r r u p t i o n o f n a t u r e . 
They r e g a r d p o l i t i c a l l i f e as b e i n g a d i s c r e t e s t a g e i n t h e r e g e n e r a t i o n 
o f n a t u r e . Assuming t h a t men have a d u t y , consequent upon a p r i m o r d i a l 
a c t o f d i s o b e d i e n c e t o s u b j e c t themselves t o p o l i t i c a l o r d e r , these t h e o r i e s 
are concerned t o d e s c r i b e t h e b a s i s o f l e g i t i m a t e r u l e i n any g i v e n s t a t e . 
T h e r e f o r e , t h ese t h e o r i e s do n o t e x p l a i n consent t o l a w on t h e assumption 
t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e - s o c i e t y w i t h government - i s an i n t e g r a l f e a t u r e o f 
human n a t u r e . That i s t o say, t h e y do n o t assume t h a t man's l i f e i s 
p o l i t i c a l i n i t s o r i g i n . For t h i s r e a s o n , t h e y do n o t make t h e i d e a l i s t 
a s s u m p t i o n , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f P l a t o , t h a t man's ends c o u l d be a c h i e v e d by 
2 
membership i n some one f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l community. 
P l a t o ' s t h e o r y o f c o n s e n t , t h e n , i s n o t based on a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e 
d i s c r e t e o r i g i n o f t h e need f o r p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Nor does he a s s e r t a c l e a r 
d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and p o s i t i v e l a w as a means o f e x p l a i n i n g 
c o n s e n t . Hooker, f o r example, i n p r e s u p p o s i n g t h e c o r r u p t i o n o f human 
n a t u r e assumes t h a t t h e law o f n a t u r e r e q u i r e s " p u b l i c r e g i m e n t " as a 
3 
consequence o f t h e f o r m e r (as w e l l as f o r t h e need o f f e l l o w s h i p ) . He 
t h e r e f o r e p o s i t s n a t u r a l law as b e i n g p r i o r b o t h t o t h e F a l l and t o t h e 
The p o i n t i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by Hooker: "The case o f man's n a t u r e 
s t a n d i n g t h e r e f o r e as i t d o t h , some k i n d s o f r e g i m e n t t h e Law o f N a t u r e 
d o t h r e q u i r e ; y e t t h e k i n d s t h e r e o f b e i n g many, N a t u r e t i e t h n o t t o any 
one, b u t l e a v e t h t h e c h o i c e as a t h i n g a r b i t r a r y . " R i c h a r d Hooker, Of t h e 
Laws o f E c c l e s i a s t i c a l P o l i t y , (London, 1969) V o l 1 , p 192. 
Hooker assumes t h a t s o c i e t y w i t h government i s n a t u r a l t o man, d e s c r i b -
i n g h i s reason f o r t h i s b e l i e f i n terms o f men's^need f o r f e l l o w s h i p (Op. 
C i t . , p 1 8 8 ) . I n t h i s he reminds us o f P l a t o : r c y v t c v i tolsw, iji/ S^&yCj )iro\u>un 
R e p u b l i c 369B 1 1 . B u t he a l s o assumes w i t h A u g u s t i n e t h a t s o c i e t y w i t h 
government i s r e q u i r e d as a consequence o f t h e c o r r u p t i o n o f human n a t u r e 
(p 1 9 0 ) . I n t h u s d e s c r i b i n g p o l i t i c a l l i f e as b e i n g r e q u i r e d as a consequence 
o f some p r i m o r d i a l a c t , Hooker assumes a d i s c r e t e o r i g i n , i n t h e l i f e o f man, 
o f t h e need f o r p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I n t h i s he d i f f e r s b o t h f r o m P l a t o , who 
r e g a r d s s o c i e t y w i t h government as an i n t e g r a l f e a t u r e o f human l i f e , and 
f r o m P l a t o ' s opponents, t h e S o p h i s t s , who a t t r i b u t e d t h e need f o r p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e t o m a t e r i a l n e c e s s i t y a l o n e and n o t m o r a l n e c e s s i t y as w e l l . Thus 
w i t h Hooker, p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s r e q u i r e d b o t h as a consequence o f man's 
c o r r u p t e d n a t u r e and f o r t h e common, m a t e r i a l , needs o f f e l l o w s h i p as w e l l . 
The d u t y t o obey t h e laws o f a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f r u l e , o r , t h a t i s , a 
s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , i s a t t r i b u t e d by him t o : ". . . a n o r d e r 
e x p r e s s l y o r s e c r e t l y agreed upon t h e manner o f t h e i r (men's) u n i o n i n 
l i v i n g t o g e t h e r . " ( p 188) 
"Howbeit, t h e c o r r u p t i o n o f o u r n a t u r e b e i n g presupposed, we may n o t 
deny b u t t h a t t h e Law o f N a t u r e d o t h now r e q u i r e o f n e c e s s i t y some k i n d 
o f r e g i m e n t ; . . ." ( p 1 9 1 ) . (My i t a l i c s ) 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f p o l i t i c a l community. Emphasizing men's n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n 
t o p o l i t i c a l l i f e , he speaks o f n a t u r a l law as t h a t w h i c h b i n d s men 
a b s o l u t e l y d e s p i t e any "solemn agreements amongst themselves what t o o r 
n o t t o do. ( p 1 8 8 ) ^ T h i s , - n a t u r a l l a w - i s t h e " f i r s t f o u n d a t i o n " o f 
p o l i t i c a l community ( I b i d . ) ; t h e second i s t h e " o r d e r e x p r e s s l y o r 
s e c r e t l y agreed upon . . ." (Cf n 2 ) , t o w h i c h we must add t h e A u g u s t i n i a n 
p o i n t o f emphasis r e l a t i n g t o t h e F a l l . As a r e s u l t o f t h e F a l l man i s 
r e q u i r e d i n obedience t o God's w i l l , t o s u b j e c t h i m s e l f t o p o l i t i c a l o r d e r . 
What we have s a i d above i n r e f e r e n c e t o Hooker i s u s e f u l t o our under-
s t a n d i n g o f P l a t o ' s own c o n c e p t i o n o f men's need f o r p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n , i n c o n t r a s t t o Hooker's, i s e v o l u t i o n a r y . I t i s n o t 
c o n t r a c t u a l , where, by ' c o n t r a c t u a l ' we i m p l y an agreement w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e s 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e as d i s t i n c t f r o m m o r a l l i f e , and w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e s p o s i t i v e 
l aw as d i s t i n c t f r o m n a t u r a l l a w . For o u r purposes i n t h i s c h a p t e r a 
b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n o f Laws 676A- 683E and R e p u b l i c 369A - 374D w i l l s e r v e t o 
i l l u s t r a t e P l a t o ' s v i e w . I n these two passages, P l a t o ' s method i s t o t r e a t 
t h e m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l l i v e s o f man as c o e x t e n s i v e . I t i s h i s i n t e n t i o n 
t o reduce t h e i d e a o f p o l i t i c a l community t o i t s s i m p l e s t f o r m i n o r d e r 
t h a t we may b e g i n t o see what i s e n t a i l e d i n a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p o l i s . 
A l s o , i n t h e Laws passage, he w i s h e s t o d i s c u s s t h e p r o b a b l e c o urse o f 
s o c i e t y ' s m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l e v o l u t i o n . S i n c e t h e Laws passage i s c a s t on 
a w i d e r p l a i n t h a n t h e R e p u b l i c t r e a t m e n t , we may b e g i n by c o n s i d e r i n g i t 
He q u o t e s A r i s t o t l e , R h e t o r i c 1: c 13, who w o u l d seem t o be p u t t i n g a 
s i m i l a r p o i n t o f view: » ^ f , ) £ jwgw st/c«u ti tiUvttf fJ<r*<. Keo/ov Sc*uct 
I n r e s p e c t o f A r i s t o t l e , however, one s h o u l d r e f e r t o Gough (J.W. 
Gough, The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , ( O x f o r d , 1967) ( p 1 4 ) . A r i s t o t l e , l i k e P l a t o , 
was opposed t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f the d i s c r e t e o r i g i n o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e , where 
i t s o r i g i n i s a t t r i b u t e d t o a c o n t r a c t (r\/i/9ijH<j : Cf. i n f r a pp 15 f f ) w h i c h 
has no m o r a l b a s i s and where p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s assumed t o s e c u r e m a t e r i a l 
needs a l o n e . 
f i r s t . A t t h e v e r y o u t s e t o f Laws I I I , a t 676A, t h e A t h e n i a n asks what 
may we suppose t o have been t h e o r i g i n o f government ( 7jr»/t cr t-t«ts P ^ ^ V 
t m r f f C f - ^nJj/f ytfot&VAt)- He wi s h e s t o d e t e r m i n e how we may d i s c o v e r 
t h e o r i g i n o f t h e p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n o f l i f e . H i s q u e s t i o n b e a r s on t h e 
development o f p o l i t i c s as t h e y move e i t h e r t o w a r d good o r e v i l . He p u t s 
h i s q u e s t i o n i n an h i s t o r i c a l f o r m and we may r e g a r d what f o l l o w s as an 
a t t e m p t t o t r a c e t h e l i f e o f man down t o t h e p r e s e n t age ( . . . ec« mc'vcx Cic 
w tu£&rc>jH.oC* -trpttAtfXvU 04r<*±'> 7 8 B ) • U n d e r l y i n g t h e A t h e n i a n ' s 
q u e s t i o n i s t h e assumption t h a t men have t h e p o t e n t i a l a b i l i t y t o mould a 
good q u a l i t y o f l i f e . I n c l u d e d i n t h i s w o u ld be t h e a b i l i t y t o make f o r m a l 
c h o i c e s o f government. T h i s f a c t , i n d e e d , b r i n g s us u n w i t t i n g l y t o t h e 
b e g i n n i n g o f l e g i s l a t i o n ( 8 1 C ) , the p r e r e q u i s i t e o f w h i c h i s men's g i v i n g 
l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n t o some p o l i s by t h e s e t t i n g up o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s . (. . . u»Col 
J/t/ Wj/o&*Cdj.' • • & CMuCy t j j ftt.t*$aky Cjf 1TaAiTf<H.S dC*^ '<JWir«/8lD) . B u t 
th e s o r t s o f communities t h a t e x i s t p r i o r t o any such arrangements a r e 
themselves s a i d t o be p o l i t i e s (itoAcctitle • 80D) ; and t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
l i f e r u n n i n g f r o m 79A t o 80C, w h i c h d e a l s w i t h p a t r i a r c h a l s o c i e t i e s , 
emphasizes P l a t o ' s b e l i e f t h a t some s o r t o f l a w , however p r i m i t i v e , i s always 
t o be f o u n d among men. That i s t o say, t h e r e i s always some f o r m o f p o l i t y 
among men, some f o r m o f m o r a l , i f n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , f o r m o f 
l i f e . Comparing t h i s t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e R e p u b l i c , f o r a moment, we 
may say t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a p r i m i t i v e community and t h e i d e a l 
community d e s c r i b e d t h e r e (428E 7) i s t h a t between t h e most o b v i o u s f e a t u r e s 
o f t h e l i f e o f man and h i s m o r a l p u r p o s e . The two a r e c o n t i n u o u s . The 
' n a t u r a l ' man i s a b e i n g o f p h y s i c a l need. But he a l s o has a m o r a l end 
w i t h i n t h e scheme o f n a t u r e . 
P l a t o s a ys, t h e n , i n t h e Laws, t h a t a c t s o f men do i n f a c t g i v e r i s e 
t o s p e c i f i c forms o f c o n s t i t u t i o n . B u t he does n o t a t t r i b u t e p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e t o men's need f o r o r d e r as a consequence o f some p r i m o r d i a l a c t . 
H i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e o r i g i n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s does n o t pr o c e e d on any such 
i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . P l a t o assumes, 
r a t h e r , t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a s i m p l e - o r ' n a t u r a l ' s o c i e t y - and a 
complex one r e s t s on degrees o f development. B u t t h i s c o n c e p t i o n does n o t 
pro c e e d on t h e assu m p t i o n t h a t t h e h i s t o r y o f man's m o r a l l i f e p r o v i d e s a 
p r e c o n d i t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I n P l a t o , s o c i e t y w i t h government ( t h e 
p o l i s ) i s n o t c a t e g o r i c a l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m ' s o c i e t y ' c o n c e i v e d as governed 
by a n a t u r a l though n o t a p o s i t i v e l a w , t h e l a t t e r b e i n g b r o u g h t i n t o 
b e i n g by human a c t . 
We have s a i d t h a t P l a t o r e g a r d s p o l i t i c a l l i f e as b e i n g an i n t e g r a l 
f e a t u r e o f human n a t u r e . H i s t h e o r y o f consent d e r i v e s f r o m a t e l e o l o g i c a l 
frame o f r e f e r e n c e t h a t sees human w i l l as p o t e n t i a l l y , t h r o u g h a l l t i m e , 
i n a c c o r d w i t h n a t u r e . He p o s i t s no r a d i c a l i n c i d e n t i n t h e l i f e o f man 
(as does Hooker, f o l l o w i n g A u g u s t i n e ) w h i c h s e v e r s man f r o m h i s o r i g i n a l 
n a t u r e and w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e s p o l i t i c a l l i f e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the word ' p o l i s 
d enotes f o r P l a t o b o t h m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . He does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h 
t h e l a t t e r f r o m t h e f o r m e r by p o s i t i n g , ab_ i n i t i o , a r a d i c a l c l e a v a g e 
w i t h i n man's h i s t o r y f r o m w h i c h p o l i t i c a l l i f e a r i s e s as a response t o a 
m o r a l r e q u i r e m e n t . For P l a t o , m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e a r e n o t d i s c r e t e 
it 
moments i n human l i f e . T h i s f a c t d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i s e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n c e p t i o n 
o f human s o c i e t y f r o m t h e l a t e r , c o n t r a c t u a l , t h e o r y . 
I n t h e Laws passage t h e A t h e n i a n develops h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p r e s e n t 
t i m e s b y means o f a s p e c u l a t i v e a c c o u n t o f t h r e e ages: an a n t i d e l u v i a n t i m e 
8. 
a p e r i o d o f p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s , and t h e p r e s e n t . The e r a b e f o r e t h e f l o o d , 
much l i k e o u r own, was a p o l i t i c a l age. A f t e r t h e c a t a c l y s m t h e r e was 
a l o s s o f c i v i l i z a t i o n i n c l u d i n g a g e n e r a l l o s s o f memory ( 7 8 A ) . Through 
many g e n e r a t i o n s t h e s i m p l e f o l k who had s u r v i v e d came t o r e d i s c o v e r t h e 
a r t s o f c i v i l i z a t i o n ( 7 8 D ) . I t i s f r o m them t h a t contemporary l i f e d e v e l o p e d . 
T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e A t h e n i a n i s n o t r e c o u n t i n g an age i n w h i c h t h e r e was 
no p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The t h r e e ages he c i t e s a r e c o n t i n u o u s i n t h a t t h e y 
a r e a l l p o l i t i c a l ages. C l e a r l y , t h e p i c t u r e he g i v e s us does n o t i n c l u d e 
a r a d i c a l i n c i d e n t p l a c e d a t a p o i n t i n h i s t o r y . The element o f myth i s 
p r e s e n t h e r e : t h e n o t i o n o f h i s t o r y as c y c l i c , w h i c h reminds us o f t h e 
P o l i t i c u s myth; t h e n o t i o n o f t h e l o s s o f memory, and t h e t h e o r y t h a t 
knowledge i s a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h i t s i n v o c a t i o n . A t t i m e s o f c a t a c l y s m , God 
has p r o v i d e d t h a t some b a s i c a r t s s h o u l d remain so t h a t l i f e m i g h t c o n t i n u e . 
The A t h e n i a n ' s a c c o u n t i s , as he has s a i d , a p i c t u r i n g o f t h e movement o f 
s o c i e t y f r o m goodness t o e v i l . P l a t o i s h e r e s p e a k i n g o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e 
as a t i m e l e s s e f f e c t o f man's m o r a l l i f e . He i s t r a c i n g t h r o u g h t i m e what 
seems t o him t o be an a p p r o p r i a t e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e , t h e a t t e m p t o f man t h r o u g h t i m e t o r e a l i z e h i s m o r a l end. The n o t i o n 
t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e had an o r i g i n i n t i m e o r t h a t i t e x i s t s f r o m a d i s c r e t e 
e v e n t i n man's m o r a l l i f e does n o t b e l o n g t o t h i s p i c t u r e . 
Though i n t h i s passage o f t h e Laws t h e r e i s no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i d e a l 
p o l i s , t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l frame o f r e f e r e n c e i s p r e s e n t . The A t h e n i a n o f f e r s 
h i s a c c o u n t i n t h e l i g h t o f t h i s frame o f r e f e r e n c e . He g i v e s us a dynamic 
p i c t u r e o f t h e n e a r l o s s o f p o l i t y and i t s g r a d u a l r e g r o w t h . H i s p i c t u r e 
o f t h e p a t r i a r c h a l community i s o f p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t t o us. We may make 
th e f o l l o w i n g remarks about i t . The n a t u r a l ends o f a p o l i s a r e most c l e a r l y 
9. 
u n d e r s t o o d i f we f i r s t p i c t u r e l i f e as a t a p r i m i t i v e s t a g e . T h i s i s what 
P l a t o i n t e n d s by h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f p a t r i a r c h a l communities. He i s n o t 
d e p i c t i n g a p r e - p o l i t i c a l , o r n a t u r a l , community i n t h e sense we have 
d i s c u s s e d above. Nor i s i t h i s i n t e n t i o n t o h a r k back t o a n o b l e age. The 
p i c t u r e he g i v e s i s n o t i t s e l f an e v o c a t i o n o f a p a s t , i d e a l c o n d i t i o n . I t 
i s r a t h e r a d e s c r i p t i o n o f j u s t i c e a t i t s most r u d i m e n t a r y l e v e l . I n t h e 
c o n t e x t o f t h e R e p u b l i c , f r o m w h i c h t h i s p i c t u r e does n o t d e p a r t , t h e 
A t h e n i a n ' s d e s c r i p t i o n i s p r o p a e d e u t i c t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n and r e f i n e m e n t 
o f j u s t i c e . I t i s a p i c t u r e o f j u s t i c e a t i t s most o b v i o u s l e v e l , t h e 
d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r and exchange o f goods. 
What may we say, t h e n , o f t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e e lement w h i c h we c l e a r l y see 
here? We l e a r n , f o r example, t h a t t h e p r i m i t i v e f o l k were si m p l e - m i n d e d 
( f y y ^ f t s o'vtki :79C 3 ) , l a c k i n g t h e shrewdness o f modern men. They were f r e e 
f r o m t h e w a r - l i k e a r t s d i s g u i s e d under t h e name o f l a w - s u i t s and f a c t i o n s 
(onejvX TTo\) Sitae U*L eTdcreis : 79 D 4) . These p e o p l e were more 
s i m p l e , b r a v e , t e m p e r a t e , and i n e v e r y way more j u s t t h a n we ( . . . el>y&6<rt(f>c>c 
. . . ScifnZc*f> ac^ : 79E) . There i s , h e r e , s o m e t h i n g o f t h e u n a n i m i t y o f tempera-
ment w i t h w h i c h we a s s o c i a t e t h e t h r e e c l a s s e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c . Y e t h e r e , 
as i n t h e s i m i l a r p i c t u r e o f p r i m i t i v e communities w h i c h t h e R e p u b l i c g i v e s 
us, we have o n l y p a r t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e n a t u r a l p o l i s . The q u a l i t y 
o f l i f e i n t h e p r i m i t i v e community was good b u t o n l y because t h e m a t e r i a l 
needs o f i t s members were a v a i l a b l e i n s u f f i c i e n t s u p p l y j u s t t o s u s t a i n l i f e 
and t h e i r n e c e s s i t o u s c o n d i t i o n drew them t o g e t h e r . I t was t h i s , r a t h e r t han 
t h e c o n s c i o u s w i l l f o r j u s t i c e w h i c h must mark t h e consummation o f t h e 
n a t u r a l p o l i s , w h i c h formed t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r sense o f k i n s h i p . What we 
see h e r e i s j u s t i c e i n i t s most a p p a r e n t f o r m , c o o p e r a t i o n a t t h e m a t e r i a l 
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l e v e l o f l i f e . S o c i e t y , even i n i t s most i d e a l c o n c e p t i o n , w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e 
t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f m a t e r i a l needs. I t i s t h e achievement o f these needs, 
t o g e t h e r w i t h a c o n s c i o u s w i l l f o r j u s t i c e t h a t t a k e s account o f non 
m a t e r i a l needs, t h a t w i l l c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e n a t u r a l , o r i d e a l p o l i s . B u t 
we see t h e most o b v i o u s e x p r e s s i o n o f j u s t i c e w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a 
p r i m i t i v e community, a community whose l i f e i s n o t moulded by a techne 
o f r u l e adequate t o t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f a l l o f i t s n a t u r a l ends and whose l i f e 
as p o r t r a y e d h e r e i n the Laws, i s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e one end o f m a t e r i a l 
s u r v i v a l . What P l a t o shows us h e r e a r e s i m p l y t h e b a s i c needs o f t h e p o l i s 
u n f a s h i o n e d by a techne o f r u l e w h i c h i s s u f f i c i e n t t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f 
a l l o f a community's ends. B u t we cannot d e m o n s t r a t i v e l y p i c t u r e a s o c i e t y 1 
b a s i c needs i f we t a k e a complex community as our example. P l a t o w o u l d t e l l 
us t h a t the communities o f t h e p r e s e n t age n o t o n l y f a i l t o e x h i b i t j u s t i c e 
i n i t s s i m p l e s t f o r m , b u t n o r do t h e s e communities have adequate knowledge 
o f t h e ends o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The p a t r i a r c h a l community, t h e n , p i c t u r e s 
j u s t i c e i n i t s s i m p l e s t f o r m . I t does n o t e x e m p l i f y what P l a t o c a l l s i n 
t h e R e p u b l i c , t h e n a t u r a l p o l i s ( tuc>t i f j r i v ol/n(0(<<rtC TToAu ) • The l a t t e r 
can o n l y be a c h i e v e d by t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a p o l i t i c a l techne as d e s c r i b e d 
i n t h e R e p u b l i c o r b y t h e r u l e o f law as d e s c r i b e d i n t h e Laws. I f , i n d e e d , 
t h e p a t r i a r c h a l community f u l f i l l e d e i t h e r o f t h e s e c r i t e r i a t h e n t h e 
a c c o u n t o f t h e r i s e o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e r i s e o f t h e D o r i a n a l l i a n c e 
(684A f f ) and i t s e v e n t u a l f a i l u r e t h r o u g h i g n o r a n c e o f t r u e p o l i t i c a l 
ends would n o t have been germane t o t h e A t h e n i a n ' s p o r t r a y a l o f h i s t o r y . 
As the p a t r i a r c h a l community o f t h e Laws was s a i d t o be s i m p l e and 
j u s t , so t h e p r i m i t i v e community o f t h e R e p u b l i c (369A f f ) i s s a i d t o be a 
1 1 . 
h e a l t h y c i t y (372E 8 ) . Here, as i n t h e Laws, P l a t o does n o t g i v e a 
s u f f i c i e n t example o f t h e n a t u r a l p o l i s . A g a i n , he i s p r e s e n t i n g an image 
o f j u s t i c e a t i t s most a p p a r e n t l e v e l , m a t e r i a l c o o p e r a t i o n ( 3 7 0 A ) . He 
does t h i s by d e s c r i b i n g a m i n i m a l community, Glaucon's c i t y o f pigs."* 
T h i s , a g a i n , i s a r e d u c t i o n o f a p o l i s t o a s t a t e m e n t o f i t s most o b v i o u s 
needs (. . . iroije'frt St tioctj?, u>t t'etk.**, ^ ij^tcep* %P**< ' 369C 8) . A g a i n , 
t h i s i s n o t t h e i n v o c a t i o n o f a n o b l e age. The community may be c a l l e d 
j u s t i f o n l y because i t e x h i b i t s j u s t i c e a t t h e o b v i o u s l e v e l o f m a t e r i a l 
c o o p e r a t i o n . B u t as t h e p a t r i a r c h a l community has no techne o f r u l e , o r 
none w h i c h i s adequate t o t h e n a t u r a l p o l i s , n e i t h e r has t h i s . I t i s o n l y 
j u s t because, i n i t s s i m p l i c i t y , t h e cause o f i n j u s t i c e cannot be i n s t a n c e d . 
But l a c k i n g t h e techne o f r u l e adequate t o t h e maintenance o f t h e i d e a l o r 
n a t u r a l p o l i s , t h e community cannot be e x p e c t e d t o w i t h s t a n d t h e i n c u r s i o n s 
o f i n j u s t i c e i n i t s g r o w t h f r o m s i m p l i c i t y . A p i c t u r e more complex t h a n t h a t 
Gregory V l a s t o s a s k s , what i s t h e n e c e s s a r y i f n o t t h e s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n d i t i o n o f a p o l i s ? 
"That t h e i d e a l p o l i s w h i c h i s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e R e p u b l i c i s meant t o 
have a l l t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f a s t a t e ( i n c l u d i n g supreme c o n t r o l o v e r t h e use 
o f p h y s i c a l c o e r c i o n i n a g i v e n t e r r i t o r i a l a r e a and maintenance o f a 
l e g a l o r d e r i n t h a t area) i s c l e a r . B ut though t h e s e a r e s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p o l i s t h e y a r e a p p a r e n t l y n o t necessary 
f o r P l a t o , e l s e he w o u l d n o t have c a l l e d t h e p r i m i t i v e community i n 369 f f . 
w h i c h c l e a r l y antecedes t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a s t a t e (no p r o v i s i o n f o r g o v e r n -
m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s ) a " p o l i s " . " ( G r e g o r y V l a s t o s , " J u s t i c e and Happiness i n 
the R e p u b l i c " : P l a t o A C o l l e c t i o n o f C r i t i c a l Essays, ed., Gregory V l a s t o s 
(New Y o r k , 1971) V o l 1 p 73 n 2 2 ) . 
I t h i n k we may answer V l a s t o s 1 q u e r y by d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e 
e v o l u t i o n a r y a s p e c t o f P l a t o ' s m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y . What we have 
s a i d above a b o u t p r i m i t i v e communities ( i n P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f them) 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t m a t e r i a l c o o p e r a t i o n i s t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f a p o l i s , 
w h i l e t h e p o l i t i c a l t e c h n e , as d e s c r i b e d by P l a t o i n t h e R e p u b l i c and t h e 
Laws. i s s u f f i c i e n t t o the r e a l i z a t i o n o f a l l t h e t r u e ends o f a p o l i s . 
We s h a l l see i n Ch I I I t h a t men's i n i t i a l c o n s e n t t o t h e r u l e o f 
p h i l o s o p h e r s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o t h e o r i g i n o f t h e i d e a l p o l i s d e s c r i b e d i n 
th e R e p u b l i c , w h i l e t h e p r i o r e x i s t e n c e o f a p o l i t i c a l techne adequate t o 
the community's maintenance i s ne c e s s a r y f o r i t s o r i g i n . 
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of the p r i m i t i v e community i s required i n order to instance these i n c u r s i o n s . 
So, we must elaborate our p i c t u r e of the healthy c i t y . Socrates t h e r e f o r e 
turns the healthy c i t y , the c i t y of p i g s , i n t o a l u x u r i o u s c i t y (372E 9 ) . 
He does so i n order to p i c t u r e i n j u s t i c e . He sees t h i s i n the a c q u i s i t i o n 
of wealth which becomes the o b j e c t of the community's l i f e . The economic 
d i v i s i o n of labour which characterized the simple community has run amok. 
I n sum, we are now to discover imbalance. Sophrosune, the mark of a j u s t 
l i f e , i s absent. J u s t i c e , a t the obvious l e v e l of s t a r k economic need, 
has been superseded by the p u r s u i t o f wealth. Wealth has become the 
community's end. During the course of h i s t o r y the t r u e ends of the p o l i s . 
which only p r i m i t i v e times exemplify i n small p a r t , have never been 
e f f e c t i v e l y achieved by men. What Socrates now wishes t o do i s t o elaborate 
the question of j u s t i c e , d e p a r t i n g from the f i r s t instance of i t which we 
have seen. 
Thus, a t 374A, the d i v i s i o n of labour i s r e c a l l e d {tyj/iko-fw/jtv £s . . . 
Cty(i/i(«.) • Having depicted j u s t i c e a t i t s most apparent l e v e l and having 
suggested the o r i g i n of i n j u s t i c e , we must now elaborate the p i c t u r e of the 
healthy c i t y as i f i n j u s t i c e had not i n t e r r u p t e d i t s course, or as i f 
j u s t i c e had been restored to the l u x u r i o u s c i t y . We must show t h a t the 
p u r s u i t of economic ends was not s u f f i c i e n t to the growth of the n a t u r a l 
p o l i s . Thus, we must develop our concept of the d i v i s i o n of labour. We 
l e a r n t h a t i f the concept of doing one's own work applies to anything, i t 
must s u r e l y apply to the work of our guardians ( rwi' <£\>k4 Hun/) . This f i r s t 
mention of the guardians and the f o l l o w i n g discussion of the f i r s t education 
prepare us f o r the main purposes of the Republic: the d e f i n i t i o n of 
j u s t i c e i n the n a t u r a l p o l i s . The d e s c r i p t i o n of the he a l t h y c i t y has 
helped us to a s c e r t a i n a rudimentary form of j u s t i c e . We now wish to 
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e s t a b l i s h a c o n t i n u i t y between t h i s form of j u s t i c e and the form of 
j u s t i c e t h a t would be necessary t o the l i f e of the n a t u r a l p o l i s . The 
e a r l i e r books of the Republic were devoted to a discussion of the moral 
and p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i e s t h a t must r e s u l t from men's f a i l u r e to achieve a 
l i f e not governed by economic need. The e a r l i e r books t h e r e f o r e describe 
the p o l i t i c a l philosophies of simple and l u x u r i o u s communities. 
The n o t i o n of the p r i m i t i v e , minimal, community, t h e r e f o r e serves 
Plato's wish to e s t a b l i s h c o n t i n u i t y between man's economic l i f e and h i s 
o t h e r , more u l t i m a t e , ends. By reducing the p o l i s to a statement of i t s 
most elementary needs, he wishes to b u i l d on t h i s groundwork; he wishes to 
show t h a t man's c o n t i n u i t y w i t h nature can and ought to be expressed i n the 
p o l i s . The n o t i o n t h a t man's p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e 
from h i s moral l i f e , the n o t i o n t h a t the i d e a l form of l i f e i s a noble age 
i n the past, - these do not belong to Plato's p i c t u r e s of p r i m i t i v e l i f e . 
What we r a t h e r see i n these p i c t u r e s i s a rudimentary form of j u s t i c e and 
men's f a i l u r e to choose a l i f e o f j u s t i c e , t h e i r f a i l u r e to make j u s t i c e 
the basis of t h e i r conscious a c t s . The p r a c t i c a l expression of t h e i r 
surmounting t h i s f a i l u r e takes us back t o Plato's discussion of sophrosune 
i n Republic IV. 
* * * 
Enough has been s a i d , f o r purposes of t h i s chapter, of Plato's conception 
of the ends of an i d e a l ( o r n a t u r a l ) p o l i s . We s h a l l discuss t h i s subject 
more f u l l y , w i t h i n the context of consent, i n subsequent chapters. A 
subjec t t h a t w i l l be of great importance to us i s the phusis-nomos c o n t r a r i e t y . 
I t w i l l be appropriate t o r a i s e t h i s problem i n the present chapter. I s h a l l 
discuss the problem here i n the context of Laws I I I and statements made by 
A r i s t o t l e i n the P o l i t i c s . Basic to the problem i s a subject we have 
already mentioned i n reference to C h r i s t i a n thought: the n o t i o n of 
the o r i g i n of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i n c o n t r a c t or covenant. We have b r i e f l y 
mentioned t h i s same conception i n reference t o the Sophists (nn, 2 supra). 
We may complete t h i s chapter by expanding on t h i s s ubject. 
I n P o l i t i c s I I I (1279b f f . ) A r i s t o t l e proposes t h a t the end of 
p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n i s , p r o p e r l y speaking, a good q u a l i t y of l i f e ( z2v 
Jyi/ : 1280a30 f f . ) . Should a given community have wealth or mutual 
p r o t e c t i o n as i t s end then the community i n question i s not d i f f e r e n t from 
an a l l i a n c e , the only r e a l d i f f e r e n c e being the p r o x i m i t y of t h e i r respect-
i v e members ( ^LVITCJU. yip $ KPCVWI/L*. rv/t/fAjUd., C^v %\\<A>\/ CelTi*/ ^(.n^ipaorv. 
ftovov Zk>\t onto&ev trvf/jtrJL^tvM . ;1280b9 f f . ) . Furthermore, when we regard a 
community i t s e l f as nothing more than an a l l i a n c e we regard i t i n the same 
way as d i d Lycophron the Sophist i n h i s explanation of the basis of 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e : the guarantee of men's j u s t claims against one another, 
law being regarded as a covenant ( r u v f j A t j : 1 2 8 0 b l l f f . ) . Now A r i s t o t l e 
i m p l i e s t h a t Lycophron d i d not hold nomos to be t h a t which makes c i t i z e n s 
v i r t u o u s or j u s t . I f t h a t i s so then A r i s t o t l e cannot have supposed t h a t 
Lycophron's n o t i o n about men's j u s t claims against one another (UXKJAKS T£V 
Si.K.+ l<vVj : I b i d . ) c a r r i e d s i g n i f i c a n t moral weight. The phrase must r e f e r , 
r a t h e r to m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s only. I n any case, i t does not s a t i s f y 
A r i s t o t l e , who would seem to be c i t i n g i t as a view contrary to h is own 
and who takes men's a t t e n t i o n to c i v i c good and e v i l to be the means to 
good government ( TTt-ft £'4p*-cys AM< Mot* (Ay n*<(tci.t<tjs SnanoTnTuo-iv o*a<. 
i^pwtc^ovo-u/ f-\>i/ofust . 1280b6) . The p o i n t i s t h i s : i n A r i s t o t l e : s o p i n i o n 
rtn/^Jjk.ij , or a covenant f o r m a t e r i a l cooperation, i s not the r e a l grounds 
of p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n (Gf. Gough, I b i d . ) . P l a t o has impli e d as much 
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i n the passages we have d e a l t w i t h above. He makes the p o i n t e x p l i c i t l y 
when, f o r example, he comes to examine the f a i l u r e of the Dorian League 
i n the Laws. 
The basis of the league was mutual assistance (Cf A r i s t o t l e , 1280a f f . ) • 
Here, the Athenian speaks s i m i l a r l y of the purpose of the league and the 
basis of government i n each member p o l i s . The end, e i t h e r o f the league 
or of the communities taken i n d i v i d u a l l y , consisted of pledges of mutual 
a i d . ( j ^ ^ t A c - ? * tptii $*crtkkvoft£*is ITo'Xtrc tyuccuj Xyorw uMijXotf etdc-ff 
/ULC* voji/ovs ' 684A 2) . But f o r what ends? The d e s c r i p t i o n about covenants 
and pledges at the beginning of the Athenian's discussion ( I b i d . ) would 
appear to be a statement about honourable i n t e n t i o n s between kings and 
peoples ((Zfpcrti/ . . . ^ nj&^r^iu St fZ<A<ri\ys n fl«ir<X(Zo-tv kfcuovs 
tUc Sjjvais uut S^jji/oc t^poLi AUt (h^rtXti/nv tift^<n/j/(**is :684AB) . But the end 
of b oth the a l l i a n c e and the communities was e f f i c i e n c y i n warfare (685E) 
and the o b j e c t of attainment most h i g h l y praised was p o l i t i c a l power (687AB) 
The Athenian goes on to say t h a t p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s which have only the 
l a t t e r as t h e i r end are not s u f f i c i e n t to engendering the whole of v i r t u e 
(688B) . The b i l a t e r a l agreements (^p<m/ ZAXyXoti ) o f which he speaks 
have, then, the same i m p l i c a t i o n s i n respect of the ends of p o l i t i c a l l i f e 
as has the n o t i o n of fjvOJjtaj as described by A r i s t o t l e : these are covenants 
f o r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y alone. 
I n r e j e c t i n g the n o t i o n t h a t p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n has p r o t e c t i o n f o r 
m i l i t a r y purposes as a c h i e f end, the Athenian also r e j e c t s the view t h a t 
the a c q u i s i t i o n of wealth i s a c h i e f end of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . (687B) . The 
purpose of the present d i s c u s s i o n , i s , i n f a c t , to a s c e r t a i n the true basis 
of p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n , the t r u e desires of men which the p o l i s ought to 
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embody (687B - 85A). P l a t o has asserted t h a t j u s t i c e can be seen a t the 
obvious l e v e l of m a t e r i a l need. But we have seen t h a t he supposes t h a t 
s o c i e t i e s f a i l to achieve t h e i r t r u e aim i f they hold m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y 
to be man's greate s t concern. Here, i n the Laws passages we are now 
discussing, he r a i s e s , i n conjunc t i o n w i t h the league's f a i l u r e , the 
question of men's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s i n s o c i e t i e s whose ends 
are wholly m a t e r i a l . I n beholding a l a r g e and powerful o b j e c t - the armed 
might, say, of a community - would not knowledge o f i t s use make a man 
happy and successful (686E)? Would not such knowledge win p r a i s e , great 
w e a l t h , and d i s t i n c t i o n (87E)? I n r e j e c t i n g the view t h a t m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y 
or p r o s p e r i t y are s u f f i c i e n t to the ends of p o l i t i c a l l i f e , P l a t o , s i m i l a r l y 
as A r i s t o t l e , i s r e j e c t i n g a concept put by many of the Sophists, a concept 
which provided an answer i n terms of men's m a t e r i a l desires to the questions: 
what are the ends o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e ? what i s the basis o f p o l i t i c a l 
o b l i g a t i o n ? The f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the So p h i s t i c answers w i l l become 
c l e a r i n the next chapters. Here, I wish only to provide an o u t l i n e of 
the place of the S o p h i s t i c answer i n Greek p o l i t i c a l thought and i n d i c a t e 
the challenge Plato puts to i t . 
At Laws 690B, i n the Athenian's discussion of what Saunders has c a l l e d 
the Seven T i t l e s to A u t h o r i t y , the Athenian s t a t e s t h a t i t i s according 
to nature (MJC* £i/<rtf ) t h a t the strong should r u l e the weak. He means by 
t h i s t h a t u n s k i l l e d or ignor a n t men ( e o i / Urtirur ty'^oi/ei ) should submit to 
the r u l e and the lead of prudent and wise men f£ f c ^ ) . He states 
Trevor J. Saunders, t r a n s . Plato The Laws, (Penguin, 1970), p 137 
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t h a t t h i s n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n amounts to the r u l e of law wi t h o u t force over 
w i l l i n g subjects (. . . AXf i £i/*r(V C^ 'i/ ceZ vej/ev fHs'i/cutt/ *fy»/yV ^<U' o\> 
fiioicou n t^t/nJini/) . ^  This statement, i n s i s t i n g t h a t the strong and prudent 
should r u l e , q u a l i f i e s an e a r l i e r statement(684C): t h a t most men b e l i e v e 
t h a t law-givers should enact laws which people accept w i l l i n g l y . By the 
strong and prudent the Athenian obviously means, i n the context of the 
passages we are now considering, men who are not ignorant i n respect of 
the greatest human i n t e r e s t s (688C 8 ) ; t h a t i s , men who do not regard 
m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y as s u f f i c i e n t to the o r i g i n and the ends of p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e . This conception envisages accord between reason and a p p e t i t e i n the 
i n d i v i d u a l , between the r u l e of law and the obedience of subjects i n the 
g 
p o l i s . This d o c t r i n e opposes current f o r m u l a t i o n s of the phusis-nomos 
c o n t r a r i e t y . 
A common f o r m u l a t i o n of the c o n t r a r i e t y presupposed a d i s c o n t i n u i t y 
between phusis, an u l t i m a t e moral law, and nomos, the conventional or 
a r t i f i c i a l m o r a l i t y of the p o l i s . I t regarded the p o l i s as permanently 
r i v e n between two c o n f l i c t i n g moral laws. Nomos, i f thus regarded, - as 
conventional m o r a l i t y - was i n t e r p r e t e d as standing f o r the moral c o n v i c t -
ions of o r d i n a r y men. Phusis, on the other hand,was regarded as a moral 
i d e a l opposed to received, customary, n o t i o n s . The theory held t h a t nomos 
concealed moral t r u t h , t h a t i t concealed a b r u t e f a c t of nature: t h a t 
those d i s a f f e c t e d by the m o r a l i t y of o r d i n a r y men ought to be given 
^ The connotation of AAei. ^ J<rtv . . . Te^vKi^l*i> i s t h a t r u l e by some of 
the others i s : ( 1 ) , n a t u r a l ; ( 2 ) , t h a t r u l e , and s u b j e c t i o n to r u l e , do 
not e s s e n t i a l l y imply men's u n w i l l i n g s u b j e c t i o n to 'the s t r o n g ' . Subject-
i o n to the r u l e of others r a t h e r i m p l i e s the subjects' b e l i e f t h a t they 
stand to r e a l i z e t h e i r i n t e r e s t s under the r u l e of the st r o n g and prudent. 
Here, the Athenian c u r t l y r e j e c t s both the a r i s t o c r a t i c , h e r o i c theory and the theo 
t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s a r t i f i c i a l , having no moral sanction "according 
to nature". (See pp 18 f f . ) 
g 
Cf 698AB, and n 1 i n Loeb ed. pp 208, 209. 
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p o l i t i c a l power and r u l e i n t h e i r own r i g h t . Heroic men, r a t h e r than be 
subject to conventional moral p r a c t i c e , should i n f a c t r u l e by r i g h t of 
nature (Cf Ch 11 n 12). The p o l i s should be adapted to t h e i r needs. 
These needs, though approved by natu r e , are no d i f f e r e n t from the needs 
of l e s s e r men. They are i n f a c t m a t e r i a l needs. Men d i f f e r , however, 
i n t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e and a b i l i t y . The m a j o r i t y of men, who are only 
strong as a c o l l e c t i v i t y , should give way to men who are t h e i r own masters. 
I f the p o l i s were adapted to the needs of the l a t t e r i t would then e x i s t 
according to nature. Conventional m o r a l i t y would be seen as an unnatural 
contrivance i s s u i n g from the covenants of weak men who conceal, by t h e i r 
p r a i se o f e q u a l i t y , t h e i r r e a l i n t e n t i o n s i n so doing - t h e i r i n a b i l i t y 
to be independent masters of t h e i r own wants. We may regard t h i s concept-
i o n as the paradigm of an a r i s t o c r a t i c theory which opposed the law of 
nature to the laws of conventional m o r a l i t y , which opposed phusis to nomos. 
But nomos was o f t e n conceived w i t h o u t reference to an i d e a l of t r u e , n a t u r a l 
m o r a l i t y . We may c a l l the l a t t e r the p r u d e n t i a l conception. I t regarded 
nomos as the product of a l l p ossible moral tenets and a l l p o s sible value 
tenets which o v e r t l y approve moral a c t i o n , the r i g h t regard of others. 
Consequently, i t made no d i s t i n c t i o n , based on nature as a moral and 
v a l u a t i v e r e f e r e n t , between one class of men - heroes, say, - and another, 
- o r d i n a r y men. The archetype of the theory i s not the hero of a r i s t o c r a t i c 
b e l i e f b u t the a d r o i t man, whoever he may be, who f e e l s 'bound' to regard 
others w e l l only so long as i t pays him, m a t e r i a l l y , to do so. The a d r o i t , 
or prudent man of the theory does not suppose he i s bound i n conscience or 
i n n a t u r a l duty t o exercise r i g h t regard i f i t i s disadvantageous to do so. 
For him, j u s t i c e - r i g h t regard o f others - i s an intermediary b e n e f i t 
only: since men pr a i s e conventional respect f o r one another (as i n the 
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A r i s t o c r a t i c theory) from the want of s k i l l to be s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , i t i s 
the prudent man's o b j e c t t o seem to be j u s t w h i l e a t the same time convert-
i n g j u s t i c e (other-regard) to h i s favour at the expense of any who would 
impede him. Since p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s he l d t o have no n a t u r a l foundation 
which would b i n d men to be j u s t ( i n the absence of l e g a l c o n s t r a i n t s ) , 
since no moral onus behoves men to found p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y , then the p o l i s , 
as a community organized under p u b l i c c o n s t r a i n t s , i s described as having 
a d i s c r e t e o r i g i n i n time, being thought to a r i s e from m a t e r i a l necessity 
9 
alone (Cf n 4 supra). The c o r o l l a r y drawn by the theory's proponents i s 
that moral and p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n 'bind' men only c o n d i t i o n a l l y . That 
men are thus 'bound' to obey i s explained by p o s i t i n g a h y p o t h e t i c a l 
covenant i n the past. But the theory's r e a l p u r p o r t i s t h a t men are only 
r e q u i r e d to regard one another w e l l so long as i t i s m a t e r i a l l y necessary 
to do so: t h a t i s to say, the duty to respect others w e l l i s not a n a t u r a l 
o b l i g a t i o n . I t obtains only so long as there i s s u f f i c i e n t power to compel 
men's r i g h t regard o f one another, or only so long as there are s u f f i c i e n t 
m a t e r i a l grounds to make i t imprudent to disregard o t h e r s . The A r i s t o c r a t i c 
and P l a t o n i c t h e o r i e s both d i f f e r from t h i s conception i n seeing the present 
c o n d i t i o n of the p o l i s as perversion o f nature, both theories h o l d i n g 
phusis to be a moral r e f e r e n t . 
I n t h i s chapter we have r a i s e d the general question, on what grounds 
di d P l a t o e x p l a i n p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n ? We have s a i d t h a t h i s answer r e s t s 
I t may be emphasized t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e , which 
Hooker c e r t a i n l y e x e m p l i f i e d ( i f he a l s o a n t i c i p a t e d Locke) a t t r i b u t e d 
the o r i g i n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e to man's response to a p r i o r moral r e q u i r e -
ment, as w e l l as to m a t e r i a l ( o r s o c i a l ) need. The p r u d e n t i a l conception 
which we have described above assumes t h a t m o r a l i t y per se i s a product 
of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l l i f e . 
on a t e l e o l o g i c a l conception of man's i n t e r e s t s . We have emphasized 
tha t t h i s conception, as developed by P l a t o , does not assume a d i s t i n c t i o n 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the l a t e r c o n t r a c t u a l theory, between n a t u r a l and 
p o s i t i v e law, a d i s t i n c t i o n which, i n i t s i n c e p t i o n , p o s i t e d a r a d i c a l 
cleavage between man's moral and p o l i t i c a l l i v e s . We have shown t h a t 
he does not assume t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e has a d i s c r e t e o r i g i n i n time, a 
conception ( w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e noted) which i s common to the l a t e r 
c o n t r a c t u a l theory and t o the theory of co n t r a c t c u r r e n t i n h i s own time. 
Plato's major concern i s the e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i s conceived as i n t e g r a l 
to the l i f e o f man. Here, he takes exception to the Sop h i s t i c view t h a t 
man's only ends are m a t e r i a l , t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e may be a t t r i b u t e d to 
m a t e r i a l necessity and has only m a t e r i a l needs as i t s ends. The question 
which h i s own theory poses to the Sop h i s t i c view i s t h i s : i f we do not 
assume t h a t some moral or n a t u r a l sanction u n d e r l i e s the founding of and 
the continued l i f e of a given community, then on what basis can we e x p l a i n 
p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n ? The m a t e r i a l i s t answer, as i t comes to us from h i s 
dialogues, was, t h a t coercion e x t e r n a l to the i n d i v i d u a l together w i t h the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s m a t e r i a l needs are s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r obedience 
to law. By t h i s , the theory i m p l i e d t h a t r i g h t regard of others i s 
contingent. I t i s not u n c o n d i t i o n a l . Right regard of others i s re q u i r e d 
of a man only i f i t would be m a t e r i a l l y imprudent to act w i t h d i s r e g a r d . 
The theory t h e r e f o r e h e l d t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e , understood as an e f f e c t o f 
men's w i l l i n g n e s s to obey laws of supposed advantage to a l l , i s ( u l t i m a t e l y ) 
not i n t e g r a l to the l i f e o f the t r u l y successful man."^ This i s so because 
the l a t t e r , a d r o i t l y a c t i n g to secure h i s advantage, f i n a l l y becomes 
While i t i s true t h a t philosophers are s a i d i n the Republic to have a 
l i f e b e t t e r than the p o l i t i c a l l i f e (520C f f . ) , i t i s not true t h a t they 
can achieve t h i s l i f e w i t h o u t belonging to the i d e a l community or w i t h o u t 
m a i n t a i n i n g , by t h e i r r u l e , a s o c i e t y i n which the i n t e r e s t s of the oth e r 
two classes are r e a l i z e d . (Ch I V ) . 
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the source of law. J u s t i c e becomes h i s good and an intermediary advantage 
or a disadvantage to others. (Cf Republic 365A f f . ) . I n chall e n g i n g t h i s 
conception P l a t o places a l l of h i s emphasis on the question of man's needs, 
developing h i s own view from t h a t of Socrates who, as the Apology and 
the C r i t o c o n f i r m , b e l i e v e d t h a t i t must pay a man to obey what law t r u l y 
e n j o i n s : to regard others w e l l even i f one's m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s go f o r f e i t . 
This conception would s a t i s f y Plato's own b e l i e f s about the t r u l y j u s t men. 
However, since i t d i d not take account of a form of p o l i t i c a l l i f e t h a t 
would p e r f e c t a l l of man's needs, i t only served as a p o i n t of departure 
f o r Plato's f i n a l theory of consent to law. I n the next chapter we s h a l l 
devote our a t t e n t i o n to Socrates' theory of the good or worthy man - the 
t r u l y j u s t man - and the t r u l y j u s t man's consent to law. 
* * * 
We may complete t h i s chapter by commenting b r i e f l y on the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t 
theory and P l a t o n i c p o l i t i c a l thought. I have sa i d t h a t Plato's theory i s 
e v o l u t i o n a r y and not c o n t r a c t u a l , (p 5 supra) We have emphasized t h a t the 
c o n t r a c t u a l theory of post a n t i q u i t y p o s i t e d n a t u r a l law as the moral 
basis of p o l i t i c a l community. The existence of p o l i t i c a l community there-
f o r e i m p l i e d , as i t s necessary c o n d i t i o n , men's sense of moral onus. The 
foundation of p o l i t i c a l community was seen to be a response to d i v i n e w i l l 
and a response to men's s o c i a l needs. We have said t h a t the n o t i o n of 
c o n t r a c t , as i t developed i n a n t i q u i t y , was explained on the basis of a 
supposed dichotomy between men's o v e r t approval of j u s t i c e and t h e i r inner 
i n t e n t i o n s , between what they were 'bound' by nomos to do - regard one 
another w e l l - and t h e i r r e a l b e l i e f , t h a t j u s t i c e was only an intermediary 
advantage to the agent, i t s p r a c t i c e being contingent on m a t e r i a l 
considerations. We s h a l l discuss t h i s conception more f u l l y i n the next 
chapter i n connection w i t h Socrates' conception of a man's i n t e r e s t s and 
a man's duty t o obey law. But the problem i t s e l f would r e s u l t i n a 
tendency i n some p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s t o i d e a l i z e the n o t i o n of c o n t r a c t 
along P l a t o n i c l i n e s . I t w i l l be u s e f u l to make a few remarks about t h i s 
matter here. 
I n c r i t i c i z i n g the n o t i o n of c o n t r a c t as explained by the phusis-nomos 
c o n t r a r i e t y , Barker s a i d : 
"Laws are v a l i d because they enshrine the w i l l of the members of 
a community to do what they f e e l they ought to do. They are 
s t r o n g , not i n p r o p o r t i o n to the force ready to execute them, 
but i n p r o p o r t i o n to the amount of readiness to obey them." 
(my i t a l i c s ) . ^ 
I n c r i t i c i s m of Barker, Popper saw t h i s statement as an o b j e c t i o n to 
the c o n t r a c t theory. He asked: 
"What can be meant by i t ? The theory attacked stresses the ' w i l l ' , 
o r b e t t e r , the d e c i s i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l , more than any other 
theory; i n f a c t , the word 'contract' suggests an agreement by 
'free w i l l ' ; i t suggests, perhaps more than any other theory, 
t h a t the s t r e n g t h of the laws l i e s i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s readiness 
to accept them. How can [ t h i s , 3 [Barker's statement} be an 
o b j e c t i o n against the c o n t r a c t theory? The only explanation seems 
to be t h a t Barker does not t h i n k the c o n t r a c t to s p r i n g from the 
'moral w i l l ' of the i n d i v i d u a l , b u t r a t h e r from a s e l f i s h w i l l ; 
and t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the more l i k e l y as i t i s i n keeping 
w i t h Plato's c r i t i c i s m . " (my i t a l i c s ) . ^ 
Barker was a t t a c k i n g the n o t i o n of c o n t r a c t as we f i n d i t i n Glaucon's 
statement (Republic 359A f f . ) , where the covenant made by men e n t a i l s the 
c o n s t r a i n t which men impose upon themselves f o r m a t e r i a l reasons alone. 
Popper wondered why the n o t i o n of c o n t r a c t must be regarded s o l e l y i n 
these terms. He saw ' c o n t r a c t ' i n terms of " p r o t e c t i o n i s m " ( I b i d . ) , 
Earnest Barker, MA.., Greek P o l i t i c a l Theory, Plato and His 
Predecessors, (London, 1918) p 161. 
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i n v o l v i n g the p r o t e c t i o n of the r i g h t s of the weak against the str o n g . 
I t i s t r u e t h a t Barker only spoke of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t i n conjunct i o n 
w i t h the view t h a t Glaucon expresses. I t may perhaps seem t h a t what he 
said was intended as a general a t t a c k on the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory. The 
p o i n t he was drawing a t t e n t i o n to was the conception of j u s t i c e as 
ex t e r n a l regimen onl y , together w i t h the i n f e r e n c e , drawn by the p r u d e n t i a l -
i s t s , t h a t j u s t i c e has no place i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r n a l l i f e (Cf. 
Popper, Op.Cit. n 46 p 261). Barker was r e f e r r i n g to Plato's i d e a l 
conception of j u s t i c e : t h a t the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e t r u l y pays a man. I n 
t h i s , he was opposing the p r u d e n t i a l conception. (That i s , he was opposing 
p r u d e n t i a l i s m qua materialism.) Elsewhere, Barker has made the f o l l o w i n g , 
more systematic statement about the c o n t r a c t u a l n o t i o n : 
"There must always be something i n the nature of an organized 
community - i n other words, a p o t e n t i a l body of sub j e c t s , already 
cohering i n v i r t u e o f a common s o c i a l w i l l , as w e l l as a p o t e n t i a l 
r u l e r ready to assume the burden of government i n agreement w i t h 
t h a t w i l l - before there can be any con t r a c t between r u l e r s and 
sub j e c t s . " ^•3( my i t a l i c s . ) 
Barker i s saying t h a t a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t or co n t r a c t of s o c i e t y i s a wider 
n o t i o n than t h a t of governmental or p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t s , the l a t t e r 
p u r p o r t i n g to s p e c i f i c agreements between r u l e r s and subjects. The 
con t r a c t of s o c i e t y i s the necessary c o n d i t i o n of t h i s . P o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , 
to be l e g i t i m a t e , must be assumed to have been in v e s t e d . I t s investment 
i m p l i e s a moral san c t i o n . Barker goes on t o say: 
"We must t h e r e f o r e h o l d , i f we are t h i n k i n g i n terms of c o n t r a c t , 
t h a t besides the c o n t r a c t of government, there i s also a contr a c t 
of s o c i e t y , a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t proper ... We s h a l l t h e r e f o r e say 
th a t the co n t r a c t of government creates potestas, b u t only potestas; 
we s h a l l say t h a t the co n t r a c t of s o c i e t y creates societas i t s e l f ; 
and, we s h a l l recognize t h a t sbcietas i s greater than potestas, or 
at any r a t e p r i o r to potestas."14 ( h i s i t a l i c s ) . 
S i r Earnest Barker, S o c i a l Contract Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau, 
(London, 1971) p x i i 
I b i d . 
Now, what Barker has sai d both here and above i s , on the face of i t , a t 
l e a s t compatible w i t h the statement i n Greek P o l i t i c a l Theory t h a t Popper 
queried. We must take Barker's c r i t i c i s m there t o be d i r e c t e d against 
those who have used the c o n t r a c t n o t i o n as though no moral sanction 
preceded the founding of a p o l i t i c a l community. I n h i s l a t e r remarks,he 
defined a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t p r o p e r l y conceived. He st a t e d t h a t a duty to 
obey laws (what the presence of potestas would s i g n i f y ) could be conceived 
as v a l i d only i f we assumed a sense of moral w i l l , o r , t h a t i s , a s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t t o begin with."'""' Popper's resentment a t Barker's e a r l i e r statement 
r e a l l y bears on a supposed, o u t r i g h t r e j e c t i o n of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory 
conceived as a necessary assumption toward e x p l a i n i n g the l e g i t i m a c y of 
some form o f r u l e , i n favour of an idealism t h a t u n f a i r l y assumes the moral 
i n c a p a c i t y of or d i n a r y men. Popper holds t h a t the idea o f s o c i a l c o n t r a c t 
i s i n i m i c a l to any p o l i t i c a l conception ( l i k e those of C a l l i c l e s , o r, i n 
h i s o p i n i o n , P l a to) which i n f a c t favours the w e l l - b e i n g of some as against 
So f a r as t h i s goes, Plato's conception of p r i m i t i v e communities 
(See above) could be s a i d to i n v o l v e the idea of ' s o c i a l c o n t r a c t ' , 
i f , by t h i s expression we imply "a p o t e n t i a l body of sub j e c t s , 
already cohering i n v i r t u e of a common s o c i a l w i l l , . . ." (above). 
A s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , so de f i n e d , would u n d e r l i e Plato's theory of 
so c i e t y even i f men have never caught s i g h t of the i d e a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
But we have seen t h a t Plato's conception does not make use o f the 
s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory i n order to p o s i t a c a t e g o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between 'socie t y ' and ' p o l i t i c a l ' s o c i e t y . I n Hooker, f o r example, 
the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t may be described as i n v o l v i n g both what n a t u r a l 
law requires as a r e s u l t of the F a l l and a man's sense of the need 
of f e l l o w s h i p w i t h o t h e r s . This conception p o s i t s a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n 
between 'socie t y ' and ' p o l i t i c a l ' s o c i e t y . 
Here we may note w i t h Guthrie t h a t i t i s misleading to speak 
of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory. The n o t i o n of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , a t 
l e a s t as Barker discussed i t , i s amenable both t o Pl a t o and, say, 
to Hooker. What i s r e a l l y a t issue between Popper and Barker i s 
the l a t t e r ' s sympathy w i t h P l a t o n i c i d e a l i s m ( o r h i s t o r i c i s m ) and 
the former's suspicion of i t , and not whether the one accepts and 
the other r e j e c t s the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory. (See W.K.C. Guthrie, 
The Sophists, (Cambridge, 1971) p 142, n 1. 
t h a t of others on the erroneous p r e t e x t t h a t there are n a t u r a l subjects 
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and r u l e r s . But l e t us, f o r the moment, take the meaning of ' s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t ' , i n a wider sense. Let us suppose, as Barker would seem 
i m p l i c i t l y to have supposed i n Greek P o l i t i c a l Theory, t h a t ' s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t ' i s a wide enough expression to i n c l u d e , say, a sense of moral 
onus t h a t would have to precede the founding of Plato's i d e a l s t a t e . By 
doing t h i s , we s h a l l see more c l e a r l y what i s i m p l i c i t i n the n o t i o n of 
s o c i a l c o n t r a c t as conceived on an i d e a l p l a i n . By doing t h i s we s h a l l 
c l a r i f y the sense i n which Plato's theory, w h i l e i t may be s a i d t o i n v o l v e 
the idea of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t i n i t s widest p o s s i b l e sense, i s e v o l u t i o n a r y 
and not c o n t r a c t u a l . " ^ 
Let us b r i e f l y consider, then, the idea of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , the n o t i o n 
of i d e a l i s m , and the n o t i o n of the regimen imposed on men which p o l i t i c a l 
community e n t a i l s . 
This c r i t e r i o n would also be required by John Rawls, who defines 
the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t ( t h e " o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n " or the " v e i l of ignorance") 
i n terms of a h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n d i t i o n i n which no a p r i o r i assumptions 
can be made as to n a t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s ( d i f f e r e n c e s , say, between n a t u r a l 
r u l e r s and subjects) among the p a r t i e s to an agreement t h a t would found 
a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y . See John Rawls, A Theory of J u s t i c e , (London, 1972) , 
p p l l f f . 
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We s h a l l remember t h a t the p r u d e n t i a l i s t s d i d not h o l d t h a t moral 
onus i s p r i o r to p o l i t i c a l community. (Cf p 18 f . supra). On t h e i r view, 
then, moral onus could not precede the founding of a given community. 
For t h i s reason, the n o t i o n of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , as defined by Barker, 
may be said t o be assumed i n Plato's p o l i t i c a l theory. The p r u d e n t i a l i s t s 
could not assume a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , however, f o r they regarded nomos as 
the product of a l l possible moral and v a l u a t i v e tenets which o v e r t l y 
approve moral a c t i o n , the r i g h t regard of others ( I b i d . ) . But t h a t i m p l i e d 
t h a t no man was bound by nature or by conscience to regard others w e l l . 
Where, then, would be Popper's necessary 'moral w i l l ' o r , f o r t h a t matter, 
Barker's societas? P l a t o may assume t h a t there are n a t u r a l r u l e r s and 
s u b j e c t s , but he does not assume w i t h the p r u d e n t i a l i s t s t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
community owes everything to nomos and nothing to phusis - nothing, t h a t 
i s , to a n a t u r a l w i l l . 
We may consider, t o begin w i t h , the Augustinian element i n Hooker. 
I f p o l i t i c a l l i f e d i d n ot e x i s t o r i g i n a l l y , b u t i t s necessity arose from 
18 some d i s c r e t e event, then p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y must be seen to be invested. 
I t was w i t h i n t h i s frame of reference, r a t h e r than one which sees p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e as a timeless f e a t u r e of human l i f e , t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l ( C h r i s t i a n ) 
theory moved. I f , moreover, man's u l t i m a t e end i s the regeneration of 
hi s nature and i f p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s only a moment i n t h i s regenerative 
need, then p o l i t i c a l community could not i t s e l f be thought s u f f i c i e n t to 
the f i n a l attainment of man's ends. Hooker i n f e r r e d from t h i s hypothesis 
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t h a t p o l i t i c a l regimen p r i m a r i l y orders men's e x t e r n a l l i v e s . 
18 
"Laws they are not th e r e f o r e which p u b l i c approbation hath not made 
so. £For only God has o r i g i n a l and f i n a l a u t h o r i t y over men. See next 
note .J But approbation they not only give who p e r s o n a l l y declare t h e i r 
assent . . ., but also when others do i t i n t h e i r names by r i g h t o r i g i n a l l y 
a t l e a s t derived from them." Op. C i t . p 194. 
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The f i n a l ends of man are described by Hooker i n terms of the 
rewards and punishments due the inner man and rendered by God. "Now 
rewards and punishments do always presuppose something w i l l i n g l y done 
w e l l or i l l ; w i t h o u t which respect though we may sometimes receive good 
or harm, y e t then the one i s a b e n e f i t and not a reward, the other 
simply a h u r t b u t not a punishment." p 188. His o b j e c t ( I b i d , and f o i l . ) 
i s to determine how men came to have the power o f reward and punishment 
over one another i n e x t e r n a l actions (p 187). So f a r as a man's inward 
l i f e i s concerned, we can only look to reward and punishment from God 
( I b i d . ) . Consequently, the laws of a Commonweal (p 188) are, he says, 
"ordained f o r e x t e r n a l order and regiment amongst man." ( I b i d . ) . Such 
laws ( p o s i t i v e laws) are only " p e r f e c t " i f they presume the inn e r 
obstinacy of man. But they are designed "so as t o frame h i s outward 
a c t i o n s , t h a t they be of no hinderance unto the common good f o r which 
s o c i e t i e s are i n s t i t u t e d . " ( I b i d . ) . Hooker, then, presumes both the 
c o r r u p t i o n of nature and he also sees p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y as the means 
(though not the end) towards man's w e l l - b e i n g , o r , we might say, h i s 
inward w e l l - b e i n g . Hooker i s im p l y i n g i n a l l of t h i s t h a t a man's 
outward acts are s u f f i c i e n t evidence t h a t the man consents to law. This 
i s to be i n f e r r e d from h i s view of man's f i n a l ends, though he also 
holds t h a t i t i s a f u n c t i o n of p o s i t i v e laws t o enable a man to see 
hi s n a t u r a l d u t i e s more c l e a r l y than he would do i n a s t a t e of nature. 
(P 192) . 
I t i s q u i t e c l e a r from Barker's w r i t i n g s t h a t he wished to prescind 
the n o t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n from the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory. He has 
i m p l i e d , r a t h e r , t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between 'moral w i l l ' and ' p o l i t i c a l 
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a u t h o r i t y ' (societas and potestas) i s , r e a l l y , a l o g i c a l one. I t i s 
not one which l i t e r a l l y p o s i t s a n a t u r a l epoch from which men are assumed 
21 
suddently to have emerged. The d i s t i n c t i o n , when seen i n t h i s l i g h t , 
i s one which avoids p o s i t i n g a d i s c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l event as though t h a t 
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were the o r i g i n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I t emphasizes, r a t h e r , the assumption 
we must make i f , i n supposing p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y to be ' l e g i t i m a t e ' , 
(and i n assuming, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t men have undertaken to obey laws) , we do 
not mean t h a t i t o r i g i n a t e s w i t h o u t a p r i o r moral sanction and i s maintained 
23 
by compulsion alone. The s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory maintains, then, 
(d e s p i t e d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view among i t s proponents), t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e i m p l i e s moral w i l l , t h a t l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y i m p l i e s a moral sanc t i o n . 
We cannot, then, speak of the o r i g i n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e (on the s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t hypothesis) w i t h o u t assuming men's sense of moral o b l i g a t i o n to 
begin w i t h . I t was f o r these reasons t h a t we saw t h a t Plato could be 
regarded as one whose p o l i t i c a l theory involves the idea of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t . 
Barker, i m p l i c i t l y a t any r a t e , so regarded him. We have used Richard 
Hooker's work as the paradigm f o r our e x p l a n a t i on of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
C h r i s t i a n n o t i o n . We have seen t h a t i n Hooker an h i s t o r i c a l f a c t i s c l e a r l y 
20 
I t i s Barker's r e j e c t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l hypothesis which explains 
h i s apparent dismi s s a l of c o n t r a c t u a l t h i n k i n g i n Greek P o l i t i c a l Theory. 
Here, I take exception to Guthrie's view t h a t i n t h a t work Barker was 
i n f a c t dismissing the theory of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t even i f he uses the 
expression i n reference to the theory t h a t Glaucon puts a t Republic 359A f f . 
(See Guthrie, Op.Cit.) 
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See Barker's c r i t i c i s m of Rousseau, S o c i a l Contract, p x x x i i f . 
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See R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozeley, Plato's Republic, a P h i l o s o p h i c a l 
Commentary, (London, 1964) pp 71 f f . 
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See H.A. P r i c h a r d , "Green; P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n " , i n Moral O b l i g a t i o n 
and Duty and Interest,(London, 1968), pp 54 f f . esp. pp 76 f f . 
present. But t h i s was r e q u i r e d by the assumption t h a t the need f o r 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e arose as much from a d i s c r e t e (moral) event i n the l i f e 
of man - the F a l l - as from s o c i a l necessity. I t i s inherent to t h i s 
conception t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s not a timeless f e a t u r e of human l i f e . 
But having assumed t h i s much and having t h e r e f o r e worked from an h i s t o r i c a l 
hypothesis, Hooker was then c h i e f l y concerned to e x p l a i n the l e g i t i m a c y of 
p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i n any given s t a t e on the basis t h a t n a t u r a l law (a 
moral law) was the p r i o r requirement of men's a u t h o r i t y over one another. 
We have seen t h a t i n Hooker's case, since men's f i n a l ends are not 
p o l i t i c a l , the n o t i o n of an i d e a l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i s not germane to h i s 
conception of consent. We have seen t h a t f o r t h i s same reason Hooker 
bel i e v e d t h a t p o s i t i v e laws - the laws of p o l i t i c a l community - p r i m a r i l y 
order men's e x t e r n a l l i v e s . We have also emphasized t h a t i n h i s case a 
man's outward acts are s u f f i c i e n t evidence of a man's consent to law, or 
of h i s consent to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . 
Plato's and Hooker's conceptions are both t e l e o l o g i c a l . Both b e l i e v e , 
t h a t i s to say, t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s r e q u i r e d of man's moral nature. This 
b e l i e f , so f a r as i t p e r t a i n s to p o l i t i c a l consent, i m p l i e s i n both cases 
t h a t consent i s confirmatory. This means, i n Plato's case, t h a t consent 
to the laws of the n a t u r a l p o l i s would confirm a p r i o r o b l i g a t i o n : men's 
duty to submit to a c e r t a i n form of r u l e , the i d e a l s t a t e . Since t h i s 
form of r u l e would complete or p e r f e c t human nature Plato's conception of 
consent i s i d e a l and e v o l u t i o n a r y (Cf. p 5, p 11 n 5 supra). I n Hooker's 
case, p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i s necessary as a means to the attainment of ends 
conceived not to be p o l i t i c a l ; though p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i s n a t u r a l (as 
being r e q u i r e d by n a t u r a l law) , i t i s also the case t h a t i t does not complete 
human ends. Since, a l s o , men are req u i r e d from the F a l l t o submit 
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themselves to p o l i t i c a l regimen, consent th e r e f o r e ( a s i n Plato's case) 
imp l i e s a c o n f i r m a t i o n : by e s t a b l i s h i n g p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and t h e r e a f t e r 
consenting t o i t , men confirm t h e i r knowledge of what d i v i n e w i l l r e q u i r e s . 
But so f a r as p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y does not complete human ends, to t h a t extent 
Hooker's p o s i t i o n i s not i d e a l . Though h i s p o s i t i o n i s not i d e a l , we have 
observed t h a t i t i s h i s t o r i c a l . But so f a r as p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y a r i s e s i n 
time i n response to some p r i o r event, t o t h a t e x t e n t Hooker's conception 
i s not e v o l u t i o n a r y . For Hooker, time i s not a g r i d on which we can trace 
man's attempts to b r i n g a f i n a l p o l i t i c a l order i n t o being. For him, time 
i s less than the whole of man's l i f e . Man's i n s t i t u t i o n s , confined by time, 
are not s u f f i c i e n t t o the sum of h i s ends. For these reasons Hooker had 
to emphasize, as P l a t o need not have, t h a t men would be bound by moral law 
24 
even i f there were no p o l i t i c a l community. The c o n d i t i o n of man, a f t e r 
the F a l l , must be a moral one. I t must be a c o n d i t i o n t h a t supplies the 
grounds, o r , t h a t i s , the ba s i s of o r i g i n , of a duty to obey the laws of 
any given s t a t e . I n p o s i t i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and p o s i t i v e 
law, i n supposing t h a t man's ends cannot be completed or p e r f e c t e d by 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e , Hooker's conception i s c o n t r a c t u a l and not e v o l u t i o n a r y . 
What he shares i n common w i t h Plato i s h i s confirmatory n o t i o n of p o l i t i c a l 
consent. Consent i m p l i e s men's c o n f i r m a t i o n of a moral onus. 
We have, s a i d i n reference to the Sophists ( t h e p r u d e n t i a l i s t s ) t h a t 
nomos - moral or p o l i t i c a l custom - was thought to be the product of men's 
"The laws which have been h i t h e r t o mentioned ( t h e laws of man's 
nature) do b i n d men a b s o l u t e l y even as they are men, although they 
have no s e t t l e d f e l l o w s h i p , never any solemn agreement amongst 
themselves what to do or not to do." (Ec P o l . , pp 187-88). 
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o v e r t approval of moral a c t i o n (p 18, p 25 n 17 supra). This d i s t i n c t i o n 
between men's outward approval of laws and t h e i r inner b e l i e f s i s of 
importance to the So c r a t i c theory of consent. I n Socrates' case the 
problem of consistency between outward a c t and inward b e l i e f would lead 
to a conception of true and nominal consent to law. We s h a l l deal f u l l y 
w i t h Socrates' view i n the next chapter. For now, we need only observe 
t h a t the supposed r i f t between the e x t e r n a l and the inward man would have 
an important bearing on the i d e a l i s m which characterizes Plato's theory of 
consent and h i s b e l i e f t h a t the n a t u r a l p o l i s would complete or p e r f e c t the 
needs of man. 
F i n a l l y , we may make the f o l l o w i n g observations about the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t 
and i d e a l i s m i n reference to an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s problem by H.D. Lewis. 
I n Lewis's opinion Plato's most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h e o r i e s underline those 
p r i n c i p l e s that are basic to the conception of a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t (p 80). 
" I t i s our duty - or i f not a duty at l e a s t an enlightened and 
elevated form o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t - to supply one another's needs, 
independently of the a r t i f i c i a l sanction imposed by the State. 
And t h i s i s a c l e a r r e p u d i a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l i s m of the 
soph i s t s . The claims of m o r a l i t y are seen to l i e deeper than 
mutual agreements, and s o c i e t y i s e n t i t l e d to our se r v i c e 
independently of our p r i v a t e convenience (The philosopher r u l e r s , 
f o r example, assume o f f i c e as a burden). But w h i l e t h i s proves 
tha t m o r a l i t y i t s e l f i s not rooted i n a c o n t r a c t , i t r e f l e c t s no 
d i s c r e d i t on the idea of a c o n t r a c t as the basic f e a t u r e of one 
s p e c i a l instrument f o r the promotion of moral ends, namely, the 
Sta t e . " ( I b i d , my i t a l i c s ) . 
I n the f i r s t place we must observe t h a t Lewis i s speaking of what Barker 
described as s o c i e t a s , or p r e - e x i s t i n g moral w i l l . But i t becomes c l e a r 
t h a t he i s also r e f e r r i n g to something l i k e a c o n t r a c t of government, or 
H. D. Lewis, "Plato and The S o c i a l Contract", Mind, 1939, 78-81 
a p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t , between r u l e r s and r u l e d i n the i d e a l s t a t e . 
Consequently (he suggests) the idea of p a r t n e r s h i p emerges as soon as 
Socrates enters upon the c o n s t r u c t i v e p a r t of the Republic; "Men 'gather 
i n t o one settlement many partners and helpers'. 'They exchange services 
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and goods."' ( h i s i t a l i c s ) . The idea of exchange already i m p l i e s an 
We must be chary of using the expressions " c o n t r a c t of government" 
or ' p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t ' i n reference to the s u b j e c t i o n of the subject 
classes to the r u l e r s i n the Republic. These expressions derive from 
medieval thought (Gough, Op.Cit. Ch 11) and r e f e r to mutual a f f i r m a t i o n s 
of e x i s t i n g r i g h t s and duties by peoples and p r i n c e s . They r e f e r , then, 
to the general conception u n d e r l y i n g medieval p o l i t i c a l thought (which 
we have seen r e f l e c t e d i n Hooker) t h a t since p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y does 
not e x i s t ab i n i t i o i t must be seen t o be i n v e s t e d . I t i s c l e a r , however, 
t h a t Plato's theory, which does not r e s t on a d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l 
and p o s i t i v e law, assumes t h a t some form of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y always 
e x i s t s . Moreover, i t i s also c l e a r t h a t the subject class of the Republic 
does not 'c o n t r a c t ' w i t h the r u l e r s on the basis of i n t e r e s t s already 
conceived to be i n being, or, t h a t i s , on the basis of i n t e r e s t s t h a t 
have not been p e r f e c t e d by a science or techne of r u l e . 
While emphasizing t h i s , we must note t h a t Plato's i d e a l s t a t e d i v i d e s , 
n a t u r a l l y , i n t o r u l e r s and subjects, a presupposition which he shares i n 
common w i t h medieval thought which assumed government to be s u i generis 
and which devised the n o t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t on the basis of t h i s 
assumption (Cf Barker, Social Contract, p x i v ) . We may f u r t h e r note t h a t 
the pledges between r u l e r s and r u l e d described i n the Laws are themselves 
much more akin to whatwecan c a l l a ' p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t ' w i t h o u t d i s t o r t i n g 
the pragmatic savour o f t h i s phrase. (Cf. re the Laws, Lewis, Op.Cit. p 79 
and Gough (Op . C i t . Ch 1.) Rankin sees the pledges of Laws 684A r a t h e r as a 
co n t r a c t " p r o v i d i n g f o r the o r d e r l y occupation of new lands", than as a 
governmental c o n t r a c t . (H.D. Rankin, Plato and the I n d i v i d u a l , (London, 
1974) , p 105. 
F i n a l l y we should observe t h a t Crossman spoke of the r e l a t i o n between 
r u l e r s and r u l e d i n the Republic almost as i f he saw a p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t 
underlying i t : " I n the eyes of the young P l a t o , there must always be a 
r u l i n g a r i s t o c r a c y and a sub j e c t people. The l a t t e r were the producers 
and d i s t r i b u t o r s of m a t e r i a l wealth The former had the p a t e r n a l 
care of the s t a t e a t h e a r t . L i v i n g on the labour of the subject masses, 
they gave them i n r e t u r n s e c u r i t y , j u s t i c e , and defence." (R.H.S. Crossman, 
Plato Today, (London, 1963), p 65. Cf. p 85). This d e s c r i p t i o n may w e l l 
be apt so long as we remember t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of subjects and r u l e r s 
are not conceived by P l a t o as e x i s t i n g ' n a t u r a l l y ' , b u t r a t h e r , as being 
p e r f e c t e d by a techne of r u l e . This conception, b a s i c to Plato's theory, 
i s not germane t o the medieval conception. Unless we are aware o f t h i s 
then the a p p l i c a t i o n of the ' p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t ' to Plato's theory i n the 
Republic i s very misleading. 
The quotes are from Lindsay's t r a n s l a t i o n . 
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e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t . These p o i n t s s t r u c k Lewis as u n d e r l i n i n g 
the f a c t t h a t Plato's i d e a l community would be a p a r t n e r s h i p . "The c i t y 
must be one i n the sense t h a t a l l i t s members acquiesce i n i t s government. 
As elsewhere i n Plato's thought, the p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y i s of paramount 
importance." ( h i s i t a l i c s ) . Plato's deepest concern i s the " v i t a l and 
l i v i n g u n i t y " which underlines human r e l a t i o n s h i p s . We f i n d embodied i n 
t h i s u n i t y "the c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e . . . . S i m i l a r l y , temperance 
which i s almost equated w i t h j u s t i c e , i s thus defined." ( h i s i t a l i c s ) . 
P l a t o answers the Sophists, on the question of i n d i v i d u a l i s m , i n terms 
of the p e r f e c t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l s o u l , a p e r f e c t i o n which " i s r e f l e c t e d 
i n the acquiescence i n a s o c i a l order whereby ( t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r f e c t i o n ) 
i s best a t t a i n e d . J u s t i c e i s ' w r i t l a r g e ' i n the c i t y . Hence the emphasis 
on f r e e and informed co-operation between r u l e r and s u b j e c t . " (p 81). 
F i n a l l y , w h i l e we allow t h a t the a u t h o r i t y of the r u l e r s i s absolute, we 
must not f o r g e t t h a t t h i s a u t h o r i t y " i s represented as derived from the 
subjects. The dependence of the former on the l a t t e r has always to be 
emphasized." ( I b i d . ) 
Lewis' conception of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , as i t applies to P l a t o n i c 
thought, i s obviously i d e a l i s t i c . He described the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t i n terms 
of Plato's e v o l u t i o n a r y theory: i n terms, t h a t i s , of the completion or 
p e r f e c t i o n of human needs and i n t e r e s t s . Together w i t h t h i s , he saw the 
most important p r i n c i p l e s of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory embodied i n Plato's 
c h i e f concern was " p o l i t i c a l freedom" ( I b i d . ) , h i s concept of a c i t y 
composed of " a l l i e s and he l p e r s " , not r u l e r s and slaves. The po i n t s a r i s i n g 
For the moral nuance of t h i s idea see A r i s t o t l e ' s Rhetoric i n Gough 
Op.Cit. 
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from Lewis' thoughts on P l a t o t h a t are of main i n t e r e s t to us are the 
conceptions of freedom which he sees embodied i n Plato's use of s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t theory, and a l s o , h i s observation t h a t p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i s 
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derived from the subjects of the i d e a l community. 
F i r s t , we may concentrate f o r a moment on the s e c t i o n from Lewis quoted 
above. Lewis, i n conformity w i t h s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h i n k i n g , has i m p l i e d 
t h a t a sense of moral w i l l must be presumed as l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to p o l i t i c a l 
o b l i g a t i o n . He has sai d t h a t duty ( o r some form of elevated i n t e r e s t ) 
e x i s t s independently of the a r t i f i c i a l sanctions of the s t a t e . But can we 
pr o p e r l y regard the sanctions of Plato's i d e a l s t a t e as ' a r t i f i c i a l ' as 
though i m p l y i n g a wider sphere of l i f e ? Here, we may r e c a l l the p o i n t made 
above (n 1Q). I f we grant t h a t the philosopher r u l e r s have a l i f e b e t t e r 
than the p o l i t i c a l l i f e we must also remember t h a t they cannot achieve 
t h i s l i f e unless they r u l e and the other classes consent to t h e i r r u l e . 
We may say, on these grounds, t h a t the i d e a l community i s only c o n t r i b u t o r y 
to the philosophers' ends. But membership of some one community - the 
i d e a l community - i s necessary to the achievement of these ends, w h i l e 
membership also completes the ends of the other two classes. We see f o r 
t h i s reason, and f o r the reasons which f o l l o w , t h a t the d o c t r i n e o f the 
sta t e ' s a r t i f i c i a l i t y i s not compatible w i t h Plato's theory, a theory 
which i s e v o l u t i o n a r y and not c o n t r a c t u a l . 
We have sa i d before now that i n Plato's view p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s an 
i n t e g r a l f e a t u r e of human nature, t h a t he does not conceive p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e as being a d i s c r e t e f e a t u r e of human h i s t o r y . So f a r as the l a t t e r 
We s h a l l consider t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t i n more d e t a i l i n Ch I I I . Here, 
I wish only to deal w i t h t h i s n o t i o n of d e r i v a t i o n w i t h s p e c i f i c reference 
to s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h i n k i n g . 
conception i s concerned, the s t a t e might be regarded as a r t i f i c i a l i n th a t 
the need f o r p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s thought to e x i s t , i n p a r t , as a consequence 
of some p r i o r act of man (the o r i g i n a l disobedience); but i t might also 
be regarded as n a t u r a l so f a r as n a t u r a l law impels men toward p o l i t i c a l 
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l i f e i n response t o t h e i r common s o c i a l needs. We have s a i d t h a t i n 
both Plato and Hooker the u l t i m a t e ground of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i e s i s 
t e l e o l o g i c a l , t h a t t h e i r d octrines of consent are confirmatory (pp 21,22 
supra). That means tha t f o r n e i t h e r t h i n k e r can p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , 
which i m p l i e s an undertaking l e g i t i m i z i n g p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , be a t t r i b u t -
ed wholly to human sanction, where, we mean by the l a t t e r , t h a t a duty to 
obey the laws of a given form of r u l e o r i g i n a t e s i n a human commitment 
31 
and does not t h e r e f o r e confirm a p r i o r moral requirement. Both assume 
a moral onus to begin w i t h and a sense of i n t e r e s t t h a t move men, i n Plato's 
case, toward the r e a l i z a t i o n of some one, i d e a l , form of r u l e , and, i n 
Hooker's case, toward the founding of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s which, owing 
to t h e i r l i m i t e d e f f e c t on human l i f e ( t h e outward regimen t h a t they impose), 
cannot complete or p e r f e c t human ends. For t h i s reason, the n o t i o n t h a t 
the s t a t e ' s sanction i s a r t i f i c i a l a p plies a p t l y to Hooker's t h i n k i n g , f o r 
h i s hypothesis i m p l i e s t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s of convenience to men though 
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i t cannot p e r f e c t t h e i r ends. Locke, indeed, would advance t h i s theory, 
30 
Hooker obviously h e l d t h i s to be the case. See f u r t h e r , Otto Gierke, 
P o l i t i c a l Theories of the Middle Age, t r a n s . F.W. Maitland (Cambridge,1968),p 89, 
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The n o t i o n t h a t p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n o r i g i n a t e s i n a human commitment 
t y p i f i e s Locke's t h i n k i n g . See i n f r a pp. 37 f f . 
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Hooker t e l l s us, on the one hand, t h a t " p u b l i c regiment . . . seemeth 
e v i d e n t l y to have r i s e n from d e l i b e r a t e advice, c o n s u l t a t i o n , and composition 
between men, j u d g i n g i t convenient and behoveful." (Cf. Gierke, Op.Clt.). 
He goes on to say t h a t there i s "no i m p o s s i b i l i t y i n nature considered by 
i t s e l f , b u t t h a t men might have l i v e d w i t h o u t p u b l i c regiment." 
(continued on page 35.) 
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a t t r i b u t i n g p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n to human commitment alone and r e l i n q u i s h i n g 
the t h e o l o g i c a l s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t men are re q u i r e d by God's w i l l to subj e c t 
themselves to p o l i t i c a l order, and thereby confirm God's w i l l by so doing. 
I n Locke, p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i m p l i e s a human undertaking as i t s necessary 
and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , w h i l e the law of nature requires men to honour 
whatever pacts they make. So long as we allow t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e does 
not f u l f i l human ends we may pr o p e r l y suppose t h a t the s t a t e ' s sanction 
i s a r t i f i c i a l , as f u r t h e r i n g though not completing human ends. Given t h a t 
we mean by t h i s t h a t the st a t e ' s sanctions imply a moral w i l l to begin w i t h , 
as the necessary c o n d i t i o n of those sanctions, then we must also prescind 
from the d o c t r i n e of the s t a t e ' s a r t i f i c i a l i t y the S o p h i s t i c hypothesis 
t h a t men are only 'bound' to obey laws from m a t e r i a l necessity, t h a t men 
are not bound to regard one another w e l l 'by nature'. However, i t i s mis-
lea d i n g to apply the conception of a r t i f i c i a l s a n c t i o n , as Lewis d i d , to 
P l a t o . He t e l l s us both t h a t the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory l i e s imbedded i n 
the e s s e n t i a l meaning o f Plato's p o l i t i c a l theory and t h a t the theory 
"emphasizes the u l t i m a t e a r t i f i c i a l i t y of the S t a t e . " (p 79). But Plato's 
conception i s p e r f e c t i o n i s t . He holds t h a t the moral onus whichmen.would 
confirm by s u b m i t t i n g t o the order of an i d e a l form of p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s , 
p r o p e r l y , compatible w i t h the p u r s u i t of ends which t h a t form of l i f e 
would complete. Here, p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s not conceived as a convenience 
which i s less than the sum of human ends (Cf. on note 10, p 20 supra). 
I t p e r f e c t s human ends. This f a c t u n d e r l i e s Plato's conception of the 
n a t u r a l p o l i s . So long as we regard the s t a t e as only c o n t r i b u t o r y t o 
32 (continued from page 34) 
But he then says t h a t we must presuppose the F a l l and the Law of 
Nature's requirement of p u b l i c regiment, (p 191). To the n o t i o n of 
convenience, then, he adds the n o t i o n of a moral onus upon men r e s u l t i n g 
from the F a l l , to subj e c t themselves to p u b l i c regiment. 
any human ends, then we may regard p o l i t i c a l l i f e as i t s e l f being 
' a r t i f i c i a l 1 . But i f we see t h i s conception as being the essence of 
Plato's p o l i t i c a l theory then we must regard h i s i d e a l i s m as an added 
thought and not as the substance of h i s t h i n k i n g . Lewis, r a t h e r l i k e 
Barker ( i m p l i c i t l y ) i n Greek P o l i t i c a l Thought, devoted h i s e f f o r t to 
showing t h a t the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory i s not an 'immoralist' d o c t r i n e , 
or , simply, an 'a-moralist' d o c t r i n e . But he loaded the theory w i t h 
P l a t o n i c nuances which, i t must be pointed o u t , the theory does not us u a l l y 
carry. We may grant w i t h him t h a t Plato's t h i n k i n g does repudiate the 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m o f the Sophists. We may grant t h a t P l a t o must repudiate 
t h i s i f he accepts that p o l i t i c a l l i f e i m p l i e s moral w i l l ( o r an elevated 
form of s e l f - i n t e r e s t ) . With these c r i t i c i s m s i n mind we may now consider 
Lewis' b e l i e f t h a t the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory u n d e r l i e s Plato's conceptions 
of p o l i t i c a l freedom and the d e r i v a t i o n of the r u l e r s ' absolute a u t h o r i t y . 
To understand Lewis' meaning we may b r i e f l y consider Locke's conception 
t h a t men's o b l i g a t i o n to obey laws i m p l i e s a human commitment or under-
t a k i n g . 
We have noted t h a t the concept of a p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t springs from 
the assumption t h a t government i s s u i generis. This concept i s character-
i s t i c of P l a t o n i c t h i n k i n g ( w i t h the reser v a t i o n s noted above, n 26) , 
w h i l e , i n i t s medieval dress, i t t y p i f i e s Hooker as w e l l . The concept of 
the p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t , thus defined, i s unfavourable to the conception 
t h a t government e x i s t s from human acts alone. The concept belongs, 
r a t h e r , to the assumption that consent i s confirmatory. P u t t i n g aside, 
f o r now, the r e l a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n s between P l a t o and Hooker, the p o l i t i c a l 
c o n t r a c t i m p l i e s t h a t a moral onus i s the necessary c o n d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l 
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s o c i e t y , t h a t government e x i s t s , p o t e n t i a l l y , a w a i t i n g men's l e g i t i m i z i n g 
i t and thus confirming a p r i o r onus to do so. Men's s u b j e c t i o n to p o l i t i c a l 
a u t h o r i t y i s s u f f i c i e n t t o the c o n f i r m a t i o n . Where government i s assumed 
to e x i s t from human sanctions alone, we remove the n o t i o n of a s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t from b o t h i d e a l i s t i c and t e l e o l o g i c a l spheres. We no longer assume 
th a t moral w i l l i m p l i e s men's attempts to r e a l i z e a p o l i t i c a l order whose 
l i f e i s equal to the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r f i n a l ends; nor need we assume 
t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s a d i s c r e t e moment i n human h i s t o r y , t h a t i t s existence 
i m p l i e s men's t e s t i f y i n g to a requirement of n a t u r a l law or d i v i n e w i l l 
t h a t they subject themselves to p o l i t i c a l order. We must r a t h e r assume 
t h a t p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i m p l i e s moral w i l l , t h a t an undertaking to obey 
common laws i s both necessary and s u f f i c i e n t f o r a duty to obey p o s i t i v e laws, 
the laws of a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y . We assume, then, t h a t p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y 
i m p l i e s a commitment. I n obeying laws, men confirm an undertaking to which 
they have committed themselves i n response to no p r i o r requirement. Assuming 
tha t moral w i l l i s i t s e l f the necessary c o n d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e , we may 
then say t h a t p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y e x i s t s from men's considerations of t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s and t h a t moral w i l l , i m p l i c i t i n an undertaking to obey common 
laws, i s i m p l i e d i n the existence of any s t a t e . Here, we s h a l l emphasize 
again, w i t h Hooker, t h a t men's e x t e r n a l acts are s u f f i c i e n t evidence of 
t h e i r consent to laws (n 19 supra). We s h a l l assume t h a t men's expectations 
about t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , together w i t h t h e i r acceptance, i m p l i e d by t h e i r 
undertaking, t h a t the r i g h t to pursue t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i s l i m i t e d , are the 
necessary and s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r an o b l i g a t i o n to obey common laws. 
Cf. Gierke, Op.Cit. 
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I f we consider the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t i n these l i g h t s then we have applied 
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Locke's c r i t e r i a to the concept. E s s e n t i a l to these c r i t e r i a i s our 
r e l i n q u i s h i n g the view t h a t government i s s u i generis. Government, r a t h e r , 
i s wholly dependent on human act s . Assuming t h i s to be so, then we may 
accurately suppose t h a t the s t a t e and i t s sanctions are a r t i f i c i a l . Obviously, 
t h i s w i l l mean against P l a t o , but against Hooker as w e l l , t h a t men are 
whol l y f r e e - morally f r e e - to e s t a b l i s h p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . That w i l l 
mean tha t p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s not v e r t i c a l l y 'located' i n human h i s t o r y . I t 
w i l l also mean t h a t we cannot determine from h i s t o r y what form of r u l e 
Cf. Second T r e a t i s e , sec 135, where Locke quotes Hooker on the 
'na t u r a l ' foundation of " p u b l i c s o c i e t i e s " and the 'order, expressly or 
s e c r e t l y agreed upon' t h a t founds a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y . (Cf. 
n 2 supra). We should also note t h a t Locke agrees w i t h Hooker (Second 
T r e a t i s e , Op.Cit.) t h a t p o s i t i v e law addresses men's outward a c t i o n s . 
We must emphasize, however, t h a t Locke nowhere uses Hooker's t h e o l o g i c a l 
supposition as a means of j u s t i f y i n g the founding of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y . 
Human reason, a sense of i n t e r e s t , together w i t h moral w i l l , are the 
sole j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of t h i s . ( I f anything, Locke denies the t h e o l o g i c a l 
supposition e x p l i c i t l y . Cf sec. 13 Op.Cit. The t h e o l o g i c a l s u p p o s i t i o n 
need not imply the concept of d i v i n e r i g h t - a theory Locke inveighs 
against i n the Second T r e a t i s e - but the theory was used, i t would seem, 
by Filmer, i n close connection w i t h the t h e o l o g i c a l supposition.) He 
stresses, r a t h e r , t h a t a p o l i t i c a l undertaking i m p l i e s men's absolute 
freedom to e n j o i n p o l i t i c a l order on themselves (sees. 87-95) and t h a t 
p o s i t i v e laws must be conformable to the law of nature which i s a 
de c l a r a t i o n of the w i l l of God (sec 135) . Here we must emphasize Locke's 
repeated claim t h a t p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y must be of convenience to men (sees 
13,95,136). Together w i t h t h i s we should remark t h a t an undertaking 
which founds a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i m p l i e s men's r e c o g n i t i o n ( t h e r e c o g n i t i o n 
both of c i t i z e n s and of those they i n v e s t w i t h power), through w i l l i n g n e s s 
to obey common laws, of l i m i t s to the p u r s u i t of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . Since 
men are under no p r i o r requirement to sanction p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y and only 
do so f o r t h e i r own convenience there must obviously be l i m i t s to the 
power of government, and i t becomes c l e a r i n sec 136 tha t the 'conformity' 
of which Locke spoke i n the previous s e c t i o n i m p l i e s those very l i m i t s , 
l i m i t s which are conformable t o reason and the law of nature ( o r the w i l l 
of God). Locke's i n t e n t i o n here, as always, i s p r a c t i c a l , not i d e a l . 
We may remark, i n sum, t h a t Locke has displaced the t h e o l o g i c a l 
supposition, which assumes i n the f i r s t place a d i v i n e commandment to 
enter p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y , by the assumption t h a t d i v i n e w i l l or the law 
of nature would r e q u i r e men to honour a p o l i t i c a l undertaking should 
they give one. (Cf. John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, ed. 
W. von Leyden, (Oxford, 1970), p 53 f . ) 
would s a t i s f y men's needs and i n t e r e s t s , i t being assumed t h a t the p u r s u i t 
of these i s always subject to moral conscience and n a t u r a l law conceived 
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as wider than p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
The n o t i o n of moral freedom i n Locke, i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to h i s 
conception of i n d i v i d u a l consent. Locke has been c r i t i c i z e d f o r h o l d i n g 
that the law of nature or reason can be vouched t o j u s t i f y m a j o r i t y r u l e , 
the conclusion of a m i n o r i t y by a m a j o r i t y i n an on-going p o l i t i c a l 
community (sec 96). Gough held t h a t the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e makes the 
no t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l consent i n e f f e c t u a l . ( O p . C i t . ) . Indeed, on Locke's 
hypothesis, men are fr e e t o found a p o l i t i c a l community. Locke says 
repeatedly t h a t only a man's consent can put him out of a s t a t e of nature. 
But t h e r e a f t e r he i s bound by m a j o r i t y decisions. Since Locke j u s t i f i e d 
We have s a i d t h a t P l a t o h e l d p o l i t i c a l l i f e to be an i n t e g r a l f e a t u r e 
of human nature, t h a t he h e l d p o l i t i c a l l i f e t o be a timeless f e a t u r e 
of human l i f e . I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t h i s t o r y , considered, f o r 
example, as c y c l i c r a t h e r than d i s c r e t e , must i t s e l f c o n t a i n a t l e a s t 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s t a t e which would complete or p e r f e c t human ends. 
Without rehearsing Popper's t h e s i s here, the i d e a l i s t or " h i s t o r i c i s t " 
conception of Pl a t o forms the basis of Popper's c r i t i c i s m . (Cf. Popper, 
n 6 pp 208 f f . ) . P lato's theory, of course, d i s t i n g u i s h e s between 
n a t u r a l subjects and n a t u r a l r u l e r s . I f we use h i s t o r y , as Popper 
supposed P l a t o d i d , as our source f o r v e r i f y i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , then 
we use i t w i t h an e t h i c a l purpose i n mind. We use i t as a means of 
j u s t i f y i n g a u t h o r i t y . (This i s t r u e whether we devote a t t e n t i o n to an 
'upward' or 'downward' cycle of h i s t o r y . ) Such a concept must h o l d , 
at bottom, t h a t a duty to submit to a c e r t a i n form of r u l e i n f a c t 
precedes men's consenting to t h a t form of r u l e . I n such a case consent 
must be confirmatory. I t must confirm a p r i o r o b l i g a t i o n . Locke's 
conception, as we are showing i n these pages, r e s t s on e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
grounds. I n Locke, a u t h o r i t y can only be j u s t i f i e d by our f i r s t assuming 
an undertaking from which, and only from which, a p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n 
could be s a i d to a r i s e . 
We may note here t h a t Lewis supposed the i d e a l r u l e r s ' a u t h o r i t y to 
derive from the sub j e c t s . I t would have been more appropriate to say 
that the r u l e r s ' a u t h o r i t y i s a c t u a l i s e d by the subje c t s ' consent. The 
r u l e r s ' a u t h o r i t y does not o r i g i n a t e i n an a c t of consent. I n Hooker, 
the a u t h o r i t y of a given government could be sai d to o r i g i n a t e i n an 
act of consent even i f i t i s also true t h a t men are req u i r e d by d i v i n e 
w i l l , i n the f i r s t place, to.submit to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . But i n 
P l a t o , since p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s coextensive w i t h human l i f e , p o l i t i c a l 
(continued on page 40) 
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the l a t t e r on the basis of n a t u r a l law i t would seem t h a t he s a c r i f i c e s 
the n o t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l consent (which must be given t o inaugurate 
p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y ) f o r the m a j o r i t y r u l e p r i n c i p l e , as i f m a j o r i t i e s 
had a n a t u r a l r i g h t to impose t h e i r wishes. To j u s t i f y the m a j o r i t y 
p r i n c i p l e as i t s e l f being based on the law o f nature simply disguises 
the f a c t t h a t i n d i v i d u a l consent belongs only t o the ina u g u r a t i o n of 
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a p o l i t i c a l community. Gough was concerned to p o i n t out t h a t on Locke's 
own showing (sees 96, 97, 98) the n o t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l consent i s not 
compatible w i t h the m a j o r i t y r u l e p r i n c i p l e , t h a t we do not solve t h i s 
problem merely by a s s e r t i n g the dubious claim t h a t the l a t t e r p r i n c i p l e 
conforms to n a t u r a l law. There i s , however, another reason why Locke 
spoke of the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e as being n a t u r a l . 
The m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e i n Locke s u r e l y underlines the f a c t t h a t w h i l e 
men undertake to found p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s f o r t h e i r greater convenience 
and s e c u r i t y , any man may be expected to know t h a t the p u r s u i t of h i s 
i n t e r e s t s i s l i m i t e d by moral law or the law o f nature both p r i o r to and 
a f t e r a p o l i t i c a l undertaking. The great e r convenience of p o l i t i c a l 
s o c i e t y does not imply the f u l f i l m e n t of a l l i n d i v i d u a l ends. I t only 
i m p l i e s s e c u r i t y to human l i f e . The m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e , t h e r e f o r e , has 
a t l e a s t t h i s much a f f i n i t y w i t h n a t u r a l law: Locke places a l l of h i s 
emphasis on the convenience of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y to men. To undertake 
to obey common laws i s not to t e s t i f y to a p r i o r commandment. But i t i s 
35 (continued from page 39) 
a u t h o r i t y cannot i t s e l f o r i g i n a t e , even i f men can a l t e r c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 
I n consistency w i t h t h i s conception, Plato's i d e a l i s m requires men to 
discover the r i g h t , or n a t u r a l , c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
J. W. Gough, John Locke's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy, Eight Studies, 
(Oxford, 1968) pp 47 f f . esp. pp 60 f f . 
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to t e s t i f y to the f a c t t h a t there are n a t u r a l o b l i g a t i o n s , t h a t a man i s 
bound by n a t u r a l law to honour any undertaking he may g i v e . To found 
p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y , t h e r e f o r e , i s to undertake to obey common laws, and 
t h e r e a f t e r t o t e s t i f y to one's own commitment by obeying. The m a j o r i t y 
p r i n c i p l e , t h en,carries moral weight. Gough d i d not emphasize t h i s f a c t . 
I n "coming out o f " the s t a t e of nature i n order to enjoy the greater 
convenience to l i f e under common laws, a man must be expected to accept a 
c o n d i t i o n of l i f e i n which he i s no longer h i s own executive. Moreover, 
m a j o r i t i e s and m i n o r i t i e s w i l l be i n e v i t a b l e where p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y i s 
of convenience to l i f e , where i t secures men i n the p u r s u i t of t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s , b u t does not guarantee the f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r ends. There i s , 
then, an a f f i n i t y between i n d i v i d u a l consent, the consent which inaugurates 
a p o l i t i c a l community, and a man's consent t h e r e a f t e r . I t i s a moral 
a f f i n i t y . The great d i f f e r e n c e between the s t a t e of nature and the p o l i t i c a l 
c o n d i t i o n i s t h a t under the l a t t e r , men have a duty to obey p o s i t i v e laws. 
But they have a n a t u r a l duty to honour any pacts they make. Consequently, 
i f they undertake to have p o s i t i v e laws they have a duty to honour t h i s 
undertaking. Where they accept by t h i s undertaking t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e only 
secures and does not p e r f e c t i n d i v i d u a l ends then regard f o r others must 
be i m p l i c i t i n the undertaking to secure general i n t e r e s t s . That i s to say, 
by t h e i r undertaking men b i n d themselves to respect the i n t e r e s t s of others 
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through t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to obey p o s i t i v e laws. Locke saw, as a 
We could say, i d e a l l y , t h a t by t h e i r undertaking men give r e c o g n i t i o n 
to one of the laws of nature: t h a t a l l men have r i g h t s , t h a t i t i s 
prima f a c i e wrong t h a t one man's i n t e r e s t s should outweigh another's. 
But we must also remember t h a t i n Locke's case the law of nature does 
not command men to enter p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y . U l t i m a t e l y , the p o i n t we 
must emphasize i s t h a t given an undertaking to obey laws, then, despite 
the motives of i n d i v i d u a l s or t h e i r inward sentiments, they have an 
o b l i g a t i o n to honour th a t undertaking. 
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consequence of t h i s , t h a t men would have to obey m a j o r i t y decisions. 
He vouched the law of nature or reason to j u s t i f y the p o i n t because, 
u l t i m a t e l y , i t must be i n the l i g h t o f t h i s knowledge t h a t a man's 
consent would begin. Given t h a t we emphasize the moral weight r a t h e r 
than the h i s t o r i c a l weight of the d o c t r i n e of i n d i v i d u a l consent, we are 
then emphasizing a man's testament to h i s own commitment which h i s consent 
to law, subsequent to an undertaking, would s a t i s f y . And by s t r e s s i n g 
t h i s p o i n t we emphasize what must be i m p l i c i t i n i n d i v i d u a l consent: a 
man's knowledge t h a t he i s bound by h i s undertaking. ' I n d i v i d u a l consent', 
then, has moral reference. I n order f o r i n d i v i d u a l consent i n an on-going 
community to have e f f e c t i v e meaning i t must be the case t h a t a man w i l l 
be bound i n t h a t community by the same knowledge w i t h which h i s consent 
began: the knowledge t h a t the p u r s u i t of h i s i n t e r e s t s i s l i m i t e d by moral 
law. As a man was f r e e t o undertake to obey p o s i t i v e laws so he must be 
responsible t h e r e a f t e r f o r honouring h i s commitment. 
Locke's p o l i t i c a l theory emphasizes a moral onus men take upon them-
selves by undertaking to obey p o s i t i v e laws. His theory stresses the 
importance of a compromise - a p o l i t i c a l undertaking - which i t s e l f i m p l i e s 
moral w i l l and a man's freedom to e n j o i n p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n upon h i m s e l f . 
I n order f o r the moral freedom which precedes the in a u g u r a t i o n of a 
p o l i t i c a l community to have r e a l weight we must associate i t w i t h the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t i s consequent upon a man's undertaking, h i s responsib-
i l i t y t o honour an agreement which r e s u l t s i n s e c u r i t y t o , i f not the 
p e r f e c t i o n o f , human ends. Where we assume, as Locke does, t h a t government 
i s not s u i generis, t h a t i t s existence depends wholly on human ac t s , and 
where we assume as w e l l t h a t an undertaking i m p l i e s moral w i l l , then we 
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we might use Barker's statement (quoted above, n 11) as a general d e s c r i p t i o n 
of Locke's p o s i t i o n . But we s h a l l remember t h a t Barker's statement was, i f 
anything, favourable to P l a t o n i c theory and to id e a l i s m . For Locke, the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s readiness t o obey laws must s p r i n g from the human sanction 
which i s the " o r i g i n a l " of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . P lato assumes t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e i s an i n t e g r a l f e a t u r e of human nature; h i s i d e a l i s m assumes the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f the p e r f e c t i o n of human ends. The sanction w i t h which the 
i d e a l community would begin does not spring from the i n i t i a l submission o f 
men t o phi l o s o p h i c r u l e . We must trace i t , r a t h e r , to the n a t u r a l onus 
upon them to submit to a c e r t a i n form of r u l e . Consequently, we might say 
th a t the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the i d e a l s t a t e derives from those who consent 
to i t s r u l e (Cf n 35). But we cannot say t h a t the p o t e n t i a l subjects are 
f r e e to e n j o i n p o l i t i c a l order on themselves, where, we mean by t h i s , t h a t 
consent to law i m p l i e s an undertaking from which p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n 
o r i g i n a t e s . By consenting to ph i l o s o p h i c r u l e , those who consent are 
already s u bjects. By t h e i r consent they confirm a p r i o r o b l i g a t i o n . 
Moreover, P l a t o assumes t h a t some form of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y always e x i s t s . 
When Lewis spoke of p o l i t i c a l freedom (p 81) he cannot have intended the 
freedom which an undertaking i m p l i e s i n Locke. He must r a t h e r have intended 
an i d e a l conception of freedom, a conception which must describe freedom 
i n terms of the p e r f e c t i o n of human ends'. 
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F i n a l l y , i t was suggested by M. B. Foster t h a t we cannot a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
speak of the consent of the t h i r d class of the Republic. Foster held t h a t 
i n order f o r 'consent' to have meaning i t must imply the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
freedom to e n j o i n p o l i t i c a l order on h i m s e l f . The t h i r d c l a s s , since i t 
M.B. Foster, "Some I m p l i c a t i o n s of A Passage i n Plato's Republic", 
Philosophy, 1936, pp 301-308. 
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does n o t e n j o i n p o l i t i c a l o r d e r upon i t s e l f , may o n l y be s a i d t o a c q u i e s c e 
i n t h e regimen o f t h e i d e a l s t a t e . F o s t e r ' s c r i t e r i a f o r consent a r e 
o b v i o u s l y t h o se w h i c h w o u l d s a t i s f y Locke. They oppose any t h e o r y o f 
p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n w h i c h p o s i t s an i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l 
s u b j e c t s and n a t u r a l r u l e r s . I s h a l l n o t he r e d i s c u s s t h e p r o p r i e t y o f 
r e s t r i c t i n g t h e n o t i o n o f c o n s e n t , as F o s t e r w o u l d have us do, o n l y t o 
those t h e o r i e s w h i c h do n o t assume ( i n some sense) t h a t government i s s u i 
g e n e r i s . We may o b s e r v e , r a t h e r , t h a t t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l c o n t r a c t 
has w i d e l y d i f f e r i n g a p p l i c a t i o n s . P l a t o w o u l d seem t o have used t h e 
con c e p t on an i d e a l p l a i n t o d e s c r i b e t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o f t h e t h i r d c l a s s o f 
t h e R e p u b l i c t o s u b m i t t o a c e r t a i n f o r m o f r u l e , and, i n d e e d , t h e w i l l i n g -
ness o f t h e r u l e r s t o impose t h e regimen o f t h a t f o r m o f r u l e on t h e m s e l v e s . 
I f t h e r e i s a sense i n w h i c h i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o speak o f t h e 'consent 
o f t h e governed' i n P l a t o , l e t us n o t e w i t h F o s t e r (and w i t h Locke as w e l l ) 
t h a t t h e t h i r d c l a s s i s n o t s e l f - r u l e d i n t h e sense w h i c h s a t i s f i e d t h e i r 
c r i t e r i a o f c o n s e n t . S i n c e t h e t h i r d c l a s s , by a c q u i e s c i n g i n t h e r u l e o f 
the p h i l o s o p h e r s , c o n f i r m s a p r i o r o b l i g a t i o n t o do so, we must t h e n a d m i t 
( w i t h a t t e n t i o n t o F o s t e r ' s p o i n t ) t h a t t h e y a re n o t ' f r e e ' t o impose 
the community's o r d e r on t h e m s e l v e s . That o r d e r e x i s t s s u i g e n e r i s . I t 
a w a i t s men's s u b m i s s i o n t o i t . I t s o r d e r i s n o t founded on a compromise 
w h i c h i m p l i e s men's r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e y w i l l be bound by m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s 
i n a s o c i e t y i n w h i c h ends cannot be p e r f e c t e d . The a u t h o r o f t h e i d e a l 
c o n c e p t i o n r e a d man's m o r a l l i f e f r o m man's a t t e m p t , t h r o u g h t i m e , t o 
r e a l i z e h i s t r u e ends. 
I t w i l l now be a p p r o p r i a t e t o d i s c u s s t h e S o c r a t i c provenance o f P l a t o ' s 
d o c t r i n e o f con s e n t . We s h a l l do so by e x a m i n i n g S o c r a t e s ' covenant w i t h 
the l aws o f Athens as d e s c r i b e d i n t h e Apology and t h e C r i t o . 
Chapter I I 45. 
S o c r a t e s ' Covenant w i t h t h e Laws o f Athens 
I t w i l l be a p p r o p r i a t e t o b e g i n o u r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e S o c r a t i c t h e o r y o f 
consent by e x a m i n i n g what i s i m p l i c i t i n S o c r a t e s ' covenant w i t h t h e laws 
o f Athens w h i c h P l a t o d e s c r i b e s i n t h e C r i t o . I s h a l l d i s c u s s t h e C r i t o 
w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Apology. The two d i a l o g u e s , t a k e n as a w h o l e , p r e s e n t 
us w i t h a common s u b j e c t w h i c h I s h a l l c a l l S o c r a t e s ' dilemma. B u t b e f o r e 
we d i s c u s s t h i s s u b j e c t I s h a l l d e v ote the f i r s t p a r t o f t h i s c h a p t e r t o 
s e t t i n g o u t t h e main f e a t u r e s o f S o c r a t e s ' c o v e n a n t . I s h a l l m e n t i o n 
o t h e r s u b j e c t s w h i c h complement t h i s and w h i c h a r e germane t o t h i s c h a p t e r 
as a w h o l e . 
What s t r i k e s us f i r s t a bout t h e covenant i s t h a t i t i s an agreement 
between S o c r a t e s and t h e laws o f Athens. P l a t o does n o t d e s c r i b e t h e 
covenant as an agreement w i t h o t h e r men. B u t we may wonder whether P l a t o 
i s n o t s i m p l y s u g g e s t i n g by way o f metaphor t h a t S o c r a t e s i n f a c t has a 
covenant w i t h h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s t o obey t h e l a w s , t h a t h i s d u t y o f 
obedience depends on t h i s c o v e n a n t . T h i s q u e s t i o n i s b a s i c f o r i t r a i s e s 
the q u e s t i o n , what i s t h e ground o f S o c r a t e s ' d u t y t o obey? I t a l s o r a i s e s 
t h e q u e s t i o n , i n what r e s p e c t s does P l a t o ' s use o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f covenant 
d i f f e r ( a s i t s u r e l y does d i f f e r ) f r o m c u r r e n t usage? I n o r d e r t o answer 
t h e s e q u e s t i o n s we must f i r s t mark f i v e f e a t u r e s o f t h e covenant. S o c r a t e s 
i s t o l d t h a t he owes h i s n u r t u r e t o t h e laws ( 5 0 D ) ; he i s f u r t h e r t o l d 
t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between h i m s e l f and t h e laws i s n o t one o f e q u a l i t y 
( 5 0 E ) ; t h i r d l y , t h e l a w s t e l l S o c r a t e s t h a t e v i d e n c e o f h i s agreement has 
been seen t o e x i s t i n h i s a c t i o n s and n o t i n words ( 5 2 D ) . The laws n e x t 
t e l l S o c r a t e s t h a t blame must a t t a c h t o men r a t h e r t h a n t o themselves f o r 
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t h e p r e d i c a m e n t i n w h i c h he now f i n d s h i m s e l f ( 5 4 C ) . F i n a l l y , S o c r a t e s 
i s t o l d t h a t i f he d i s o b e y s t h e laws o f Athe n s , t h e n t h e e t e r n a l l a w s , t h e 
b r o t h e r s o f men's laws i n Hades, w i l l themselves have been d i s o b e y e d ( I b i d . ) . 
We s h o u l d emphasize t h a t t h e laws t e l l S o c r a t e s t h a t i f he r e f u s e s t o 
ac c e p t t h e v e r d i c t passed on h i m he w i l l r e t u r n an e v i l f o r an e v i l , a 
wrong f o r a wrong (j/i/rttiTcKy <r*3 l > «fCi X«/t.oi/pytffXS :54C 1 ) . Assuming 
t h a t S o c r a t e s w o u l d q u i t Athens wronged by men ( I b i d . ) t h e la w s i m p l y t h a t 
t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n w i t h S o c r a t e s p e r t a i n s t o a wrong committed by men b u t 
n o t by th e m s e l v e s . I n t h i s , men are seen t o abuse law o r t o m a l a d m i n i s t e r 
i t w h i l e law i t s e l f i s b l a m e l e s s . 
We may n o t e i n r e f e r e n c e t o these p o i n t s t h a t P l a t o assumes t h a t t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n t o obey a r i s e s f r o m S o c r a t e s ' c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h i s o b l i g a t i o n 
i n h i s day t o day a c t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , h i s d u t y t o obey t h e laws o f Athens 
i m p l i e s a d u t y t o obey t h e e t e r n a l l a w s . I t i s f u r t h e r i m p l i e d t h a t he 
cannot i n v o k e t h e l a t t e r t o j u s t i f y d i s o b e y i n g t h e f o r m e r . T h e r e f o r e , h i s 
d u t y t o obey cannot be c o n d i t i o n a l on c o n f o r m i t y between t h e laws o f Athens 
and t h e e t e r n a l l a w s , f o r t h e la w s i m p l y t h a t t h e r e i s complete a c c o r d 
between themselves and t h e i r b r o t h e r s . T h i s means i n p r a c t i c a l terms t h a t 
S o c r a t e s has no a p p e a l f r o m t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e c o u r t t h a t f o u n d h i m 
g u i l t y o f i m p i e t y even i f i t s f i n d i n g was u n j u s t . T h a t i n i t s e l f m i g h t be 
r e g a r d e d as an abuse o f l a w . B u t t o d i s o b e y t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g must 
i t s e l f r e s u l t i n a d i s a v o w e l o f l a w . I n s a y i n g t h a t S o c r a t e s w o u l d r e t u r n 
an e v i l f o r an e v i l s h o u l d he d i s o b e y t h e c o u r t t h e laws i m p l y t h a t t h e 
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was an u n j u s t one. B u t t h e i r emphasis i s p l a c e d on t h e 
d u t y t o obey and n o t on a r i g h t o f c o n s c i e n c e t o d i s o b e y . The o n l y a l t e r n -
a t i v e S o c r a t e s has t o obedience i s q u i t t i n g t h e community. That a l t e r n a t i v e * 
o f c o u r s e , i s n o t open t o h i m s h o u l d he d i s o b e y an i n j u n c t i o n o f t h e laws 
by d o i n g so. I f , t h e n , as t h e Apology s u g g e s t s , S o c r a t e s i s bound i n 
con s c i e n c e t o f o l l o w h i s own c o n v i c t i o n s , t h e C r i t o c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e can 
be no c o n f l i c t o f d u t y between the laws o f Athens and t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f 
the e t e r n a l l a w s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , so l o n g as S o c r a t e s had remained c o n t e n t 
t o be a c i t i z e n o f Athens he had t h e r e b y i n c u r r e d a d u t y o f obedience. He 
c o u l d n o t t h e n a p p e a l t o a h i g h e r l a w t o revoke an agreement w h i c h had 
been seen t o e x i s t f r o m h i s l i f e as a member o f t h e community. 
Given t h e s e f a c t s what may we h e r e say o f S o c r a t e s ' r i g h t o f d i s s e n t ? 
A b r i e f comparison w i t h A n t i g o n e ' s case i n t h e p l a y o f Sophocles w i l l be 
i n s t r u c t i v e . W h i l e A n t i g o n e sees c o n t r a s t , i f n o t a n t i t h e s i s , " ' " between a 
h i g h e r law and an e d i c t o f Creon, S o c r a t e s sees a r e s o l v a b l e c o n f l i c t 
between h i g h e r laws and men's a t t i t u d e s t o them as e v i d e n c e d i n t h e i r r e g a r d 
f o r t h e laws o f t h e community. We may say t h a t S o c r a t e s d i s s e n t s as does 
A n t i g o n e i n t h e Theban p l a y . B u t S o c r a t e s d i s s e n t s because he b e l i e v e s 
men's usage o f t h e laws i s n o t i n a c c o r d w i t h what t h e laws and t h e i r 
b r o t h e r s t r u l y e n j o i n . We s h a l l r e c a l l t h a t t h e la w s r e m i n d S o c r a t e s t h a t 
men and n o t t h e laws a r e t o blame f o r h i s demise. We s h a l l see, moreover, 
t h a t t h e C r i t o a f f i r m s what t h e Apology i m p l i e s : t h a t S o c r a t e s d i s s e n t s 
f r o m men's abuse o f t h e laws b u t n o t f r o m t h e laws t h e m s e l v e s . S o c r a t e s 
i s seen t o d i s s e n t on b e h a l f o f t h e l a w s . He does n o t d i s s e n t f o r t h e 
sake o f one law as c o n t r a s t e d w i t h a n o t h e r . He b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s own case 
denotes c o n f l i c t between men and law p e r se, and h i s g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n i n 
the two d i a l o g u e s i s t h a t t h i s c o n f l i c t c o u l d be r e s o l v e d . 
For t h e vi e w t h a t t h e law o f n a t u r e and c o n v e n t i o n a l law are 
a n t i t h e t i c see pp-. 501 f f . 
48. 
I t i s i m p l i c i t i n t h e A n t i g o n e t h a t Creon's e d i c t o v e r - s t e p s t h e 
bounds o f t h e w r i t t e n laws and t h u s confounds t h e r i g h t f u l demands o f t h e s e 
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w i t h t h e immoral demands o f t h e u n w r i t t e n l a w s . Here t h e p r o b l e m i s 
d i f f e r e n t . Two k i n d s o f l a w , t h e w r i t t e n and t h e u n w r i t t e n , have d i s t i n c t 
i f unopposed demands. These demands must n o t be c o n f u s e d . The p r o b l e m o f 
t h e Apology and t h e C r i t o i s t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l law conforms t o t h e demands, 
o r e x e m p l i f i e s t h e demands o f t h e h i g h e r l a w s . I t i s a man's d u t y t o 
a t t e s t t o t h i s f a c t . T h i s means t h a t men's honour o r abuse o f t h e one 
e n t a i l s honour o r abuse o f t h e o t h e r . Here, i t i s n o t a q u e s t i o n o f 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g two spheres o f l a w , w h i c h , w h i l e t h e y make d i s t i n c t demands 
on t h e p e r s o n , m i g h t b o t h be s e r v e d e q u a l l y so l o n g as t h e i r s e p a r a t e 
demands a r e n o t c o n f u s e d . R a t h e r , i t i s a q u e s t i o n o f b r i n g i n g men's 
a t t i t u d e s i n t o c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e h i g h e r laws t h r o u g h t h e i r r e g a r d f o r 
t h e laws o f t h e community. To p u t t h e m a t t e r s h o r t l y , w e n o t e an under-
c u r r e n t o f i d e a l i s m i n t h e two P l a t o n i c d i a l o g u e s w h i c h i s f o r e i g n t o t h e 
more c o n s e r v a t i v e view o f the A n t i g o n e . W h i l e Creon's h u b r i s compels 
A n t i g o n e t o obey one law and d i s o b e y a n o t h e r , P l a t o s u g g e s t s t h a t w h i l e 
S o c r a t e s , t o o , c o n f r o n t s a dilemma he may y e t choose t o s e r v e what i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y one m o r a l r e q u i r e m e n t and escape t h e dilemma's h o r n s . 
P l a t o b e l i e v e s , t h e n , t h a t S o c r a t e s ' c o n f l i c t i s between a man and h i s 
f e l l o w c i t i z e n s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the l a w s . We may r e c a l l t h a t P l a t o 
has n o t seen f i t t o q u e r y w h e t h e r t h e r e i s e q u a l i t y between t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
and h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s . R a t h e r , t h e laws ask S o c r a t e s w h e t h e r e q u a l i t y 
e x i s t s between themselves and him. Had P l a t o p u t t h e f o r m e r q u e s t i o n t h e n 
"He who observes t h e laws o f h i s c o u n t r y and remains bound i n honour 
t o t h e e t e r n a l laws s t a n d s h i g h i n h i s c i t y ' s r e g a r d . B u t he who i s 
p r e s u m p t i o u s and o v e r - b o l d i s a d i s g r a c e and l i v e s beyond t h e p a l e o f 
men's laws tin*Ats ) : 367-371 (/Jjt/evs . . • pipi* ) . 
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between S o c r a t e s and t h e laws m i g h t have been d e a l t 
w i t h w i t h i n t h e framework o f a covenant between him and h i s f e l l o w 
c i t i z e n s , where t h e assumption was t h a t t he laws themselves had s p r u n g 
f r o m a covenant among e q u a l p a r t n e r s and owed t h e i r e x i s t e n c e w h o l l y t o 
t h a t . B u t t h e emphasis r a t h e r i s t h a t S o c r a t e s and h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s 
have been n u r t u r e d by t h e l a w s . A l t h o u g h t h i s may t e l l a g a i n s t an i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n w h i c h sees t h e covenant w i t h t h e laws as a metaphor o f a covenant 
a man has w i t h h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s we must r e c a l l t h a t t h e laws h o l d o u t 
t o t h e c i t i z e n t h e r i g h t t o persuade them i f t h e y , t h e l a w s , seem t o be i n 
e r r o r (>t ^ /euXu/s ct T0t*v//£/, :51E 7 ) . P l a t o s u ggests by t h i s t h a t t h e 
laws a re n o t i n t r a n s i g e n t . That l e n d s a n o t e o f a m b i g u i t y t o t h e p i c t u r e : 
on t h e one hand t h e laws say t h e r e i s complete a c c o r d between themselves 
and t h e i r b r o t h e r s ; on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e y a r e amenable t o p e r s u a s i o n . 
That can o n l y be d i r e c t e d t o w a r d men, those who a d m i n i s t e r t h e l a w s . Thus, 
w h i l e t h e d u t y o f obedience does n o t c a r r y w i t h i t a r i g h t o r a d u t y o f 
d i s o b e d i e n c e s u b j e c t t o f a i l u r e o f c o n f o r m i t y between men's laws and t h e 
h i g h e r l a w s , t h e laws o f Athens a re seen t o be s u b j e c t t o change o r t o b e t t e r 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s can o n l y mean t h a t w h i l e t h e demands o f t h e A t h e n i a n 
laws a r e t h e same as those o f t h e e t e r n a l l a w s , t h e A t h e n i a n s a c t i n d i s -
r e g a r d o f t h i s f a c t . We must emphasize i n r e s p e c t o f t h i s t h a t so f a r as 
S o c r a t e s can j u d g e , p e r s u a d i n g men t o w a r d a b e t t e r r e g a r d o f t h e laws does 
n o t c o n s t i t u t e d i s o b e d i e n c e . 
For t h e reasons g i v e n above t h e r e i s c e r t a i n l y j u s t i c e i n t h e c l a i m 
t h a t the IfptcrQKOITOCL*. o f t h e laws has i n v i e w a d i a l o g u e between a man and 
h i s c o n s c i e n c e , o r , more w i d e l y , between a man and t h e c o n s c i e n c e s o f h i s 
f e l l o w c i t i z e n s ( C f . B u r e n t , p 200) . I n t h i s sense t h e n o t i o n o f a 
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covenant w i t h t h e laws i s m e t a p h o r i c a l . But t h e i n t i m a t e c o n n e c t i o n between 
t h e laws o f Athens and t h e e t e r n a l laws i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e f o r m e r a r e n o t 
the p r o d u c t o f human i n v e n t i o n . T a k i n g t h i s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f a c t s t h a t 
t h e laws p r o v i d e n u r t u r e and t h a t S o c r a t e s has always a s s o c i a t e d law w i t h 
v i r t u e ( 5 3 C ) , P l a t o i s e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t t h e d u t y t o obey t h e laws i s n a t u r a l , 
t h a t t h i s d u t y does n o t a r i s e f r o m an u n d e r t a k i n g . T h i s f a c t i s su g g e s t e d , 
and, I t h i n k , s u p p o r t e d f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t w h i l e S o c r a t e s m i g h t c o n f i r m 
t h a t he has a d u t y o f obedience he has no r i g h t t o i n v o k e a s t a n d a r d o f 
law o r j u s t i c e h i g h e r t h a n o r d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t o f t h e c i t y ' s laws as 
grounds f o r d i s c l a i m i n g t h i s d u t y . We may l o o k h e r e f o r what i s i m p l i c i t 
i n t h e i n e q u a l i t y w h i c h i s s a i d t o e x i s t between S o c r a t e s and t h e l a w s . 
To i l l u s t r a t e P l a t o ' s meaning we may r e f e r t o t h e c u r r e n t n o t i o n o f 
covenant w i t h w h i c h he i m p l i c i t l y c o n t r a s t s S o c r a t e s ' covenant i n t h e C r i t o . 
We s h a l l r e c a l l t h a t t h e Leucophron had suggested t h a t law i s a covenant 
t h a t assures men's j u s t c l a i m s a g a i n s t one a n o t h e r (e^ff^t^s eikk^kois T~u»if 
fit* 'wi/. : P o l i t i c s 1280B 11) . I n t h e absence o f f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e we can 
t a k e t h a t t o mean t h a t l a w e x i s t s as a means o f s e c u r i n g men i n t h e p u r s u i t 
o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , b u t t h a t i t i s n o t t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f law t o make 
men v i r t u o u s ( I b i d . ) . I f we i n f e r f r o m t h i s t h a t t h e d u t y o f obedience 
a r i s e s f r o m a covenant w h i c h men make among themselves t h e n , as I have 
s u g g e s t e d , we m i g h t speak o f e q u a l i t y as o b t a i n i n g among t h o s e who make t h e 
covenan t . A t any r a t e , t h e subsequent d u t y t o obey c o u l d be s a i d t o depend 
e q u a l l y on a l l members o f t h e community so formed h o n o u r i n g t h e laws w h i c h 
s p r i n g f r o m t h e co v e n a n t . B u t t h i s d o c t r i n e , as the R e p u b l i c shows u s , 
was r e g a r d e d by many as i m p l y i n g t h a t e q u a l i t y i t s e l f was u n n a t u r a l , t h a t 
by n a t u r e any c r e a t u r e w i l l seek i t s own advantage (irhtoi/, and, by 
5 1 . 
l a w , i t i s f o r c i b l y c o n s t r a i n e d t o honour e q u a l i t y (359C) . I n d e e d , t h e 
emphasis t h a t was p l a c e d on t h e d o c t r i n e , as P l a t o ' s r e p o r t s show, was 
such as t o t r e a t t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a man s h o u l d obey t h e law i n terms 
o f w h e t h e r i t was advantageous t o do so. We s h o u l d n o t e t h a t w h i l e t h e 
C r i t o does n o t s t a t e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f advantage i s b e s i d e t h e q u e s t i o n 
w h e t h e r a man has an o b l i g a t i o n t o obey, the d i a l o g u e does c l a i m t h a t a 
d u t y o f obedience i s n o t c o n d i t i o n a l on i t m a t e r i a l l y p r o f i t i n g a man t o 
obey. 
The combined n o t i o n s o f Leucophron and t h o s e we r e c e i v e f r o m Glaucon 
i n t h e R e p u b l i c p o i n t t o two a s p e c t s o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f covenant w h i c h 
t h e C r i t o c h a l l e n g e s : t h a t l a w does n o t p e r t a i n t o v i r t u e , o r , t h a t i s 
t o say, t h a t i t i s n o t a f u n c t i o n o f law t o make men v i r t u o u s , b u t r a t h e r 
t o s e c u r e them i n t h e p u r s u i t o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t s ; s e c o n d l y , t h a t law i s 
u n n a t u r a l r e s t r a i n t . Leucophron's s t a t e m e n t , as i t s t a n d s , need n o t b e a r 
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an i m m o r a l i s t c o n n o t a t i o n . B u t G l a u c o n 1 s s t a t e m e n t , i n so f a r as i t 
opposes what i s j u s t by n a t u r e t o what i s j u s t by law ( vojuw ok pttt tr<*p~ 
*ftc*L ec< Cyt/ Co\) iirc>\j Cij/yt/, : I b i d . ) does b e a r t h i s c o n n o t a t i o n ; 
f o r , h i s c o n c e p t i o n l e n d s i t s e l f , as he proceeds t o e x p l a i n , t o t h e b e l i e f t h a t 
G u t h r i e n o t e s t h a t Leucophron's c o n c e p t i o n as i t s t a n d s c o u l d be 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t propounded by t h e a u t h o r o f t h e speech a g a i n s t A r i s t o g e i t o n : 
"laws were i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t n a t u r e because n a t u r e i s d i s o r d e r l y and law 
i n t r o d u c e s i m p a r t i a l i t y and e q u a l j u s t i c e f o r a l l . " (W.C.K. G u t h r i e , 
The S o p h i s t s , (Cambridge, 1971, p 143) . What i s t r u e o f Leucophron i s , 
I t h i n k , a l s o t r u e o f P r o t a g o r a s i n t h a t t h e l a t t e r w o u l d seem t o have 
r e g a r d e d n a t u r e , as i f n o t opposed t o nomos, t h e n i n d i f f e r e n t t o i t . 
B u t we must remark t h a t P r o t a g o r a s s t r e s s e d what Leucophron w o u l d seem 
n o t t o have emphasized; t h a t i t i s v r u t u e (ouf<os and £V*y) more t h a n men's 
j u s t c l a i m s a g a i n s t one a n o t h e r t h a t b r i n g s o r d e r t o human l i f e and p u t s 
men o u t o f a s t a t e o f n a t u r e - ( C f . nn 5, 6 i n f r a ) . 
t h e man who succeeds i n l i f e w i l l c o n v e r t t h e law t o h i s advantage by 
a p p e a r i n g t o be j u s t ( o r by a p p e a r i n g t o honour e q u a l i t y ) , t h a t what 
t r u l y p r o f i t s a man i s p u b l i c a p p r o b a t i o n ( CcrjioLCy y^p <kfi/<'i*. foneiv 
bctitHav ecftt jjij OVZ+.KXK :361A) . What i s common t o Leucophron's and t o 
Glaucon's s t a t e m e n t s i s t h a t i t i s t o a man's i n t e r e s t o r advantage t o 
obey law. Glaucon's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( t h e i m m o r a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) i s 
t h a t i t i s o n l y a man's e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s - h i s m a t e r i a l wants combined 
w i t h h i s r e p u t a t i o n w i t h o t h e r s - t h a t h i s a p p e a r i n g t o be j u s t w i l l 
p r o mote. I n so s p e a k i n g Glaucon has reduced t h e R e p u b l i c ' s debate about 
j u s t i c e t o t h e q u e s t i o n whether j u s t i c e i s d e s i r a b l e and f o r what 
consequences i t i s d e s i r a b l e . I n d e e d , P l a t o f e e l s bound t o answer t h e 
S o p h i s t i c q u e s t i o n about j u s t i c e on t h e same ground t h a t t h e S o p h i s t s 
d i s c u s s e d i t : w h e t h e r b e i n g j u s t t r u l y p r o f i t s a man. We may add he r e 
t h a t t h i s w i l l be o f c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e t o h i s c o n c e p t i o n i n t h e 
R e p u b l i c o f men's co n s e n t t o t h e p h i l o s o p h i c community. ( C h l j ) . 
I n t he C r i t o P l a t o c o n v e r t s t h e r e c e i v e d n o t i o n o f covenant t o t h e 
v i e w t h a t i t i s n o t o n l y a man's e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s t h a t h i s covenant 
m i g h t be exp e c t e d t o promote. For he a s s o c i a t e s t h e d o c t r i n e , p o s i t i v e l y , 
w i t h S o c r a t e s ' n o t i o n o f a man's t r u e s t i n t e r e s t , t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e 
s o u l . I n c h a l l e n g i n g t h e r e c e i v e d v i e w P l a t o t h r o w s h i s w e i g h t a g a i n s t 
t h e t h e o r y he w o u l d l a t e r r e c i t e t h r o u g h Glaucon: t h a t men w o u l d have 
no i n t e r e s t i n o b e y i n g l a w b u t f o r t h e i r s u p p o s i n g i t t o be t o t h e i r 
e x t e r n a l advantage t o do so, and t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l j u s t i c e , t h e j u s t i c e 
o f nomos, pays a man l e s s w e l l t h a n t h e d i c t a t e s o f n a t u r e , w i t h t h e 
r e s u l t t h a t t h e d u t y t o obey becomes c o n d i t i o n a l on t h e s e l f i s h advantage 
t h a t accrues t o a man f r o m o b e y i n g i f he i s an u n s u c c e s s f u l man, o r fr o m 
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a c q u i r i n g t h e f a v o u r o f t h e laws ( a p p e a r i n g t o obey) i f he i s a s u c c e s s f u l 
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man. He b e g i n s t o d e v e l o p h i s own t h e o r y i n t h e C r i t o where he s u g g e s t s , 
as he does i n t h e Apol o g y , t h a t law concerns more than a man's e x t e r n a l 
i n t e r e s t s . He i m p l i e s i n these two d i a l o g u e s t h a t a man has a d u t y t o 
obey the law even i f some e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t o f h i s i s n o t t h u s s e r v e d . 
Here P l a t o i s seen t o r e j e c t t h e i m m o r a l i s t c o n n o t a t i o n o f e q u a l i t y a l o n g 
w i t h t h e n o t i o n t h a t law a r i s e s i n a covenant. He p u t s h i s own view by 
m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t he c i t i z e n i s n o t the e q u a l o f t h e l a w , t h a t t h e c i t i z e n , 
by a c c e p t i n g t h e b e n e f i t s o f membership o f t h e community, c o n f i r m s an 
o b l i g a t i o n t o Obey. T h i s e n t i t l e s t h e c i t i z e n t o persuade the laws o r 
even t o l e a v e t h e community s h o u l d he f i n d i t t o h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
B ut i t does n o t e n t i t l e t h e c i t i z e n t o revoke t h e d u t y o f obedience e i t h e r 
by an a p p e a l t o a h i g h e r law o r fr o m the sense o f m a t e r i a l advantage. 
The r e c e i v e d n o t i o n o f covenant c l a i m e d t h a t t h e d u t y o f obedience 
s p r i n g s f r o m t h e l a t t e r m o t i v e ( a man's p r a c t i c a l advantage, w h a t e v e r 
i t m i g h t b e ) , i m p l y i n g t h a t j u s t i c e and t h e laws o f communities a r e 
caused by human agency a l o n e . T h i s t h e o r y m i g h t c a r r y w i t h i t an 
i m m o r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f men's i n t e r e s t s , a s , f o r example, when a man's 
i n t e r e s t s a r e seen t o be promoted by h i s c o n v e r t i n g the law t o h i s 
f a v o u r t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f o t h e r s . P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n i n t h e Apology and 
"And j u s t i c e l i e s midway between b o t h o f these ( c » ? ^pipcov 
c 0 t n iS<t'v+c»* A ) a n £ f i s n o t honoured as a r e a l good, b u t i s o n l y 
honoured i n the l a c k o f b e i n g a b l e t o do wrong. One who had t h e power 
t o do i n j u s t i c e and t o be a r e a l man w o u l d never covenant w i t h anybody 
t o do no wrong n o r t o s u f f e r i t . Only a s i m p l e t o n w o uld do t h a t . " (359B) 
The ' r e a l ' man o f whom Glaucon speaks w o u l d be a b l e t o l i v e i n a 'law-
bound' s t a t e as though he h i m s e l f were t h e so u r c e o f l a w . Tha t i m p l i e s 
t h a t t he r e a l man would n o t r e g a r d h i m s e l f as any man's e q u a l . Presumably, 
he w o u l d become t h e source o f law by h a v i n g a c q u i r e d t h e l a w s ' f a v o u r . 
(See R e p u b l i c 365 i n t o t o . ) By so d o i n g he w o u l d g i v e t h e l i e t o men's 
p r a i s e o f j u s t i c e and e q u a l i t y ; he w o u l d show, by h i s a c t i o n s , t h a t he 
d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s e had any n a t u r a l o r u n c o n d i t i o n a l h o l d on a man. 
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the C r i t o i s an e x p l i c i t r e j e c t i o n o f t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w . 
Wa s h o u l d mark, t h a t i n a l t e r i n g t h e n o t i o n o f covenant P l a t o i s 
d e n y i n g t h a t t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o obey t h e community's laws i s a r t i f i c i a l . 
T h i s d o c t r i n e , r e g a r d l e s s o f i t s c o n n o t a t i o n s , must r e g a r d t h e d u t y t o 
obey as b e i n g o f human d e s i g n i f a p r e s e n t o b l i g a t i o n t o obey i s seen t o 
r e s t on a common u n d e r t a k i n g f r o m w h i c h such o b l i g a t i o n s p r i n g s . We have 
We may c a l l t h i s t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t d o c t r i n e . What concerns us he r e i s 
the assumption o f many o f i t s p r o p o n e n t s t h a t t h e v i r t u e s , j u s t i c e , p i e t y , e t c . 
o r i g i n a t e i n human w i l l and owe n o t h i n g t o d i v i n e w i l l . T h i s i m p l i e s b o t h t h a t 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s a r t i f i c i a l and t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f a community's laws 
depends on common consent. The l a t t e r was e s s e n t i a l l y t h e v i e w o f P r o t a g o r a s 
as r e p o r t e d i n P l a t o ' s accounts o f him. Where t h e d o c t r i n e c o u l d d e p a r t f r o m 
P r o t a g o r a s ' own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s i n t h e c o n n o t a t i o n w h i c h i t s i m m o r a l i s t de-
t r a c t o r s p l a c e d on t h e j u s t i c e o f the common co n s e n t ; f o r they i n s i s t e d on a 
cle a v a g e between the b e n e f i t s t o be g a i n e d f r o m n a t u r a l j u s t i c e (Wj? TAfr««'fr5t,i«*' , 6 
I W r * £i/«> JW«f** i r 6 { ? r f * i ' i f i JLyAfo'v , R e p u b l i c 359C) and t h o s e t o be 
a c q u i r e d f r o m t h e j u s t i c e o f c o n v e n t i o n a l o p i n i o n . The l a t t e r was s a i d t o be 
necessary (^vd-yiCiUot/ : 358C) t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e weak b u t was n o t i t s e l f t r u l y 
b e n e f i c i a l (e«le clf/.9»v : I b i d . ) . P r o t a g o r a s , i n s a y i n g t h a t U<$**>$ and 
were i m p a r t e d t o a l l men i n common, means t h a t men a c q u i r e d m o r a l sense t h r o u g h 
d i v i n e i n t e r v e n t i o n . We s h o u l d n o t e t h a t he i m p l i e d by t h i s t h a t the e x i s t e n c e 
o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e s t a n d s o r f a l l s w i t h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m o r a l sense and 
ft4i ) t f o r t h e l a t t e r does n o t e x i s t i n man's n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n (t%.»J2u, Wt-'it(Tn 
ir f * ' A ' ) r — • c ' . •* i >• ' i ' 'fl \ r-e / / t f f f d , f<$ UvP/HfTT'it* UOUf Tt IUK O l t f y i / tv ectt/ ircKf-w" KefffeK "CtfUC Ota 
M»< <^/JUA* f»u4-ft^H' P r o t a g o r a s 322C) . Man's l i f e p r i o r t o t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f 
Hermes was a c o n d i t i o n o f a g g r e s s i o n and s u f f e r i n g . I t a l s o l a c k e d c i v i c a r t , 
TTeAtCitfy* Tfejt i/y • P r o t a g o r a s i m p l i e s t h a t s o c i e t y ' s h a v i n g m o r a l sense,which 
Hermes i m p a r t e d , i s b o t h n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t t o i t s h a v i n g c i v i c a r t . I n 
h o l d i n g t h i s b e l i e f P r o t a g o r a s may be c a l l e d a c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t , f o r what he 
c l a i m s i s t h a t g i v e n men's m o r a l sense t h e n p o l i t i c a l sjgnse prpceeds > f r o i n agree-
ments among men as t o what i s j u s t and r i g h t ( £!T#*7 e>l*- tyf CtotrCj W»kt< Sottt*. 
iUi lUKl To*y , CatVc* tUt. ( l i v e rtbcy , oTt/ va/tff •!IJieae_tetus 167C. 
Cf. on 172AB*Op.Cit. n 6 ) . S i n c e the cleavage between n a t u r e and c o n v e n t i o n i s 
f o r e i g n t o P r o t a g o r a s ' v i e w , and because he c l a i m s t h a t m o r a l sense i s shar e d 
by men i n common, h i s b e l i e f t h a t some men a r e more adept t h a n o t h e r s a t t e a c h -
i n g what i s b e n e f i c i a l o r p r o f i t a b l e c a r r i e s w i t h i t t h e b e l i e f t h a t human good 
p e r t a i n s t o t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f s o c i e t y as a whole and n o t t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r w e l l -
b e i n g o f e i t h e r t h e weak by n a t u r e or t h e s t r o n g by n a t u r e . B ut t h i s c o n c e p t i o n 
i s n o t i d e a l i s t i c , f o r a l though oil f i f f and %i.utj are shar e d by a l l men P r o t a g o r u s 
i m p l i e s t h a t i t i s common consent and n o t an i d e a l norm w h i c h g i v e s v a l i d i t y t o 
a community's la w s . Had he i m p l i e d thatafdfw* a n d Slxy c o u l d o b t a i n w i t h o u t 
c i v i c a r t he m i g h t have c l a i m e d t h a t man's n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n was i t s e l f m o r a l . 
Y e t t h e sense o f 322C sta n d s a g a i n s t t h i s . P r o t a g o r a s , no l e s s than Plato,assumes 
t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e and m o r a l l i f e a r e c o e x t e n s i v e . B ut t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e 
T h e a e t e t u s ( s e e n e x t n o t e ) s t a n d s a g a i n s t P l a t o ' s t h e o r y because i t i m p l i e s t h a t a 
s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i o n o f a community 1s consen t i s i t s agreement, a t any t i m e , as t o 
what i s j u s t . W h i l e t h i s e n t a i l s common m o r a l sense, i t p r e c l u d e s an i d e a l 
r e f e r r e n t o f j u s t i c e whose c o n f i r m a t i o n i s n o t o n l y i m p l i c i t i n men's consent t o 
laws b u t w h i c h i s a l s o assumed t o be a f i n a l and r t i o n a l b a s i s o f a s o c i e t y whose 
"form would P e r f e c t human needs. 
seen i n Ch 1 t h a t P l a t o r e j e c t s t h i s c o n c e p t i o n where i t denotes t h e 
d i s c r e t e o r i g i n o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e . What he r e j e c t s i s t h e i m p l i c i t 
b e l i e f o f t h i s c o n c e p t i o n t h a t t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o "obey law i s a r t i f i c i a l , 
where t h i s means t h a t j u s t i c e o r p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e a r e p r o d u c t s o f human 
enactment. We may say i n r e f e r e n c e t o P r o t a g o r a s ' t h e o r y t h a t w h i l e i t 
does n o t c a r r y an i m m o r a l i s t c o n n o t a t i o n i t i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a b e l i e f 
i n t h e d i s c r e t e o r i g i n o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e , w i t h t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n t o obey law i s a r t i f i c i a l , as depending ( g i v e n t h e presence o f 
Jt%u/s and &t'*^) on human w i l l . ( C f . n 8 i n f r a ) . I n r e j e c t i n g t h e c o n c e p t i o n 
o f d i s c r e t e o r i g i n s P l a t o p r o v i d e s an o b j e c t i v e s a n c t i o n f o r obediance t o 
law and i n so d o i n g he i n f e r s t h a t s i n c e p o l i t i c a l l i f e does n o t o r i g i n a t e 
i n human enactment t h a t t h e d u t y t o obey t h e laws o f t h e community i s 
n a t u r a l . He t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t s t h e n o t i o n t h a t a p r e s e n t o b l i g a t i o n t o 
obey o r i g i n a t e s i n human w i l l . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n , as i t i s dev e l o p e d i n 
P l a t o ' s t i m e , m i g h t i m p l y t h a t n a t u r e i s m o r a l l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o law. But 
i t m i g h t i m p l y t o o , as i n t h e case o f C a l l i c l e s o f t h e G o r g i a s o r i n t h e 
t h e o r y c i t e d by Glaucon i n t h e R e p u b l i c , t h a t n a t u r e and law are a n t a g o n -
i s t i c , t h a t t h e r e i s a law o f n a t u r e t h a t s t a n d s o v e r and above c o n v e n t i o n 
and i s opposed t o i t . T h i s i s t h e v i e w t h a t P l a t o a t t a c k s . The i m m o r a l i s m 
w h i c h a t t a c h e s t o t h i s v i e w i s more t h e o b j e c t o f h i s a t t a c k t h a n t h e view 
o f P r o t a g o r a s t h a t nomos, i n k e e p i n g men a t a remove f r o m n a t u r e , i s b a s i c 
t o t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f human l i f e . B u t w h i l e r e j e c t i n g t h i s v i e w , P l a t o 
A t T h e a e t e t u s 172AB S o c r a t e s s t a t e s t h a t t h e r e a r e t h o s e who b e l i e v e 
w i t h P r o t a g o r a s t h a t w h i l e men d i f f e r i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o assess what 
i s t r u l y advantageous i t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e , p i e t y 
and i m p i e t y , have no n a t u r a l e x i s t e n c e o f t h e i r own ( ttt ot>n tree aortc eivcZi/ 
oi/iti/ ovrw t+»vo<J *f.o\/ ) b u t become ^ t r u e on t h e b a s i s o f common consent 
( Ct Wry f»S** I** y i f K f r M t dkyfrt* ) a n d re m a i n t r u e f r o m t h e t i m e 
t h e y a r e adopted and f o r so l o n g as t h e y a re m a i n t a i n e d ( t o r t oz<* 
( c o n t i n u e d on page 56) 
devotes h i s main a t t e n t i o n t o d i s c r e d i t i n g t h e f o r m e r v i e w w h i c h m a i n t a i n s 
t h a t nomos must c o n c e a l t h e t r u t h a b out what men t a k e t o be t h e i r t r u e 
o r n a t u r a l i n t e r e s t s . The l a t t e r c o n c e p t i o n t o o , however, i s d i s t i n c t 
f r o m P l a t o ' s t h e o r y o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e , f o r i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t nomos i s t h e 
l e g i t i m a t e b a s i s o f a community's consent i t i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s t h e v i e w 
t h a t knowledge o f a u n i v e r s a l c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e c o u l d l e g i t i m i z e 
c o n s e n t . That can o n l y mean t h a t « f ' « a n d firtp a r e n o t paradigms f r o m 
w h i c h j u s t i c e can be i d e a l l y known and on w h i c h a c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y 
w h i c h i s u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d can be founded. On P r o t a g o r a s ' v i e w , m o r a l 
6 ( c o n t i n u e d f r o m page 55) 
Jo5,9 *•<«• ovov Sony jipo*o\/' ) . Those who a c c e p t t h i s d o c t r i n e , t h e n , 
a d m i t t o degrees o f a b i l i t y i n a s s e s s i n g what i s advantageous, p r o f i t a b l e , 
o r good ( $Z c<Z tTvpi^i:poi/c*. saucy 9 juij trv/j^tpovc* ct&fir&di) , and t h e i r 
p o i n t o f emphasis i s t h a t j u s t i c e and t h e o t h e r v i r t u e s a r e c o n v e n t i o n a l , 
as depending f o r t h e i r v a l i d i t y on common o p i n i o n and enactment. S o c r a t e s 
does n o t say i n e x a c t l y what r e s p e c t those who m a i n t a i n t h i s t h e o r y a r e 
d e p a r t i n g f r o m P r o t a g o r a s ' c o n c e p t i o n (AU oa-oi. f£ pt, T^vtdV«t<r< T:»V 
"ftpufttiy/p*,/ \byovtTL.\/, ) , u n l e s s i t i s f r o m an i m m o r a l i s t c o n s t r u c t -
i o n upon t h e d o c t r i n e w h i c h was f o r e i g n t o P r o t a g o r a s ' own v i e w . We know, 
f o r example, t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e m o r a l sense on w h i c h t h e y were 
based was t o be honoured by a l l men i n p r e f e r e n c e t o t h e l i f e o f n a t u r e 
((K«it v y o v ^ y t &6S rrpia1 c-Afol, co^ *>tj SM/tft>\/ d\^oZt u.<t S t u f f y e t -
C-Kfi*' Kreu/Ut/ Ivs vo<T9V TToKtu>S. \ P r o t a g o r a s 322D) . The r e p o r t o f 
P r o t a g o r a s ' t h o u g h t i n t h e T h e a e t e t u s does n o t d e p a r t f r o m t h i s v i e w , f o r 
i t i s t h e r e i m p l i e d t h a t t h e man who i s a b l e t o t e a c h what i s b e n e f i c i a l 
w i l l n o t assume t h a t t h e j u s t i c e o f common consent must g i v e p l a c e t o 
a h i g h e r o r d e r o f j u s t i c e . R a t h e r , he w i l l cause what a g i v e n s o c i e t y 
r e g a r d s as b e n e f i c i a l (.XfyrCtl) b o t h t o be and t o seem b e n e f i c i a l (167C) . 
I f P l a t o emphasizes t h e p o s s i b l e r e l a t i v i s m o f t h i s d o c t r i n e i n t h e 
T h e a e t e t u s i t w i l l be remembered f r o m t h e P r o t a g o r a s t h a t t h e w i s e man, 
no l e s s t h a n any o t h e r c i t i z e n , must share i n common m o r a l sense. Those, 
however, who d i d d i s v a l u e t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l v i r t u e s , o r t h e v i r t u e s o f 
common c o n s e n t , and c o n t r a s t e d them w i t h t h e j u s t i c e o f n a t u r e , t o o k t h e 
P r o t a g o r e a n d o c t r i n e i n a t r a n s v a l u e d sense and c l a i m e d t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l 
j u s t i c e t h w a r t e d r a t h e r t h a n promoted what i s t r u l y advantageous. ^Here ^ 
we may c i t e Laws 890A^ ( 2. f'JV p t k t c + i . HM eZtv, CeCt- (-K^ercu fc'riCc, 
where P l a t o adapts t h e T h e a e t e t u s ' c o n c e p t i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n a l j u s t i c e t o 
t h e v i e w w h i c h h e l d t h a t , t r u e j u s t i c e i s n o t r e n d e r e d v a j i d , h y common t c o n s e n t 
True j u s t i c e , r a t h e r , c o n s i s t s i n t h e success o f f o r c e ( zo OLAI/LIOZAZOI/ O Z.C 
r t y <V i/cui $uJ)ey t - f f f , ) . I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s c o n c e p t i o n P r o t a g o r a s 
m a i n t a i n s ' t h a t t r u e j u s t i c e i i s based on a f u n d a m e n t a l sense o f j u s t i c e 
o r r i g h t w h i c h i s common t o a community's members. 
sense i s b o t h n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t t o a community's h a v i n g c i v i c 
a r t , b u t the. community's p r e s e n t agreement as t o what i s j u s t . 
s a t i s f i e s t h e presence o f j u s t i c e and consent i n t h a t community. T h i s 
i m p l i e s t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l j u s t i c e - what a g i v e n community accepts as i t s 
m o r a l n o r m s — i s s a n c t i o n e d by a p r e s e n t agreement as t o what i s j u s t 
r a t h e r t h a n by a u n i v e r s a l c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e , t h e knowledge o f w h i c h 
w o u l d p e r f e c t p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The c r i t e r i o n o f consent f o r P r o t a g o r a s 
i s , as G u t h r i e p o i n t s o u t , f a c t u a l and n o t n o r m a t i v e . 7 P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n 
d i f f e r s f r o m t h i s . 
I n s e e k i n g t o c o u n t e r t h e c l a i m t h a t e x t e r n a l advantage l e g i t i m i z e s 
c o n s e n t P l a t o , no l e s s t h a n h i s n a t u r a l i s t opponents, s u b o r d i n a t e s t h e 
f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n , w h e t h e r t h e r e i s agreement i n a community as t o what 
i s j u s t , t o t h e n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n , what c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e f u l f i l s a 
man's t r u e s t needs. P l a t o , t h e n , defends t h e v a l i d i t y o f nomos on t h e 
b a s i s o f h i s b e l i e f i n a n a t u r a l s t a n d a r d o f j u s t i c e w h i c h makes t h e 
f u l f i l m e n t o f t h o s e needs p o s s i b l e . A man's obedience t o t h e demands o f 
t h i s n a t u r a l c r i t e r i o n u n d e r l i e s h i s obedience t o t h e laws o f t h e community. 
I n s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h i s i s so, P l a t o i s making a c l a i m t h a t d i f f e r s f r o m 
P r o t a g o r a s ' b e l i e f . P r o t a g o r a s b e l i e v e s t h a t m o r a l sense u n d e r l i e s t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f c i v i c a r t . B u t P l a t o suggests t h a t a community's consent 
i s u l t i m a t e l y l e g i t i m i z e d by a u n i v e r s a l , r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e 
r a t h e r t h a n o n l y by a p r e s e n t agreement as t o what i s j u s t . I n r e j e c t i n g 
t h e n o t i o n o f t h e d i s c r e t e o r i g i n o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e P l a t o a l s o r e j e c t s 
what i s i m p l i c i t i n t h i s t h e o r y , t h a t t h e laws o f t h e community a re 
a r t i f i c i a l , as b e i n g dependent on human s a n c t i o n . He t h e r e f o r e assumes, 
as a g a i n s t P r o t a g o r a s , t h a t a man's consent i s l e g i t i m i z e d by h i s 
o b e y i n g a n a t u r a l c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e . T h i s means t h a t t h e d u t y t o 
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obey t h e laws o f t h e community i s n a t u r a l s i n c e t h i s d u t y proceeds f r o m 
t h e demands o f a c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e w h i c h i t s e l f i s u n i v e r s a l o r 
n a t u r a l . ^ 
I f we a l l o w t h a t m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e a r e c o - e x t e n s i v e then 
i t c o u l d be s a i d on t h i s v i e w t h a t men may choose t o obey t h e community's 
l a w s , b u t i t c o u l d n o t be s a i d t h a t t h e y have chosen ab i n i t i o w h e t h e r 
t h e r e s h o u l d be law o r some f o r m o f p o s i t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t , where a 
sense b o t h o f o b l i g a t i o n and i n t e r e s t w o u l d u n d e r l i e t h a t c h o i c e . I t 
i s d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r we meet w i t h t h e l a t t e r v i e w , w h i c h i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
t h e v i e w o f Locke, i n a n t i q u i t y . The case w h i c h Glaucon c i t e s i n t h e 
R e p u b l i c c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e p r o p o n e n t s o f t h e t h e o r y he d e s c r i b e s 
assumed t h a t o n l y a sense o f i n t e r e s t ( o r e x t e r n a l advantage) c o u l d 
u n d e r l i e such a c h o i c e . We s h o u l d emphasize t h a t f o r t h e s e t h i n k e r s 
t h e t h e o r y o f d i s c r e t e o r i g i n c a r r i e d w i t h i t an i m m o r a l i s t c o n n o t a t i o n . 
P r o t a g o r a s , t o o , r e g a r d s t h e n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n as l a c k i n g m o r a l i t y . 
The h i s t o r i c a l myth o f t h e P r o t a g o r a s , however, i l l u s t r a t e s an i m p o r t a n t 
r e s p e c t i n w h i c h b o t h he and P l a t o a r e o f one mind: t h a t g i v e n n i o y a l i t y j 
t h e r e must be some f o r m o f p o s i t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t o r p o l i t i c a l o r d e r . 
Where t h e y d i f f e r i s i n t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n s o f what i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r 
co n s e n t . Since P r o t a g o r a s b e l i e v e s t h a t a community's agreement as t o 
what i s j u s t i s s u f f i c i e n t he does n o t i m p l y , as P l a t o does, t h a t consent 
must v e r i f y o r c o n f i r m , i f o n l y i m p l i c i t l y , a man's b e l i e f i n a n a t u r a l 
c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e . Consent, o r t h e d u t y t o obey, a r e t h e r e f o r e 
l e g i t i m i z e d b y agreement, n o t by c o n f i r m a t i o n o f a n a t u r a l c r i t e r i o n . 
Here we s h o u l d emphasize t h a t i n P r o t a g o r a s ' case t h e v i e w t h a t t h e l a w s 
o f t h e community a r e a r t i f i c i a l means t h a t a community's agreement as 
t o what i s j u s t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r c o n s e n t , t h a t change i s i n h e r e n t t o 
law . Y e t t h e ' o r i g i n a l ' o f consent i s , f o r P r o t a g o r a s , t h e agreement 
o f t h e community, n o t t h e s a n c t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . He, no more t h a n 
P l a t o , assumes t h a t consent u l t i m a t e l y i m p l i e s a m o r a l c h o i c e t h a t must 
be f r e e o f p o s i t i v e command. Were t h i s i m p l i c i t i n P r o t a g o r a s ' v i e w 
he w o u l d have needed t o r e g a r d t h e n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n o f man as m o r a l 
b u t n o t p o l i t i c a l . B u t b o t h he and P l a t o a r e committed t o t h e v i e w t h a t 
p o l i t i c a l community i s t h e e f f i c i e n t s o u r c e o f a c i t i z e n ' s b e l i e f o f 
what i s j u s t o r b e n e f i c i a l . For t h i s r e a s o n , i t c o u l d be s a i d t h a t 
P r o t a g o r a s , as much as P l a t o , supposes t h a t t h e d u t y t o obey t h e la w s 
o f t h e community.is ' n a t u r a l ' . B u t t h a t c o u l d n o t mean i n P r o t a g o r a s ' 
case ( a s i t must i n P l a t o ' s ) t h a t a c i t i z e n ' s c o n f i r m a t i o n o f b e l i e f 
i n a u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e l e g i t i m i z e s c o n s e n t . For 
t h e n , t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r con s e n t i s g i v e n must be n o r m a t i v e and n o t 
f a c t u a l . For P r o t a g o r a s , men's s h a r i n g m o r a l sense u n d e r l i e s p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e , b u t agreement as t o what i s j u s t e s t a b l i s h e s c o n s e n t . 
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We f i n d a p r i m a r y source f o r P l a t o ' s own c o n c e p t i o n i n t h e Apology 
and t h e C r i t o . T h e r e , t h e p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t r u c t i o n P l a t o p l a c e s on t h e 
d o c t r i n e o f covenant i s t h a t t h e d u t y t o obey i s n o t r e n d e r e d v a l i d ab 
i n i t i o b y an u n d e r t a k i n g , t h a t an agreement as t o what i s j u s t i s n o t 
i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t f o r c o n s e n t . R a t h e r , a man has a p r i m a r y d u t y t o obey 
e t e r n a l l a w s . I t i s t h e n open t o a man t o c o n f i r m t h i s d u t y b y o b e y i n g 
t h e l a w s o f t h e community. P l a t o suggests b y t h i s t h a t a man r e c o g n i z e s 
k i n s h i p between t h e laws o f h i s c i t y and t h e h i g h e r l a w s . He r e c o g n i z e s 
t h a t h i s d u t y t o obey t h e laws o f t h e community conforms t o t h e d u t y t o 
obey h i g h e r l a w s , t h a t t h e d u t y t o obey i s n a t u r a l and i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h 
a man's d e s i r e t o r e a l i z e h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t s . So f a r , then,we have d e a l t 
w i t h two approaches w h i c h P l a t o d i s c u s s e s i n r e s p e c t o f t h e q u e s t i o n o f 
p o l i t i c a l c o n s e n t . These d e r i v e f r o m the f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n , what i s 
t h e l e g i t i m a t e b a s i s o f men's consent t o law: an agreement o r an under-
t a k i n g as t o what i s j u s t and l a w f u l , founded on a common m o r a l sense, 
o r , men's i m p l i c i t c o n f i r m a t i o n , t h r o u g h o b e y i n g l a w s , o f an i d e a l 
c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t i c e , t h e knowledge o f w h i c h w o u l d p e r f e c t human needs? 
We have mentioned a n o t h e r p r o b l e m w h i c h P l a t o r e g a r d e d as o f f i r s t i m p o r t -
ance: w h e t h e r t h e r e i s p a r i t y o f d u t y among t h e members o f a community 
t o obey i t s l a w s ? An i m p o r t a n t c o r o l l a r y a t t a c h e s t o t h i s q u e s t i o n : 
w h e t h e r any i n d i v i d u a l o r group o f i n d i v i d u a l s , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s , 
i s t h e so u r c e o f law and t h e d u t y t o obey? ( C f . n 4 supra ) 
The A p o l o g y and t h e C r i t o d e a l i m p o r t a n t l y w i t h a s u b j e c t we have n o t 
d i s c u s s e d i n any d e t a i l : on what grounds may an i n d i v i d u a l l e g i t i m a t e l y 
c h a l l e n g e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y ? I n d e a l i n g w i t h t h i s s u b j e c t t h e s e 
d i a l o g u e s f o c u s o u r a t t e n t i o n on t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e p a r i t y o f d u t y t o 
obey l a w s , t h e s o u r c e o f l a w , and a man's i n t e r e s t i n o b e y i n g l a w s . 
60. 
Here, although P l a t o emphasizes the n o t i o n of k i n s h i p between e t e r n a l 
laws and a community's laws, we do not y e t f i n d the p u r p o r t t o p o l i t i c a l 
theory of h i s developed b e l i e f , mentioned above, i n an i d e a l c r i t e r i o n of 
j u s t i c e . At t h i s p o i n t i n our chapter i t w i l l be u s e f u l to i n d i c a t e i n 
f u r t h e r d e t a i l the p o i n t s of d o c t r i n e i n e i t h e r dialogue which a s s i s t us 
i n understanding the d o c t r i n e of consent which both dialogues o f f e r as 
a whole. We s h a l l then discuss w i t h i n the context of the Apology i t s e l f , 
Socrates' challenge to h i s accusers t o show him t h a t he had been u n j u s t . 
Following t h i s , we s h a l l r e f e r again to the e a r l y books of the Republic 
i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Apology, to i l l u s t r a t e f u r t h e r the S o c r a t i c 
theory of consent. F i n a l l y , we s h a l l complete t h i s chapter by o f f e r i n g 
a more d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the C r i t o and i t s r e l a t i o n to the d o c t r i n e 
of the Apology. 
* * * 
I have s a i d i n the f i r s t s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter t h a t P l a t o develops 
a theory of covenant i n the C r i t o which i s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the received 
view. I n order to analyse f u r t h e r h i s conception of Socrates' treatment 
of the question of consent we may discuss the sub j e c t under two heads: 
Plato's statement of Socrates' moral p o s i t i o n i n the Apology and the 
C r i t o | the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s p o s i t i o n to Plato's p o l i t i c a l thought. 
F i r s t , a general statement about the consistency of Socrates' p o s i t i o n 
i n the two dialogues. 
We have sai d t h a t contemporary op i n i o n t r e a t e d the question about the 
v a l i d i t y of conventional j u s t i c e i n terms of the question whether i t 
p r o f i t s a man to obey the laws of the community. I n the Apology and the 
C r i t o P l a t o repudiates the b e l i e f t h a t a man's consent to the laws i s 
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i n h i s defence, t h a t he has always made a p u b l i c p r o f e s s i o n of h i s 
b e l i e f s (32A f f . ) . We s h a l l see t h a t Socrates' n o t i o n of p u b l i c p r o f e s s i o n , 
whether by means of act or statement of b e l i e f u n d e r l i e s the f a c t t h a t he 
has no r i g h t f u l a l t e r n a t i v e to obeying the law. I t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t a t 
t h i s p o i n t i n the discussion to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s conception b r i e f l y . I t 
was w i t h i n f u l l view of p u b l i c o p i n i o n t h a t Socrates dissented from the 
b e l i e f t h a t obedience to the law depends on m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y . I t was i n 
t h i s same s p i r i t of p u b l i c p r o f e s s i o n t h a t he expressed h i s disapproval 
of the i l l e g a l a c t i o n s of the T h i r t y . Moreover, he i m p l i e s t h a t i t would 
be i n f u l l view of the law t h a t he would c a r r y out h i s mission, though i n 
so doing he might be subject to c e r t a i n a r r e s t and condemnation. When 
he says i n the Apology that h i s duty to obey conscience overrides a 
contrary v e r d i c t of the c o u r t , Socrates i s saying t h a t i f he i s to d e s i s t 
from h i s mission then the law must force him to d e s i s t . But given h i s 
b e l i e f t h a t obedience to the law does not depend on m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t , 
and given h i s p u b l i c p r o f e s s i o n of t h i s b e l i e f , then h i s p o s i t i o n i s t h a t 
i n seeking to f u l f i l l h i s mission he would not evade the consequences, 
l e g a l or otherwise, of so doing. He i s also saying t h a t a man mightaot- from 
a conscientious d e c i s i o n which met w i t h s o c i e t y ' s disapproval and condemn-
a t i o n and y e t s t i l l be bound to obey the law. This i s the p o s i t i o n t h a t 
i s common to both dialogues. I t i s the source of consistency between them. 
Thus, Socrates imagines a possible c o n d i t i o n the court might hold out to 
him: "This time, Socrates, we s h a l l not f o l l o w Anytus' advice, but w i l l 
f r e e you on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t you cease to spend time i n your i n v e s t i g -
ations and i n your love of i n q u i r y . I f you are seen to continue t h i s 
p r a c t i c e you w i l l be put to death" (29CD). Socrates says t h a t h i s r e p l y 
c o n d i t i o n a l on the e x t e r n a l or m a t e r i a l advantages t h a t accrue from 
obedience. He describes the S o c r a t i c a t t i t u d e i n t h i s matter by means 
of a dilemma: could a man avoid breaking f a i t h w i t h the es t a b l i s h e d laws 
which he had always b e l i e v e d i t was h i s duty to obey i f , i n disagreeing 
w i t h the v e r d i c t o f a l e g a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d c o u r t , he b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s 
duty to obey h i s conscience had a claim on him t h a t was p r i o r to t h a t 
c o urt's decision? The question i s u l t i m a t e l y resolved by Socrates' b e l i e f 
t h a t the discharge of the duty of obedience t o the laws i s compatible w i t h 
what i t i s i n man's best i n t e r e s t t o do. With t h i s conception Socrates 
combines h i s b e l i e f t h a t w h i l e the duty to obey conscience i s p r i o r t o 
the duty to obey the laws, i t does not supersede the l a t t e r duty. Rather, 
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the former duty i s consonant w i t h the duty to obey the laws. For purposes 
of convenience I s h a l l regard the f i r s t of Socrates' r e s o l u t i o n s as h i s 
moral p o s i t i o n , and the second as h i s p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n . Socrates says 
i n the Apology t h a t he would carry out h i s mission, i f released by the 
co u r t , despite subsequent a r r e s t and i t s consequences. He claims i n the 
C r i t o t h a t i t i s wrong t o disobey law. I f the substance o f h i s teaching 
was t h a t the soul's w e l l - b e i n g i s a man's primary concern then he would 
have been i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e i f , i n the case of the C r i t o , 
he had chosen to accept o f f e r s of assistance t h a t would have l e d to h i s 
escape from Athens. Had he done so he would have contravened a v e r d i c t 
of the cou r t t h a t had been l e g a l l y given. He could have i m p l i e d by t h i s 
a c t i o n t h a t obedience t o the laws i s c o n d i t i o n a l on a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t , 
the s e c u r i t y of h i s l i f e . We must remember here what Socrates has said 
Socrates does not mean t h a t merely by obeying the laws i s i t probable 
t h a t a man stands to act i n h i s best i n t e r e s t . He r a t h e r means t h a t a 
man must obey the laws i n order to act i n h i s best i n t e r e s t . Only by 
mai n t a i n i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n can Socrates resolve the dilemma of obedience 
t o conscience and to law which the two dialogues put before him. 
62. 
to the cou r t would be: " I f you set me f r e e on t h i s c o n d i t i o n , men of 
Athens, I s h a l l both respect and love you but I s h a l l obey d i v i n e command 
r a t h e r than you, and so long as I remain a l i v e and am able I s h a l l not 
stop p h i l o s o p h i s i n g . " ( I b i d . ) Socrates i m p l i e s by t h i s t h a t so long as 
the law leaves him f r e e to do so, he w i l l continue w i t h h i s mission. He 
does not say, however, t h a t he would attempt to evade the consequences 
of doing so. He t h e r e f o r e puts himself openly at the laws' d i s p o s a l . " ^ 
I n so doing he proceeds i n h i s actions from conscience and also a t t e s t s 
to h i s duty to obey the law. 
We may now begin to examine i n more d e t a i l the nature of Socrates' 
moral p o s i t i o n : h i s b e l i e f t h a t the discharge of the duty o f obedience 
i s compatible w i t h what i t i s i n a man's best i n t e r e s t to do. Socrates' 
b e l i e f i n t h i s turns on the f o l l o w i n g question: whether a man contravenes 
h i s i n t e r e s t s by di s r e g a r d i n g p u b l i c approval and so disgraces himself 
(Apology 28B). The C r i t o provides a c o r o l l a r y to the b e l i e f t h a t disregard 
of p u b l i c approval occasions disgrace: a man could not be serving h i s 
best i n t e r e s t s i f he d i d not r e q u i t e an i n j u s t i c e done him even i f by so 
doing he would disobey the laws. I n denying these claims Socrates i s 
denying C r i t o ' s claim t h a t a man who disobeyed an unconscionable d e c i s i o n 
of a c o u r t would be a c t i n g i n h i s best i n t e r e s t . He i s also denying t h a t 
i f a man d i d not disobey he would be a cause of disgrace and shame both 
to h imself and others. This d i s t i n c t i o n of view between Socrates and 
and C r i t o i s v i t a l and w i l l occupy our a t t e n t i o n below. F i r s t , however, 
i t i s important to emphasize t h a t i n denying C r i t o ' s claims Socrates i s 
1 0 Cf. Si J L A M «a torn r^«v*i»»6lv€0'f:(29D) , w i t h : * f t zis 
OWL TT4p' £i/ev fwtT*C6 tc yllfc* h <Uow<r«a t f u 0 c< Kdl at fiA/Ui 
& tVcf »?K A V * . 1 ( 3 3 B ) " ' 
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also denying t h a t the man who obeys conscience i m p l i e s by so doing t h a t 
disobedience t o the es t a b l i s h e d laws could be j u s t i f i e d . Had Socrates 
proposed the l a t t e r view he would e f f e c t i v e l y have a f f i r m e d e i t h e r the 
contemporary b e l i e f , which i s i m p l i c i t i n C r i t o ' s plea (see below), 
t h a t i n seeking h i s advantage a man assumes he i s the equal of the law, 
or the i d e a l i s t i c b e l i e f i n a law of nature whose demands supersede the 
laws of common consent. These f a c t s bear as much on the p o l i t i c a l as 
the moral aspect of Socrates' p o s i t i o n . We s h a l l see t h a t they are bound 
up w i t h the b e l i e f , i m p l i c i t i n the C r i t o , t h a t a man's duty to obey the 
laws of the community i s n a t u r a l . 
We have sai d t h a t P lato describes Socrates' p o s i t i o n i n the C r i t o 
by means of a dilemma. This method involves us from the s t a r t w i t h two 
senses o f a man's w e l l - b e i n g or of a c t i o n which i t i s i n a man's i n t e r e s t 
to do. C r i t o ' s p o s i t i o n i s t h a t i f Socrates breaks f a i t h w i t h the 
est a b l i s h e d laws he w i l l avoid being a cause of disgrace to those whom 
common op i n i o n would expect to a s s i s t him i n escaping (45E,46A). C r i t o 
i m p l i e s by t h i s t h a t Socrates w i l l have r e q u i t e d a wrong done to him; 
f o r he w i l l have acted i n the obvious and, apparently, l e g i t i m a t e , i n t e r e s t 
of s e c u r i t y to h i s l i f e . By doing t h i s he w i l l have avoided b r i n g i n g shame 
upon h i m s e l f . ( I b i d . ) Now given C r i t o ' s p o s i t i o n Socrates' answer 
to i t i s p a r a d o x i c a l , f o r what he i n e f f e c t says i s t h a t i f he y i e l d s 
to C r i t o ' s e n t r e a t y he cannot then serve what i t i s t r u l y i n h i s i n t e r e s t 
to do. By y i e l d i n g to C r i t o ' s e n t r e a t y he would i n c u r shame. To serve 
h i s i n t e r e s t , and avoid i n c u r r i n g shame, Socrates btdieves he must bear 
the shame o f having committed i n j u s t i c e (Apology 39B). What Socrates i s 
saying t o C r i t o i s t h a t a man i s so bound i n conscience t o obey the laws 
which, by h i s former a c t i o n s , he has agreed to obey, th a t he cannot 
r i g h t f u l l y suspend the covenant so es t a b l i s h e d , though he might avoid an 
i n j u s t i c e to h i m s e l f by so doing. He i s also saying t h a t by obeying the 
laws of the community a man cannot be a c t i n g contrary to h i s true i n t e r e s t , 
though obedience might e n t a i l s u f f e r i n g e v i l . But the man who uses h i s 
in f l u e n c e even t o escape an unconscionable v e r d i c t r e t u r n s an e v i l f o r an 
e v i l . I n so doing he f a i l s to act i n h i s best i n t e r e s t . This i s compatible 
w i t h Socrates' claim i n the Apology t h a t he must obey h i s conscience; f o r 
he b e l i e v e d i t was i n h i s t r u e s t i n t e r e s t to do t h i s , and, as we have 
seen, a v i t a l c o r o l l a r y to t h i s cl a i m i s t h a t Socrates would not avoid the 
consequences of h i s a c t i o n s . I n the context of the C r i t o and Socrates' 
covenant w i t h the laws Socrates i s impl y i n g t h a t i f we use as a p r e t e x t 
f o r escaping Athens the f a c t t h a t the court judged the case wrongly ( i . e . 
unconscionably) we then admit t h a t r e q u i t i n g wrong i s only e f f e c t i v e l y 
countermanded by law i f a man i s unable t o r e q u i t e wrong. Plato i n d i c a t e s 
by C r i t o ' s ready acquiescence i n Socrates' proposal of t h i s p r e t e x t (50C2, 
50A4, Cp 49C2 f f . ) t h a t C r i t o accepts t h a t the c o n d i t i o n o f a man's 
obedience to law i s t h a t the law must secure a man's i n t e r e s t s . I f i t does 
no t , then i t i s t o be disobeyed given t h a t a man has the a b i l i t y to disobey 
i t . C r i t o thus proposes t h a t the laws of common consent are not a f i n a l 
a r b i t e r of r i g h t a c t i o n or of a c t i o n which i t i s i n a man's i n t e r e s t t o 
do (ASCr^Ert f t , % TwKp*c frj» o'uft /i*«u«V ff- Stupes tittup M Tp4-jj/* , 
{Tfacoi/ rrpoSt\i\f<*.(. t*e$o* fUz&jMtj ) . I n e f f e c t , C r i t o proposes t h a t i t i s 
r i g h t t h a t Socrates should disobey the law, t h a t i t i s r i g h t t h a t he 
should r e q u i t e an i n j u s t i c e men have done to him; f o r Socrates has the 
a b i l i t y to save himself i f only he w i l l do so. Only i n t h i s way can 
Socrates act b e n e f i c i a l l y (46A3) , so as t o win p u b l i c approval and avoid 
disgrace. P l a t o models C r i t o ' s b e l i e f on the values of common o p i n i o n . 
I t was against these same values t h a t Socrates posed h i s defence i n the 
Apology. The question which i s common to bo t h dialogues i s whether 
b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n , or a c t i o n which i s r i g h t , e n t a i l s u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
obedience to the laws. This question u n d e r l i e s the moral emphasis, as 
o u t l i n e d above, of Socrates' p o s i t i o n and the challenge t h a t C r i t o 
opposes to it . " ' " ' ' ' Underlying the moral emphasis of the argument i s the 
question what a c t i o n s of a man complement the a c q u i s i t i o n o f h i s t r u e s t 
i n t e r e s t . Here i t w i l l be important f o r us to consider Socrates' summary 
statement o f h i s mission a t Apology 29D f f . 
F i r s t , a general o u t l i n e of the problem which t h a t statement r a i s e s . 
Socrates says t h a t h i s mission was to teach men t h a t t h e i r primary concern 
i s the soul's w e l l - b e i n g . We s h a l l see t h a t he i m p l i e s by t h i s t h a t a 
necessary c o n d i t i o n of j u s t i c e i s t h a t a man's b e l i e f s should be t r u l y 
r e f l e c t e d by h i s a c t i o n s . We f i n d the basis of t h i s conception i n Socrates' 
b e l i e f t h a t a man should be and not seem to be j u s t , t h a t i t cannot repay 
a man to seem to be j u s t w h i l e not being so. We should mark t h a t t h i s 
conception i s opposed to the view which C a l l i c l e s of the Gorgias t y p i f i e s 
(488B, 490A, 491E f . ) which associates j u s t i c e w i t h mastery and advantages 
over o t h e r s , and i n j u s t i c e w i t h the emasculation of the str o n g by the 
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laws and customs of general consent (492A). This means, i n sum, t h a t 
I t would perhaps be more precise t o say t h a t C r i t o , r a t h e r than 
a c t i v e l y opposing Socrates' own b e l i e f , i s an u n w i t t i n g proponent of the 
view t h a t i n j u s t i c e can be b e n e f i c i a l . I t i s important to Plato's purpose 
t h a t C r i t o should imply t h a t t h i s i s so when he maintains t h a t i t i s 
r i g h t t h a t Socrates should y i e l d to h i s advice; f o r by ma i n t a i n i n g 
t h i s p o s i t i o n C r i t o i m p l i e s t h a t he supports the theory of c o n t r a c t t h a t 
P l a t o seeks t o counter i n h i s statement of Socrates' own conception of 
the theory (See ahead pp l©8ff ) . The b e l i e f t h a t i s i m p l i c i t i n C r i t o ' s 
plea i s t h a t a man would be j u s t when i t p r o f i t e d him to be so, but 
would be u n j u s t , were he able, when i n j u s t i c e brought greater b e n e f i t 
than j u s t i c e . To h o l d t h i s p o s i t i o n i s t o maintain t h a t the laws of 
common consent only e f f e c t i v e l y i n v a l i d a t e u n j u s t a c t i o n when a man i s 
not strong enough to be u n j u s t . 
12 (page 66) 
Socrates b e l i e v e s t h a t by disobeying or dishonouring the laws a man can 
n e i t h e r do what i s r i g h t nor act i n h i s best i n t e r e s t . He th e r e f o r e 
believes t h a t obedience to the laws i s compatible w i t h the f u l f i l m e n t of 
a man's t r u e s t i n t e r e s t . We must regard Socrates' conception about 
consistency between b e l i e f and a c t i o n ( h i s conception t h a t men should be 
and not seem to be j u s t ) as basic to these problems and as having an 
important bearing on h i s theory of consent t o the laws. I n Plato's 
Apology he discusses h i s views about b e l i e f and a c t i o n w i t h i n the context 
of h i s conception of a man's t r u e w e l l - b e i n g : t h a t the l a t t e r consists i n 
a man's a c t i n g so as to b e n e f i t both himself and o t h e r s . Since we wish to 
examine t h i s n o t i o n w i t h reference t o consent and the d o c t r i n e of c o n t r a c t 
i t w i l l be u s e f u l to r e c a l l here the main features of the c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t 
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C a l l i c l e s , l i k e Socrates, b e l i e v e s t h a t a man should be and not seem 
to be j u s t . For t h i s reason, both may be sai d to disavow the cautionary 
e t h i c i m p l i c i t i n C r i t o , t h a t a man should disobey the laws when he i s 
able should i t repay him to do so. This theory recommends obedience 
or disobedience depending on what a man's c a p a b i l i t i e s are. But C a l l i c l e s 
condemns those who are not able to disobey the laws and customs of general 
consent, f o r i n t h e i r p r a i s e of the l a t t e r they conceal t h e i r r e a l b e l i e f s 
(492B) . While C a l l i c l e s means by ' r i g h t ' a c t i o n , a c t i o n which achieves 
advantage over o t h e r s , he, no less than Socrates, b e l i e v e s t h a t the j u s t 
man cannot be one who conceals what he t r u l y b e l i e v e s (484A . . . , eifgt^tirc^s 
KVtla/l^ S&riroCff *f(-C(,pDS O FwA»$t >C-tl £vCd\t&t(. €$ *k*l/f^ VQ f M ifl/O-frUS 
We have s a i d t h a t the question posed by the Apology and the C r i t o i s 
whether b e n e f i c i a l or r i g h t a c t i o n e n t a i l s u n c o n d i t i o n a l obedience to 
the laws. By u n c o n d i t i o n a l obedience we s h a l l mean the f o l l o w i n g : that 
t r u e obedience to the laws, on Socrates' terms, excludes a man's winning 
p u b l i c approval by g i v i n g the appearance of j u s t i c e to h i s a c t i o n s , w h i l e 
a c t i n g from motives which i m p l i c i t l y exclude the i n t e r e s t s of others; t h a t 
a man's obedience i s r e q u i r e d even when he has the a b i l i t y to disobey. I t 
i s important to mark t h a t these c r i t e r i a are i m p l i c i t i n Socrates' p o s i t i o n 
(PP 77 f f . ) . I t i s important to observe, however, t h a t u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
obedience does not e n t a i l a man's remaining i n a community should he wish 
to leave, provided t h a t escape from the laws i s not i m p l i c i t i n h i s 
departure; t h a t u n c o n d i t i o n a l obedience does not debar a man from 
persuading the laws. 
view of co n t r a c t which Socrates opposes. Plato's u l t i m a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t theory springs from Socrates' r e j e c t i o n o f the 
conception of men's i n t e r e s t s t h a t was o f t e n i m p l i c i t i n the theory of 
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j u s t i c e which the c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t view maintained: t h a t one man's 
i n t e r e s t s i m p l i c i t l y exclude the p u r s u i t by another man of h i s i n t e r e s t s ; 
t h a t given the a b i l i t y e i t h e r to disobey the laws or to convert them to 
one's own advantage, a man should do so. I n e i t h e r case, a man obeys the 
laws or disobeys them from c o n s i d e r a t i o n of h i s i n t e r e s t s . The theory 
maintains, then, t h a t a s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r the existence of conventional 
j u s t i c e and law i s the s e c u r i t y to and the p r o t e c t i o n of a man's i n t e r e s t s 
14 
t h a t obedience t o the laws a f f o r d s * P l a t o , as we have suggested (p57 ) , 
devotes h i s main a t t e n t i o n to the moral i m p l i c a t i o n which he knew t h a t 
the d o c t r i n e might e a s i l y c a r r y : t h a t nomos conceals the t r u t h about what 
men take to be t h e i r r e a l i n t e r e s t s . A major aspect of the d o c t r i n e which 
Plato c r i t i c i z e s i s i t s suppos i t i o n t h a t a s u f f i c i e n t demonstration of 
I t should be remembered t h a t Protagoras, whom we must regard as a 
c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t , d i d not belong to the immoralist camp. Cf nn5, 6 supra. 
I t i s important t o emphasize i n respect o f t h i s t h a t the view of c o n t r a c t 
which Plato r e j e c t s i s one which assumes a n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n of men and 
a d i s c r e t e o r i g i n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n order to assert t h a t a man's tr u e 
w e l l - b e i n g c o n s i s t s of a c t i o n which i s of disadvantage to another. 
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The view i s s u c c i n c t l y r e j e c t e d i n Plato's l a s t p o l i t i c a l work, 
the Laws, where the Athenian gives a terse statement of h i s own view 
as^ compared t o t h a t of most other men: . . . gut vo vu/^^o-S^i c& ttel 6 * ^ c 
f/tittV tLffffiltt iti <C pLtljC4.fi/ yypiyttei, tdfilirtp a' 1(>WOL T r$ i'irS fytKt'teCtos 
y/-f' t-r ct- ft-JLc tivtit totrtucev fftvov &6u/. : 707D. This statement 
echoes the conception which Plato expresses i n the Apology and the C r i t o 
through c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Socrates' mission and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
laws of Athens:; What we should note i n the Laws passage i s the contr a s t 
between the attainment o f moral excellence over time and mere existence. 
We s h a l l see t h a t t h i s same conception u n d e r l i e s Socrates' n o t i o n of 
covenant i n the Crito,where the idea of co n t r a c t i s i m p l i c i t l y adapted 
to a conception of n a t u r a l ends. 
68. 
whether a man i s j u s t i s given by a man's ove r t approval of the laws and 
by h i s apparent w i l l i n g n e s s t o obey them. The basis of Plato's c r i t i c i s m 
of t h i s aspect of the d o c t r i n e i s i m p l i c i t i n Socrates' c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n a t Apology 29D f f . 
Before we examine the Apology f u r t h e r we may f i r s t summarize b r i e f l y 
the t o p i c s to which the n o t i o n o f b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n i s r e l a t e d . Socrates 
i m p l i e s i n h i s summary of h i s p r o t r e p t i c work t h a t he has dedicated h i s 
teaching both to h i s own p r o f i t and to t h a t of others. We have said t h a t 
he c a r r i e d out t h i s work i n f u l l view of the laws and of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , 
and t h a t he would not evade the l e g a l consequences of doing so (p 6l) . 
This f a c t , together w i t h a conception o f j u s t i c e ( o r r i g h t a c t i o n ) as 
regard f o r s e l f and b e n e f i c i a l regard f o r others, w i l l be seen to 
characterize Socrates' theory of obedience to law. We have already i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t the l a t t e r concept i s of importance to h i s n o t i o n of a man's best 
i n t e r e s t or h i s t r u e w e l l - b e i n g (p 66 ) . We should also emphasize t h a t the 
ground of h i s mission, as s t a t e d i n Plato's Apology, was h i s b e l i e f t h a t 
the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e requires more of a man than h i s regard f o r m a t e r i a l 
i n t e r e s t s : e i t h e r h i s own or those of others. We have i n d i c a t e d t h a t there 
i s a close a s s o c i a t i o n between the concept of a man's i n t e r e s t s and Plato's 
treatment of Socrates' b e l i e f ( i m p l i c i t i n the Apology and the C r i t o ) t h a t 
a man should seek to be and not seem to be j u s t (pp 65: f f X • With respect 
to the not i o n of consent, t h a t conception w i l l be seen to imply t h a t a 
man would f a i l t o act i n h i s best i n t e r e s t , even i f he obeyed the laws, 
i f h i s regard f o r others sprang from m a t e r i a l or p r u d e n t i a l motive; i t 
im p l i e s t h a t such a man could not t r u l y obey the laws. I n sum, i t i m p l i e s 
t h a t a man's e x t e r n a l acts are i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence of consent. 
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These notions u n d e r l i e the d o c t r i n e of consent as we f i n d i t i n the 
Apology and the C r i t o . They serve to d i s t i n g u i s h Plato's conception of the 
d i s t i n c t i o n betweenthe S o c r a t i c and the c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t t h e o r i e s . They are 
the roots of Socrates' n o t i o n of consistency between b e l i e f and a c t i o n from 
which Plato's developed theory of consent departs. 
* * * 
Socrates' treatment of b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n i s prefaced by h i s statement 
t h a t the charges brought against him had been the r e s u l t of long-standing 
slander and i l l w i l l t w T(oK\wv Su^oK^ rt uic ^$a/t{'. : 28A) of which 
Meletus who brought the charge, and Anytus, who supported i t from p o l i t i c a l 
motives, were only s p e c i f i c c a s e s . I n a l l t a n g i b l e respects the charge 
was brought on moral and r e l i g i o u s grounds. Whatever p o l i t i c a l ( v i z . 
f a c t i o n a l ) grounds there could have been f o r i t had t o remain i m p l i c i t 
since Socrates could not be charged i n respect of any personal a f f i l i a t i o n s 
t h a t t r a n s p i r e d p r i o r to the amnesty of 403. Despite t h i s , Socrates 
p o i n t s to two events i n Athens' recent past which could have won the 
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condemnation of b0-fch -the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The indictment s p e c i f i e s 
moral issues alone: t h a t Socrates does not b e l i e v e i n the gods the s t a t e 
b elieves i n but i n other strange d i v i n i t i e s , t h a t he i s a c o r r u p t o r of the 
young. Why then would Plato have hill assert a di s c l a i m e r of p a r t y l o y a l t y 
Thus, at 19B, Socrates says t h a t Meletus t r u s t e d i n the curr e n t 
p r e j u d i c e against him when he brought h i s charge (. . .$^o\^j . . . ^  ^ 
16 ' •> ' «« ' ~ ' 
32B: rot t-jui ( d u r i n g democracy's r u l e ) jvtvn Vpi/t+ve>*\/ 
li/Hct.ui&u}/ vf/2}/ y^'kv Win* rr^fdt *»j/*us {tut &±</c<«. 
fylprvj/') ;^ 32D:"E/vi yif 6Ktcfy 'i *ft«i ( t h e o l i g a r c h y ) i$<7r\tfw} 
ortwt 'JrLtpd. e'voV.* tZ<rt* C«- Cfiyu*fif^nci '• I n both cases Socrates 
s t a t e s t h a t h i s actions were governed by moral considerations alone. 
I f , on e i t h e r of these occasions he had been a r r e s t e d , but released on a 
c o n d i t i o n s i m i l a r to t h a t a c t u a l l y c i t e d i n the Apology (p 61 sup r a ) , 
there i s no reason to suppose that h i s stand would have been any d i f f e r e n t . 
He would then s u r e l y have spoken s i m i l a r l y t o the way Pl a t o makes him 
speak i n respect of the a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n he c i t e s . He would have s a i d 
(continued on page 70) 
i n h i s defence? There are two reasons f o r t h i s which we s h a l l develop 
below: i n the minds of Socrates' accusers (those who a c t u a l l y brought 
the charge) Socrates' alleged d i s l o y a l t y to the community's t r a d i t i o n a l 
precepts i m p l i e s c r i t i c i s m of the government t h a t would uphold these 
precepts. P l a t o , w h i l e not denying Socrates' c r i t i c i s m of t r a d i t i o n a l 
moral a t t i t u d e s , makes i t c lear through Socrates' d i s c l a i m e r of p a r t y 
l o y a l t y (Cf n 16) t h a t the moral p o s i t i o n of Socrates' case (Cf p6l 
supra), which the Apology r a i s e s i n i t s treatment of b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n , 
i s s u f f i c i e n t l y a b s t r a c t as to be undeserving of any i m p l i c a t i o n of 
f a c t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e . I f , then, d i s l o y a l t y to the present power i s 
i m p l i c i t i n the s p i r i t of the indictment (and we are a f f i r m i n g t h a t i t 
i s ) then t h a t f a c t serves Plato w e l l i n combining the question of consent 
to the community's established government w i t h h i s treatment of the charge 
of i r r e l i g i o n and c o r r u p t i o n . We s h a l l see t h a t these two questions are 
i n f a c t t r e a t e d by him as n a t u r a l complements. 
We have sai d t h a t Plato's d o c t r i n e of consent i s characterized by h i s 
r e j e c t i o n of the view t h a t nomos conceals what men take to be t h e i r r e a l 
i n t e r e s t s (pp56> > 66supra) . The l a t t e r n o t i o n i s characterized by the 
dictum 'Justice consists i n b e n e f i t i n g one's f r i e n d s and harming one's 
enemies (. . . xo pyfcL » t b £>(>K<t<.ov ecvctc r>M ^(Aoyj ^ t A t - t ^ 
fc'fpfyttt fiUnvetv • : Republic 336A) . This n o t i o n , whose i m p l i c a t i o n s 
permeate the thought of the R e p u b l i c , 1 7 underlies the charge against 
Socrates and h i s answer to the charge i n the Apology. 
With respect to our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Socrates' a t t i t u d e to the 
charge and h i s conception of b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n , we may begin w i t h some 
(continued from page 69) 
t h a t the r u l i n g p a r t y would need f o r c i b l y to r e s t r a i n him i f i t was 
embarrassed by h i s a t t i t u d e and h i s a c t i o n s w i t h respect to what j u s t i c e 
and obedience to laws r e q u i r e of a man. 
17(page7l). 
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remarks about h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f the good or worthy man a t Apology 28B f f . 
(Cf p62 supra). There, Socrates defines the good man as one who w i l l 
o nly consider (tfferret/) whether h i s p r o j e c t e d acts are those of a good or 
a bad man. He s t a t e s t h a t f e a r of m a t e r i a l consequences ought not t o 
the man who acts from m a t e r i a l motive i s one from whom l i t t l e good could 
be expected. I t i s important t h a t we f i x an exact meaning t o the phrase,. 
Interlocutor ( at 38B2. ) thinks that I t ID.only of hio f o l l y that Boorates 
should "be ashamed ( p 118 ). This vould mean that by the intcrlooutor's 
standard, Aohillee must bo counted 0.0 a poor fool f o r net 
considering the certain death that muat follow his slaying? Heotor# 
^ We should n o t e , w i t h o u t a t t h i s p o i n t developing the s u b j e c t , t h a t 
P l a t o adapts the values o f t r a d i t i o n t o h i s own p o l i t i c a l conception. 
A t Republic 375C, f o r example, he adapts Polemarchus 1 d e f i n i t i o n o f 
j u s t i c e (336A, supra) to h i s d e s c r i p t i o n ^ o f the temperament of the new 
community's guardians: cov* otiC<-ie>us tt(>*ovi JvCout €<f»u , IT/ies £f Vovj 
1T>X «-/•<•'> I»J ^ U o c t • . Polemarchus' d e f i n i t i o n o f j u s t i c e i s 
unacceptable t o Socrates because by i t , j u s t i c e e n t a i l s not only r e n d e r i n g 
b e n e f i t , b u t a l s o , doing harm. Unless by 'doing harm 1, Polemarchus had 
meant a c t i o n which m o r a l l y improves an e v i l man (and from the c o n t e x t o f 
Republic 335B f f . we may be sure he had not meant t h i s ) , h i s d e f i n i t i o n 
must a l s o be problematic; f o r as the Republic's f u r t h e r treatment o f 
j u s t i c e w i l l show, the dictum ' b e n e f i t i n g f r i e n d s , harming enemies' 
serves the p r u d e n t i a l theory of j u s t i c e which describes the ' f r i e n d ' , 
f o r example, as one whom i t m a t e r i a l l y pays a man to b e n e f i t even i f 
the f r i e n d i s not a good man and the enemy, whom i t pays t o i n j u r e , i s 
(See i n f r a , p 78f ) . 
What we wish t o note here i s t h a t Plato's reformism i s marked not 
by abandoning t r a d i t i o n b u t by r e v i s i n g i t . Thus Polemarchus 1 b e l i e f 
t h a t j u s t i c e c o n s i s t s i n b e n e f i t i n g f r i e n d s , harming enemies w i l l be 
u l t i m a t e l y r e v i s e d by P l a t o to take the form of the S o c r a t i c n o t i o n 
which we f i n d i n the Apology, t h a t j u s t i c e c o n s i s t s i n b e n e f i t i n g 
both oneself and o t h e r s . We s h a l l see t h a t t h i s conception u n d e r l i e s 
P l a t o ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the guardians a t 375C. But h i s d e s c r i p t i o n 
of the guardians there springs from a t r a d i t i o n a l tenet which belongs 
no l e s s t o the values c u r r e n t among p o l i t i c a l l y ambitious men such as 
Ismenias of Thebes (336A), or t o men o f decent p i e t y such as Polemarchus, 
than t o the re v i s e d values of the reformed s o c i e t y he describes i n the 
Republic. 
ig h (</7i>AoytJje<r&fr) m a we man's con s i d e r a t i o n s about h i s a c t i o n s , t h a t 
31 'utKpov ogtAbS ecrcci/j (B 7) . Burnet p o i n t s out t h a t Socrates 
Socrates takes the i n t e r l o c u t o r to assume t h a t m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , 
danger of l i f e or death, are the condi t i o n s t h a t should n a t u r a l l y determine 
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a man's a c t i o n s . The A c h i l l e s i l l u s t r a t i o n shows t h a t what the i n t e r -
l o c u t o r meant was t h a t the worthy man w i l l make m a t e r i a l considerations 
the standard of h i s a c t i o n s , whether r i g h t or wrong. For by t h a t standard, 
A c h i l l e s , who had a vested i n t e r e s t i n keeping Hector a l i v e , d i d not act 
i n t h i s i n t e r e s t . He i s t h e r e f o r e , according to the i n t e r l o c u t o r ' s 
standard, to be counted as a f o o l . The p o i n t Socrates makes i s t h a t 
A c h i l l e s foreswore t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the b e l i e f t h a t he was bound to 
avenge Patroclus' death. Socrates' i l l u s t r a t i o n shows t h a t considerations 
of l i f e and death d i d not deter him from doing so; and Socrates i m p l i e s 
t h a t he was not thereby, I^JLVKO j , f o r having refused to consider the 
pr o l o n g a t i o n of h i s l i f e i n l i e u of doing what he b e l i e v e d to be r i g h t . 
Such considerations would, r a t h e r , have r e s u l t e d i n shame ( K^LloLf tkdrcos 
28D 2 ) . Instead of t h i s , A c h i l l e s showed himself to be a good or worthy 
man. 
I t i s important t o draw a t t e n t i o n to what Socrates i s saying a t 28B 
f f . i n respect of a man's motive i n doing r i g h t a c t i o n . The A c h i l l e s 
i l l u s t r a t i o n i m p l i e s , c o n t r a r y to the i n t e r l o c u t o r ' s p o s i t i o n , t h a t 
considerations of m a t e r i a l cost are not p r o p e r l y germane to a man's 
determination to do r i g h t a c t i o n . This i s made e x p l i c i t a t 28E f . 
I t may be noted t h a t there i s an important a f f i n i t y between what 
Socrates says here about the good or worthy man and h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of 
the p r u d e n t i a l i s t view of j u s t i c e a t Republic 360D: t h a t men w i l l p r a i s e 
the man who has the power to do wrong b u t refuses to do so, though 
they w i l l t h i n k him a mindless and wretched man (/.(^Aui/CAces ,i('oj(roC*r*s ) • 
The importance of t h i s conception to the moral and p o l i t i c a l theory of 
the Apology and the C r i t o w i l l become apparent l a t e r i n the chapter. 
The i n t e r l o c u t o r had i m p l i e d t h a t knowledge of m a t e r i a l consequences i s 
a s u f f i c i e n t i n c e n t i v e to a man's avoiding shame i n h i s actions 
> C ' 
(Gttitj0tiff*ed) • But Socrates emphasizes t h a t shame of not doing what a 
man beli e v e s to be r i g h t (j&(-Xcio'Cev) , regardless of m a t e r i a l consequences 
to h i m s e l f , i s the sole motive of the good or worthy man (28D 6 - 1 0 ) . 
Socrates means by t h i s t h a t m a t e r i a l motive makes a man unworthy even i f 
a man who acts from such motive does what i s r i g h t . Thus, at 28E f he 
implies t h a t h i s own motive f o r standing ground i n b a t t l e (This was a c t i o n 
which was r i g h t i n respect of ot h e r s , the community whose b i d d i n g he 
f u l f i l l e d . ) could be a t t r i b u t e d to fe a r of s u f f e r i n g disgrace from not 
doing what common opin i o n and common sanction b e l i e v e d to be r i g h t , i f , 
by t h a t same standard, he might have avoided disapproval by disobeying 
a d i v i n e command which he i n t e r p r e t e d as a r i g h t f u l command despite what 
others might have supposed. Thus, Socrates would not have l i v e d up to 
h i s c r i t e r i o n of the worthy man, i f , during m i l i t a r y commission, he had 
behaved as most would expect and r e q u i r e a man to behave, but had on 
another occasion disobeyed a command of Delphi from f e a r , say, of p u b l i c 
censure ( f e Q t j j t x j 17 J UW oCiovf f/^/^ti-.. : 2 9 A ) • S u c h a c t i o n would 
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have been strange and i n c o n s i s t e n t (dtoU : 28D 10 ) . I t would have been 
so by the c r i t e r i o n of the good man who does what i s r i g h t not only 
because common opin i o n deems some a c t i o n r i g h t b u t , u l t i m a t e l y , because 
he believes he must do what i s r i g h t . The man who does what i s r i g h t only 
Tredennick (Penguin) goes f u r t h e r than most by h i s "shockingly 
i n c o n s i s t e n t " . That i s a good compromise, though, between Fowler's 
" t e r r i b l e t h i n g " and Burnet's "strange conduct". For i t b r i n g s out the 
idea which I have emphasized above t h a t considerations of death, f e a r of 
r e p u t a t i o n , - i n a phrase, m a t e r i a l considerations - are no r e a l measure 
of a man's worth even i f the man, c a l c u l a t i n g h i s own advantage, does 
what i s r i g h t from these motives. 
because common o p i n i o n or personal expediency requires r i g h t a c t i o n of 
him i s not a man of much worth. This n o t i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e of 
Socrates' r e p l y t o h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r . 
Socrates f u r t h e r emphasizes t h a t to have q u i t the s t a t i o n the god 
had assigned to him would have been t o show himself g u i l t y of the la c k of 
knowledge - knowledge of one's own ignorance - which he censures i n other 
men. He lends a strong moral tone to t h i s form of ignorance, saying that 
i t i s most shameful («/ff ^  £ £/l(i/6i$i<rCfis) > and he describes i t as the 
ignorance of supposing t h a t death i s the worst of e v i l s . He means by 
t h i s t h a t the man who i s moved i n a c t i o n from m a t e r i a l considerations 
displays deep ignorance of morally r i g h t a c t i o n . The l a t t e r requires a 
man to avoid actions that are e v i l and shameful, actions which one knows 
to r e s u l t i n i n j u s t i c e to others (disobeying a b e t t e r being, whether 
d i v i n e or human) w h i l e being unconcerned about actions whose r e s u l t to 
oneself one does not know to be good or e v i l (iTpe rtv z*nt lUktvv &StL 
occ /CUM. terccv, • • • fo^y'^dt Mt ytu^ojfrc '. 29B 7-9) . We may i n f e r 
Socrates' meaning from the context. He means t h a t the man who denies t h i s 
c r i t e r i o n lacks knowledge of h i s own ignorance. He lacks conscientious 
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knowledge. That he lacks t h i s knowledge (and so denies the S o c r a t i c 
I t may be emphasized t h a t Socrates saw h i s duty to the god as 
being f u l f i l l e d by spending h i s l i f e examining h i s own s t a t e of wisdom 
and t h a t of others (28E 5 ) , t h a t h i s response to the oracle given to 
Chaerephon was r a t i o n a l . Since the oracle always gave i t s p e t i t i o n e r s 
an ambiguous answer (Cf 21B 4) Socrates would not be expected to act 
w i t h o u t thought as to what the or a c l e can have meant. Here, we must 
remember h i s b e l i e f t h a t no god speaks f a l s e l y (21B 7-8), t h a t he b e l i e v e d 
i t was of the utmost importance to give f i r s t place to h i s discovery of 
what the ^ oracle had meant (tv#« it cLv&y/LtLteV efoitic (littt CV t»i> Btov 
Wtfit TfiHtrtfif TCoLiiodn.— 2IE3 -5) . Thus, h i s attempts to confute the 
oracle were devoted to e s t a b l i s h i n g f o r himself the t r u t h ( o r , r a t h e r , 
what t r u t h ) ^  the oracle can have enunciated ( Lv*> ytc n±i Ai/Cxiy KC*s 
<j f/lu rU^ytrvnco.'. 22A 6-7). 
(continued on page 75) 
c r i t e r i o n ) i s shown by h i s p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t d eath i s t h e w o r s t o f p e r s o n a l 
e v i l s , a p r e s u m p t i o n w h i c h governs h i s a c t i o n s i n r e s p e c t o f o t h e r s . Thus, 
A c h i l l e s , had he f a i l e d t o avenge P a t r o c l u s , w o u l d have shown t h a t h i s 
f e a r o f d e a t h had a p r i o r c l a i m on h i m t h a n a d u t y t o a kinsman. So 
S o c r a t e s , had he reneged h i s god's command, w o u l d have shown t h a t p u b l i c 
a p p r o v a l p r o v i d e s t h e f i n a l s a n c t i o n o f a man's a c t i o n s . We s h o u l d n o t e , 
f i n a l l y , t h a t S o c r a t e s i m p l i e s t h a t i t i s a man's want o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s 
knowledge t h a t w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a t r u e charge o f i n j u s t i c e {tut eiXiffiu/S . . . 
iuULut :29A 1 ) , t h a t l a c k o f such knowledge i s tantamount t o d i s b e l i e f 
i n gods ( I b i d . ) . 
I n sum, t h e n , h i s r e p l y t o h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r i n d i c a t e s h i s b e l i e f 
t h a t i n o r d e r f o r a man t o be w o r t h y he must e x e r c i s e r e g a r d f o r a n o t h e r 
f r o m t h e b e l i e f t h a t i t i s m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d t o t r e a t o t h e r s w e l l . We s h a l l 
see t h a t t h i s c o n c e p t i o n i s a m a i n - s t a y o f S o c r a t e s ' t h e o r y o f consent: 
t h a t a man's r e g a r d f o r a n o t h e r , as shown by h i s o b e y i n g a community's 
l a w s , does n o t q u a l i f y as t r u e consent i f t h e man obeys f r o m m a t e r i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n u n d e r l i e s S o c r a t e s ' b e l i e f t h a t a man's 
e x t e r n a l a c t s a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e o f consent ( C f pp 52 > 6'©: s u p r a ) . 
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Now t h e o r a c l e ' s meaning f o r S o c r a t e s was t h a t t h a t man i s w i s e who, 
l i k e S o c r a t e s , knows t h a t he i s w o r t h v e r y l i t t l e i n r e s p e c t o f wisdom 
( 2 3 B ) . From t h i s p o i n t ( s o B u r n e t ) t h e r e c o u l d no l o n g e r be any q u e s t i o n 
o f S o c r a t e s s e e k i n g t o c o n f u t e t h e o r a c l e . R a t h e r , he w o u l d a t t e s t t o 
what he t o o k i t s meaning t o be: t h a t human wisdom r e s t s i n a man's 
awareness o f h i s own i g n o r a n c e . The m o r a l a s p e c t o f Socrates^' obedience 
t o the^god's s t a t e m e n t , o f which^he g i v e s a h i n t a t 22D 7 {(tidscot f$tov 
Mj.i t'Uk\CL y(-yt*c*fo£wC*cvs<rh>JLc—), becomes dominant f r o m 28B f f , 
where he speaks o f what I have c a l l e d men's want o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge. 
I t i s u s e f u l t o p o i n t o u t t h a t S o c r a t e s says t h a t t h e god's meaning 
was p u t t h r o u g h h i s name ( tfy»(r/<<-/^t/V^,tt ft Cw tyZ o ^ ^ c ; ; 23A 8 - 9 ) , 
t h a t t h e god was u s i n g h i m as an example (ipi r-LpAtly/t*. Tioivv/tw? I b i d . ) . 
T h i s passage u n d e r l i n e s t h e i d e a t h a t S o c r a t e s b e l i e v e d h i m s e l f t o be t h e 
god's i n s t r u m e n t (lT> t r Kt/Lfytrjjj.) f o r p u t t i n g t h e c o n c e p t i o n t h a t a man i s 
w i s e who i s aware o f h i s own i g n o r a n c e , and t h a t S o c r a t e s ' obedience t o 
the god, as r e l a t e d t o us by P l a t o , t o o k t h e f o r m o f h i s e n c o u r a g i n g men 
to w a r d r a t i o n a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f s e l f . 
S o c r a t e s has shown by r e f e r e n c e t o the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t he m i g h t have q u i t 
h i s s t a t i o n f r o m f e a r o f p u b l i c c e n s u r e , t h a t t o have done so w o u l d have 
i n d i c a t e d h i s own l a c k o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge. He w o u l d have shown 
t h a t he had h i m s e l f supposed t h a t t he d i s c h a r g e o f d u t y was c o n d i t i o n a l on 
a m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , f e a r o f the consequences o f p u b l i c d i s a p p r o v a l . 
We see i n t h i s h i s b e l i e f t h a t a man does n o t t r u l y consent t o a r i g h t f u l 
command u n l e s s he i s moved t o f u l f i l i t f r o m t h e b e l i e f t h a t r i g h t a c t i o n 
i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d . We may c a l l t h i s a s p e c t o f S o c r a t e s ' t h e o r y 
o f consent t h e consent o f c o n s c i e n c e . ( C f p 61 s u p r a ) . B u t i n c a l l i n g i t 
t h i s we s h a l l n o t e t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e i s p r u d e n t i a l , f o r i t u l t i m E . t e l y 
i m p l i e s t h a t w r o ng-doing c o u l d n o t p r o f i t a man (See j j n f f r a ^ P P 84—87F) . 
S o c r a t e s saw i t as h i s d u t y t o t h e god t o p u t t h i s c o n c e p t i o n b e f o r e h i s 
f e l l o w c i t i z e n s . So f a r as t h a t i s t r u e t h e n o t i o n o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s consent 
p o i n t s t o h i s b e l i e f t h a t an i n j u n c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t f o r b i d d i n g h i m t o 
pursue h i s m i s s i o n c o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d as f i n a l . B u t i t p o i n t s as w e l l 
t o t h e more g e n e r a l b e l i e f t h a t a man's m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g i s n o t t h e 
c o n d i t i o n h i s d o i n g r i g h t a c t i o n , o r a c t i o n b e n e f i c i a l t o a n o t h e r . S i n c e 
w r o n g - d o i n g c o u l d n o t p r o f i t a man, consent f r o m c o n s c i e n c e i m p l i e s t h a t 
a man's r i g h t r e g a r d o f o t h e r s i s necessary t o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f h i s t r u e 
w e l l - b e i n g . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s b e l i e f i s S o c r a t e s ' c o n c e p t i o n t h a t obedience 
t o law f r o m t h e m o t i v e o f m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t i s n o t t r u e c o n s e n t . 
We have s a i d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f S o c r a t e s ' d i s l o y a l t y e n a b l e s P l a t o 
t o combine t h e q u e s t i o n o f consent t o t h e community's e s t a b l i s h e d g o v e r n -
ment w i t h h i s t r e a t m e n t o f t h e charge o f i r r e l i g i o n and c o r r u p t i o n ( p 7/0' 
s u p r a ) . The p i v o t a l q u e s t i o n i n t h i s i s t h e n o t i o n o f t h e consent o f 
con s c i e n c e b y w h i c h P l a t o i l l u s t r a t e s S o c r a t e s ' c o n c e p t i o n o f consent 
and t h e p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i c e , c o n t r a s t i n g t h i s w i t h t h e t h e o r y w h i c h he 
sees i m p l i c i t i n h i s a c c u s e r s ' s t a n c e . T h i s q u e s t i o n b r i n g s t o l i g h t t h e 
f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f S o c r a t e s ' n o t i o n o f b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n so f a r as t h a t 
c o n c e p t i o n p e r t a i n s t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f p o l i t i c a l c o n s e n t . H i s t h e o r y o f 
b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n opposes t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l t h e o r y t h a t a man's p u r s u i t o f 
h i s i n t e r e s t s i m p l i c i t l y e x c l u d e s t h e i n t e r e s t s o f o t h e r s . ( C f n 12 s u p r a ) 
I t d e n i e s t h e main t e n e t o f t h i s t h e o r y , t h a t a man's e x e r c i s e o f r e g a r d 
f o r o t h e r s f r o m weakness o r f r o m f e a r o f n o t d o i n g so i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r 
c o n s e n t t o t h e l a w s , S o c r a t e s i m p l i e s , b y r e j e c t i n g t h i s n o t i o n , t h a t 
c o n s e n t f r o m f e a r i s n o m i n a l and n o t t r u e c o n s e n t . A t A p o l o g y 28B f f . 
S o c r a t e s had c e n s u r e d t h e m o r a l i g n o r a n c e i m p l i c i t i n a man's b e i n g moved 
i n a c t i o n f r o m m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n (p74 s u p r a ) . He has i m p l i e d t h a t 
t h i s i g n o r a n c e amounts t o a want o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge, t h a t i t r e s t s 
i n a man's b e l i e f , h e l d f r o m deep m o r a l i g n o r a n c e , t h a t t h e d u t y t o r e g a r d 
a n o t h e r w e l l i s c o n d i t i o n a l . H e r e , a man's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o do r i g h t a c t i o n 
w o u l d n o t r e s t i n t h e shame o f n o t d o i n g i t ; i t w o u l d r e s t i n h i s c o n s i d e r -
a t i o n s o f what t h e m a t e r i a l l y p r o f i t a b l e c o u r s e o f a c t i o n w o u l d be. From 
A p o l o g y 29D f f . S o c r a t e s f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e s h i s r e j e c t i o n o f t h i s , t h e 
p r u d e n t i a l i s t case f o r r i g h t a c t i o n . HID r e j e c t i o n s t a n d s as. a d e n i a l o f i t s 
i m p l i c i t t h e o r y o f c o n s e n t . I n the A p o l o g y and C r i t o , P l a t o r e j e c t s t h e 
p r u d e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s by d r a m a t i c a l l y p o r t r a y i n g S o c r a t e s ' c o n c e p t i o n s 
o f b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n and c o n s e n t t o t h e l a w s . He a c h i e v e s t h i s i n t h e 
A p o l o g y b y showing t h a t A n y t u s ' and M e l e t u s 1 a c c u s a t i o n i s i r o n i c a l ; f o r 
i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t S o c r a t e s has done i n j u s t i c e , t h e y i n f a c t e x e m p l i f y a 
main t e n e t o f t h e p r u d e n t i a l i s t t h e o r y , t h a t j u s t i c e , o r r i g h t r e g a r d o f 
a n o t h e r can e n t a i l i n j u s t i c e . The C r i t o , assuming t h a t S o c r a t e s has had 
wrong done h i m , a t t e s t s t o h i s own b e l i e f t h a t r e q u i t a l o f wrong does n o t 
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l i e w i t h i n t h e bonds o f m o r a l i t y . These m a t t e r s f o r m t h e b a s i s o f o u r 
f u r t h e r s t u d y o f t h e Apology and t h e C r i t o . 
We may now r e t u r n t o our s t u d y o f Apology 29D f f . I n s t a t i n g t h a t 
n o t h i n g s h o r t o f f o r c e w i l l p r e v e n t him f r o m p u r s u i n g h i s m i s s i o n S o c r a t e s 
says t h a t he has t h e utmost r e g a r d and a f f e c t i o n ( B u r n e t ) f o r h i s f e l l o w 
c i t i z e n s , b u t he w i l l obey t h e god r a t h e r t han t h e y . He s t a t e s t h a t he 
w i l l f o r c e men (ir^ftAtkoyn/os r t tUc tiKvyt/tt. :29D 5,6) toward 
r a t i o n a l s e l f - e x a m i n a t i o n ( f ^ ^ r v ^ y * . . . eAtyJt*^ : 29E 4 , 5 ) , t h a t he w i l l do 
t h i s f o r t h e i r own b e n e f i t {tftusttpu/ /C/t Vf e<rBi/C<-Pu/. . . Koajeu>t ; 30A 2 , 3 ) . 
He d e s c r i b e s h i s own r e g a r d f o r o t h e r s , w h i c h he expresses i n h i s e l e n c h t i c 
a c t i v i t y , i n terms o f r e p r o a c h i n g men (ovu$(n> ) f o r t h e i r wrong-headed 
n o t i o n s about m o r a l good, o r v i r t u e («lfki<j) . We want t o show t h a t u nder-
l y i n g t h i s s t a t e m e n t ( 2 9 D - 30A) i s t h e v i e w t h a t a man's r e g a r d o f o t h e r s 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e man h i m s e l f i s j u s t o n l y i f he b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s own 
m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g i s n o t a c o n d i t i o n o f h i s d o i n g r i g h t a c t i o n , o r o f 
h i s d o i n g a c t i o n t h a t has b e n e f i c i a l r e s u l t t o a n o t h e r . For now, we s h o u l d 
r e c a l l i n r e s p e c t o f t h i s t h e v i e w o f h i s accusers t h a t S o c r a t e s , by 
p u r s u i n g h i s a c t i v i t i e s , has e x h i b i t e d t h e w o r s t d i s r e g a r d f o r h i s c i t y ' s 
customs, a d i s r e g a r d w o r t h y o f condemnation. B u t S o c r a t e s h e r e e x p l a i n s 
t h a t he has d i r e c t e d h i s r e p r o a c h , o r h i s ' d i s r e g a r d ' , t o w a r d e x p o s i n g t h e 
i g n o r a n c e o f h i s kinsmen (r#<J tiucoif : 39A 4 ) . H e r e , as a t 28B f f . , he 
c a r r i e s on w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g . He i n t e r p r e t s men's 
i g n o r a n c e i n terms o f t h e i r d e v o t i o n t o w e a l t h , r e p u t a t i o n , h o n o u r y ^ y ^ x f / > 
, tcpy ) . I n s a y i n g t h a t he reproa c h e s men f o r t h i s he h i g h l i g h t s h i s 
own b e l i e f t h a t v i r t u e ( i f t - r y ) does n o t r e s t i n men's m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t f o r 
one a n o t h e r ( 3 0 B ) . I f , b y e x p r e s s i n g t h i s b e l i e f , he i n j u r e s men and does 
n o t b e n e f i t them, t h e n , says S o c r a t e s , he i s g u i l t y o f i n j u s t i c e (Cf 
€c jt/W olv T&U AfjfuV • • •(J/W^fr^ - :30B 5 , 6 ) . These s t a t e m e n t s e m p h a t i c a l l y 
r a i s e t h e q u e s t i o n , i n what does b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n c o n s i s t ? They s e t t h e 
pace f o r S o c r a t e s ' f i n a l answer t o t h e charge o f i m p i e t y and c o r r u p t i o n . 
We may now t u r n t o our f i n a l t r e a t m e n t o f these m a t t e r s . 
F i r s t , a s h o r t s t a t e m e n t o f S o c r a t e s ' n o t i o n o f b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n so 
f a r as t h i s b e a r s s p e c i f i c a l l y on con s e n t . T h i s s t a t e m e n t w i l l s e r v e , i n 
p a r t , as a b r i e f r e v i e w o f ground we have a l r e a d y c o v e r e d ( C f . p66 s u p r a ) . 
I t w i l l a l s o s e r v e t o u n d e r l i n e t h e b a l a n c e o f t o p i c s w h i c h b e l o n g t o our 
assessment o f S o c r a t e s ' n o t i o n o f c o n s e n t . P l a t o p o r t r a y s S o c r a t e s ' 
a t t i t u d e t o r i g h t a c t i o n b y g i v i n g d r a m a t i c emphasis t o t h e b e n e f i t 
S o c r a t e s has p r o v i d e d o t h e r men, h i s concern f o r (€nji/6K C-t*.) t h e t r u e 
w e l l - b e i n g o f o t h e r s . A v i t a l a s p e c t o f S o c r a t e s ' t e a c h i n g , as d e s c r i b e d 
i n t h e A p o l o g y , i s h i s p r o p o s a l t h a t t h e t r u l y j u s t man ( t h e good o r w o r t h y 
man) b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e p e r p e t r a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i n j u r y , f o r h i s own s e c u r i t y ' 
sake, w o u l d be o f g r e a t e r i n j u r y t o h i m s e l f t h a n t o t h e r e c i p i e n t (30CD). 
An i m p o r t a n t c o r o l l a r y a t t a c h e s t o t h i s : i t i s t h a t r i g h t a c t i o n - a c t i o n 
i n r e g a r d o f o t h e r s - i n c l u d e s a man's c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f h i s own t r u e w e l l -
b e i n g ; ' r i g h t a c t i o n 1 , t h e n , i m p l i e s a c t i o n t h a t i s t r u l y ( n o t m a t e r i a l l y ) 
b e n e f i c i a l t o o n e s e l f . We may c a l l t h i s S o c r a t i c p r u d e n t i a l i s m . S o c r a t e s 
a t t e s t s t o h i s own n o t i o n o f consent t o law by d e n y i n g t h e c u r r e n t p r u d e n t -
i a l i s t b e l i e f t h a t a god ( o r a man) m i g h t compel a man t o i n j u r e a n o t h e r 
u n j u s t l y . By d e n y i n g t h i s b e l i e f , S o c r a t e s d e n i e s two p r o p o s a l s t h a t 
a t t a c h t o i t : t h a t ' j u s t i c e ' , where t h i s means o b e y i n g l a w s , can e n t a i l 
i n j u s t i c e , and t h a t j u s t i c e i s a r e a l b e n e f i t t o a n o t h e r man b u t o n l y an 
i n t e r m e d i a r y b e n e f i t t o o n e s e l f . Here we must remark t h a t consent o f 
co n s c i e n c e and consent t o law w i l l b o t h be seen t o f i g u r e as elements o f 
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t r u e c o n s e n t . We have s a i d t h a t S o c r a t e s g i v e s e x p r e s s i o n o f h i s own 
consent t o t h e laws by a c t i n g i n t h e i r f u l l v i e w (p 6l s u p r a ) . By 
c o n s e n t i n g t o c o n s c i e n c e he shows t o men what a t r u l y j u s t man's m o t i v e i n 
c o n s e n t i n g t o law i s : he consents t o law f r o m t h e b e l i e f t h a t t o do so i s 
r i g h t ( C f on 28E f . , p 73 s u p r a ) . H e r e , we must draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e 
c o r o l l a r y above: i t i m p l i e s t h a t t h e t r u l y j u s t man consents t o law i n t h e 
b e l i e f t h a t r i g h t a c t i o n e n t a i l s t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f h i s t r u e s t i n t e r e s t . 
I n r e s p e c t o f t h i s p o i n t we must emphasize t h a t S o c r a t e s , by a c t i n g i n f u l l 
v i e w o f t h e l a w s , has g i v e n d r a m a t i c e x p r e s s i o n t o h i s b e l i e f t h a t a man's 
e x e r c i s e o f r e g a r d f o r o t h e r s t h r o u g h o b e y i n g laws i s n o t , p r o p e r l y , 
c o n d i t i o n a l on m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y (Cf pp 72~73 s u p r a ) . H i s e x p r e s s i o n o f 
t h i s b e l i e f d e n i e s a p r i n c i p a l t e n e t o f t h e p r u d e n t i a l i s t t h e o r y ; f o r by 
r e f u s i n g t o d e s i s t f r o m h i s m i s s i o n , he has shown t h a t an i n j u n c t i o n o f 
h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s b i d d i n g h i m t o d e s i s t c o u l d n o t be r i g h t . We s h o u l d 
b r i e f l y n o t e one o t h e r f e a t u r e o f S o c r a t e s ' p o s i t i o n w h i c h i s o f i m p o r t a n c e 
t o t h e s e m a t t e r s : h i s p r o p o s a l s i m p l y t h a t obedience t o law and t h e 
e x e r c i s e o f o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n a r e t r u e and n o t f a l s e r e f l e c t i o n s o f 
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human n a t u r e . H i s p r o p o s a l s s u p p o r t a c l a i m o f t h e C r i t o , t h a t t h e d u t y 
T h i s n o t i o n i s i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h a n o t h e r one we have 
mentioned b e f o r e now: t h a t a man's e x t e r n a l a c t s a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t 
e v i d e n c e o f consent (P75 s u p r a ) . A b r i e f resume o f t h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l be 
a p p r o p r i a t e a t t h i s p o i n t . We see an i m p l i c i t d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f what JLS 
s u f f i c i e n t f o r consent f r o m what S o c r a t e s has s a i d a t Apology 28E f . (pp7'5 
79'supra) : t h e r e , he i m p l i e d t h a t mere obedience t o laws ( the e x t e r n a l 
a c t o f o b e y i n g them) t h a t s o c i e t y r e q u i r e s a man t o obey i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t 
f o r c o n s e n t ) . The man's consent i s o n l y t r u e consent i f i t i s a case o f 
th e consent o f c o n s c i e n c e . I n t h e b r o a d c o n t e x t o f P l a t o ' s argument w i t h 
p r u d e n t i a l i s m t h e man who w o u l d deny t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t h e a c t o f r e g a r d i n g 
a n o t h e r w e l l i s n o t u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d and i s a f a l s e r e f l e c t i o n o f 
human n a t u r e : v i z ; t h e p r u d e n t i a l i s t i m p l i e s t h a t men's h o r t a t i o n s t o 
r e g a r d one a n o t h e r w e l l ( t o p r a c t i s e j u s t i c e ) a r e o n l y a c o v e r f o r t h e i r 
n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n t o do t h e o p p o s i t e . T h i s d e n i e s two f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m s 
made: by P l a t o : t h a t t h e t r u l y j u s t man consents t o law i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t 
( c o n t i n u e d on page 80) 
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t o obey laws o f p o l i t i c a l community i s i t s e l f n a t u r a l . I n t h a t r e g a r d i t w i l l 
be u s e f u l t o r e c a l l h e r e S o c r a t e s ' b e l i e f t h a t t h e d u t y t o obey conscience 
p r e c e d e s , though i t does n o t supersede t h e d u t y t o obey e s t a b l i s h e d laws 
(p 61 s u p r a ) . 
We have i n d i c a t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e t o o u r d i s c u s s i o n o f Apology 30CD. 
Something now needs t o be s a i d o f i t s d r a m a t i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . T here, S o c r a t e s 
f o r c e f u l l y s t a t e s t h a t A n y tus and M e l e t u s a r e u n j u s t men, men who, i n t h e i r 
a t t e m p t t o k i l l a man u n j u s t l y , commit t h e w o r s t o f e v i l s . He says t h a t 
t h e i r a c t i o n i s more e v i l t h a n any m a t e r i a l i n j u r y (ottjotfctci/ac-- • • e^c-Xtio-ecei/ 
• • • *(Cij/u/irt-ttv ) he c o u l d s u s t a i n f r o m t h e i r i n j u s t i c e . He s t a t e s , moreover, 
t h a t t h o s e who a t t e m p t t o k i l l a man such as h i m s e l f ( vo<-olzo\/ o'vc< otov 
Zfuf ktyut) - one who had t a u g h t t h a t men's p r i m a r y c o n c e r n i s t h e s o u l ' s w e l l -
b e i n g - would i n j u r e themselves f a r more t h a n t h e y c o u l d t h a t man. I n d e e d , 
he s t a t e s t h a t t h e y w o u ld n o t be a b l e t o i n j u r e h im, f o r t o suppose t h a t a 
b e t t e r man m i g h t s u f f e r i n j u r y f r o m a worse i s t o suppose, w r o n g l y , t h a t t h e 
laws o f God o r man (&tyt.C0$ w o u l d p e r m i t o r s a n c t i o n such i n j u r y . Now, 
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d e s p i t e t h i s s t r o n g s t a t e m e n t , we may assume t h a t A n y tus and M e l e t u s 
b e l i e v e d t h a t S o c r a t e s had h i m s e l f committed i n j u s t i c e . B u t how does P l a t o 
i n t e r p r e t t h i s b e l i e f ? A t Apology 30CD So c r a t e s does n o t speak o f them as i f 
they were w e l l i n t e n t i o n e d b u t p r o f o u n d l y m i s t a k e n men. He speaks o f them, 
r a t h e r , as men who knew t h e y were c o m m i t t i n g i n j u s t i c e by b r i n g i n g t h e i r 
charge a g a i n s t him. Here, P l a t o w i s h e s t o d r a m a t i z e t h e a c c u s a t i o n and t o f i x 
21 ( c o n t i n u e d f r o m page 81.) 
i t i s i n h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t t o do so and n o t f r o m m a t e r i a l c o n v e n i e n c e ; 
t h e t r u l y j u s t man b e l i e v e s t h a t he i s r e q u i r e d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y ( r e q u i r e d 
by n a t u r e ) t o r e g a r d o t h e r s w e l l . 
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I t i s u s e f u l t o ^ j i o t e t h a t S o c r a t e s speaks o f h i s new a c c u s e r s as though 
t h e y were one man (&lces JI/W i<rws ect-Ctu • • •; noitu/ »i c\>C9<rt v& 7T>tfrc > 
. . . ) . T h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t as f a r as P l a t o was concerned t h e i r s i m i l a r i t y 
o f m o t i v e o v e r r i d e s any p a r t i c u l a r d i f f e r e n c e s . As S o c r a t e s i s a paradigm 
o f j u s t i c e , so they e x e m p l i f y i n j u s t i c e . Cf. n 15 s u p r a . 
t h e p l a c e o f Anytus and M e l e t u s i n t h e p r o c e s s a g a i n s t S o c r a t e s . He wishes 
t o p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e y , t h e u p h o l d e r s o f nomos, have a c t e d as i f t h e y knew 
t h a t t h e y were d o i n g wrong t o a man and b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e y were d o i n g so 
f o r t h e i r own p r o f i t . P l a t o b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e y have m i s u n d e r s t o o d S o c r a t e s ' 
r e p r o a c h o f Ath e n s . But he avowedly b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e y have i n t e r p r e t e d 
i t , u n j u s t i f i a b l y , as t r u l y damaging, when t h e y s h o u l d have known i t t o be 
b e n e f i c i a l . To p u t i t s h o r t l y , t h e y h o l d S o c r a t e s t o have committed i n j u s t i c e 
by h a v i n g damaged t h e i r r e p u t a t i o n s as w o r t h y men, by h a v i n g c a l l e d i n 
q u e s t i o n t h e knowledge o f t h e ' tLj.\o>. and r e d u c i n g i t t o a pose. 
P l a t o , r e g a r d i n g t h a t as t h e m o t i v e w h i c h u n d e r l i e s t h e i r c h a r g e , i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t t h e y e x e m p l i f y a deep s e a t e d m o r a l i g n o r a n c e , an i g n o r a n c e t h a t does 
n o t a b s o l v e them s i n c e i t i s t h e i g n o r a n c e o f s u p p o s i n g t h a t m a t e r i a l harm 
( i n o ur case, S o c r a t e s ' ' d i s r e g a r d ' o f men's r e p u t e ) i s t h e w o r s t o f e v i l s . 
(We s h o u l d n o t e t h a t P l a t o i m p l i e s , i n t h e c o n t e x t , t h a t t h e y r e g a r d t h i s 
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e v i l as w o r t h y o f r e q u i t a l , n o t o f punishment ) . Here, a t 30CD, P l a t o 
r e c a l l s t h e e a r l i e r a s s o c i a t i o n S o c r a t e s had made between t h i s k i n d o f 
23 " s 
t r S o c r a t e s says t h a t t h e y a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o k i l l a man u n j u s t l y , (atvbpa. 
eitmws C-f<<C-(/><ci' AMoKZit i/iWc. : 30D 5 ) . T h a t i m p l i e s t h a t i n P l a t o ' s 
v i e w t h e i n j u r y done t o S o c r a t e s was n o t done i n the s p i r i t o f ' i m p a r t i a l 
j u s t i c e " . That i s t o say, i t was n o t done i n t h e s p i r i t o f punishment, 
f a i r l y c o n s i d e r e d t o be deserved f o r a c t s b e l i e v e d t o be c r i m i n a l . Here 
t h e r e i s marked c o n t r a s t w i t h A c h i l l e s ' p o s i t i o n ( s u p r a ) . A c h i l l e s slew 
H e c t o r i n t h e name o f j u s t i c e and f o r shame o f n o t d o i n g what j u s t i c e 
r e q u i r e d . Had he s l a i n H e c t o r f r o m m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n (and P l a t o 
e m p h a t i c a l l y supposes he d i d n o t ) , t h e n h i s m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g w o u l d 
have been h i s m o t i v e i n d o i n g r i g h t a c t i o n . He w o u l d , t h e n , n o t have 
been a good o r w o r t h y man. But t h e case o f Anytus and M e l e t u s , i s 
i m p l i c i t l y f a r worse, f o r by k i l l i n g a man u n j u s t l y t h e y b o t h a c t f r o m 
m a t e r i a l m o t i v e and do wrong as w e l l . The t h o u g h t u n d e r l y i n g "cttffpil • • • 
ciiroK-CtAtfvVAi" i s t h a t S o c r a t e s ' a c c u s e r s , b e l i e v i n g t h a t he has done 
wrong, a l s o b e l i e v e t h a t a wrong deserves a wrong ( n o t i m p a r t i a l j u s t i c e ) 
i n r e t u r n . T h a t can o n l y mean, as we s h a l l p r e s e n t l y see, t h a t A n y t u s 
and M e l e t u s e x e m p l i f y t h e d a r k v i e w t h a t j u s t i c e , t h e advantage o f t h e 
s t r o n g e r power, e n t a i l s i n j u s t i c e . H e re, t h e ' s t r o n g e r power' i s common 
o p i n i o n (Cp. p 74 s u p r a ) , t h e p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t S o c r a t e s , and A n y t u s and 
Me l e t u s a r e i t s a g e n t s , i m p l i c i t l y b e l i e v i n g i t t o be t h e s o l e source o f 
j u s t i c e . 
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i g n o r a n c e and t h e want o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge (p 74 f - s u p r a ) . He 
wants t o have S o c r a t e s s p e l l o u t t o h i s a c c u s e r s t h a t t h e y , t h e champions 
o f law and t r a d i t i o n , e x e m p l i f y t h r o u g h t h e i r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i s 
m i s s i o n , t h e w o r s t t r a n s g r e s s i o n s a g a i n s t t h e v e r y meaning o f law and 
custom, t h e t r a n s g r e s s i o n s o f r a d i c a l , s e c u l a r t h o u g h t . P l a t o w i s hes t o 
make i t c l e a r t h a t S o c r a t e s ' a c c u s e r s , i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t he has committed 
i n j u s t i c e , a r e themselves a t l e a s t c o m p l i c i t i n t r u e i n j u s t i c e (Cf *v* 
ws . . . SuCtLiM \ P 75'supra) . Thus he c a l l s them u n j u s t men. Here, 
t h e i r o n y o f t h e i r case; i t i s t h e y , n o t S o c r a t e s , who i m p l y d i s b e l i e f i n 
gods. I n t h i s t h e y r e v e a l a p r o f o u n d i g n o r a n c e o f r i g h t a c t i o n and a man's 
t r u e i n t e r e s t . We may r e g a r d Apology 30CD as t h e d r a m a t i c f o c a l p o i n t i n 
t h i s d i a l o g u e w i t h r e s p e c t t o P l a t o ' s t r e a t m e n t o f p r u d e n t i a l i s m and 
b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n , t h e l a t t e r b e i n g t h e s u b j e c t s t h a t u n d e r l i e h i s n o t i o n 
o f j u s t i c e and cons e n t . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o draw a t t e n t i o n t o Apology 30CD 
a t t h i s p o i n t i n o u r d i s c u s s i o n , f o r what P l a t o says t h e r e i s v i t a l t o o u r 
f u r t h e r t r e a t m e n t o f S o c r a t e s ' n o t i o n o f c o n s e n t . W i t h t h i s i n mind we may 
now g i v e f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o P l a t o ' s b e l i e f t h a t Anytus and M e l e t u s 
r e p r e s e n t t h e want o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge. T h e i r want o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s 
knowledge i m p l i e s t h e i r acceptance o f t h e p r u d e n t i a l i s t n o t i o n o f j u s t i c e . 
H e r e , S o c r a t e s ' c h a l l e n g e t o M e l e t u s t o pro v e h i m a w i l f u l c o r r u p t o r o f 
the young i s r e l e v a n t . 
I n t h e exchange w i t h M e l e t u s (25B 5-26A) P l a t o has d e a l t w i t h t h e 
paradox "No man w i l l i n g l y does wrong" so as t o b r i n g o u t i t s p r u d e n t i a l 
f o r c e i n common sense terms. We may f i r s t c o n s i d e r t h e g e n e r a l r u n o f t h e 
argument and th e n d e a l w i t h t h o s e a s p e c t s o f i t w h i c h a re germane t o o u r 
s u b j e c t . The argument i s t h a t a man c o u l d n o t wrong h i s a s s o c i a t e s ( t h e 
young) i f he knew t h a t t o do so w o u l d r e s u l t i n h i s own i n j u r y . M e l e t u s ' 
24 a c c u s a t i o n t h a t S o c r a t e s has w i l l i n g l y c o r r u p t e d t h e young must be f a l s e , 
f o r i n j u r y o f t h e young v e r y l i k e l y b r i n g s about one's own i n j u r y . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e man who i n j u r e s o t h e r s m o r a l l y must be i g n o r a n t o f h i s 
i n t e r e s t s . He must be i g n o r a n t o f a c t i o n w h i c h i s b e n e f i c i a l t o h i m s e l f . 
T h i s p o i n t s e r v e s S o c r a t e s ' b e l i e f t h a t M e l e t u s i s h i m s e l f a man c o r r u p t e d 
f r o m want o f t r u e m o r a l e d u c a t i o n , a man who seeks f r o m deep i g n o r a n c e t o 
do e v i l t o a man whom he w i l l n o t r e c o g n i z e as a kinsman who b e n e f i t s b o t h 
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t h e young and s o c i e t y by h i s a c t i o n s . S o c r a t e s j u s t i f i e d h i s c l a i m t h a t 
M e l e t u s must be l y i n g by p u t t i n g t h e paradox i n t h e p r u d e n t i a l f o r m 'No 
man w o u l d seek t o i n j u r e h i m s e l f . ' I n t h i s way he c o u l d i m p l y , unparadox-
i c a l l y , t h a t no man w o u l d w i l l i n g l y do wrong ( c o r r u p t t h e y o u n g ) , t h a t t h e 
24 e ' e 
"ytvbfi" ( o r y t u b n , Adam ) , a t 26A, i s r e n d e r e d " l y i n g " by a l l 
t r a n s l a t o r s I am aware o f , e x c e p t T r e d e n n i c k , who p r e f e r s " . . . y o u r 
a c c u s a t i o n i s f a l s e . " The i d e a w h i c h most t r a n s l a t o r s w a n t , t h a t M e l e t u s 
i s g u i l t y o f a b r a z e n l i e , t a k e s a deeper hue f r o m t h e g r e a t e r c o n t e x t t o 
w h i c h t h e argument b e l o n g s . I f , w i t h i n t h e argument's own c o n t e x t , we 
a c c e p t t h a t no man w o u l d w i l l i n g l y i n j u r e h i m s e l f , t h e n t h e man who d e n i e s 
t h i s i s s i m p l y n o t t o be b e l i e v e d (Cdvc*. . . .oo$(t\>*. : 25E 6 ) . Such a man 
must be l y i n g . B u t P l a t o a l s o wants t o show, w i t h i n t h e argument's 
b r o a d e r c o n t e x t , t h a t M e l e t u s (and A n y t u s ) do n o t know t h a t by a t t e m p t i n g 
t o harm S o c r a t e s t h e y w i l l harm themselves more t h a n t h e y w i l l h i m. He 
wants t o show t h a t A n y t u s and M e l e t u s , i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t S o c r a t e s had 
committed i n j u s t i c e , mark themselves as g u i l t y o f t h e want o f c o n s c i e n t -
i o u s knowledge. I f t h i s t y p e o f i g n o r a n c e i s c u l p a b l e t h e n i t i s n o t g o i n g 
t o o f a r t o c a l l one o f i t s v i c t i m s a l i a r ( r a t h e r t h a n , say, a s i m p l e t o n 
who needs our p i t y ) f o r i m p l i c i t l y b e l i e v i n g t h e u n b e l i e v a b l e , t h a t a man 
w o u l d i n j u r e h i m s e l f . H ere, as l a t e r (30CD) P l a t o w i l l o n l y d e a l h a r s h l y 
w i t h t h e i g n o r a n c e o f c o n s c i e n c e and i t s m o t i v e s . As S o c r a t e s ' i n t e r -
l o c u t o r a t 28B f f . w ants t o make o u t t h a t S o c r a t e s i s a s hameful f o o l , so 
P l a t o , i n the e a r l i e r passage, wants t o make use o f p r u d e n t i a l i s m t o make 
M e l e t u s l o o k l i k e a f o o l . 
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man who d i s a g r e e d w o u l d have t o be s u g g e s t i n g t h a t a man, w h i l e d o i n g harm 
t o o t h e r s , c o u l d be s a i d t o be i n j u r i n g h i m s e l f w i l l i n g l y ( i . e . w i t h t h e 
knowledge t h a t he w o u l d b r i n g harm upon h i m s e l f ) . B u t t h i s d e f i e s common 
sense ( C f n 2 4 ) . 
By p u t t i n g t h e paradox i n t h i s common sense f o r m P l a t o p r e p a r e s us f o r 
the w i d e r i s s u e o f the case: t h a t S o c r a t e s ' a c c u s e r s have a c t e d as i f t h e y 
b e l i e v e d , i n deep i g n o r a n c e o f t h e i r t r u e w e l l - b e i n g , t h a t i n j u r i n g a n o t h e r 
f r o m m a t e r i a l m o t i v e c o u l d be p r o f i t a b l e . B u t t h a t b e l i e f i s t h e p r o d u c t 
o f p e r v e r s e e d u c a t i o n . To e s t a b l i s h on common sense grounds t h a t no man 
w o u l d w i s h t o i n j u r e h i m s e l f i n v i t e s A n y t us and M e l e t u s t o e x p l a i n t o 
So c r a t e s i n what way, i f i t i s i n h i s i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e young s h o u l d be 
good, he has i n j u r e d them. I t cannot have been f r o m t h e d e s i r e t o i n j u r e 
h i m s e l f . C o n s e q u e n t l y , he must have a c t e d i n i g n o r a n c e o f t h e knowledge 
t h a t improves t h e young. But i f t h a t i s so, t h e n Anytus and M e l e t u s s h o u l d 
n o t sue f o r h i s punishment, f o r s i n c e he d i d n o t know he was c a u s i n g i n j u r y 
t o t h e young t h e n he cannot have a c t e d w i t h i l l i n t e n t i n t h e i r r e g a r d . To 
have done so must have b r o u g h t i n j u r y t o h i m s e l f . H i s purpose i n u s i n g t h e 
paradox i n a d e m o n s t r a t i v e l y common sense way e s t a b l i s h e s common gro u n d 
between h i m and h i s a c c u s e r s : t h a t no man w o u l d a c t so as t o b r i n g i n j u r y 
upon h i m s e l f . We s h o u l d emphasize t h a t a t 25C f f . S o c r a t e s does n o t s p e c i f y , 
e x c e p t i n common sense t e r m s , t h e k i n d o f e v i l a man i s l i k e l y t o b r i n g upon 
h i m s e l f who makes t h e young bad (25E 3 ) . I n terms o f S o c r a t i c p r u d e n t i a l i s m , 
r e a l i n j u r y i s i n j u r y t o t h e s o u l . We may i n f e r t h i s f r o m 30CD where 
S o c r a t e s says t h a t men who a t t e m p t t o do e v i l ( i n t h i s case, m a t e r i a l i n j u r y ) 
w i l l harm themselves more t h a n t h e y w i l l t h e i r v i c t i m s . The reason g i v e n 
a t 25C f f . f o r g u a r d i n g a g a i n s t c o r r u p t i o n o f t h e young i s t h a t t h i s w i l l 
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p r o b a b l y (Kt-vfvv6V<rns) r e s u l t I n i n j u r y t o o n e s e l f . B u t t h i s need o n l y 
i m p l y t h e b e l i e f t h a t i t i s n o t i n s o c i e t y ' s m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e 
young be c o r r u p t e d . What S o c r a t e s has wanted t o do h e r e i s e s t a b l i s h 
agreement w i t h M e l e t u s t h a t men who commit ' v o l u n t a r y wrong' (See n 26) 
c o n t r a v e n e t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . He does n o t t h e r e e s t a b l i s h t h a t v o l u n t a r y 
wrong must r e s u l t i n i n j u r y t o t h e agent's s o u l . He o n l y e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t 
a man who makes t h e young m o r a l l y worse w i l l l i k e l y a c t a g a i n s t h i s own 
i n t e r e s t s i n d o i n g so. He has come t o t r i a l f o r h a v i n g c o r r u p t e d t h e 
young. He has t h e r e f o r e b r o u g h t p o t e n t i a l harm upon h i m s e l f , b u t i t cannot 
be f r o m f a i l u r e t o know t h a t a man endangers h i m s e l f who makes t h e young 
m o r a l l y worse. On what grounds, t h e n , can h i s a c c u s e r s suppose t h a t he 
had a c t e d w i t h i l l i n t e n t ? 
The s h a r e d c o n v i c t i o n , t h a t no man a c t s so as t o i n j u r e h i m s e l f , p o i n t s 
t o , though i t does n o t i m p l y w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n , t h e p r o p o s a l made f r o m 
28B f f . t h a t t h e man who l a c k e d c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge w o u l d do g r e a t e r 
i n j u r y t o h i m s e l f t h a n t o one he i n t e n d e d i n j u r i n g . Such a man must be 
i g n o r a n t o f h i s t r u e w e l l - b e i n g ; f o r he a c t s so as t o i n j u r e h i m s e l f . 
T h a t i s t o say, t h e man who supposes t h a t i n j u s t i c e i s p r o f i t a b l e and who 
a c t s w i t h t h e knowledge t h a t he i s i n j u r i n g o t h e r s , i s a man who does 
wrong u n w i l l i n g l y , where ' u n w i l l i n g l y ' i m p l i e s t h a t t h e man a c t s i n deep 
i g n o r a n c e o f what h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t i s ; f o r , no man who knew t h a t i n j u r y o f 
a n o t h e r w o u l d r e s u l t i n h i s own i n j u r y c o u l d a c t so as t o i n j u r e a n o t h e r . 
The b u r den o f p r o o f i n t h e case a g a i n s t S o c r a t e s r e s t s on Anytus and M e l e t u s 
who must show t h a t S o c r a t e s , i n h a r m i n g t h e young ( h i s kinsmen) a c t e d w i t h 
i l l i n t e n t i o n . B u t S o c r a t e s has s t a t e d t h a t he c o u l d n o t have known t h a t 
t h e r e s u l t s o f h i s a c t i o n s ( h i s t e a c h i n g ) were e v i l , and t h e r e f o r e , d i d 
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n o t know t h a t he w o u l d l i k e l y s u f f e r t h e i r i l l e f f e c t s . C l e a r l y t h e n , i f 
S o c r a t e s d i d n o t know t h a t he was d o i n g wrong he w o u l d be i n need o f 
yl/d^«s, n o t Ko\Aats s i n c e , i f he l e a r n t t h a t h i s a c t i v i t y was d e s t r u c t i v e 
26 
o f h i m s e l f and o t h e r s , he w o u l d cease t o do what he now does u n w i l l i n g l y . 
But i n b r i n g i n g S o c r a t e s b e f o r e a c o u r t M e l e t u s and Anytus must have 
assumed t h a t he had a c t e d w i t h i l l i n t e n t i o n and i n i g n o r a n c e o f a c t i o n 
t h a t w o u l d p r o f i t h i m , o r , t h a t i s , t h a t he committed v o l u n t a r y wrong. 
U n d e r l y i n g S o c r a t e s ' d e n i a l t h a t he d i d commit v o l u n t a r y wrong and h i s 
l e s s o n i n e q u i t a b l e p r o c e d u r e i s h i s c h a l l e n g e t o h i s a c c users t o show him, 
i f t h e y w i l l , what j u s t i c e and b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n a r e ; f o r i f t h e y r e j e c t 
What c o n s t r u c t i o n a r e we t o p u t on ' v o l u n t a r y o r i n v o l u n t a r y w rong-
d o i n g ' ( c o r r u p t i n g t h e young) a t 25D f f . ? P l a t o has c o n t r i v e d S o c r a t e s ' 
r e j e c t i o n o f M e l e t u s ' c l a i m t h a t he, S o c r a t e s , d i d wrong w i l l i n g l y , b y 
h a v i n g M e l e t u s agree t h a t ' d o i n g wrong w i l l i n g l y ' = 'knowing t h a t one i s 
i n j u r i n g o n e s e l f . ' B u t i t i s u n l i k e l y , on p r u d e n t i a l grounds, t h a t anyone 
w o u l d a c c e p t t h i s e q u i v a l e n c e as t r u e t o human n a t u r e . S u r e l y , t h e n , t h e 
man who does wrong ' w i l l i n g l y ' must be one who b e l i e v e s , i n deep i g n o r a n c e 
o f h i s b e s t i n t e r e s t , t h a t w r o n g - d o i n g i s , o r can b e , p r o f i t a b l e t o 
h i m s e l f . T h e r e f o r e , when S o c r a t e s says a t 26A t h a t t h e c o u r t s are p l a c e s 
t o b r i n g men who a r e i n need o f punishment r a t h e r t h a n i n s t r u c t i o n h i s 
i m p l i c i t meaning i s t h a t t h e y are p l a c e s t o b r i n g men g u i l t y o f i n j u s t i c e , 
men who, i n deep i g n o r a n c e o f t h e i r t r u e i n t e r e s t , have sought t o i n f l i c t 
i n j u r y on o t h e r s . These a r e men who do v o l u n t a r y wrongs. The c o r r e c t e d 
f o r m o f t h e e q u i v a l e n c e above must t h e n be: ' d o i n g wrong' w i l l i n g l y = 
' i n j u r i n g an i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e d e e p l y m i s t a k e n b e l i e f t h a t w r o n g - d o i n g i s 
p r o f i t a b l e . ' I f M e l e t u s c o u l d p r o v e t h i s o f S o c r a t e s t h e n h i s a r r a i g n m e n t 
w o u l d be j u s t i f i e d ; f o r i n t h a t case, S o c r a t e s w o u l d have known t h a t he 
was c a u s i n g i n j u r y . B u t he d e n i e s t h i s a l l e g a t i o n on t h e p r u d e n t i a l ground 
t h a t no man c o u l d w i l l i n g l y i n j u r e h i m s e l f . ( H e r e , t h e p l e a he makes i s 
based on common sense.) T h e r e f o r e , i f h i s a c t i o n s have r e s u l t e d i n 
c o r r u p t i o n o f the young, and he has b r o u g h t i n j u r y upon h i m s e l f by h i s 
a c t i o n s , he must have a c t e d i n i g n o r a n c e o f h i s own i n t e r e s t s . Only i f he 
knew t h a t he had been c a u s i n g i n j u r y (and had t h o u g h t t h a t t o be p r o f i t a b l e ) 
w ould he deserve p u n i s h m e n t . 
We may r e p h r a s e ' d o i n g wrong w i l l i n g l y ' t o r e a d ' a c t i n g w i t h i n t e n t t o 
do i n j u s t i c e . " ( C f 6/rt f.6t-pM , 30CD) . Now t h e man who a c t s w i t h such i n t e n t 
harms h i m s e l f more t h a n he does h i s v i t i m s ( I b i d . ) . I n t h a t case, he must 
be i g n o r a n t o f a c t i o n t h a t w o u l d t r u l y p r o f i t h i m and w o u l d n o t commit 
i n j u r y i f he knew t h a t i t l e a d s t o h i s own i n j u r y . Such a man must do 
i n j u s t i c e u n w i l l i n g l y , where ' u n w i l l i n g l y ' means ' a c t i n g i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n 
o f a c t i o n t h a t w o u l d t r u l y p r o f i t one'. B u t t h i s man i s g u i l t y i f he does 
know ( u n l i k e S o c r a t e s ) t h a t he i s c o m m i t t i n g i n j u s t i c e . S o c r a t e s i m p l i e s 
t h a t he h i m s e l f has a c t e d u n w i l l i n g l y because he has n o t known t h a t h i s a c t i o n s 
w o u l d cause i n j u r y b o t h t o h i m s e l f and t o o t h e r s . 
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t h e i m p r o b a b l e p o s i t i o n t h a t a man w o u l d w i l l i n g l y i n j u r e h i m s e l f t h e n 
t h e y must suppose t h a t S o c r a t e s knew t h a t he was d o i n g wrong and t h a t he 
a c t e d i n t h e m i s t a k e n b e l i e f t h a t t h i s c o u l d p r o f i t him. S o c r a t e s ' d e n i a l , 
on p r u d e n t i a l g r o u n d s , t h a t he knew he was c o r r u p t i n g t h e young and h i s 
p l e a f o r i n s t r u c t i o n i n s t e a d o f punishment s e r v e t o oppose h i s b e l i e f s about 
j u s t i c e and b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n t o those o f h i s a c c u s e r s . They a l s o s e r v e t o 
g e n e r a t e h i s a c c u s e r s ' r e a l m o t i v e f o r c h a r g i n g him: t h a t he has a s s a i l e d 
t h e i r r e p u t a t i o n s as men who have knowledge t h a t improves t h e young. 
Soc r a t e s says l a t e r (29A) t h a t h i s accusers w o u l d have had a t r u e cause 
a g a i n s t h i m i f he had a c t e d i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f a c t i o n he had known t o be 
r i g h t , f u l f i l l i n g t h e god's b i d d i n g ( C f p 76-)• Had he so a c t e d he w o u l d 
have l a c k e d c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge, h i s d u t y t o f u l f i l h i s m i s s i o n b e i n g 
c o n d i t i o n a l on m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , - c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f p u b l i c a p p r o v a l . 
B u t t h i s w o u l d have i m p l i e d d i s o b e y i n g the o r a c l e . I f S o c r a t e s i s t o be 
a r r a i g n e d f o r d i s b e l i e f i n gods (as w e l l as f o r c o r r u p t i n g t h e young) 
s u r e l y t h i s a c t , h i s d i s o b e y i n g t h e o r a c l e , would be a j u s t cause a g a i n s t 
him. H i s s t a t e m e n t f r o m 28B f f . i s an emphatic s t a t e m e n t o f h i s b e l i e f 
t h a t t h e good o r w o r t h y man w i l l n o t p e r m i t m a t e r i a l convenience t o be t h e 
c o n d i t i o n o f h i s d o i n g r i g h t a c t i o n . Had S o c r a t e s d i s o b e y e d a b e t t e r b e i n g 
(tn/...6'(C: 29B 7, 8 ) he w o u l d have shown t h a t r i g h t a c t i o n i s c o n d i t i o n a l v. v 
on m a t e r i a l c onvenience. H i s m i s s i o n w o u l d have been a f a r c e , f o r he w o u l d 
have shown t h a t a s t r o n g e r power ( p u b l i c a p p r o v a l ) was i t s e l f t h e f i n a l 
a r b i t e r o f r i g h t a c t i o n . B u t had he shown t h i s , t h e n he s h o u l d , i n c o n s i s t -
ency w i t h t h a t , have y i e l d e d t o t h e u n j u s t commands w h i c h he c i t e s a t 32B-D 
( C f . n 16 s u p r a ) . W i t h t h e s e t h o u g h t s i n mind we may emphasize t h a t a t 26A 
(See n 26) he i m p l i e s t h a t t he man i n need o f punishment i s one who knows 
he has done wrong and who has a c t e d f r o m t h e l a c k o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s 
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knowledge, o r , t h a t i s , f r o m t h e b e l i e f t h a t w r o n g - d o i n g c o u l d be p r o f i t a b l e 
t o h im. The l a t t e r b e l i e f i s amenable t o t h e p r u d e n t i a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t 
j u s t i c e - o b e y i n g a s t r o n g e r o r b e t t e r b e i n g , f o r example, - e n t a i l s 
i n j u s t i c e - s a v i n g one's l i f e o r one's r e p u t a t i o n a t t h e expense o f o t h e r s . 
Presumably, M e l e t u s w i l l n o t drop h i s charge on t h e s t r e n g t h o f 
S o c r a t e s ' p l e a t h a t he d i d n o t know he was c a u s i n g i n j u r y . He must t h e r e -
f o r e suppose t h a t S o c r a t e s has a c t e d w i t h i l l i n t e n t , n o t knowing t h a t t h i s 
w o u l d j e o p a r d i s e h i s , S o c r a t e s ' , own b e s t i n t e r e s t s ( M e l e t u s and Anytus 
s h o u l d a t l e a s t have b r o u g h t w i t n e s s e s t o show t h a t S o c r a t e s d i d wrong -
w h i c h t h e y d i d n o t do (34AB) - even i f t h e y a c c e p t e d S o c r a t e s ' p l e a t h a t 
he d i d n o t know t h a t was d o i n g i n j u r y t o o t h e r s ) . The danger S o c r a t e s has 
i n c u r r e d cannot have r e s u l t e d f r o m h i s i g n o r a n c e o f t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s 
i m p r u d e n t t o c o r r u p t t h e young. B o t h he and h i s accusers know t h a t i t i s 
i n s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e young s h o u l d n o t become m o r a l l y w orse. Y e t 
i f he has come t o t r i a l , he must have a c t e d t o w a r d o t h e r s w i t h i l l i n t e n t i o n 
On Plat6*s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f S o c r a t i c p r u d e n t i a l i s m , t h e paradox, as s t a t e d 
a t 25C, opposes S o c r a t e s ' r e a l b e l i e f about s e l f - i n j u r y s i n c e , as s t a t e d 
t h e r e , i t o n l y means t h a t we have a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t i n e d u c a t i n g t h e young 
( C f . on ' micov* a t 25E 3, p 104 i n f r a ) . I f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n c o n s i s t s o f 
no more than f u r t h e r i n g t h i s i n t e r e s t , t h e n t h e b e n e f i t o f r i g h t r e g a r d 
w h i c h men e x p e c t f r o m one a n o t h e r has no more t h a n a m a t e r i a l b a s i s . The 
S o c r a t i c a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e paradox i m p l i e s , i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h i s , t h a t a 
man's m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g i s s u b o r d i n a t e t o h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t . Now, t h e 
Apology shows t h a t t h e man who e x e r c i s e s S o c r a t i c d i s r e g a r d ( C f . p 7/8' s u p r a ) 
w i l l l i k e l y r e c e i v e e v i l ( m a t e r i a l i n j u r y ) i n r e t u r n . B u t s i n c e such a man 
27 
does n o t suppose t h a t m a t e r i a l i n j u r y i s r e a l i n j u r y , t h e n , i n e x e r c i s i n g 
( c o n t i n u e d on page ^0) ' ' 
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' d i s r e g a r d ' o f o t h e r s he w i l l n o t b e l i e v e t h a t he i s a c t i n g so as t o i n j u r e 
h i m s e l f . I f he i s , i t behoves h i s accusers t o e x p l a i n why he i s . T h e i r 
28 
i m p l i c i t answer i s t h a t m a t e r i a l i n j u r y i s r e a l i n j u r y . That t h i s i s 
P l a t o ' s v i e w o f t h e i r mind i s shown f r o m 30D (See n 27) where S o c r a t e s 
p o i n t s t o A n y t u s and M e l e t u s b y name i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e vi e w t h a t 
m a t e r i a l e v i l i s t h e w o r s t o f e v i l s t h a t can b e f a l l a man. S o c r a t e s ' accusers 
must show i n t h e case a t hand t h a t S o c r a t e s has committed wrong by t h e p u r s u i t 
o f h i s m i s s i o n . To p r o v e t h e case t h e y must show t h a t he has c o r r u p t e d t h e 
young w i t h i l l i n t e n t . B u t i f they a c c e p t on common sense grounds t h a t he 
c o u l d n o t have known he was c o r r u p t i n g t h e young b u t s t i l l do n o t drop t h e i r 
c h a r g e , t h e y must s t i l l b e l i e v e he has a c t e d w i t h i l l i n t e n t . I n P l a t o ' s 
b e l i e f t h e y can o n l y show t h a t S o c r a t e s has damaged men's r e p u t a t i o n s f o r 
m o r a l knowledge and t h a t t h e y r e g a r d t h i s - S o c r a t i c d i s r e g a r d - as t r u e 
i n j u r y , i n j u r y w o r t h y o f punishment. Only i n t h i s way can t h e y show t h a t 
S o c r a t e s has b r o u g h t i n j u r y upon h i m s e l f . I n showing t h i s t h e y p r o v e t h a t 
t h e y a r e themselves t h e r e s u l t s o f a p e r v e r s e e d u c a t i o n , f o r t h e y show t h a t 
t h e y b e l i e v e t h a t r i g h t r e g a r d o f o t h e r s i s r o o t e d i n men's m a t e r i a l 
27 ( c o n t i n u e d f r o m page 8?) 
ol'oji/**. , (30D f f . ) . Here S o c r a t e s d e c l a i m s t h e vi e w t h a t m a t e r i a l i n j u r y 
qua t h e r e c i p i e n t i s r e a l . B u t he i s e q u a l l y concerned w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n 
o f t h e t agent i n i n f l i c t i n g m a t e r i a l i n j u r y : i^A«l T7>Au y^\Kt>v j T W \ L 
ooreffC in>i&, * v f f * ktliiws c-tnjLc-i^Fo^r<*^<Oi(Ibid.). 
28 
Here, ' m a t e r i a l i n j u r y ' connotes S o c r a t i c ' d i s r e g a r d ' o f men's 
r e p u t a t i o n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e common sense v i e w t h a t S o c r a t e s ought t o 
have known t h a t / h i s d i s r e g a r d o f o t h e r s w o u l d one day r e s u l t i n h i s own 
un d o i n g (diroK.rtci'ttc • • • U^f/Cgr^tw above) . The v i e w t h a t m a t e r i a l i n j u r y 
i s n o t r e a l c a r r i e s two meanings: t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n t o i n j u r e a n o t h e r 
marks a man as u n j u s t , even i f r e a l i n j u r y i s i n j u r y t o t h e s o u l , and 
t h e u n j u s t man cannot t r u l y i n j u r e t h e j u s t man; t h a t t h e man who 
e x e r c i s e s S o c r a t i c ' d i s r e g a r d ' , though he damages men's r e p u t a t i o n s , 
a c t s f o r t h e good o f t h e i r s o u l s (See ahead, pp 1 0 0 > f f . ) . I n c o n f o r m i t y 
w i t h t h e p r u d e n t i a l i s m o f t h e paradox, such a man a c t s ( i n S o c r a t e s ' 
v i e w ) i n h i s own t r u e i n t e r e s t . 
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considerations. For t h i s reason they condemn themselves, i n Plato's 
b e l i e f , of the moral ignorance of which Socrates convicted them (Cf. p 7T 
supra). We have s a i d t h a t t h e i r stand exemplifies r a d i c a l i s m . We s h a l l 
see t h a t t h e i r p o s i t i o n , since i t i m p l i e s a conception of a man's 
kinsmen wh o l l y opposed to Socrates', also i m p l i e s an opposed theory of 
consent t o law. The conception of b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n t h a t Socrates puts 
i n the Apology l i e s a t the heart of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e (Cf. pp 108 f f . ) . 
The p r u d e n t i a l t u r n of the paradox, w i t h i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s e i t h e r to 
common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s m or S o c r a t i c p r u d e n t i a l i s m , u n d e r l i e s the questions 
of b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n and i n j u r y . Socrates claims t h a t he could not have 
committed v o l u n t a r y wrong p r e c i s e l y because wrong-doing leads to the agent's 
own i n j u r y . I t i s important to s t r e s s t h i s p o i n t because the unjust man 
who does commit v o l u n t a r y wrong b e l i e v e s , i n deep ignorance of h i s t r u e 
w e l l - b e i n g , t h a t wrong-doing can be p r o f i t a b l e . We have s a i d t h a t Socrates 
imputes t h i s d o c t r i n e to h i s accusers (30CD). At 25C f f . he maintained 
t h a t i f he i n j u r e d others (made them morally worse) he would l i k e l y receive 
i n j u r y i n r e t u r n . But i n terms of So c r a t i c p r u d e n t i a l i s m the only r e a l 
i n j u r y i s i n j u r y t o a man's s o u l . Had he intended to co r r u p t the young 
he must then have been i g n o r a n t of h i s own true i n t e r e s t . The i n j u r y he 
would receive would not be the i n j u r i e s corrupted men could do to him, 
however severe, but the i n j u r y he would have done to himself by making the 
young morally worse. We have s a i d t h a t t h i s conception does not f o l l o w 
w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n from the statement at 25C f f . Indeed, Socrates here 
intends to make o p p o s i t i o n w i t h h i s own view, basing the opp o s i t i o n on the 
commonly shared views t h a t no man acts so as t o i n j u r e h i m s e l f , t h a t 
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s o c i e t y has an obvious i n t e r e s t i n the moral education of the young. For 
the statement, i f taken i n a m a t e r i a l i s t sense opposes Socrates' own 
conception of p r u d e n t i a l i s m . The discussion a t 25C f f . has two f u n c t i o n s : 
i t asserts t h a t i t i s not i n any man's i n t e r e s t s t h a t the young be corrupted; 
i t serves Socrates' plea t h a t i f he has made the young worse he cannot then 
have known the grounds of h i s own or society's i n t e r e s t s . I f he i s wrong 
i n not b e l i e v i n g that our i n t e r e s t i n educating the young r e s t s on obvious, 
m a t e r i a l grounds, then he must l a c k s k i l l i n teaching the young, he must 
lac k the knowledge t h a t makes men good or worthy (Cf 30B 5 , 6 ) . The broad 
issue to which these questions belong i s the n o t i o n of techne, or s k i l l , -
s k i l l i n teaching the young and i n l i v i n g w i t h one's kinsmen (See i n f r a , 
PP 102 f f . ) . 
A * * 
There i s general agreement among commentators t h a t the charge brought 
against Socrates conceals a p o l i t i c a l motive. We have agreed w i t h t h i s 
view (p 70 supra). A b r i e f assessment of the matter w i l l be u s e f u l a t t h i s 
29 
p o i n t . A good general treatment o f the problem i s o f f e r e d by Crossman. 
He has s a i d t h a t Socrates' accusation was compounded of the f a c t s t h a t 
h i s a r i s t o c r a t i c f o l l o w i n g , being moved by the negative side of h i s teach-
i n g , regarded him as a u s e f u l arm i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to depose the democratic 
regime; w h i l e the democracy, since i t s only arm against disorder l a y i n 
i t s a f f i r m a t i o n s of t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f had i n e v i t a b l y to condemn him. 
Crossman believes t h i s was not u n j u s t i f i e d . Athens was a dying c i t y unable 
to accommodate new views of l i f e which the s o c i a l c r i t i c i s m e i t h e r of 
Socrates or of other i n t e l l e c t u a l s i m p l i e d . While the c i t y r e l i e d f o r i t s 
R. H. Crossman,Plato Today, (London, 1963) pp 32 f f . (Cf pp 181 f f . ) . 
s u r v i v a l on a t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f become more formal than s u b s t a n t i a l , i t 
was s t i l l j u s t i f i e d i n i d e n t i f y i n g Socrates, owing both t o the d e s t r u c t i v e 
aspect of h i s teaching and to h i s as s o c i a t i o n s , w i t h those who contemned 
t r a d i t i o n but could only displace i t w i t h v i o l e n t d i s regard of t r a d i t i o n a l 
values. Here we must note Crossman's view on the question of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 
and we should note t h a t o t h e r s , too, (both Burnet and H a c k f o r t h ) , have noted 
the l o y a l t y to the democracy and the zealous concern f o r i t e x e m p l i f i e d by 
Anytus. While Burnet, T a y l o r , and Crossman have a l l seen a concealed 
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p o l i t i c a l motive behind the charge, Hackforth suggested that i f the charge 
were p o l i t i c a l then, since Socrates was not l i k e l y t o abate h i s c r i t i c s m 
of the democracy a f t e r 403 a s p e c i f i c charge of p o l i t i c a l d i s l o y a l t y could 
probably have been brought. 
Hackforth was concerned w i t h the e m p i r i c a l genesis of the charge and 
the t r i a l and p r e f e r r e d t o take the charge a t i t s face value as i n d i c a t i n g 
moral offences alone r a t h e r than implying as w e l l a charge of ^/KroSyp'n 
( I b i d . ) . While n o t i n g H a c k f o r t h 1 s disagreement w i t h the m a j o r i t y view we 
can grant that w h i l e the charge does not mask a p o l i t i c a l offence t h a t we 
can p o s i t i v e l y c i t e , Socrates' defence y e t has strong p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
I f the regime of the T h i r t y seemed ( w i t h good reason) t o i t s opponents t o 
epitomise the r a d i c a l challenge to t r a d i t i o n a l order, and i f , indeed, 
Socrates' c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i m p l i e d t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f was not s u f f i c -
i e n t to make men v i r t u o u s , we have every reason to suppose th a t Anytus' 
concern f o r s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y (Cf H a c k f o r t h , p 76) i s s t r o n g l y t i n c t u r e d 
by the b e l i e f t h a t c r i t i c i s m of t r a d i t i o n i m p l i e s a l l e g i a n c e w i t h p o l i t i c a l 
R. Hackforth, The Composition of Plato's Apology, (Cambridge, 1933) 
p 73. 
sentiments t h a t undermine i t . I f the charge against Socrates i s not 
fo r m a l l y p o l i t i c a l , Plato none-the-less makes the question of consent to 
law combined w i t h the moral issue of p r u d e n t i a l i s m the major t h r u s t s i n 
Socrates' defence. Why else would Socrates have r e f e r r e d , though the 
amnesty made t h i s unnecessary, t o past events i n which he showed at neaCB" 
cost to h i s l i f e h i s unwillingness t o be c o m p l i c i t i n un j u s t acts which had 
p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l sanction, i f he had not supposed t h a t the question of 
a man's consent t o law and a man's motive i n obeying law were not major 
issues i n the charge against him? Here the question of Socrates' associa-
t i o n s w i t h h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s i s of importance. Taking the charge on i t s 
face value as a charge of i m p i e t y , Plato sets Socrates' conception of 
p r u d e n t i a l i s m against what he takes, i f the t r u t h were known, to be t a c i t 
grounds of the charge: t h a t a man who had associations w i t h those opposed 
to the democracy must himself oppose the t r a d i t i o n s the democracy purported-
l y upholds. His sometime associations w i t h a r i s t o c r a t i c sympathisers, 
together w i t h the supposed sympathy w i t h a n t i - t r a d i t i o n a l d o c t r i n e s which 
t h a t could imply, furnished i n h i s accusers' minds s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r 
a charge of impiety. But t h e i r conception of a man's i n t e r e s t s , as 
adduced by Socrates i n h i s defence, makes them and not him the represent-
a t i v e s of the challenge to t r a d i t i o n a l m o r a l i t y which they f e a r . (See 
dfoffrsu- PP 100 f f •) 
Now the most important f e a t u r e of Socreates 1 teaching i s , f o r our 
purposes, h i s idea about conscientious knowledge and the worthy man's 
motive i n obeying laws (pp 73, 83 supra). We may note w i t h the claim of 
the i n d i c t m e n t , t h a t Socrates does not b e l i e v e i n the gods the s t a t e 
believes i n , t h a t , indeed, h i s god i s not a f i g u r e of worship p e c u l i a r 
t o the c i t y of which he i s a c i t i z e n . That i t i s not i s shown from h i s 
statement t h a t he would pursue h i s mission wherever he might. That 
means t h a t h i s duty t o pursue h i s mission, or to obey h i s god, must u n d e r l i e 
h i s consent to any community's laws. Together w i t h t h i s we must note h i s 
d i s c l a i m e r of p a r t y l o y a l t y or a f f i l i a t i o n . This d i s c l a i m e r i s l i n k e d to 
h i s p r o t r e p t i c statement i n t h a t the i d e a l of duty and s e l f - i n t e r e s t t h a t 
he pursues does not come to r e s t i n the support of one p o l i t i c a l f o r c e 
against another; h i s associations w i t h men, whoever they might be, are i n 
a i d of a uniform d o c t r i n e of moral o b l i g a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l consent t h a t 
a pplies not only to h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s but to others as w e l l . 
Why d i d h i s accusers suspect, or, indeed, misunderstand t h i s doctrine? 
We may agree w i t h Crossman t h a t what they feared was the negative p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t i e s o f those of Socrates' f o l l o w i n g known to be opposed to democratic 
r u l e . We f i n d the basis f o r our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t the charge covers 
p o l i t i c a l d i s l o y a l t y i n the i m p l i c i t equation Socrates' accusers make 
between the community's t r a d i t i o n a l moral p r a c t i c e s and the p o l i t i c a l s e n t i -
ment t h a t purports to uphold them; f o r we may suppose the accusers to have 
intended t h a t t h e i r charge would i n c l u d e an i m p l i c a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l d i s -
l o y a l t y i f i t i s also the case t h a t they b e l i e v e d that democratic sentiment 
alone was equal t o s u s t a i n i n g and approving r i g h t f u l moral and r e l i g i o u s 
p r a c t i c e . But i t i s j u s t t h i s which Socrates i m p l i c i t l y denies i n h i s 
defence when he challenges h i s accusers to show him t h a t by teaching h i s 
d o c t r i n e of a man'e tr u e w e l l - b e i n g he has i n j u r e d h i s kinsmen, w h i l e he 
e x p l i c i t l y emphasizes ( w i t h a view to the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t he would act 
against h i s best i n t e r e s t s by r e f u s i n g t o d e s i s t from h i s mission) both 
t h a t he has eschewed on p r u d e n t i a l grounds conventional means of advising 
Cf 37D - 38A. 
the community (31C 3 f f . ) , and t h a t he has never placed the sanction of 
p o l i t i c a l power before what he knew the laws t r u l y to e n j o i n , before 
what he knew t o be r i g h t (32A f f . ) . We may r e c a l l here our e a r l i e r 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t Anytus and Meletus, i n claiming t o uphold nomos exemplify, 
i n Plato's mind, transgressions against i t . P l a t o has cast them i n the 
r o l e of men who exemplify, i f u n w i t t i n g l y , those same r a d i c a l views of 
p o l i t i c s and m o r a l i t y which they themselves fear and t o which they suspect 
Socrates t o have been a p a r t y . Socrates i m p l i e s i n h i s defence t h a t i t i s 
he and not they who upholds nomos. His reason r e s t s on a d i s t i n c t i o n he 
makes between what we have c a l l e d nominal and t r u e consent. This d i s t i n c -
t i o n stands opposed t o the I m p l i c i t view of h i s accusers which we see i n 
t h e i r response to Socrates' question, "Who i s i t t h a t knows the laws?" 
(24D 11). Their i m p l i c i t answer i s t h a t a community's moral t r a d i t i o n s 
are the sole source of i t s laws and the sole source of a man's knowledge 
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of h i s duty to others. 
Socrates opposes to h i s accusers' charge the apparent t r u i s m t h a t 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , where t h i s means p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p u b l i c o f f i c e s of 
the community, must be discharged i n view of the community's w e l l - b e i n g . 
We may add t h a t he shows no d i s a f f e c t i o n w i t h the discharge of c i v i c 
f u n c t i o n s consequent upon being an Aithenian c i t i z e n . But he does temper 
t h i s view w i t h the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a man w i l l achieve greater b e n e f i t both 
f o r himself and f o r others by advising the community as a p r i v a t e person 
(. tfctA/rw t<i/ '• 32A 1) than as a holder of p u b l i c o f f i c e or as an assemblyman 
( 1iyf/trit-'vn.i/ '• I b i d . ) . Underlying t h i s a p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n i s a d i s t i n c t i o n 
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The p o t e n t i a l immoralism which P l a t o g r a f t s on to the charge arises 
from Socrates' challenge t o h i s accusers to show him i n what a man's 
i n t e r e s t s c o n s i s t . The question whether Plato i s f a i r i n h i s treatment 
of the accusers i s not easy to answer. We can sympathize w i t h Crossman's 
view (a view l a r g e l y shared by others) t h a t the accusation, was j u s t i f i e d 
i f only because i t was i n e v i t a b l e . But our treatment of the d o c t r i n e of 
(continued on page 97) 
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b e l i e f , which he opposes to common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s m , t h a t obedience t o 
laws i s compatible w i t h a man's t r u e i n t e r e s t and t h a t b e n e f i c i a l a c t i o n 
e n t a i l s u n c o n d i t i o n a l obedience to laws (Cf. pp 61,63 - 68, and n 12 supra) . 
These matters u n d e r l i e a fundamental p o i n t which Plato wants the Apology 
to i l l u s t r a t e , t h a t Socrates was a tr u e kinsman to h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s , 
w h i l e they, i n r e j e c t i n g h i s mission, show themselves t o be ign o r a n t of 
the grounds of k i n s h i p . 
The claim of the ind i c t m e n t t h a t Socrates i s impious and t h a t he has 
wronged h i s kinsmen reduces t o the b e l i e f , shared by Socrates and h i s 
accusers, t h a t the man who does wrong or who acts w i t h i l l i n t e n t i o n w i t h 
regard to h i s kinsmen, contravenes h i s i n t e r e s t s . Socrates' n o t i o n of the 
consent from conscience, which e n t a i l s the b e l i e f t h a t wrong-doing cannot 
p r o f i t a man (p77) t h e r e f o r e raises the question, w i t h respect t o what 
i n t e r e s t of a man should a man perform r i g h t a c t i o n or a c t i o n b e n e f i c i a l to 
another? We have sai d t h a t Socrates c a r r i e d out h i s mission, i n which he 
put h i s answer t o t h i s question, i n f u l l view of the laws, t h a t he l e f t 
h i mself a t society's disposal i n so doing. I n t h i s , he e x e m p l i f i e d h i s 
conception of un c o n d i t i o n a l obedience t o law, demonstrating h i s c o n v i c t i o n 
t h a t the performance of the du t i e s of c i t i z e n s h i p i n d i c a t e t h a t a man i s 
j u s t (or t h a t he t r u l y obeys law) only i f he believes t h a t r i g h t regard 
of others e n t a i l s the a c q u i s i t i o n of h i s own true i n t e r e s t . This denies 
the view of common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s m t h a t r i g h t regard of others i s an 
intermediary b e n e f i t t o oneself, t h a t the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e i s contingent 
on i t s m a t e r i a l l y b e n e f i t i n g a man to act w i t h r i g h t regard toward others. 
We may emphasize that Socrates saw i t as i n h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t and t h a t of 
others t h a t he should continue i n the course he was convinced was r i g h t 
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(Cf n 20). By c a r r y i n g out h i s mission i n f u l l view of the laws he l e f t 
Cf Apology 31 DE. 
s o c i e t y f r e e t o accept or r e j e c t him. He would not contravene whatever 
d e c i s i o n i t might make. I n t h i s way he ex e m p l i f i e d h i s b e l i e f t h a t a man's 
considerations of what i t i s i n h i s true i n t e r e s t to do are compatible w i t h 
h i s obeying laws. 
Socrates' associations w i t h h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s do not conceal h i s 
motive i n doing what he be l i e v e d to be r i g h t . Rather, they r e f l e c t h i s 
motive, being a testament to h i s b e l i e f t h a t i t i s i n a man's t r u e i n t e r e s t 
to regard others w e l l . By l e a v i n g himself a t society's d i s p o s a l w h i l e i n 
the prosecution of h i s mission he underlined h i s b e l i e f t h a t a man's 
consent t o law i s only true consent i f i t i s a case of consent from 
conscience. His question a t 24D 11 introduces an important l i n k between 
h i s notions of consent and a man's considerations of h i s i n t e r e s t s . Lying 
a t the r o o t of t h i s question i s Plato's b e l i e f t h a t Socrates' accusers, by 
a c t i n g as i f they b e l i e v e d t h a t law could sanction wrong-doing i n defence 
of any i n t e r e s t , deny Socrates' conception of the basis of consent t o law. 
We should b r i e f l y reassess the grounds on which P l a t o asserts t h i s claim. 
Socrates had challenged h i s accusers to show him t h a t he had wronged 
others. Accordingly, he re q u i r e d t h a t they show him i n what way he had 
endangered h i m s e l f . The charge of the in d i c t m e n t , t h a t he had acted w i t h 
i n t e n t t o destroy accepted values, masked, i n Plato's view, the r e a l grounds 
of the charge, t h a t by exposing the emptyness of men's reput a t i o n s f o r 
knowledge, Socrates had brought himself i n t o d i s f a v o u r w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d 
order. Socrates and h i s accusers were both agreed t h a t a man acts against 
h i s i n t e r e s t s who i n j u r e s o t h e r s , t h a t he i s g u i l t y of wrong i f he has acted 
w i t h i l l i n t e n t . But t h e i r r e j e c t i o n of Socrates' mission i n d i c a t e d t o 
Plato t h a t the connotation they attached to t h i s shared conception i s t h a t 
r i g h t regard of others i s determined from a man's considerations of good 
repute - from m a t e r i a l considerations. To t h i s idea Socrates opposed the 
weight of h i s moral teaching, t h a t the good or worthy man determines to do 
r i g h t a c t i o n from considerations of h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t , apart from what 
common o p i n i o n approves. This i s so whether a man i s f u l f i l l i n g p u b l i c 
d u t i e s o r a c t i n g as a p r i v a t e person. I n denying t h a t he has done wrong 
Socrates t h e r e f o r e also denies t h a t he has acted so as t o b e n e f i t h i m s e l f . 
I t i s on these grounds t h a t he denies the indictment's claim t h a t he has 
been u n j u s t . I n denying the charge t h a t he has corrupted the young he 
th e r e f o r e denies the common sense claim t h a t a man bri n g s r e a l i n j u r y upon 
himself who acts w i t h o u t consideration f o r h i s repute w i t h others, o r , t h a t 
i s , who acts w i t h o u t regard f o r h i s m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g . 
* * * 
The question Socrates asks a t 24D 11, "Who i s i t t h a t knows the laws?" 
i s rooted i n the questions: " I s there anything more important than t h a t the 
young should t u r n out as w e l l as possible?", and, "Who makes the young 
b e t t e r ? " (24D-D1). The analogy from techne, i n v o l v i n g the concept of care 
f o r oneself, u n d e r l i e s these questions. The n o t i o n of techne, as used i n 
the Apology, i s basic t o the d o c t r i n e of consent so f a r discussed. F i r s t , 
a general statement of i t s bearing on our s u b j e c t . 
Socrates uses the analogy i n conjunct i o n w i t h the p r i n c i p l e discussed 
above (n 26) t h a t a man who wrongs h i s kinsmen must be ig n o r a n t of h i s 
i n t e r e s t s . The indictment against Socrates r e s t s on moral grounds: 
Socrates has committed i n j u s t i c e , being a man who corr u p t s the young. To 
have wronged h i s kinsmen, means, i n the context of the answer Socrates gives 
to the charge, to have made the young mo r a l l y worse w i t h the r e s u l t of 
wronging h i s s o c i e t y and b r i n g i n g i n j u r y upon h i m s e l f . But Socrates denies 
t h a t he d i d wrong. He denies t h i s on the p r u d e n t i a l grounds t h a t he cannot 
have i n j u r e d h i s kinsmen i n the knowledge t h a t he was doing so, since 
anyone w i l l agree t h a t a man who i n j u r e s others contravenes h i s own i n t e r e s t s . 
I f i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h others Socrates has brought i n j u r y upon h i m s e l f , 
he wishes h i s accusers to show him i n what way he has done so. We have 
s a i d t h a t t h e i r i m p l i c i t answer i s t h a t Socrates has brought disrepute -
m a t e r i a l i n j u r y - upon hi m s e l f . Here we must note t h a t i n denying the 
indictment's claim t h a t he had wronged others Socrates i s also denying t h a t 
he had brought moral i n j u r y upon h i m s e l f , i m p l y i n g by t h i s t h a t he cannot 
have done r e a l i n j u r y - moral i n j u r y - to h i s kinsmen. We have noted t h a t 
the techne analogy i s used i n conjunction w i t h p r u d e n t i a l i s m : would i t be 
i n a man's i n t e r e s t s t o a c t w i t h disregard ( w i t h o u t care) i n h i s dealings 
w i t h others? The conception of care (f/tk<-*f*i) p e r t a i n s both to a man's 
knowledge o f some s k i l l - i n our case, the s k i l l t h a t improves the young -
and h i s concern f o r h i m s e l f : f i r s t , h i s s k i l l qua h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the 
young; second, the s o c i a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s of t h i s work. We have s a i d t h a t 
the n o t i o n of consent from conscience bears on the question, w i t h respect 
t o what i n t e r e s t of a man should a man perform r i g h t a c t i o n - a c t i o n 
34 
b e n e f i c i a l to another (p 98')? I n conjunction w i t h t h i s question we must 
exp l a i n the connotations which at t a c h to 'care' or 'concern f o r o n e s e l f 
i n one's work. Socrates combines the question, "Who improves the young?" 
( o r , 'Who has s k i l l i n moral i n s t r u c t i o n ? ' ) w i t h the question of a man's 
i n t e r e s t s i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h others so as to give the b e l i e f he shares 
'Right a c t i o n ' could simply be a c t i o n t h a t does not impede the 
m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g of another man. But Socrates i m p l i e s i n the Apology 
t h a t a man i s j u s t only i f he bel i e v e s t h a t h i s own m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g 
i s not a c o n d i t i o n of h i s doing r i g h t a c t i o n , or a c t i o n w i t h b e n e f i c i a l 
r e s u l t to another. (Cf p 78 supra). He supposes, moreover, t h a t he w i l l 
have t r u l y b e n e f i t e d men i f he convinces them of t h i s b e l i e f even i f he 
must s u s t a i n i n j u r y i n so doing. 
w i t h h i s accusers, 'No man v o l u n t a r i l y acts so as t o i n j u r e h i m s e l f . ' , 
two a p p l i c a t i o n s (Cf pp 85-88 supra). We may b r i e f l y review these a p p l i c a -
t i o n s . 
We may ask what s o r t of e v i l the man who makes others morally worse 
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w i l l receive from them? The S o c r a t i c i n t e n t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e , 'No 
man v o l u n t a r i l y seeks t o i n j u r e h i m s e l f . ' i s t h a t a man would i n j u r e himself 
m o r a l l y - or t r u l y i n j u r e himself - who wronged o t h e r s , not knowing t h a t 
t o do so i s d e t r i m e n t a l to a man's true w e l l - b e i n g even i f i t r e s u l t s i n 
m a t e r i a l p r o f i t . To s t a t e t h i s n o t i o n a t i t s most p a r a d o x i c a l , had Socrates 
q u i t h i s mission he would have done so from the motive of m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y -
the f e a r of death (29A). But t h i s was t o admit t h a t the m a t e r i a l l y prudent-
i a l course of a c t i o n was the c o n d i t i o n of doing what was r i g h t - accepting 
the community's h y p o t h e t i c a l o f f e r to s e t him f r e e , on the understanding 
t h a t he would be condemned i f he continued w i t h h i s mission. But t h a t was 
to f a i l t o act e i t h e r i n h i s own t r u e i n t e r e s t or i n t h a t of others. I t 
was both to admit t h a t the community was the f i n a l source of law and t o 
disobey the god (Cf pp 79 and 96 supra). The ' b e n e f i t ' he would receive 
from.the community by q u i t t i n g h i s mission would have been s e c u r i t y t o h i s 
m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g , but t h i s could not have been a moral b e n e f i t ; v i z . , 
such a b e n e f i t could not confirm him i n h i s b e l i e f t h a t he was a b e t t e r man 
than h i s accusers, a man whom they could n o t t r u l y i n j u r e (Cf 30CD). Such 
We assume, by asking t h i s q u e s t i o n , t h a t Socrates would make h i s 
community morally worse by q u i t t i n g h i s mission. (For by q u i t t i n g h i s 
mission he would concede t h a t a man's m a t e r i a l concerns are the sum of 
h i s well-being.) The community ' b e n e f i t s ' him by not k i l l i n g or banishing 
him. But Socrates' acceptance of t h i s b e n e f i t makes him morally worse, 
f o r he must cease to do r i g h t a c t i o n - obey the god- i n order t o enjoy 
the b e n e f i t . To disobey the god, however, who i s b e t t e r than Socrates 
(Cf tw... &e0 29B 7) i s , i n h i s view, both e v i l and shameful. 
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a ' b e n e f i t ' , r a t h e r , must have made Socrates a worse man, f o r i t s 
enjoyment was c o n d i t i o n a l on h i s f o r s a k i n g what he saw as a duty t o the 
god, and, indeed, a duty t o h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s . But he then must have 
supposed t h a t wronging another - the god - f o r the m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t he 
would receive from the community - could be a p r o f i t r a t h e r than a 
detriment t o him. Also, he would have conceded t h a t r i g h t a c t i o n , a c t i o n 
which b e n e f i t s another, i s c o n d i t i o n a l on the agent's m a t e r i a l consider-
a t i o n s . For Socrates would have consented t o the laws of the community 
from f e a r of death. But whis would be t o abandon the god's mission i n 
favour of the community's i n j u n c t i o n t h a t he q u i t h i s mission. Had he 
supposed t h i s to be more prudent than the continued prosecution of h i s 
mission, he must then i n f a c t have abandoned b e l i e f i n the god; f o r he 
would have admitted t h a t the m a t e r i a l l y p r o f i t a b l e course of a c t i o n -
consenting to the community's i n j u n c t i o n - was the r i g h t course of a c t i o n 
But Socrates cannot both maintain t h i s b e l i e f and b e l i e v e , at the same 
time, i n a god who permits no r e a l i n j u r y to b e f a l l a j u s t man, a man 
who f u l f i l s i t s b i d d i n g . Socrates i n f a c t b e l i e v e d t h a t t o abandon h i s 
mission was to b r i n g e v i l upon h i m s e l f , the k i n d of e v i l t h a t makes men 
morally worse; f o r by q u i t t i n g h i s mission he would abandon h i s b e l i e f 
t h a t m a t e r i a l i n j u r y i s not true i n j u r y . To have abandoned t h i s b e l i e f 
he must have become a worse man. 
This conception i s b u i l t upon the more obvious meaning of p r u d e n t i a l 
ism, t h a t no man would a c t w i t h respect to others (as Socrates did) so 
as to i n c u r t h e i r d i s f a v o u r , thus b r i n g i n g p o t e n t i a l ( m a t e r i a l ) i n j u r y 
upon himself. The qu e s t i o n , would i t be i n a man's i n t e r e s t s t o i n j u r e 
others or t o act w i t h o u t care i n respect of them could simply be asking 
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(as a t 25C f f . ) : would i t pay t o make oth e r s , the young, mo r a l l y bad 
(jfo^d^po]/) when we know t h a t some day they might do us some i n j u r y ? 
Could a man r e a l l y be s a i d to have s k i l l i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h others 
who thus brought m a t e r i a l i n j u r y upon himself? We may r e f e r here t o 
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the statement at 25C f f . At 25E 3 , 1 A W x s i / 1 simply r e f e r s t o the e v i l 
a man would in c u r from another's i l l i n t e n t i o n s , from one who had been 
made co r r u p t . Socrates combines t h i s n o t i o n of e v i l t o the s e l f ( m a t e r i a l 
i n j u r y i n f l i c t e d by another ) w i t h the n o t i o n of e v i l men (oc • • .TToi/^oc: 
25C 7) who b r i n g e v i l upon t h e i r kinsmen and good men who b r i n g good t o 
give the two a p p l i c a t i o n s of the paradox we have discussed above (pp 83-
92). At 30CD, Socrates st a t e s t h a t he himself has i n c u r r e d the prospect 
o f what Anytus, Meletus, and others (o&cos. . . n*i UXKPS cts ) regard as the 
greates t of e v i l s - m a t e r i a l i n j u r y . But h i s statement ( I b i d . ) t h a t 
m a t e r i a l i n j u r y i n c u r r e d by the v i c t i m i s not nearly so great an e v i l 
as the agent's motive i n causing i n j u r y ( k i l l i n g a man u n j u s t l y ) , together 
w i t h h i s d e n i a l , on p r u d e n t i a l grounds, t h a t he has i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n j u r e d 
o t h e r s , (Cf n 26) confirms h i s own i n t e n t i o n i n respect of the p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t no man would v o l u n t a r i l y act so as t o i n j u r e h i m s e l f : t h a t a man 
who i n c u r r e d m a t e r i a l i n j u r y i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h others could n o t , by 
th a t reason, have sustained t r u e i n j u r y . We have s a i d t h a t the n o t i o n of 
consent from conscience raises the question w i t h respect t o what i n t e r e s t 
of a man should a man perform r i g h t a c t i o n , or a c t i o n b e n e f i c i a l t o 
another? Underlying Socrates' discussion w i t h Meletus at 25C f f . are 
the questions: w i t h respect t o what i n t e r e s t s of a man, o r , indeed, of 
s o c i e t y , should we educate the young? What are the r e a l consequences of 
making the young worse ( ^ ^ ^ / ? » V ) ? I f we answer these questions from 
36 
t> < J«7 6-ls Carovcov du*tJt+t HICU wvtt- <»" tooT v ow, oct 
" ' ' y ' ' i t e l ' \ A ~ 
r , J «•» ' 
J»7T o(( /F o<Jf . . . * 
m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , then the k i n d of e v i l i s t h a t intended at 25E3 
by *m.itev\ m a t e r i a l i n j u r y alone. The prudent man, the man who knows h i s 
best i n t e r e s t s , w i l l be one who has l e a r n t t h a t i t cannot p r o f i t him to 
contravene h i s m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g . This conception w i l l be r o o t and 
branch of h i s moral education. He w i l l have l e a r n t , when young, t h a t 
r i g h t regard of others i s recommended from the obvious m a t e r i a l needs of 
the s e l f . He w i l l have l e a r n t as w e l l t h a t m a t e r i a l e v i l i s the worst of 
e v i l s , the worst e v i l t h a t can b e f a l l a man. But t h i s teaching opposes 
Socrates' b e l i e f t h a t a man's regard f o r h i s m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g i s not a 
s u f f i c i e n t ground on which to base h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h others - whether the 
young or one's f e l l o w c i t i z e n s - a f e a t u r e of the case he had l e f t open 
at 25C f f . i n order t o generate h i s accusers' i m p l i c i t answer to the 
question: i n what does r i g h t regard of others consist? They must know, 
f o r they accuse him of i n j u s t i c e , of w i l f u l d i s r e g a r d of the moral needs of 
the young and hence of s o c i e t y . Yet Socrates knows t h a t he w i l l probably 
i n c u r i n j u r y i f he makes the young worse. I n what way, then, has he 
disregarded h i s kinsmen and brought i n j u r y upon himself? On what basis has 
he committed v o l u n t a r y wrong? 
His accusers must answer t h a t Socrates has lacked s k i l l i n h i s r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h them, - i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h h i s s o c i e t y ( f o r which they act as 
advocates) and i t s requirements of him as a c i t i z e n . But i f Socrates' 
d o c t r i n e of a man's i n t e r e s t s i s damaging, then t o whom i s i t damaging? 
Those who survived i t s i l l e f f e c t s should now come forward to accuse him 
(33C f f . ) . Since, however, none do come forward yet he f i n d s himself 
on t r i a l , he must s t i l l have w i l f u l l y disregarded others and lacked 
knowledge of h i s own i n t e r e s t s i n so doing. His accusers accept t h a t he 
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cannot have caused i n j u r y w i t h o u t knowing t h a t i t i s f o l l y to make the 
young worse. For i t i s p l a i n to any man t h a t we stand to i n j u r e ourselves 
i f we do not tend to t h e i r moral education. But h i s accusers s t i l l regard 
Socrates as culpably i g n o r a n t of a c t i o n which would b e n e f i t both h i m s e l f 
and o t h e r s , f o r they do not drop t h e i r charge. His plea f o r i n s t r u c t i o n 
generates h i s accusers' i m p l i c i t answer th a t Socrates has not l e a r n t what 
others have: t h a t a man's m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g i s the basis on which r i g h t 
regard of others i s determined. This b e l i e f denies Socrates' theory of 
conscientious knowledge and a man's t r u e i n t e r e s t . I t therefore also 
denies Socrates' avowed b e l i e f t h a t the 'disregard' of others which he 
has p r a c t i s e d i s b e n e f i c i a l . 
Socrates dedicated h i s reproach of Athens, h i s 'disregard' of others, 
to h i s conception of conscientious knowledge and a man's t r u e i n t e r e s t . He 
put t h i s conception before a l l c i t i z e n s , before the young, before f o r e i g n e r s , 
teaching what he b e l i e v e d any man should know about the grounds of a man's 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h others. B r i e f l y s t a t e d , he b e l i e v e d t h a t a man who i s 
' s k i l l e d ' i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h others - a man who p r o f i t s i n h i s r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h others - should be any man. We may mark what he says at 23B: t h a t 
the oracle must have meant t h a t t h a t man ( Ovces oyu!\/ . . . . ) - any man -
i s wisest who, l i k e Socrates, knows he i s of l i t t l e worth i n respect of 
wisdom, t h a t he, Socrates, i s only an exemplar, the god's instrument, i n 
p u t t i n g t h i s view before men. A man who was wise would not l e t f e a r of 
death ( o r any m a t e r i a l consideration) be the c o n d i t i o n of or stand i n 
the way of h i s doing what he b e l i e v e d was r i g h t . The man who was not wise 
would do so and would f a i l to act i n h i s true i n t e r e s t . This means t h a t 
any man should act from conscience (Cf p 74 supra and n 20), t h a t moral 
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education must c o n s i s t i n p u t t i n g t h i s knowledge before man. We have 
said t h a t Socrates' stand i n the Apology i s a p o l i t i c a l (p 96 supra). We 
mean by t h i s t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n was not p a r t i s a n . While t h a t i s t r u e , we 
must remember t h a t he was w i l l i n g to f u l f i l the duties consequent upon 
being an Athenian c i t i z e n . But he i m p l i c i t l y disclaims personal a l l e g i a n c e 
to p a r t y (p 95 supra). We should also mark t h a t h i s mission, w h i l e i t s 
prosecution i l l u s t r a t e s a general theory of consent to law, i s not a c a l l 
f o r a p a r t i c u l a r form of r u l e . He does not oppose h i s c i t y ' s p o l i t i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e . What he does oppose i s men's a t t i t u d e s to law as seen i n 
current values - values which he exposes i n h i s defence. His theme i s the 
choice a man makes i n obeying the laws of a present form of r u l e . On t h i s 
theme he bases h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a man i s s e l f - r u l e d who acts from con-
science i n e x e r c i s i n g r i g h t regard of others, i n doing what law ought t o 
order a man to do. 
While the analogy from techne w i l l be used by Plato i n the Republic 
to i l l u s t r a t e a theory of p o l i t i c a l consent developed on l i n e s of class 
i n t e r e s t , he makes use of the concept i n the Apology to exemplify Socrates' 
b e l i e f t h a t any man might exercise t r u e p r u d e n t i a l s k i l l i n h i s r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h others and t h a t any man i s responsible f o r conscientious knowledge. 
Since, t y p i c a l l y , the analogy implies the exercise of s k i l l upon 'matter' 
i n f e r i o r t o the agent of the s k i l l we must show how P l a t o used the analogy 
i n the Apology to e x p l a i n Socrates' basic n o t i o n of one man's duty to 
another, a n o t i o n which he developed i n terms of h i s conception of a man's 
true i n t e r e s t . Here, d i v i s i o n s of p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n on l i n e s of class 
i n t e r e s t i s n e i t h e r assumed nor i m p l i e d . The analogy i s r a t h e r used to 
i l l u s t r a t e the general question Socrates puts t o h i s accusers, who b e l i e v e 
themselves to be advocates of moral good, 'What does prudence counsel i n 
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respect of a man's regarding others w e l l ? 1 A man's answer t o t h i s question 
w i l l i n d i c a t e h i s conception of a man's i n t e r e s t s , h i s conception of the 
b e n e f i t t h a t comes t o a man from e x e r c i s i n g r i g h t regard of others. I t w i l l 
i n d i c a t e whether he believes a man stands to gain anything other than 
m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y from h i s exercise of r i g h t regard of others. I t w i l l 
i n d i c a t e a t the same time whether he bel i e v e s t h a t r i g h t a c t i o n could e n t a i l 
anything more than a man's regard f o r another's m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g . I n 
s h o r t , h i s answer w i l l i n d i c a t e h i s conception of society's i n t e r e s t i n 
moral education and h i s conception of the j u s t man, the man who regards h i s 
kinsmen w e l l . 
* * * 
Socrates b e l i e v e d t h a t by the prosecution of h i s mission he was a i d i n g 
the god (23B) . He gave help t o the god by p o i n t i n g out t o men what he took 
the god's oracle t o him t o mean: that he was the god's instrument i n showing 
men that human wisdom amounts t o a confession of ignorance. We have described 
t h i s wisdom, i n i t s moral aspect, as being conscientious knowledge. So f a r 
as conscientious knowledge p e r t a i n s t o a man's conception of h i s i n t e r e s t s 
i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s , we may described Socrates' service t o the god 
as being devoted t o h i s encouraging men to l e a r n , from c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s , how a god would have men regard one another. An important nuance 
from the techne analogy underlies Socrates' r e l a t i o n w i t h the god. Socrates 
ascertained on r a t i o n a l grounds what the god must have intended by i t s 
oracle (Cf n 20). He was the god's instrument, b e n e f i t i n g the god by 
a s c e r t a i n i n g i t s meaning. I n t h i s , he was as one subordinate or i n f e r i o r 
to the god, being convinced t h a t he must regard the god's business as of 
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to b e l i e v e t h a t he had a mission from the god to h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s . By 
encouraging them toward r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n about t h e i r i n t e r e s t s he b e l i e v e d 
he was b e n e f i t i n g the god, a b e t t e r being whom he be l i e v e d he must serve. 
He believed, a t the same time, t h a t no man who acted i n the service of the 
god could s u s t a i n t r u e i n j u r y , t h a t such a man must himse l f be a 'b e t t e r * man 
whom others could not i n j u r e (Cf 30CD). The n o t i o n of techne, so f a r as i t 
underlies Socrates' r e l a t i o n w i t h the god, ex e m p l i f i e d what P l a t o i n f e r r e d 
from the example o f Socrates t o be a r a t i o n a l choice, a choice from a man's 
true i n t e r e s t t h a t a man makes i n obeying an o b j e c t i v e moral law. Socrates 
described t h i s choice as being open t o any man. I n the Apology, P l a t o 
portrayed Socrates' consent to the god by showing t h a t Socrates consented 
to what he b e l i e v e d law t r u l y enjoined upon him: to regard others w e l l , 
both the god and h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s , w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r m a t e r i a l 
s e c u r i t y . On t h i s conception P l a t o based a theory of the s e l f - r u l e d man. 
The Apology epitomizes t h i s theory. Socrates died i n the prosecution of 
a mission which he b e l i e v e d he would abandon a t the p r e j u d i c e of h i s t r u e 
i n t e r e s t (Cf pp 103ff. supra) . By i t s prosecution he not only died; he 
also e x e m p l i f i e d t r u e consent t o law. He d i d so both by a c t i n g i n f u l l view 
of the laws of h i s c i t y and from h i s b e l i e f t h a t he could s u s t a i n no e v i l 
by a c t i n g as he be l i e v e d the god would have him act. I n t h i s P lato regarded 
him as an exemplar of a man's consent to moral law, as an exemplar of man's 
conception of h i s own i n t e r e s t s as evidenced by h i s obeying a b e t t e r being 
and by obeying the laws of h i s c i t y . I n s h o r t , Socrates b e n e f i t e d the god 
by r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n upon the meaning of i t s o r a c l e . He himself thereby 
b e n e f i t e d by the knowledge t h a t no r e a l harm could come to a man who acted 
as a god would have him a c t , a man who acted from conscience i n h i s r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h o t h e rs. 
We have s t a t e d t h a t the d o c t r i n e of consent i n the Apology has both 
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t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l aspects (p 97' supra). These i n v o l v e Socrates' 
conceptions of a man's t r u e i n t e r e s t and h i s n o t i o n of the source of law i n 
communities (P 9& ) , and, as a p r a c t i c a l complement t o these conceptions, 
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h i s testament to them i n h i s actions as a c i t i z e n . The analogy from techne, 
so f a r as i t describes Socrates' r e l a t i o n w i t h the god, ex e m p l i f i e s h i s 
conception of a t r u l y j u s t man's consent to law. For t h i s reason the analogy 
complements the p r a c t i c a l aspect of the do c t r i n e of consent, serving t o 
exemplify a man's b e l i e f , a t t a i n e d on r a t i o n a l grounds, t h a t i t must be i n 
h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t to regard others w e l l . We have sai d t h a t Socrates' 
accusers exemplify common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s m (pp 81-84). Accordingly, we 
have i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e i r i m p l i c i t n o t i o n of the j u s t man - the good or 
worthy man - derives from the view t h a t the j u s t man regards others w e l l 
from m a t e r i a l considerations. P l a t o devoted the f i r s t three books of the 
Republic to a f u l l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s p o i n t of view, a p o i n t of view t h a t 
maintains t h a t m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y i s the only ground of j u s t i c e . There, h i s 
account of common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s m serves h i s u l t i m a t e i n t e n t i o n to discuss 
p o l i t i c a l consent w i t h i n the context of a so c i e t y i n which the needs and 
i n t e r e s t s of three classes of c i t i z e n are conceived as r e a l i z e d . I n the 
Apology h i s conceptions of tr u e and nominal consent do not depart from the 
context of cu r r e n t p o l i t i c a l l i f e . We see both here and i n the C r i t o , on 
the p l a i n of a c t u a l p o l i t i c s , Plato's o p p o s i t i o n to the view t h a t a man's 
m a t e r i a l considerations are s u f f i c i e n t f o r consent to law and r i g h t regard 
of others. I t w i l l be u s e f u l a t t h i s p o i n t i n our discussion to c l a r i f y 
f u r t h e r those aspects of p r u d e n t i a l i s m t h a t are common to the e a r l y books of 
the Republic and the theory of consent i n the Apology. Here, we s h a l l be 
c h i e f l y i n t e r e s t e d i n making use of the Republic to c l a r i f y the i m p l i c i t view 
of Socrates' accusers t h a t j u s t i c e - obeying a stronger power - e n t a i l s 
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wronging o t h e r s . Hence, the importance t o our discussion of a c e n t r a l question 
of the Apology; what does prudence counsel i n respect of a man's rega r d i n g 
others w e l l (p 107 )? We s h a l l deal w i t h the Republic i n t h i s chapter o n l y to 
the e x t e n t t h a t i t throws valuable l i g h t on the d o c t r i n e of consent i n the 
Apology. When we have done t h i s we may take up again our co n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
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C r i t o i n order to complete our discussion of the S o c r a t i c conception of consent. 
We have s a i d t h a t the analogy from techne i n the Apology complements 
the p r a c t i c a l aspect of the d o c t r i n e of consent, t h a t i t e x e m p l i f i e d Socrates' 
b e l i e f , a t t a i n e d on r a t i o n a l grounds, t h a t i t must be i n a man's t r u e 
i n t e r e s t t o regard others w e l l (p 110 s u p r a ) , t h a t he h i m s e l f had a duty t o 
put t h i s view before men. When he says, a t 32A 4,5 t h a t he w i l l l e t h i s 
a c t i o n s be h i s witness to the f a c t t h a t he has never y i e l d e d t o i n j u s t i c e 
through f e a r of death he i m p l i e s t h a t the t r u l y j u s t man demonstrates by h i s 
a c t i o n s - h i s outward a c t i v i t y - h i s b e l i e f t h a t r i g h t regard of others i s 
not contingent on m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Such a man b e l i e v e s he must become 
a worse man - a man l a c k i n g the b e n e f i t of knowing what a god would r e q u i r e 
of men - i f he acts u n j u s t l y . That i s t o say, he would lack the moral b e n e f i t 
o f knowing t h a t i t cannot p r o f i t a man, b u t must r a t h e r i n j u r e a man, t o 
wrong o t h e r s . (Cf pp 102 » 104 supra). I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s , the t r u l y 
j u s t man i s one vrhose a c t i o n s are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s b e l i e f t h a t t h e 
b e t t e r man - t h e man who r e f r a i n s from i n j u s t i c e - cannot be i n j u r e d by a 
vrorse man* Such a man's outward actions w i l l r e f l e c t t h i s b e l i e f . I n 
consistency w i t h the demonstration given a t 32A 4, 5 f f . Socrates 
We have d e a l t a t s u f f i c i e n t l e n g t h i n t h i s chapter w i t h S o c r a t i c and 
common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s m as they occur i n the Apology t o j u s t i f y s p e c i f i c 
reference t o the Republic, an obviously l a t e r work, so f a r as the Republic 
a s s i s t s us i n d e f i n i n g the S o c r a t i c theory of consent. For example, the 
n o t i o n o f covenant (.V^&yKy) > as explained on p r u d e n t i a l grounds by Glaucon, 
f i n d s a n a t u r a l c o n t r a s t i n the C r i t o where, we have suggested, Socrates 1 
d o c t r i n e i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Apology. I t i s not before P l a t o develops h i s 
a c t u a l conception of an i d e a l community (Republic 369B f f . ) t h a t the P l a t o n i c 
and S o c r a t i c conceptions of consent become v i a b l y d i s t i n c t . For t h i s reason, 
the e a r l y books of the Republic are germane to our s p e c i f i c treatment o f the 
S o c r a t i c conception. Our present chapter i s the n a t u r a l place f o r s p e c i f i c 
reference to these books of the Republic. 
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has described h i s mission as an a c t i v i t y t h a t has not been dependent on 
m a t e r i a l considerations. I t has been an a c t i v i t y t h a t has been t r u l y 
b e n e f i c i a l t o others (29D f f . ) . Moreover, from what we know of Socrates' 
r e l a t i o n w i t h the god (pp 108 , 109 supra) we know t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t 
by s e r v i n g the god and h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s he was a c t i n g i n h i s own true 
i n t e r e s t as w e l l , t h a t he himself b e n e f i t e d from h i s p r o t r e p t i c a c t i v i t y . 
These features of Socrates' p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t e h i s b e l i e f t h a t the p r a c t i c e 
of j u s t i c e , both i n h i s day t o day l i f e and i n the prosecution of h i s p e c u l i a r 
duty, had a r e s u l t - the a c q u i s i t i o n of h i s true w e l l - b e i n g - t h a t was c o n t i n -
uous w i t h i t s p r a c t i c e . This idea u n d e r l i e s Socrates' b e l i e f t h a t obedience 
to law, where t h i s i m p l i e s a man's true consent, i s compatible w i t h a man's 
. . . * T . . J 40 a c q u i s i t i o n of h i s tr u e i n t e r e s t . 
We should emphasize t h a t Socrates was a b e t t e r man owing t o the 
serv i c e he gave the god (pp 102 s 104supra). Here, he was as one i n f e r i o r 
to a s u p e r i o r ; he was as one who was b e n e f i t e d by h i s response to a 
superior being, the god. That e x e m p l i f i e s a main f e a t u r e of the techne 
analogy (p 107supra). But together w i t h t h i s , we must emphasize the p o i n t 
of the p r a c t i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n given a t 32A 4 , 5 f f . There, Socrates i m p l i e s 
t h a t i n h i s day-to-day l i f e as a c i t i z e n he has acted toward others as a 
god would have a man act (Cf. efiejdouv/ tois $m*ioi* ; 32E 5) , regarding 
other men as being 'b e t t e r ' than himself i n the sense th a t any man owes a 
duty to another. P e c u l i a r t o Socrates' conception i s h i s b e l i e f t h a t by 
regarding others w e l l , where a man i s not moved t o do so from m a t e r i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a man demonstrates s k i l l or prudence i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
others. Since Socrates supposes he i s only an exemplar of conscientious 
knowledge (Cf p 10<& ) , h i s n o t i o n of s k i l l as conveyed to us i n the 
p r a c t i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n p o i n t s to a conception of moral e q u a l i t y among men: 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of any man to act j u s t l y i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h others. 
We may emphasize t h a t the n o t i o n of c o m p a t i b i l i t y e n t a i l s the b e l i e f 
t h a t the b e t t e r man (the t r u l y j u s t man) w i l l always act as a god would 
have a man act: from conscience i n respect of others (p 107 Jsupra) . He w i l l 
b e l i e v e t h a t t o do so i s i n h i s true i n t e r e s t and t h a t consent from consc-
ience i s the basis of true consent to law. Socrates e x e m p l i f i e d h i s b e l i e f 
t h a t consent from m a t e r i a l considerations i s less than t r u e consent by 
e x e r c i s i n g r i g h t regard of others i n f u l l view of the laws of Athens. He 
thus gave h i s c i t y complete freedom t o w i t n e s s v to accept, or t o r e j e c t 
h i s own conception of j u s t i c e and consent to law. At h i s t r i a l , then, he 
put h i m s e l f at h i s c i t y ' s d i s p o s a l , e n t r u s t i n g h i s f a t e n ot only to i t s 
decision but also^ to the god: i/^i/f^M/ tt yip, *v ^fpfs ' AtiyfAeij «i* »tf*</ 
XAtt *yl ce- «Vt«rp* K+t vpCtf • 35D6 f f . (His statement ( I b i d . ) 
(Continued on page 113.) 
As the t r u l y j u s t man's outward a c t i v i t y r e f l e c t s h i s i n n e r b e l i e f , 
so too does h i s o s t e n s i b l e consent t o law - h i s day to day l i f e i n which he 
f u l f i l s the duties of c i t i z e n s h i p - r e f l e c t conscientious consent. We may 
regard the j u s t man's outward a c t i v i t y here defined as h i s c o n t i n u i n g 
consent. We may say t h a t the l a t t e r i s the outward m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the 
consent of conscience, t h a t i t r e f l e c t s the j u s t man's b e l i e f t h a t he i s 
bound i n conscience t o regard others w e l l : i t w i l l r e f l e c t a man's being 
moved to the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e from the b e l i e f t h a t he i s morally r e q u i r e d 
to regard others w e l l . The Apology demonstrates t h i s conception of j u s t i c e . 
I t i s a conception which opposes common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s m , i t s n o t i o n of 
j u s t i c e , and i t s theory of consent t o law. I t i s a theory which underlines 
a main f e a t u r e of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t theory as we described t h i s theory i n 
Chapter 1: t h a t a man's consent to law imp l i e s a n a t u r a l duty to regard 
others w e l l . But the no t i o n of a man's i n i t i a l s u b j e c t i o n t o p o l i t i c a l 
order, which would imply on h i s t o r i c a l grounds a c a t e g o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between n a t u r a l and p o s i t i v e law, was not ap p l i c a b l e to the S o c r a t i c concept-
i o n . Indeed i t was t o the moral r a t h e r than to the h i s t o r i c a l emphasis of 
c o n t r a c t u a l t h i n k i n g t h a t Locke's conception of i n d i v i d u a l consent was 
devoted. But the emphasis i n Locke was on l i m i t a t i o n s t o the p u r s u i t of 
i n t e r e s t s which a man's moral knowledge, as evidenced by h i s obeying laws, 
must impose upon him (pp 39 f f . Ch 1 ) . I n Socrates' case, however, a l l 
emphasis i s placed on a man's knowledge of conscience, and, w i t h t h a t , on 
h i s b e l i e f t h a t such knowledge i t s e l f e n t a i l s a man's a c q u i s i t i o n of h i s 
40 (continued from page 112) 
t h a t he be l i e v e s i n the gods as do none of h i s accusers consists w i t h 
h i s b e l i e f t h a t no r e a l harm could come to a man who acted i n a god's 
ser v i c e . I f he were to implore h i s judges (f(?r0+i : 35 C,D), instead 
of teaching and persuading them, he would encourage them t o d i s b e l i e v e 
i n gods (35 D) - to d i s b e l i e v e , t h a t i s , t h a t a b e t t e r man cannot be 
- t r u l y harmed.) 
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t r u e i n t e r e s t : t h a t a man acquired h i s tru e i n t e r e s t i n the exercise of 
j u s t i c e , i n the exercise of the r i g h t regard of others. Again, a man's 
consent from conscience i m p l i e s h i s knowledge of how a god would have a 
man act i n respect of others. Socrates b e l i e v e d t h a t a man's consent t o 
law, i f i t i s t r u e consent, i s the n a t u r a l e f f e c t of what a god would 
r e q u i r e . On t h i s conception he based h i s b e l i e f t h a t a man's duty to obey 
d i v i n e law precedes, though i t does not supersede, h i s duty to obey the laws 
of h i s c i t y . We see t h i s conception i n the Apology and the C r i t o taken t o -
gether. The S o c r a t i c conception c a t e g o r i c a l l y opposes the d o c t r i n e of 
covenant (ovi/ffyV^) which P l a t o describes i n the Republic. The i m p l i c i t 
t h r u s t of Socrates' o p p o s i t i o n i s against the moral i m p l i c a t i o n s which 
f o l l o w on the S o p h i s t i c conception of the d i s c r e t e o r i g i n s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e 
These i m p l i c a t i o n s come to r e s t i n Glaucon's statement (360D) t h a t no man i s 
j u s t of h i s own w i l l but of necessity ( a'ufets %LH<IUOZ, *AAJ olv«c/-
KA^Jjt/tri/es ) • The thought expressed i n t h i s phrase opposes the Socra t i c 
conception t h a t a man's r a t i o n a l considerations must lead to the c o n v i c t i o n 
41 
t h a t a god would not sanction a man's doing wrong to others, t h a t i t must 
Together w i t h Socrates' conception a t Apology 30CD t h a t i t i s not a 
god's w i l l (ou. . . Styled) t h a t a worse man could i n j u r e a b e t t e r - o</f£ 
•ftp «iV S\>\/*LC0 - we s h a l l remember t h a t Socrates b e l i e v e d he was a i d i n g , 
or b e n e f i t i n g , the god by the prosecution of h i s mission (pp 108 supra). 
We s h a l l r e c a l l as w e l l t h a t Socrates b e l i e v e d he was a c t i n g i n h i s own t r u e 
i n t e r e s t by prosecuting t h i s mission. I n s h o r t , h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
god stands as an exemplar of how a god would have a man regard another, 
b e t t e r , being - whether a god or a man (Cf 29B7). Here we may note the 
wide c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t i s p r o p e r l y to be placed on ^toif/ctrnj ' "allowed by 
the laws of god and men, rig h t e o u s " (L & S, Intermediate Ed. p 361). 
I n the context o f the Apology the concept underlying '&&//LC<!V* i s 
that men's laws ought to conform t o those of a god. Socrates t r e a t s t h i s 
concept, throughout, on p r u d e n t i a l l i n e s : I n j u r i n g a b e t t e r man (or 
attempting to do so) must make a man morally worse (30 D5); i t must 
deprive him of the b e n e f i t of being a good man. We have seen t h a t Socrates 
must become morally worse i f he abandons h i s mission. I f he d i d so he 
could not then be confirmed i n the b e l i e f t h a t he was a b e t t e r man whom 
(continued on page 15) 
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be I n a man's t r u e i n t e r e s t to regard others w e l l . I n the Republic, as i n 
the Apology, P l a t o develops the n o t i o n of consent i n conjunction w i t h the 
question of d i v i n e sanction. Socrates and h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s t r e a t the 
problem i n terms of the questions: whether i t i s r a t i o n a l , and t h e r e f o r e 
p r o f i t a b l e , to regard j u s t i c e as having an absolute claim on a man; what 
does the existence of law imply about men's considerations of t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s ? The treatment of these questions i s ranged, h i s t o r i c a l l y , from 
the secular, contemporary views of Thrasymachus and Glaucon t h a t j u s t i c e i s 
the stronger man's advantage and t h a t r i g h t regard of others i s not n a t u r a l , 
t o the provenance of these views, as rehearsed by Adeimantus, i n t r a d i t i o n a l 
conceptions about d e i t y and what the gods sa n c t i o n . 
We have i n d i c a t e d t h a t Socrates' conception of techne i n the Apology, 
so f a r as i t denotes a man's s k i l l i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s , e x e m p l i f i e s 
h i s conception of a t r u l y j u s t man's consent t o law. We have sa i d t h a t 
Socrates' conception i n the Apology i s conveyed t o us i n both t h e o r e t i c a l 
and p r a c t i c a l terms. The former of these i s marked by the analogy from 
techne which u n d e r l i e s the n o t i o n of conscientious knowledge; the l a t t e r , 
by a p r a c t i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n which describes the s k i l l e d or t r u l y j u s t man's 
consent to law i n h i s day-to-day a c t s , i n h i s acts as a member of a 
p o l i t i c a l community. We have seen t h a t such a man w i l l a ct as a god would 
r e q u i r e a man to act. We have f u r t h e r noted t h a t the So c r a t i c conception 
of consent from conscience may be regarded, i n i t s outward m a n i f e s t a t i o n , 
41 (continued from page 114). 
worse men could not i n j u r e (p 103supra)• I n Socrates' conception of 
d e i t y , t h e r e f o r e , the question 'What would a god sanction?' must reduce 
to the question 'What does prudence counsel i n respect of a man's regarding 
others w e l l ? ' (pp 72, 107, l l ^ u p r a ) . 
42 v 
Cf on ' f y y * ' , n 38 supra. 
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as a man's con t i n u i n g consent. The moral i m p l i c a t i o n s of the So c r a t i c 
conception of the a c t i v i t y of j u s t i c e , which i l l u s t r a t e s Socrates' d o c t r i n e s 
of consent t o law and the s e l f - r u l e d man, oppose the conception of the 
d i s c r e t e o r i g i n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e as described by Pl a t o i n the Republie. 
That conception maintains t h a t k i n s h i p i s dependent on m a t e r i a l necessity 
alone, t h a t a man's r i g h t regard of others i m p l i e s only h i s want of m a t e r i a l 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , t h a t j u s t i c e has no n a t u r a l claim on a man. The theories 
of j u s t i c e which P l a t o records i n the e a r l y books of the Republic proceed 
from the view that j u s t i c e i s another man's good, t h a t i t s p r a c t i c e i s only 
of intermediary b e n e f i t to the agent. We f i n d here, i n e x p l i c i t d e t a i l , 
the i m p l i c a t i o n s t o moral education of the S o p h i s t i c answer to the question: 
what does prudence counsel i n respect of a man's regarding others w e l l ? 
The pur p o r t of t h i s question to p o l i t i c a l theory i s determined by our 
answers to two other questions: what i s the source of law and r i g h t a c t i o n 
( j u s t i c e ) i n p o l i t i c a l communities; what man could be s a i d , from the evidence 
of h i s actions as a c i t i z e n , t o 'know the laws', (pp 96, > 100 supra), o r, 
that i s , t o know what law t r u l y e njoins on a man? 
Socrates q u i t e c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s i n the Apology by means of the 
analogy from techne, t h a t the moral l i f e of a s t a t e i s not self-dependent, 
t h a t consent t o a s t a t e ' s laws, where i t i s t r u e consent, i s the n a t u r a l 
e f f e c t of what a god would r e q u i r e of a man (Cf p 114 and n 41 I b i d . ) By 
mainta i n i n g t h i s view he denies t h a t a man's regard f o r the m a t e r i a l w e l l -
being of others i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r consent to law and r i g h t regard of others. 
The f o l l o w i n g c o r o l l a r i e s a t t a c h to Socrates' p o s i t i o n : a man cannot be 
said t o la c k s k i l l , and the r e f o r e t o have f a i l e d i n achieving happiness or 
success, who wins the disfavour of others; i f , i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s , 
a man has not acted from considerations of h i s own m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g , the 
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man i s both j u s t and successful. I n Plato's b e l i e f , Socrates' accusers 
i n the Apology i m p l i c i t l y deny t h i s p o s i t i o n and i t s c o r o l l a r i e s by accusing 
Socrates of wrong-doing. By t h e i r accusation they i n f a c t exemplify the 
p r u d e n t i a l i s t t e n e t t h a t j u s t i c e consists i n b e n e f i t i n g f r i e n d s and i n 
harming enemies. By t h e i r accusation, they imply t h a t Socrates was i g n o r a n t 
of h i s own i n t e r e s t s i n h i s i n c u r r i n g the i l l favour of others. F i n a l l y , 
they imply by t h e i r a c t i o n i n accusing him t h a t a community's moral t r a d i t i o n -
t h a t p o l i t i c a l community - i s the sole source of law. 
The s e l f - r u l e d man of S o c r a t i c theory b e l i e v e s he has a covenant w i t h 
other men. The Apology explains t h i s conception by p u t t i n g the view t h a t 
a man's r i g h t regard of o t h e r s , as r e f l e c t e d by h i s e x t e r n a l p r a c t i c e of 
j u s t i c e , i s t r u e consent t o law when i t i s a case of the consent of conscience. 
The s e l f - r u l e d man's consent to law, i s , on the So c r a t i c theory, a n a t u r a l 
e f f e c t of what a god would r e q u i r e . Thus h i s covenant w i t h men r e f l e c t s 
d i v i n e w i l l . This conception denies the S o p h i s t i c view t h a t men praise 
j u s t i c e from the want of m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , t h a t obedience to law 
from m a t e r i a l i n s u f f i c i e n c y i s s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r men's consent, f o r 
t h e i r recommendation of and t h e i r p r a c t i c e of the r i g h t regard of others. 
Common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s m supposes t h a t j u s t i c e i s an e x t e r n a l , a r t i f i c i a l 
q u a l i t y o n l y , supposing t h a t i t s p r a c t i c e conceals men's true d i s p o s i t i o n . 
While that i s so, the p r u d e n t i a l i s t s yet recommend the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e 
t o the man who would be s k i l f u l i n h i s a c t i o n s ; f o r such a man, since he 
wishes to win men's favour, does not wish to seem u n j u s t i n the eyes of 
those whose favour he seeks, those who pr a i s e and recommend the p r a c t i c e 
of j u s t i c e . Indeed, the s k i l f u l man's r e a l o b j e c t i s to d i v e r t p u b l i c 
favour to h i m s e l f , to become the 'other man' of Thrasymachus' d e s c r i p t i o n -
the man who i s advantaged by men's p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e . U l t i m a t e l y , the 
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s k i l f u l man, succeeding from the favour others show him, w i l l be able to 
go beyond what p u b l i c opinion approves. He w i l l be able to achieve complete 
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i n j u s t i c e . By doing so he w i l l l i v e according to men's true i n c l i n a t i o n . 
I n h i s view, t o succeed i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s to l i v e as would a m a t e r i a l l y 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t man, a man who would succeed i n a n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n i n which 
there were no moral s t r i c t u r e s on men's a c t i o n s . The s k i l f u l man, then, 
according to the theory, a t t a i n s success by overcoming nomos, by showing 
from the example of h i s own l i f e t h a t nomos has no l e g i t i m a t e , or n a t u r a l 
hold on him. He proves the case put by Glaucon t h a t the s k i l l e d man does 
not assume he has a covenant w i t h other men (Cf n 4 p 53 supra), t h a t men 
w i l l p r a i se the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e and so deceive themselves from t h e i r 
fear of s u f f e r i n g i n j u s t i c e (. . . etTeCi volti/ ('tin e<vc<»V C t n e j u s t mariJj<AAy-
Au»i/ tvtvctov €$* JT*rwr>s iJU^'Aai/* vlv tov IctiHilrdut ifofov . \ 360D 27). 
According to the theory, then, the source of law i n communities i s men's 
recommendation of j u s t i c e from m a t e r i a l i n s u f f i c i e n c y and the use which 
s k i l f u l men make of t h i s recommendation. I n consequence of t h i s , any man 
who had the power to exercise i n j u s t i c e b u t who refused to do so would be 
most miserable and i r r a t i o n a l (£PA<-<*Ti*roff • . .i^ey COCACQS : I b i d . ) , f o r a 
man can have no grounds f o r p r a c t i s i n g j u s t i c e other than m a t e r i a l necessity. 
These views proceeded from the assumption t h a t a community's moral l i f e i s 
self-dependent. I n h o l d i n g t h a t moral custom must o r i g i n a t e i n m a t e r i a l 
n e c e s s i t y , the common sense p r u d e n t i a l i s t s supposed as w e l l t h a t a man's 
response to moral h a b i t must be s u f f i c i e n t f o r consent to law. The immoral-
i s t complexion which t h i s view takes derives from the claim t h a t w h i l e men's 
r i g h t regard of one another i s approved by custom, reason i t s e l f can only 
The ^ essence of the view i s s t a t e d by Glaucon at 362A: ttu cvci. y^p j 
tt»9t £o$A</ ^fc/iTck, W SOILZIV 'kS<.<»v '4Kk ' £TSM idiktt*,.'. « I n the 
paragraph above, I have provided a b r i e f statement of t h i s view. 
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approve r i g h t regard, or j u s t i c e , c o n d i t i o n a l l y . We have p r e v i o u s l y a l l u d e d 
t o Socrates' b e l i e f t h a t the man who does what i s r i g h t because common 
op i n i o n or personal expediency r e q u i r e s r i g h t a c t i o n of him i s not a man of 
much worth (p 74 supra). His meaning i s explained by the d o c t r i n e of con-
s c i e n t i o u s consent and e x e m p l i f i e d by the p r a c t i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n o f Apology, 
32A f f . Socrates h e l d t h a t a man's r i g h t regard of o t h e r s , as seen from 
h i s consent to law, i s a n a t u r a l requirement which i s j u s t i f i e d by r a t i o n a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s . He b e l i e v e d t h a t consent i s t o be understood 
both as a response t o custom and as a response to reason. When a man 
consents from reason, or from c o n s i d e r a t i o n of h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t , he 
ex e m p l i f i e s the consent o f the s e l f - r u l e d man, the man who b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s 
covenant w i t h others i s a n a t u r a l e f f e c t of what a god would r e q u i r e . Such 
a man i n Socrates' view consents t r u l y . He i s the b e t t e r man whom worse 
men cannot i n j u r e . Such a man w i l l always act so as t o regard others w e l l , 
be they stro n g e r or weaker men. I n s h o r t , h i s consent t o law b o t h belongs 
t o custom and transcends i t . Since t h a t i s so, no human s a n c t i o n could be 
good against a man's t r u e consent, f o r by consenting t r u l y a man exercises 
r i g h t regard of others and so acts as a god would r e q u i r e . Together w i t h 
t h i s we s h a l l remember t h a t Socrates acted i n f u l l view of the laws of h i s 
c i t y . By doing so he t e s t i f i e d to h i s b e l i e f t h a t a man's m a t e r i a l w e l l -
being i s not a c o n d i t i o n of h i s r i g h t regard of o t h e r s , of h i s consent t o 
law. These f a c t s b r i n g us back t o the question a t Apology 24D 11 , 'Who i s 
i t t h a t knows the laws?' and t o the n o t i o n s of p r u d e n t i a l i s m t h a t u n d e r l i e 
the question. The broad issue which pervades these aspects of the Apology 
i s the n o t i o n of moral custom (pp 78, 79 supra and 96 supra) and Plato's 
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b e l i e f t h a t Socrates' accusers offended moral custom by condemning him. 
Before we consider i n f u r t h e r d e t a i l the Republic's bearing on these 
questions i t w i l l be u s e f u l t o make some c l a r i f i c a t o r y remarks about the 
os t e n s i b l e a t t i t u d e to law and custom which Socrates' accusers represent. 
Together w i t h t h i s , we may assess to what e x t e n t , i f any, the Apology 
provides a c a l l f o r p o l i t i c a l reform. 
* * * 
We have s t a t e d before now th a t most commentators have a t t e s t e d to 
Anytus' l o y a l t y t o the Athenian democracy and i t s t r a d i t i o n s (p 93 supra). 
But we cannot lose s i g h t of the f a c t t h a t Plato's a t t i t u d e , w h i l e w r i t i n g 
the Apology, was h a r d l y sympathetic to whatever t a n g i b l e sentiments Anytus 
(or Meletus) may have had (Cf. n. 12). We have seen t h a t Socrates' challenge 
to h i s accusers t o show him t h a t he had committed wrongs amounted to a 
demand f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of p r u d e n t i a l a c t i o n . We have seen that t h e i r 
answer, had they chosen t o s p e l l i t out, would have shown them t o b e l i e v e 
t h a t a man's m a t e r i a l considerations are a s u f f i c i e n t i n c e n t i v e (indeed, 
the only i n c e n t i v e ) t o h i s t r e a t i n g others w i t h r i g h t regard. A major 
question, then, which P l a t o had i n view when presenting Socrates*apology, 
i s the issue of moral custom - men's r i g h t regard of one another - and what 
t h i s i m p l i e s t o a man i n h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of h i s i n t e r e s t s . 
Indeed, Socrates' question a t 24D 11 introduced the problem of a man's 
i n t e r e s t s : the man who knows the laws also knows what h i s advantage i s . 
He knows t h a t by obeying laws and hence regarding others w e l l , he stands to 
act i n h i s own i n t e r e s t s . But the c o n s t r u c t i o n Socrates placed on t h i s 
conception was t h a t a man must be i g n o r a n t of h i s t r u e w e l l - b e i n g who 
consents t o law from m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Such a man i s ignorant of 
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what custom requires of a man. His ignorance of the requirements of custom 
w i l l r e v e a l h i s ignorance of what a god would r e q u i r e of a man i n respect 
of a man's regard of others. Socrates i m p l i c i t l y l e v e l s these charges a t 
his accusers, a t men who see themselves as the champions of nomos and as 
the guardians of the moral w e l l - b e i n g and education of the young. I n 
cont r a s t t o the view they have of themselves as upholders of moral good 
Socrates t r e a t s h i s accusers as men who do great i n j u r y to themselves by 
condemning him, as men who act i n deep ignorance of t h e i r t r u e w e l l - b e i n g . 
He thus a s s a i l s them as men who l a c k p r u d e n t i a l s k i l l , i m p l i c i t l y accusing 
them of being u n f i t t o see to the education of the young. 
Socrates' charge accords w i t h h i s statement t h a t he h i m s e l f was never 
anyone's teacher (33A). For he taught the young, or, f o r t h a t matter, 
anyone who would l i s t e n to him, t h a t w e l l - b e i n g does not c o n s i s t i n m a t e r i a l 
p r o s p e r i t y , r e p u t a t i o n , or honour (29E). I n teaching t h i s he was not 
teaching a s k i l l t h a t would accord w i t h conventional notions of v i r t u e . On 
h i s own b e l i e f , he was teaching a s k i l l which would r a t h e r r e s u l t i n conscien-
t i o u s knowledge from a confession of ignorance. On the one hand, h i s 
e l e n c h t i c a c t i v i t y had i t s negative side: i t sought t o d i s s o l v e r e p u t a t i o n s 
f o r knowledge. But a t another l e v e l i t sought t o teach men t h a t r i g h t 
a c t i o n i s more to be valued than m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g . On the p o s i t i v e s i d e , 
then, Socrates' teaching was intended to have a s p e c i f i c a l l y moral r e s u l t -
a r e s u l t which he i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms of the advantage to the agent of other 
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regarding a c t i o n - an advantage which m a t e r i a l l oss could not p r e j u d i c e . 
I t was on these grounds t h a t Socrates would j u s t i f y to men the conventional 
requirement t h a t they should regard one another w e l l . To do so serves a 
Socrates says t h a t he does not know the consequences of death, b u t 
he does know t h a t i t i s wrong t o harm a b e t t e r being, e i t h e r a god or a 
man: 29B7. Cf. on 32E 5, n 40 supra. 
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man's t r u e i n t e r e s t . The man who obeys laws from c o n s i d e r a t i o n of h i s t r u e 
i n t e r e s t , and not from considerations of h i s m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g , i s a man 
who can be said t o 'know the laws', a good or worthy man. 
Socrates' p o s i t i o n was bound to c o n f l i c t w i t h the b e l i e f s of h i s 
accusers since they i n t e r p r e t e d h i s conception of p r u d e n t i a l s k i l l - being 
rooted, as i t was, i n a search f o r the r a t i o n a l grounds of moral a c t i o n - not 
only as a challenge to t h e i r own a b i l i t y t o i n s t i l v i r t u e i n the young 
(Cf 22D 7) but as an a f f r o n t t o received t r a d i t i o n as w e l l . To h i s accusers' 
i m p l i c i t c l a i m t h a t prominent men - Al c i b i a d e s and C r i t i a s - had been 
corrupted by t h e i r associations w i t h him (33A), Socrates might answer th a t 
he could not have intended to harm the characters of men. He might claim, 
p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h a t to do so would have been to b r i n g harm upon hi m s e l f . 
At any r a t e , h i s disclaimer of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s associates t u r n i n g 
out w e l l or badly i s marked by h i s statement t h a t he never promised nor gave 
i n s t r u c t i o n to anyone (33B) . That meant, i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s , t h a t he had 
no t attempted t o undermine commonly accepted values, nor to teach s k i l l s 
t h a t would enable a man to t u r n the l a t t e r to h i s m a t e r i a l advantage. Rather, 
he had sought and had encouraged others t o seek the r e a l grounds of p r u d e n t i a l 
a c t i o n . His accusers'suspicion t h a t h i s a c t i v i t i e s had the purpose of 
d i s r u p t i n g the exercise of conventional duties marked them, i n Plato's eyes, 
as men i g n o r a n t of those same grounds of p r u d e n t i a l a c t i o n . P l a t o saw them 
as men who would describe commonly accepted values as no more than the 
product of a man's conformity to the e x t e r n a l i n c e n t i v e s h i s s o c i e t y might 
put before him. Hence, Socrates' i n v o c a t i o n of the Athenian c i t i z e n who 
cares f o r wealth repute and honour (29D 7). To the ad hominem charge t h a t 
Socrates had corrupted important men, Pl a t o opposed the case of Anytus, the 
exemplar of m a t e r i a l success. 
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The theory of consent i n the Apology answers each p a r t of the charge 
l a i d against Socrates, the c o r r u p t i o n charge and the charge of i m p l i c i t 
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atheism o r unconventional r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f . I n h i s apology, Socrates 
gave p r i o r place to i n d i v i d u a l conscience - a man's testament to what a god 
would r e q u i r e - as the source of the conventional requirement t h a t men should 
regard one another w e l l . The c o n f l i c t between Socrates and h i s accusers i s 
rooted i n Socrates' conception t h a t consent i s a response both t o custom and 
to reason (p 119' supra) . To t h i s conception we must oppose h i s accusers' 
equation of antinomian sentiment w i t h Socrates' c a l l f o r self-examination. 
We may understand by t h i s t h a t they are a f f i r m i n g what Socrates denies: t h a t 
consent from custom - or , i f we l i k e , conformity to t r a d i t i o n - i s s u f f i c i e n t 
f o r consent t o law. I n co n t r a s t t o Socrates, h i s accusers e f f e c t i v e l y 
b e l i e v e d t h a t a man's consent to law, h i s r i g h t regard of o t h e r s , resides i n 
an u n c r i t i c a l conformity to received values. Here we must mark Plato's 
i r o n i c a s s o c i a t i o n of the accusers' p o s i t i o n w i t h a m a t e r i a l i s t or secular 
inference which 'common sense' p r u d e n t i a l i s m drew from t r a d i t i o n a l moral 
sentiment. Socrates' accusers, Anytus i n p a r t i c u l a r , are a p p r o p r i a t e l y cast 
by P l a t o not only as the supporters of t r a d i t i o n b ut also as u n w i t t i n g 
exemplars of the new, m a t e r i a l i s t e t h i c . I t was from t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n g 
values together w i t h Socrates' explanation of the true grounds of a man's 
response to custom t h a t Plato constructed the Apology's conception of 
Against Burnet's explanation t h a t the charge r e f e r s to nonconformity 
i n r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e (p 104) we must weigh the f a c t t h a t Socrates was 
known t o be scrupulous i n the discharge of r i t u a l d u t i e s (Hackforth, 
p 59). P o i n t i n g t o Apology 29A and 35D, where Socrates makes reference 
t o what he regards as p l a u s i b l e grounds f o r a charge of atheism, 
Hackforth b e l i e v e d t h a t these references must r e f e r to i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
atheism i n the a c t u a l charge, r a t h e r than, as Burnet would have i t , 
merely the non-acknowledgement of the worship prescribed by convention 
(nomos): Burnet, I b i d . 
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46 p o l i t i c a l consent. 
We noted i n Ch JL that the early books of the Republic describe the 
p o l i t i c a l theories of simple and luxurious communities (p 13). We have now 
suggested that i n the Apology Plato sets Socrates' theory of consent against 
the i m p l i c i t materiaism of his accusers' position - a materialism which takes 
the form of a perfervid devotion to the restored democracy and to i t s p o l i t i c a l 
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and s o c i a l traditions. While Socrates' notion of consent from conscience 
describes obedience to law as being a response both to custom and to reason, 
h i s accusers i m p l i c i t l y maintain against t h i s position that the c i t y ' s ostensible 
traditions are the sole source of i t s laws. Socrates' b e l i e f that a man's consent 
to law (where t h i s i s true consent or the s e l f - r u l e d man's consent) i s a 
reflec t i o n of divine w i l l i s met by the accusers' i m p l i c i t claim that 
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Crossman spoke of Socrates' appeal to the common sense and the c r i t i c a l 
faculty of the ordinary man. He said that " i t s innate humility i s . . . 
the deadliest enemy of absolutism i n a l l i t s forms. I t s simple assertion 
that a l l men are equal i n their ignorance of the f i n a l values i s the 
dissolvent of vested i n t e r e s t s i n knowledge and in s o c i a l power". (Crossman 
Op.Cit. p 186). R. S. Bluck expresses this same sentiment when he 
distinguishes Socrates' position from that of Anytus and Meno i n the 
Meno. He sees the di s t i n c t i o n as that between a view of arete which 
regards the l a t t e r as a moral conception, and a view which sees i t as a 
s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l conception alone. R. S. Bluck, Plato's Meno (Cambridge, 
1961) pp 125-126. 
These statements point to our own d i s t i n c t i o n between the s e l f - r u l e d 
man who consents truly to law and the man who consents nominally, from 
external incentives alone. 
^ Cf. 29E: " > > 0. glpirt <r . . . \r(Ji/, ncK '• The reference i s to Periclean 
Athens (Burnet, Adam), which epitomized for Plato the luxurious c i t y whose 
p o l i t i c a l theories he would describe i n d e t a i l i n the Republic. 
At Apology 31C 5, Socrates says that h i s auditors might find i t 
strange that he has devoted h i s private l i f e to int e r f e r i n g (irok'Jtr/'*-/yo /n/) 
in the a f f a i r s of others, while he has not pursued the conventional i n t e r e s t 
of public or p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( I b i d . ) . I n conjunction with h i s b e l i e f 
that he has been sent to his c i t y as a g i f t from the god (31A 8) he 
claims that something beyond usual human motives - material motives -
^Jifi ol\jfyuJ /ri't/u/ • • 31B) . Cf. Burnet's note) - has prompted him to 
neglect h i s own a f f a i r s , prompting him to concern himself with the a f f a i r s 
(continued on page 125). 
Socratic rationalism (n 20 supra) i s a groundless basis for consent and 
for participation i n the l i f e of one's c i t y (Cf. n 48). To the Socratic 
claim that consent to law i s , properly, an act from consideration of one's 
true i n t e r e s t (pp 108 f f . ) his accusers oppose the b e l i e f that outward 
conformity to law and custom i s a s u f f i c i e n t basis for consent. Together 
with these facts we may emphasize that Socrates' theism, with i t s implic-
ation of universal authority (pp 9>3 r r - ) stands i n contrast to the ortho-
doxy of his accusers, challenging them to state their own case for piety and 
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for veneration of the gods. 
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and in t e r e s t s of others ( eb ii fye-'r*/Wfdccm/ 82). His statement 
at 31B-B5 i s both an i m p l i c i t indictment of current p o l i t i c s , i n which 
men concern themselves with matters other than moral virtue (arete: B5. 
Cf on 29E), their true i n t e r e s t , and a paradoxical claim that he has 
not tended to h i s own concerns, his material or p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . 
Cf Burnet's note on 31C 5 regarding the a l l u s i o n i n " ire K\> tf p*f/vouti " 
to P e r i c l e s ' claim that Athens does not hold those who remain aloof from 
a f f a i r s of state to be quiet men (5ir^*^»c«<) D U t useless men ('dflptiei/ ) . 
Underlying Socrates' claim that he has been neglectful of his own 
concerns i s h i s conception of the a c t i v i t y of the j u s t man: h i s consent 
from conscience and his continuing consent. At 31B f. Socrates implies 
that his own a c t i v i t y , i n which we find the essence of h i s theory of 
p o l i t i c a l consent, has marked him i n the eyes of others as a useless man, 
ho s t i l e to the proper concerns and a c t i v i t i e s of a c i t i z e n (Cf. p 97 )» 
while he believes that h i s a c t i v i t y has been dedicated both to his own 
well-being and to that of other c i t i z e n s . 
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Burnet's thesis that the charge of non-conformity amounted only 
to non-acknowledgement of the worship prescribed by nomos does not 
take account, as Hackforth showed, of Socrates' disavowal of atheism. 
(See n 45). Plato, i t seems to me,was intent on r a i s i n g the issue of 
atheism i n the Apology as a means of embarrassing Socrates' accusers. 
In h i s view i t was they and not Socrates who had acted so as to contravene 
divine w i l l . (See above, n 40 and n 41 re Apology 30CD). Hackforth's 
phi l o l o g i c a l demonstration that the charge bears the implication of 
atheism surely finds additional support from Plato's o v e r - a l l 
treatment of the accusation. I f Socrates has good grounds for suggesting 
that his accusers act as i f they did not believe in gods (Cf. n 40 ad fin. ) 
i t i s because he i s defending himself against a claim which he believes 
the indictment may j u s t as w e l l have made. 
While challenging his accusers to state their own case for piety 
and religious duty, Socrates i s also challenging them to explain to him 
the basis of a man's consent to law. Plato used the concept of techne i n 
the Apology to describe Socrates' notion of the s e l f - r u l e d man's consent 
(p 119 supra). By means of the concept of techne, Socrates had raised 
the question of prudential s k i l l as exhibited i n men's right regard for 
one another, arguing that the man who obeys conventional requirements from 
conscience or reason (pp 108 f f . ) i s the man who truly consents to law. 
Believing he had a mission from the god to encourage men toward ra t i o n a l 
consideration of th e i r i n t e r e s t s , Socrates held that no injunction of the 
court could be v a l i d against this duty. But he also s a t i s f i e d the natural 
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claim that no man i s above the law by acting i n the laws f u l l view. 
Thus, the concept of techne, and with i t , Socrates' pursuit of his mission, 
implies that the community i s not the sole source of law. But i t also 
implies that no man may presume to be above the laws. Socrates used the 
analogy i n the Apology to explain the moral and prudential grounds of man's 
consent to law. Though he questioned the wisdom of the community i n r e j e c t -
ing him, he did not use the analogy s p e c i f i c a l l y to describe p o l i t i c a l 
science, or that i s , the science by whose rule men might j u s t l y submit to 
be governed given that some man had this science ."^ 
49 n 
pp 62, 98 supra; Cf. pp 80, 103 > a n d 1 1 4 0 • 
Statesman 299BC i s often cited as a l a t e indication of Plato's 
view of the democracy which put Socrates to death. (Burnet, p 103; 
G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought, (Boston, 1966) pp 280; J.B. Skemp, 
Plato's Statesman, (London, 1962) p 208, n 1; Cp Hackforth, p 77). 
In the Statesman Plato maintains that rule by law i s e s s e n t i a l 
to the governance of states when we r e j e c t the dire c t application of 
p o l i t i c a l science. Given that we r e j e c t p o l i t i c a l science, then any 
form of government together with the consent of i t s c i t i z e n s must be 
(continued on page 127) 
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So far as Socrates was concerned, his mission was dedicated to the 
moral well-being of individuals. A l l implications of the r a d i c a l reform 
of government that Plato would l a t e r see in h i s mission are subordinate, 
in the Apology, to Socrates' conception of the moral basis of a man's 
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rooted i n respect for custom, however unsatisfactory t h i s may be with 
comparison to rule by p o l i t i c a l science. Now the impossibility of the 
application of p o l i t i c a l science would seem to eliminate, i n Plato's 
mind, the grounds for consent as explained by Socrates i n the Apology. 
There, Socrates showed that r a t i o n a l consideration of one's i n t e r e s t s , 
leading to consent from conscience, provides the moral basis of consent 
to law. (Cf Skemp, Ibid.).. We have said in the text above that the 
techne analogy i n the Apology i s not, s p e c i f i c a l l y , devoted to the science 
of government. (But see n 52.) . I t i s rather devoted to a conception of 
the s e l f - r u l e d man's consent to the laws of a society of which he i s a 
c i t i z e n though not the r u l e r . But i n the l a t e r work, Plato t e l l s us 
that s o c i e t i e s must r e j e c t any man who would c a l l for examination of 
conventional p r i n c i p l e s . His reason i s that where there i s no r e a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l science, there can be no wisdom greater than the 
wisdom of the laws (299C; Cp Socrates' question at Apology 24D 11: "Who 
i s i t that knows the laws?"). Plato i s saying that i f we must r e j e c t 
p o l i t i c a l science as being practicable we must also r e j e c t the right to 
examine the moral basis of received t r a d i t i o n . Where we r e j e c t both of 
these, then government must work s t r i c t l y within the l i m i t s of a constitu-
tion which imitates, so far as possible, rule by theoretical knowledge 
(.At? Sij cjis cctdvctr ye t. , . fl-oAioiA*,. • . /syfeneci K t C v c o i s Civ* voywv 
•tt-oiilv ir*p* ci V fY/"*/'/*'***** jrxc/»<* t&ij, • 301A) ; and consent_must 
proceed from veneration for custom ( ouStv y*ip rtU*' vopvuv e<i/ia 
fa^wC<-f>o\/ : 299C) . 
This can only mean that i n the l a t e r work Plato had come to equate the 
Apology's notion of s e l f - r u l e with possession of the science of ruling 
others. That accounts for the bitterness with which he invokes the Apology, 
while , at the same time, maintaining that where p o l i t i c a l science does 
not obtain men who would examine the grounds of law and ancestral custom 
are a danger to s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y ( & m*c*. crvfyf<y<*r* pi« *j.$otjrn/ 
^j^^f*" {'y*tir&tLi, ^<2v e'tpfj/tuun/ . • • ' ,,%.(>A. c«o i& nptorOti/ M^O* 
fci reTrce c» HuHtr } :300A). The notion of the s e l f -
ruled man has, i n Plato's thinking, given way to a more exclusively p o l i t i c a l 
conception which has s o c i a l order, and not the individual's confirmation of 
moral law, as i t s i n i t i a l reference for the theory of government and consent. 
I f we must admit democracy as a possible form of constitution, while at the 
same time we r e j e c t the p o s s i b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l science, then, Plato would 
seem to be saying, we must concede to the demands of Socrates' accusers 
who themselves believed that no man could be wiser than the laws. Plato's 
l a t e concession to this b e l i e f must, however, be o f f s e t by h i s conviction 
that Socrates was one who i n fact had p o l i t i c a l science. I believe that 
i t i s to these facts that we must attribute Plato's apparent endorsement of 
the community that would punish or r e j e c t any of i t s c i t i z e n s who wished to 
know the grounds of moral custom (Cf Hackforth, I b i d . ) . 
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consent to law. To h i s accusers' i m p l i c i t claim that no man i s wiser than 
the laws (Cf n 50), Socrates gave, as his defence, his conception of true 
prudential s k i l l : h i s conception of the moral grounds of obedience to law 
and right regard of others. He implied that h i s accusers lacked knowledge 
of these grounds. I n the Apology, then, Plato ranged Socrates against his 
accusers not as spokesman for a new p o l i t i c a l order but as a man who dissented 
from conventional views of respect for law and custom, as a man who believed 
he had a duty to impart conscientious knowledge to any who would hear him. 
Of great importance to Socrates' apology i s h i s accusers' i m p l i c i t claim 
that his past associations, together with h i s alleged i n t e r e s t i n speculative 
science, marked him as a man d i s l o y a l to nomos and to democratic rule, as 
one who had sympathized with the contemporary b e l i e f , popular among the 
aristocracy, in the v a l i d i t y of nature as against the a r t i f i c i a l claims of 
law and moral custom."** But i n Socrates' view, h i s accusers' suspicion 
that h i s actions favoured contemporary radicalism to the disadvantage of 
the established form of rule were groundless. Plato's description of the 
Socratic theory of consent disposes of that charge by devoting attention not 
to questions about forms of rule but to the more fundamental question of 
Hackforth traces the indictment's i m p l i c i t charge of atheism 
to Socrates' alleged sympathy with the phusikoi. But while we may 
accept Hackforth 1s grounds for this i n other respects, i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to agree with him, as against Burnet, that the indictment has no 
p o l i t i c a l implications. (Hackforth, p 76). Surely, Socrates' alleged 
sympathy with speculative science,the influence the l a t t e r could have 
on received values and the democracy which upheld them, and Socrates' 
past associations with men h o s t i l e to the democracy, mark the indictment 
as both p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l in i t s implications. 
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the moral grounds of a man's consent to law In any society. A main 
question of the Apology - the question which receives attention i n the 
early books of the Republic - i s whether the Socratic attitude to convention-
a l b e l i e f i s b e n e f i c i a l , either to oneself or to others. On the Apology's 
evidence we know that Athens did not believe that i t was. But i n rejecting 
Socrates' mission Plato believed that Athens had exercised r e p r i s a l , not 
j u s t i c e . I n so doing, i t exemplified to Plato's mind the b e l i e f that the 
worthy man acts from considerations of repute, honour, and material security, 
that Athens would teach Socrates that a prudent man's consent to law must 
derive from these considerations. I t would teach Socrates that consent to 
law from any other motive i s not only groundless, but also unjust; for men's 
considerations of material well-being are themselves the sole source of law 
with i t s requirement that men should regard one another w e l l . Athens would 
therefore r e j e c t Socrates' doctrine of a man's covenant with others (p 117 
supra). He, on his part, would challenge his c i t y ' s r e j e c t i o n of th i s 
doctrine as one c i t i z e n among equals.: Though there are hints i n the Apology 
of the existence of a formal p o l i t i c a l science, these remain suppressed, or 
at any rate, they are not a main feature of the Apology's doctrine of 
consent. There, Socrates assumes that he i s the equal of other c i t i z e n s 
and he described, with reference to what a god would require of any man, a 
j u s t man's consent to law. Here, he describes the consent of the s e l f - r u l e d 
For an indication i n the Apology i t s e l f of the p o l i t i c a l implications 
as opposed to s t r i c t l y individual and moral implications of Socrates' 
argument, see 36C 6: r<iV iAutol/ //yStir** eiri/>*ktt<r9«<. , as contrasted with 
irfilv eUvcov f/i-K^tiH ; and, balancing this:Ti£i' r ? 5 fto\nvs(C8) } j as 
contrasted with rr.pt\/ cC^eTji tljs irokt-us,. B^urnet's statement that fffi/'fAf-t* 
Z75 TTeklrivs i s , i n principle, the same as f.m/t-Atu t*vco\> i s to be noted 
(p 154). I t was on the analogy of the individual who seeks h i s proper 
i n t e r e s t that Plato would construct his theory of the state which achieved 
i t s true i n t e r e s t . But this would be a state whose order depended on 
the exercise of p o l i t i c a l science. 
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man who i s an equal among other c i t i z e n s . I t i s only i n the Apology, the 
Crito, and the early books of the Republic that we cl e a r l y find t h i s point 
of emphasis i n Plato's doctrine of consent. 
Before returning to our consideration of the Republic we may make the 
following b r i e f remarks about Anytus as he appears i n the Meno. At 71E, i n 
answer to Socrates' request for a d e f i n i t i o n of a man's virt u e , Meno states 
that i t consists i n tending to the business of the c i t y , that the virtuous 
man acts so as to benefit h i s friends and harm h i s enemies and to avoid 
suffering harm himself. Later i n the dialogue Anytus i s seen to agree with 
this definition when he warns Socrates (who has been exposing the i n a b i l i t y 
of great men to teach virtue) not to speak i l l of men, and implies that i n 
53 
Athens i t i s easy to punish or reward men according to thei r merits. We 
have seen that Socrates r e j e c t s this same notion of virtue - j u s t i c e regarded 
54 . . . . as reward and retribution - in the Apology, where he opposed a man's 
ostensible, s o c i a l i n t e r e s t i n practising j u s t i c e - a man's external 
in t e r e s t s - to h i s consideration of h i s true well-being. Anytus, who despises 
the "new learning' and who counsels Meno to avoid the sophists i s seen i n the 
Meno to invoke a defi n i t i o n of j u s t i c e which, on Plato's showing i n the 
Republic, i s root and branch of the prudential, p o l i t i c a l theories which 
Anytus regards as a threat to s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y . As Koyre has put i t : "The 
Sophist lacks the inhibitions of the conformist: thus, he reveals the true 
55 
essence of the l a t t e r . " We have seen that i n the Apology Plato has invoked 
this same essence i n Socrates' challenge to h i s accusers to show him the 
53 Cf Bluck, Op.Cit. , on p t f u v at Meno 94E 5, pp 385 f f . 
Op.Cit., p 218, on 71E 3,4. 
Alexandre Koyre, Discovering Plato, trans. L.C. Rosenfield (New York) 
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grounds on which he has acted against his own best i n t e r e s t s and committed 
i n j u s t i c e . 
* * * 
Socrates' peculiar duty - a duty which he exercised i n f u l l view of 
the laws - was to teach men what a god would require of a man i n his regard 
of others. His elenchtic a c t i v i t y was devoted to h i s d i s p e l l i n g men's 
b e l i e f s i n the value of material well-being and good repute as v a l i d bases 
for a man's consent to law, and, through h i s consent, h is right regard of 
others. The Socratic d i s t i n c t i o n between the s t r i c t l y s o c i a l or external 
grounds (Cf p p I 2 3 f f . and n 47) raised a fundamental question which would 
exercise Plato's attention i n subsequent works: what r e l a t i v e value must 
we attach, on the one hand, to consent from conscience (or consent from 
reason), and, on the other hand, to consent from customary requirement? 
To what extent could Socrates' conception of consent be applied to s o c i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l , i n d i s t i n c t i o n to personal, reform? I n the early books of 
the Republic Plato prepares the ground for his own p o l i t i c a l theory by 
pit t i n g the Socratic doctrine, which we have seen i n the Apology, of the 
truly j u s t man's consent, against the conventionalist or m a t e r i a l i s t con-
ception of a man's consent to law. 
We have already described i n b r i e f d e t a i l the p r i n c i p a l feature of 
the conventionalist notion of j u s t i c e and consent, as pictured i n the 
Republic, which oppose the Socratic conception (pp 117-119 supra). I t would 
be outside our purpose to give a detailed analysis of each of the arguments, 
(continued from page 130.) 
Alexandre Koyrl, Discovering Plato, trans. L.C. Rosenfield 
(New York, 1945), p 12 n 9. 
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beginning from Republic 1, which lead, f i n a l l y , to Socrates' account of the 
natural state - the po l i s Htcl ^ i / a - i e oundti** (428E) -, i t s form of rule, 
and the consent of i t s classes. Rather, we s h a l l concentrate on one basic 
theme which i s common to the Apology and to the Republic sections i n question: 
Plato's characterization of the conventionalist b e l i e f that the Socratic 
notion of other-regard i s imprudent and a n t i - s o c i a l (Cf n 47)."^ His 
characterization of conventionalism i n the Republic r e f l e c t s the temperament 
of Athens, a c i t y i n whose judgment Socrates was a useless and unjust man. 
Plato believed Athens to be guilty of great ignorance i n i t s condemnation of 
Socrates. In the Republic he l e t Socrates' interlocutors put the case for 
the conception of j u s t i c e he believed lay i n back of the charge of the 
accusers of the Apology: that material considerations form the natural basis 
of a man's regard for others; that a man could have no other grounds than 
these for the performance of action that benefits others. In the Republic 
Plato draws attention to the immoralist implication which this theory could 
have: that the exercise of other-regarding action conceals a prudent man's 
re a l wish, his desire to give the force of truth to h i s actions by converting 
the s t r i c t u r e s of conventional moral opinion to his own material ends - h i s 
desire to seem j u s t without being so (pp 118--9 ) • Byi-drawing attention to 
this conception Plato demonstratively contrasted Socratic individualism 
with the Sophistic i d e a l of material s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . He described the 
Sophistic interpretation of the tr a d i t i o n a l moral tenets which society 
holds out to i t s members, contrasting t h i s with Socrates' conception of the 
truly j u s t man's grounds for right action. Here, as i n the Apology, Plato 
By 'conventionalist b e l i e f , I mean both the sentiments of common 
opinion, as, say, described by Meno, and the inferences which S ophistic 
thinkers drew from these. 
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i s concerned with the question whether a man's ostensible conformity to 
custom s a t i s f i e s h i s consent to law. He concludes that i n actual s o c i e t i e s , 
men's ostensible acceptance of customary moral b e l i e f holds out l i t t l e hope 
for the achievement of personal v i r t u e . He yet believed that the Socratic 
model for consent, involving consent from reason and consent from custom, 
could be applied on a s o c i a l s c a l e . I n Chapter IV, we s h a l l see that he 
found the means for this application in the v i r t u e of sophrosune. 
In h i s treatment of sophrosune Plato w i l l combine the Socratic notion 
of consent from reason with a new concept of customary consent. His new 
theory of consent from custom w i l l address the problem of consent from 
material need. Unless Plato intends by h i s resolution of t h i s problem that 
consent from custom, while i t w i l l not be a s e l f - r u l e d man's consent, w i l l 
none-the-less be true consent, then he w i l l not have answered the Sophistic 
conviction that men's ostensible regard for one another conceals t h e i r 
natural i n c l i n a t i o n s . I f the doctrine of sophrosune does not oppose this 
conviction then the ideal community's approval of j u s t i c e , as shown through 
the consent of i t s classes, w i l l resemble p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y as the Sophists 
describe i t ; for the consent of the subject c i t i z e n s , i f i t only conceals 
thei r r e a l i n c l i n a t i o n s , w i l l confirm the Sophistic b e l i e f that consent to 
law i s only an external agreement, that ' j u s t i c e ' i s the benefit of those 
who rule. I n that case, the relationship Plato envisages between the 
r u l e r s , who w i l l consent to membership of the community from reason, and 
the subjects, whose consent w i l l be rooted i n custom, w i l l be one of 
tension and not h a r m o n y . T h e s e are the bare facts of sophfosurie as i t 
This w i l l be true even i f the p r i n c i p a l benefit the rulers derive 
from membership of the community i s not a material onee TTe take up 
t h i s matter more f u l l y when we d i s c u s s the t h i r d c l a s s ' s consent i n 
Qi IV. 
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r e l a t e s to the doctrine of consent i n the Republic. Plato sees i n the 
virtue of sophrosune the solution to the problem which Socrates' i n t e r -
locutors had put to him: on what grounds does i t p r o f i t a man to practise 
j u s t i c e and so regard others well? 
Adeimantus had said that he would c l a r i f y Glaucon's statement (362E) , 
that j u s t i c e i s only a secondary or intermediary benefit to the agent, by 
tracing men's approval of j u s t i c e to i t s roots i n tr a d i t i o n a l moral teaching; 
while Glaucon, for his part, had fleshed out the bones of Thrasymachus' 
doctrine that the j u s t man i s the man who benefits the stronger power. The 
Republic's three main introductory speeches departed from the picture of 
common piety which Cephalus had presented. Taking up Polemarchus' admission 
that the j u s t man harms neither friend nor enemy (336A), the following 
speeches showed how contemporary Sophistic theories of p o l i t i c a l consent 
derived from the tr a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f that j u s t i c e i s l e s s rewarding than 
i n j u s t i c e . They showed that a man's material considerations must be h i s 
sole motive for the practice of j u s t i c e i f i t s practice i s to be i n any way 
profitable; for both tradition and common opinion ( did. ct- ktyej/ti/ov H*l 
vPv rroifcZv) have dishonoured and contemned ( r f t y / i i ^ t v . . . vfrtpop'** ) the 
man whom we agree, from approved standards of conduct (&o$j . . ,/U( \/oj/u) ) 
to be better, i f weaker, than e v i l men who have been praised for their 
material success ( f uJ^u^/Ji/iJj t-tv ) • Tradition has taught that temperance 
(sophrosune) and j u s t i c e , while praiseworthy and noble (/c/AoV ) are hard 
and d i f f i c u l t to achieve. Licence and i n j u s t i c e , which are only shameful 
by the standards of received opinion, are easier to achieve and more 
profitable (Cf 364 AB). The Sophists' case, put by Thrasymachus, i s thus 
explained at the l e v e l of ordinary opinion by Glaucon and Adeimantus. 
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The l a t t e r give us the r e a l purport of men's approval of j u s t i c e : the man 
who practises temperance and j u s t i c e i s only 'better' Ji*t*. voj/et/. But i n 
men's private b e l i e f he i s weak. For i f such a man ever has the power to 
do wrong surely he w i l l then act so as to p r o f i t himself truly. Indeed, 
i f he does not, he must be i r r a t i o n a l and wretched (p 1JE3 supra) . I n 
short, prudence may counsel us to disregard the moral standards of the man 
who, i n common b e l i e f , i s judged to be better than the unjust man. Clearly, 
then, a man could have no grounds for practising j u s t i c e beyond material 
necessity. L i f e i s more pleasant for the s e l f s u f f i c i e n t man, the man 
who can dispense with moral s t r i c t u r e s . Men's approval of j u s t i c e i s 
r e a l l y a form of deceit which ar i s e s from t h e i r fear of i n j u s t i c e and t h e i r 
desire for material security ( I T j j a j 
Taylor has said that Adeimantus' contribution to the Republic's 
introductory discussion i s "independent of a l l speculation about moral 
58 
origins." Indeed, Adeimantus spoke only of customary moral requirement 
and of the grounds on which tradition recommends the practice of j u s t i c e . 
But Adeimantus' chief question was one which Socrates had exercised i n the 
Apology: 'What would a god require of a man in the man's relations with 
others?' Glaucon and Thrasymachus had dealt with a more immediately p o l i t i c a l 
question which springs from the basic moral one. Glaucon's position, that 
material necessity alone moves men to regard one another w e l l , was the 
corollary to Thrasymachus' assertion that the j u s t man i s the man who acts 
so as to benefit the stronger power. Both positions were a denial of 
Socrates' conception, as described i n the Apology, that the j u s t man - the 
A. E. Taylor, Plato, The Man and His Works, (London, 1955), p 271. 
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man who consents truly to law - i s a better man whom worse men cannot 
i n j u r e . Both deny Socrates' conception of the moral grounds of a man's 
obeying a better being, whether a man or a god (Cf nn 40, 31 supra). Both 
deny the moral grounds of Socrates' conception of p o l i t i c a l consent: that 
the truly j u s t man does not consent to law and exercise right regard of 
others from considerations of his material well-being. What Adeimantus had 
described was the moral t r a d i t i o n which lay behind the secular paradigm on 
which Trasymachus had based h i s theory of the j u s t man and on which Glaucon 
described a current sophistic theory of p o l i t i c a l consent. Adeimantus had 
shown that Glaucon's theory was at le a s t amenable to the tr a d i t i o n a l moral 
b e l i e f that the gods are moved to favour men who make a show of piety. As 
with veneration of the gods, so with men's regard for one another: the 
s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i o n of a man's being j u s t i s h i s exercise of right regard from 
the material respect which others require of him. Moreover, aman's own 
material needs form the only prudential c r i t e r i o n of h i s exercise of j u s t i c e . 
In holding that material considerations were the s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i o n 
of j u s t i c e , Glaucon and Adeimantus also posited a prudential standard of 
action - i n j u s t i c e - which could be more profitable than j u s t i c e , the 
demand which men make of one another. They held that the j u s t man - the 
man whom common opinion agreed was better than the unjust man (364AB) -
did not exemplify truth (u\yBe'(tj Ipojstvmd^ i n h i s relations with 
ethers. They meant by this that moral action i s , at best, a secondary 
benefit, that common opinion's approval of j u s t i c e only conceals the truth 
of men's r e a l i n c l i n a t i o n s . They also meant that the practice of j u s t i c e 
was only contingent on material considerations, that a man was only bound 
from considerations of his material well-being to regard others w e l l . 
Cf p n 8 and n 43 Ibi d . 
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The theory's prohibition on i n j u s t i c e was prudential. But i n prohibiting 
i n j u s t i c e i t was reject i n g Socrates' notion of the worthy man, for i n 
holding that j u s t i c e was a secondary benefit to the agent the theory denied 
that i t s practice could have any r e s u l t for the agent beyond material 
benefit. 
In terms of s t r i c t l y secular p o l i t i c a l theory, Glaucon's view could 
imply that the practice of j u s t i c e was sanctioned only by the community's 
agreement that wrong-doing was e v i l . As against Socrates' notion of 
covenant, Glaucon's theory implied that men were not bound by nature, or 
by what a god would require, to regard one another w e l l . But he none-the-
le s s borrowed from the t r a d i t i o n a l theology i n assessing the value which 
his theory places on j u s t i c e . We see the influence of tradition i n the 
proponent's view that the man who would not r e f r a i n from wrong-doing, i f 
he had the power, tsdvoycos ( 360D, Cf 364 AB) . Moreover, the b e l i e f 
that the man who would do no wrong i s wretched (otfcMies) indicates that 
men's exhortations to practise j u s t i c e - the exhortations of nomos - must 
conceal what men truly believe (Cf n 59): that j u s t i c e i s only an i n t e r -
mediary benefit to the agent. As against Socrates, then, the theory held 
not only that there was no source of law external to s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l 
community, but also, that by practising j u s t i c e a man could only act, 
provisionally, in his true i n t e r e s t ; for a man could not achieve h i s true 
i n t e r e s t u n t i l he had lent truth to h i s actions by overcoming nomos. But 
that could only mean that a man's true end i s not refl e c t e d i n society's 
ostensible approval of j u s t i c e . The man who believes that i t i s , has no 
grounds (other than h i s f a i t h i n nomos) for th i s b e l i e f (UvofCej)' Nor can 
he p r o f i t from h i s b e l i e f (eL&iios) > Truth, rather, i s revealed i n a man's 
a b i l i t y to abandon moral scruples i n favour of material ends (362 AB). 
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We see, then, that Glaucon's p o l i t i c a l theory combined the view 
that j u s t i c e i s a human convention only, with the t r a d i t i o n a l moral view 
that the gods - stronger powers than men - would be complaisant to i n j u s t i c e . 
Considered by i t s e l f , we need not regard the view that i n j u s t i c e can be 
profitable as 'immoralist' (though i n Socrates' opinion, such b e l i e f i s 
the mark of i g n o r a n c e ) B u t we must regard as immoralist the b e l i e f 
that wrong-doing can be sanctioned. Glaucon had said that j u s t i c e i s the 
product of men's material needs, that a man's exercise of j u s t i c e from 
material considerations i s s u f f i c i e n t to h i s being a j u s t man. But he 
tinctured this view with reference to tr a d i t i o n a l teaching about the gods' 
complaisance toward unjust men, and he concluded that since no man has any 
prudential grounds in supposing that j u s t i c e i s h i s true good, the man who 
r e a l l y p r o f i t s from i t s exercise can only have done so by regarding stronger 
men well at the expense of weaker men or j u s t men. Glaucon meant by this 
that a man would achieve h i s greatest good by assuming that he had no 
covenant with other men - a covenant which forbade wrong-doing. But he 
also meant that 'the stronger power' sanctions t h i s assumption. His notion 
of covenant, therefore, denies Socrates' conception both i n prudential and 
i n moral terms, for i t assumes that the r e a l source of law (that which 
requires a man's right regard of others) i s the stronger power, and i t 
assumes, as against Socrates' notion of moral ignorance, that wrong-doing 
could pr o f i t a man. Glaucon's theory of p o l i t i c a l consent agrees with 
Thrasymachus' assertion (343 C) that j u s t i c e i s the other (stronger) man's 
^ / C f Socrates' statement to Thrasymachus at 348E: (t j^A^ kunctktiv r^i/ 
civts, ('^'ft*/ rt At-ft-ii/ /etc* \/*y<. 5 A*yo*rt*' . 
That i s to say, while some people hold i n j u s t i c e to be profitable, they w i l l 
maintain that i t i s shameful and e v i l . Such people w i l l not sanction 
i n j u s t i c e . 
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good. This i s the r e a l truth which nomos conceals. His theory lays down 
the assumptions which 'the many' make about nomos, and purports to show 
that these assumptions confirm Thrasymachus' conception about j u s t and 
unjust men. 
Thrasymachus' doctrine of j u s t i c e i s the contrary of Socrates' 
conception. While Socrates explained i n the Apology that the s e l f - r u l e d 
man did not act from material considerations, Thrasymachus asserted i n the 
Republic an i d e a l of the materially s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t man. Socrates had 
said i n the Apology that the j u s t man, acting from considerations of h i s 
true i n t e r e s t , was both the equal of other men, and s e l f - r u l e d both i n h i s 
relations with them and in his fulfilment of divine requirement. Thrasy-
machus states the bare facts behind the case of Glaucon and Adeimantus, 
that the 'better' man - the man who would r e f r a i n from i n j u s t i c e - i s a 
man who cannot exemplify 'truth' i n his actions. Thrasymachus, whose account 
of j u s t i c e i s r e a l l y the conclusion to Glaucon's account of a man's covenant 
to do no wrong, denies that the man who consents to law has any grounds for 
doing so beyond the external compulsion which he cannot override. 
I n Ch IV we s h a l l see, in conjunction with the doctrine of sophrosune, 
how Plato sought to render compatible the notions of consent from material 
and non-material need. At present, i t i s necessary for us to consider i n 
further d e t a i l how Thrasymachus' and Glaucon's theories of consent find 
unwitting support i n the b e l i e f s of Socrates' accusers i n the Apology. 
Our examination of this subject w i l l lead us to our f i n a l consideration of 
Socrates' covenant with the laws i n the Cr i t o . 
* * * 
Polemarchus had proposed that the j u s t man benefits those who seem 
to be friends and harms those whom he supposes to be enemies (334C) . But 
he revised t h i s d e f i n i t i o n when Socrates had pointed out that i f we mistake 
the f r i e n d (who i s r e a l l y good) for the enemy (who i s t r u l y e v i l ) , we s h a l l 
have reversed Simonides' dictum - that j u s t i c e i s benefiting friends and 
harming enemies - and established a p o t e n t i a l l y immoral d e f i n i t i o n of 
ju s t i c e (TTti'jfes y*f f°<K«^ o Aoyps : 334D 5). This conclusion, at 
which Polemarchus halted, established as his own b e l i e f , that we must know 
which men are good, and which e v i l , before we can be sure of Simonides' 
d e f i n i t i o n (335A f . ) . But Socrates then pointed out that i t i s not the 
j u s t man's part ( f t HA CM JvSpet : 335B; epyev :335D) to harm anyone -
whether friend or not ( ovce fikec ovi* AWOV ouHe vn. f : 335D) . While 
Polemarchus had suggested that the ju s t man gives t h e i r due to friends 
and to enemies, Socrates changed the connotation of 'harm' (J}A jLnr* (v '• 
335B f f . ) to moral i n j u r y , basing his rejection of both Polemarchus1 
d e f i n i t i o n s on the grounds that the j u s t man, by d e f i n i t i o n , never acts so 
as to make others morally worse ( I b i d . ) . Plato thus introduced into 
Socrates' discussion with Polemarchus two d i f f e r e n t views of the value of 
the j u s t man to us. By way of contrast with Polemarchus' position, he had 
proposed a d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i o n of the effect of the j u s t man upon others: 
the j u s t man does not worsen the characters of others. I n regarding the 
just man as one who would benefit friends and harm enemies, Polemarchus can 
only have been considering the external effects of j u s t i c e : for him, the 
j u s t man i s one who benefits good men and harms e v i l men i n some material 
sense.^ Thrasymachus, who takes up the thread o f the argument, at le a s t 
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Hence, the p o s s i b i l i t y of the immoral conclusion at 334D 5: 
TO/ya'fS • • • Aoj'Vj . I f we are mistaken about who the f r i e n d , or the 
gooaman, i s (and the enemy and the e v i l man), then i t i s j u s t to injure 
(continued 
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agrees that j u s t i c e i s only an external benefit, holding that the j u s t man 
benefits those who can command his material respect. 
We should observe that by'harming enemies' ( fiXjir z *<• ) Polemarchus 
had not meant wronging enemies, or doing i n j u s t i c e to them. He had only 
epitomized a t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f about the j u s t man: the man who benefits 
friends and harms enemies. But he did not broach the question, which, 
of j u s t or unjust acts, are the more pr o f i t a b l e for the agent. He only 
implied, by way of contrast to Socrates' conception of the value of the 
j u s t man to society, that we can only define j u s t i c e i n terms of the external 
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effects of a man's acts. Polemarchus, who serves as a point of departure 
fo r Thrasymachus, confined his d e f i n i t i o n of j u s t i c e to men's most obvious 
need i n practising i t : the preservation of material well-being which i t s 
61 (continued from page 
friends and benefit enemies (334C) . That would be an immoral conclusion 
i f the mistake we make (fA/«l^> ctivooriv : Ibid.) involves, not an honest 
misjudgment of friends and enemies, but rather, a misjudgment of what 
i t i s (Socratically) i n our best interest to do: to r e f r a i n from 
i n j u s t i c e . I f we make a moral mistake i n t h i s matter we then suppose 
that i t could be p r o f i t a b l e to in j u r e good men (whom we then regard 
as enemies) and benefit e v i l men (whom we regard as fr i e n d s ) . But both 
mistakes, either the honest one or the immoral one, leave out of account 
the e f f e c t of j u s t i c e or i n j u s t i c e on the agent of the act. Polemarchus 
i s only concerned with j u s t i c e as an external a c t i v i t y , and he believes -
without making an immoralist deduction himself - that only material 
considerations can prompt our determining which men are good and which e v i l . 
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Obviously, by Polemarchus' revised d e f i n i t i o n (334C), i t cannot 
p r o f i t a man to be unjust (fo r he w i l l not seem to be a friend and a good 
man). But the disadvantage of being unjust, i n t h i s case, results from 
the harm that j u s t men w i l l do to the man known to be unjust. There i s 
contrast here with Plato's remedial theory of punishment. By that theory, 
unjust men - far from being 'harmed' by punishment are benefited by i t 
(Cf Republic 380 BC, 445 A). That i s so even i f the salutariness of 
punishment demands the extreme penalty of death. Had Polemarchus vouched 
the b e l i e f that i n j u s t i c e could be p r o f i t a b l e , i t would have been 
consistent with his conception of j u s t i c e (as external benefit and harm) 
to have maintained that the unjust man would be better o f f i f he escaped 
the j u s t man's notice. His unrevised d e f i n i t i o n , at least, i s amenable 
to this b e l i e f , while his revised d e f i n i t i o n does not accommodate Plato's 
remedial theory which implies that wrong-doing i s not p r o f i t a b l e . 
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practice brings to society. On these grounds Thrasymachus would b u i l d 
his ideal of the materially s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t man. The moral mistake to 
which Polemarchus1 d e f i n i t i o n (334C) could lead was i t s i m p l i c i t assumption 
that i n j u s t i c e could be. pr o f i t a b l e . . From Socrates' point of view this 
constitutes a moral mistake because i t i s a mistake of b e l i e f , i t i s a 
mistake which misassesses a man's real i n t e r e s t . Polemarchus had not 
suggested, on his own b e l i e f , that wrong-doing could be sanctioned. But 
i n Socrates' view, that i s the true immoralism which ignorance of inter e s t s , 
fanned by degraded moral teaching, must lead to. He suggests to Polemarchus 
that the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f they had been discussing cannot r e a l l y be 
att r i b u t e d to Simonides or to any other wise man (335E). I t i s much more 
l i k e l y that i t comes from some tyrant - Periander, Xerxes, or Ismenias of 
Thebes. Socrates based this conjecture on the grounds that the b e l i e f he 
had discussed with Polemarchus i s open to a view of jus t i c e that springs 
from moral ignorance and so serves the interests of tyranny.^"' 
Socrates says i n his concluding words with Polemarchus that i n 
no case i s i t j u s t to harm anyone ( ol/ftl/too y*f ScKtiiet/ cnHe'v* tj/vtl/ 
ov ft AtLtr Cf-ii/. : 335E 4 ) . Degraded moral education teaches that 
i n j u s t i c e can be p r o f i t a b l e . From the point of view of degraded b e l i e f , 
0 tdn t tit/ ( I b i d . ) connotes doing material wrong, together with the 
advantage that could attach to doing such wrong. Socrates' conclusion 
i s an inference from his own conception (335B f f . ) of the j u s t man's 
function and his value to society: the j u s t man does not harm the 
characters of men, either by act or by expression of his b e l i e f s . The 
effect of men's being t r u l y harmed w i l l show i t s e l f i n their b e l i e f , 
which the t r u l y j u s t man denies, that wronging another i n some external 
sense can t r u l y harm the recipient or p r o f i t the agent. At 335E 4, 
(}kj-wc (-m would thus seem to carry a double meaning: harming a man 
i n some external sense and harming a man by making him morally worse. 
The conception of j u s t i c e which Socrates put to Polemarchus involves 
the concept of techne and, with i t , the concept of true prudential s k i l l . 
Hence Socrates' allusion to the b e l i e f s of wise and blessed men ( 
ro^wv it ttSt ytiUpitvV A4fw 335E) . 
Admittedly, Socrates does not make mention i n the relevant passage 
(335B f f . ) of the j u s t man's acts or expressions of b e l i e f . But he does 
contrast the j u s t man's function (.(rfytv) , and, i m p l i c i t l y , his value to 
society, with Polemarchus' view. The notion of function must surely 
involve both moral b e l i e f and consequent acts.) 
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Thrasymachus i s the Republic's true advocate of tyranny. He i s a 
proponent of the view that the unjust man lends the force of t r u t h to his 
actions. Together w i t h his b e l i e f that p o l i t i c a l community i s the sole 
source of law, he maintains a p o l i t i c a l ideal which raises the materially 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t man above the s t r i c t u r e s of moral custom (nomos). 
Thrasymachus not only denies Socrates' b e l i e f that i n j u s t i c e cannot p r o f i t 
a men, he equates i n j u s t i c e with v i r t u e (348E). In doing so, he denies 
Socrates' concept of the better man and with i t , his doctrine of p o l i t i c a l 
consent. 
I t was argued by G. B. Kerford that i n the Republic Thrasymachus sets 
up i n j u s t i c e as a moral ideal. His equation of i n j u s t i c e with v i r t u e , his 
be l i e f that men would f u l f i l t h e i r natures through i n j u s t i c e , show that 
Thrasymachus - though he does not use the language of phusis - h6""Qs 
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belongs among the proponents of natural r i g h t . I have indicated that 
Thrasymachus' ide a l , so f a r as i t i s related to p o l i t i c a l consent, i s l a t e r 
embellished by Glaucon's statement that the s k i l f u l man succeeds i n 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e as would a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t man i n a natural condition i n 
which ( i t i s assumed) there would be no moral s t r i c t u r e s (Cf p H 8 ) • 
Glaucon's theory of covenant provides a theoretical basis f o r the ' d r i f t ' 
of societies to tyranny, while Adeimantus proposed that t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f 
i t s e l f assumes that i n j u s t i c e i s sanctioned by nature and that j u s t i c e i s 
sanctioned only by nomos. The three positions are complementary i n that 
they a l l oppose phusis to nomos. So far as that i s so, Kerford i s surely 
r i g h t i n placing Thrasymachus i n the 'phusis-nomos' camp. But Thrasymachus' 
theory of consent, so far as i t opposes Socrates' theory of the better man 
G.B. Kerford, "The Doctrine of Thrasymachus In Plato's Republic". 
Durham University Journal,XI ( i x ) pp 19-27. Cf p 27. 
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i n the Apology, denies that men are bound, unconditionally, to regard one 
another w e l l . For th i s reason we cannot easily regard his theory as being 
65 
a moral ideal. His equation of i n j u s t i c e with v i r t u e i s , i n e f f e c t , an 
immoralist doctrine which claims that commonly accepted moral requirements 
are only conditionally b i n d i n g . ^ 
65 
Cf. D.A. Rees on Kerford, i n Adam Vol 1, p xxx. 
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Kerford confirms his own acceptance of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as being 
true of Thrasymachus' position, i n his note 33 to p 27, I b i d . 
"There i s nothing to suggest that Thrasymachus thought that weaker 
men were consulting t h e i r interests by being j u s t and obeying 
laws when unable to r e s i s t . Rather they ought to break them on 
a l l occasions when they have a reasonable chance of escaping 
detection." Cf. 348D 6-9: tru St oltt. yt terwt rtvt ri ^iXX^'ueui. %no-
x<ej/vo\iCA<st A<-y«<y. Aeo-trtAf* pi* cUv . . . . mi cX roitCicot. , 
I f , by saying that a man ought to break laws when he can escape 
detection, we mean that law 'binds' him, only conditionally, to regard others 
w e l l , then we have opposed some self-assertive standard - phusis, say - to 
a moral standard - nomos. Our position i s that nature sanctions s e l f -
assertion, while convention forbids i t . 
Antiphon's b e l i e f that nomos, rather than r e f l e c t i n g nature, opposes 
i t , may well be a source on which Plato drew i n constructing the arguments 
of Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus. But I do not think that Antiphon, 
i n On Truth, went so fa r as to suggest that a man ought to disobey the 
laws when unseen by others. His statement at 11: 60, that for the most 
part, nomos i s i n opposition to phusis - oct cx TTOKKK cive M*ir<*. vtr^oi/ 
ft-KJ'itfi/ T»Atj/i'i</i tit #J*n xfou - does not po s i t i v e l y assert, i n addition 
to t h i s , that nomos binds men only conditionally. However, there i s at 
least^an a f f i n i t y between Republic 348D 6-9 ( KAv&tvt*) and Antiphon 11:40: 
Jin if k\<KTto. ) /Hj It*** f'»l/-
Antiphon holds that nomos i s h o s t i l e to nature {ir«,Ktyiu,s) • But 
rather than suggesting that nature sanctions a standard that we ought to 
pursue ( i f able), he rather combines a view which sees nature as i n d i f f e r e n t 
to moral custom with a pessimism about the power /of nomos to counteract _^ 
nature. Cf 11: 80:*6<rc»i/ o'cffV f i / V n ^iKwctf^ ol/i 1 t>l<tto'ctp4 ky'ib* 
si w'yit krrec^rroun c.ls &6pittt»s ? *f ' 5 V 9 ? ^ 1 " J VI: 165f f . : 
Vtvv i/ <r e (*t Cus K pO«"<.<cjf1r</oi.S CpC Ot«t(/Co< t» t-K VOfoV (H.K.J.LOV 0»J( 
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I f , I n Socrates' view, we are mistaken about who the good man i s 
and who the enemy, then the mistake could be one of honest misjudgment. 
But i t could be the moral mistake of misassessing the true friend and the 
real enemy.^ I f , however, on either count, men hold that i t belongs to 
the j u s t man to benefit some and harm others, then they are mistaken about 
the j u s t man's function or his a c t i v i t y i n society. For the j u s t man acts 
only to benefit others. To misconceive the just man's function, i s , on 
Socarates' view, to define j u s t i c e only i n terms of i t s external benefits 
and sanctions. The man who acts with r i g h t regard toward others from 
external incentives lacks true prudential s k i l l . I n Socrates' view, men 
who are only j u s t from external incentives are nominally j u s t . They are 
men of l i t t l e worth, for they are ignorant of a man's true i n t e r e s t . For 
thi s reason, they are also ignorant of the moral grounds (or the true 
prudential grounds) of r i g h t action. The b e l i e f that i n j u s t i c e could be 
pr o f i t a b l e , a r i s i n g from a misconception of the value of j u s t i c e to the 
individual and to society, characterizes this ignorance. But i f a man 
believes that i n j u s t i c e could be sanctioned, and therefore acts on this 
b e l i e f , he i s g u i l t y of true wrong-doing, for he acts from ignorance of what 
6 8 
a better being - a god or a man - would require. Such a man acts upon 
We make the mistake of supposing that i t could be p r o f i t a b l e to 
spurn (<<f«'/*5f«i' *wi oMpop*</ ) men who are good XJL.{JL \SO/I/VV (the better, 
though weaker men of Republic 364 AB), and praise e v i l men. We sha l l then 
hold with those whose b e l i e f s Adeimantus describes that licence and 
i n j u s t i c e are shameful, not by nature, but i n opinion and by conventional 
sanctions alone ( f o f j f ft- f f i v e v u*i VQJJU/ <*.<.<?fpt>0 . I t w i l l only be from 
conventional agreement (oyeAoyel/i/K-s), though not from inner conviction, 
that we believe that weaker or poorer men are better than e v i l men 
(Republic 364 AB). Cf n 61 supra.) 
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To this conception one must add the Socratic corollary: that the 
wrong-doer must harm himself far more than he does his vi c t i m . Cf pp 88 f. 
nn 27, 28 p89f«$PPlOO) f f - supra. 
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the b e l i e f that men's approval of j u s t i c e , t h e i r overt regard f o r one 
another, conceals the natural t r u t h that j u s t i c e isanotherfs good 
&\koifto</ u.^d.&e</ : Republic 343 C) and a detriment (^/U^ ) to the man 
who obeys and serves the other, stronger, man ( TPZ TTtridojjti/n/ re K£ 
VKtpC-cow tos ) . The p o l i t i c a l force of this view comes to rest i n 
Thrasymachus' b e l i e f that the j u s t man who obeys laws cannot be sel f - r u l e d ; 
for by obeying, he serves an inte r e s t that i s not, f i n a l l y , his own. 
At Republic 343C, Thrasymachus says that i n j u s t i c e rules those who 
are good-natured - those who are guileless and ju s t ( tj i t UttKiJ. . . . M f ^ f t 
z£i/ cjs U k ' / f f Z i f i y P t i e Z s Ct MI ZviAtwk/j ) . He i s not speaking of the nominally 
j u s t man, but of those who refuse from conscience to do wrong. Such men 
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are naive, for they lack real knowledge of a man's interests. I n his 
b e l i e f , such men do not know the grounds f o r obeying laws: men's i n a b i l i t y 
to p r o f i t from i n j u s t i c e , or, the provisional advantage that could come 
from regarding the 'other man' w e l l . The naive man's be l i e f s are wide of 
the mark, for he supposes that j u s t i c e has a natural claim on him, that he 
must regard any man w e l l . He does not know that the only claim on him i s 
the needs of those who are stronger than he - those who rule i n their own 
interest though not i n his. I f he obeys laws from the conviction that he 
i s bound i n conscience to do so, he can only serve the in t e r e s t of others; 
but he can serve no real interest of his own. I n saying t h i s , Thrasymachus 
denies that a man who i s not the arb i t e r of the laws can be se l f - r u l e d ; 
that i s , he i s saying, as against Socrates that there are no moral grounds 
for obeying laws. The "guileless and the j u s t " believe that they are bound, 
unconditionally, to regard others w e l l , while Thrasymachus holds, i n 
contradiction of t h i s , that a man's only ground for obeying i s the compulsion 
69 vr» t > n < - c~ ' > i , ' 
Uythi/ rip tfi/rt » • • • 343C. 
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which the stronger power, acting i n i t s own i n t e r e s t , can bring to bear on 
him. He holds that i n j u s t i c e rules the naive because they cannot p r o f i t 
from t h e i r conception that they are morally bound to regard others w e l l . ^ 
We have noted above that Thrasymachus admits of two kinds of j u s t man: 
the Socratically j u s t and the nominally j u s t . The terms he uses to describe 
j u s t men ( t*U jX^dw* ty/ydmhw::343C; ird\/\S yt*\/*U4v t l ^ S t i ^ : 348B), 
while they could refer to men who lack the ingenuity to practise i n j u s t i c e , 
refer s i g n i f i c a n t l y to men who are just from conviction. (Cf <v evy&etr-
Catce \**p*-c*s , : 343 d) . Socrates had described such men i n the Apology 
The phrase, cwv t£s clky$t*s &i&u/Zv ( I b i d . ) , has been variously 
translated: Cornford: "innocents who are called j u s t " (p 25); Guthrie, 
The Sophists: "genuinely simple and j u s t " (p 89); Lees: "simple and j u s t " 
(p 72); Shorey:"simple i n every sense of the word" (p 67). 
Given that Thrasymachus i s making a f r o n t a l attack on Socrates' own 
b e l i e f s , 11 tJs UXyPiZs" denotes those who are j u s t from conviction, not 
from material convenience. Thrasymachus says a l i t t l e further on (344A) 
that these people suffer i n j u s t i c e but are unwilling to do wrong. I n 
his view such people are miserable and wre tched <utci-zw*) . Quite 
c l e a r l y , he i s speaking of those who have no basis for their conviction, 
not of those who regard others w e l l from necessity of external force. 
Thrasymachus' div i s i o n of men into rulers and ruled perhaps obscures 
the f a c t , stated at 338DE, that his conception of j u s t i c e applies to any 
form of constitution, be i t democracy or otherwise. For th i s reason, his 
conception of men who are "guileless and j u s t " does not imply that these 
people (qua subjects) believe that i t i s j u s t to obey other men (qua 
rulers) no matter what they order. Thrasymachus wants to contrast t h i s 
a t t i t u d e (the atti t u d e of those whom Socrates would c a l l nominally j u s t 
men) with the att i t u d e of the guileless and ju s t - those who are toyQiuol 
because they believe that j u s t i c e prohibits wrong doing absolutely. 
Thrasysmachus believes that Socrates should disabuse himself of this b e l i e f , 
for on his view ju s t i c e i s required from external coercion alone, not from 
a natural duty. Whatever the form of constitution under which a man l i v e s , 
only the coercion of 'other' men binds him to obey laws. 
Given Thrasymachus' premise that i n j u s t i c e i s a man's real end, and 
that only external compulsion 'binds' men to obey laws, Thrasymachus would 
agree with Glaucon that men's covenant to do no wrong i s provisional and 
not binding. On his premise, democratic equality i s a farce; for i n a 
democracy the 'other man' i s only the majority which coerces the ind i v i d u a l 
to obey i t s laws. (Cf. n 4 P5.3 supra) . On Thrasymachus' premises, 
'j u s t i c e ' must have i t s roots i n an i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between rulers 
and ruled. We have seen that Glaucon would explain t h i s same concept on 
the basis of the discrete origins of p o l i t i c a l and moral l i f e (Ch 1 p 19). 
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as self-ruled. I n holding that there are no moral grounds f o r obeying 
laws, Thrasymachus believes that by obeying laws a man can, at the very 
most, serve no more than a social i n t e r e s t , an interest that i s only 
provisionally advantageous to him and which he should shun i f that were 
advantageous and he were able. Not only does he maintain that the Somatic-
a l l y j u s t do not act i n th e i r own i n t e r e s t , he also regards as false their 
conviction that men are bound, unconditionally, to regard others w e l l . 
Polemarchus, i t w i l l be recalled, had allowed that the dictum, 
'benefiting friends, harming enemies', would not be a good d e f i n i t i o n of 
ju s t i c e i f i t meant that we sometimes mistake who the real f r i e n d and 
enemy are: we must have knowledge who they are. A similar d i s t i n c t i o n , 
from the point of view of the in t e r e s t of rulers, i s rehearsed from Republic 
339 C f f . Socrates and Thrasymachus both agree that j u s t i c e i s advantageous, 
but Socrates had queried Thrasymachus' q u a l i f i c a t i o n that j u s t i c e i s the 
advantage of the stronger; for the rul e r (the stronger) might mistakenly 
l e g i s l a t e so as to f a i l to achieve his own inte r e s t \ t o f 4 y »c j / w atpfcvcf-r 
J k e v C f i fUiu etscTls Tftoezirzwcrtv,'. 339 E) . But by the ' r u l e r ' , Thrasymachus 
had r e a l l y meant the ruler properly so called (, i&B* oirov A^wv e r c t t : 341 A) -
the ruler who, i d e a l l y , makes no mistake i n l e g i s t l a t i n g i n his own inte r e s t 
( I b i d . ) . He had therefore meant that j u s t i c e , by d e f i n i t i o n , i s the 
advantage of the stronger (of those who r u l e ) . On h i s t o r i c a l grounds, i t 
w i l l often work out that those who have power w i l l contravene t h e i r own 
interest* But Thrasymachus had meant that a l l legislation,by i t s nature, 
aims at securing the interest of those who govern even i f mistakes are, i n 
fa c t , sometimes made.^ 
Thrasymachus w i l l allow that rulers sometimes err (340A), but he does 
not suppose that this defeats his position. Nor need i t ; for Thrasymachus 
(continued on page 
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So far i n our discussion of Thrasymachus we have seen with his b e l i e f 
that j u s t i c e (what a man owes another, stronger than himself) i s the product 
of l e g i s l a t i o n , he had defined the proper work of rule as l e g i s l a t i o n i n the 
int e r e s t of government. We have seen that his d e f i n i t i o n holds good for 
any manner of constitution. Together with this conception he has combined 
the b e l i e f that no man who obeys laws can be se l f - r u l e d . The free man 
(tkti>Q«-f€u/citpe? : 344 CD) ^  i s , properly speaking, the unjust man who can 
convert men's approval of ju s t i c e (other-regarding action) to his own ends. 
Freedom, so defined, is a quality of which Thrasymachus approves. The free 
man, or materially s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t man, i s for Thrasymachus the ideal 
paradigm of the ends of l e g i s l a t i o n : the successful maintenance of 
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believes (as Socrates himself believes) that error i s incidental to the 
work or function of rule or craftsmanship. A rul e r - one who, by nature, 
seeks his own advantage - errs i n proportion as he lacks wisdom: i^rct 
$Hf/te>t>pyef '*} <ro<(os J *pfiiv\/ t'ufc-Zs k f t p r j i / f - t cot* or** eipf.wv»$ , «lAAi 
7T»S yJ & *(W«-tOCL . • • o 'A^u,v fyjfCilr'- 340E. 
Given that a r u l e r f a i l e d to act i n his own i n t e r e s t , and i t was 
therefore j u s t f o r the ruled to act accordingly, with the result that they 
bring disadvantage to the ruler - c» y»y> zov ttpttTcevos 'd$<>/t^t>pav SyWov 
iffloefireet ceils >}zocrrw rros. t-lv . : 339 E - Thrasymachus could answer 
that l e g i s l a t i o n which resulted i n the rulers' loss would be bad l e g i s l a t i o n . 
We should note, also, that there i s nothing preventing Thrasymachus, 
on his own accounting of the ruler's function, from maintaining that a rul e r 
would, on occasion, act i n his subjects' interest i f he knew that t h i s would 
be advantageous for himself. The point i s , that the able r u l e r always 
secures his own advantage whether this brings loss or gain to his subjects. 
Accordingly, the function of government i s to l e g i s l a t e i n i t s own interest. 
Cf. 338 E: c/^r; 1 oiv i'crc^, p&\ri<rc<r t j Afr'yw <v «(ir*V«u5 reus irekf-nv 
c^icnf <Tv*t fc^-tLin/j c£ i^s mtf-ecfitJiAt *p£,s • c f • L a w s c> where 
the Athenian rehearses what some people hold the natural d e f i n i t i o n of 
government to be (^</<r«. op** r*t> fuC-Kcav ) : "that the laws ought not to 
aim either at war or at goodness i n general, but ought to have regard to the 
benefit of the established p o l i t y , whatever i t may be, so that i t may keep 
power forever and never be resolved." (Bury i n Loeb). The Athenian further 
specifies that the people who hold this d e f i n i t i o n mean, by ' p o l i t y , the 
'stronger power' ( I b i d . ) . 
Freedom, for Thrasymachus, i s r e l a t i v e to a man's a b i l i t y to act 
independently of the claims of others on him. Hence the comparative: 
i t s authority by government. Thrasymachus assumes that the acquisition of 
thei r ends by the governed could be, but are not by d e f i n i t i o n , the real 
object of government. The proper work of government i s to maintain i t s 
authority. At t h i s point we may note two things: Thrasymachus1 concept 
of j u s t i c e , since i t rejects the Socratic notion of self r u l e , i s 
incompatible with Socrates' notion of moral equality (Cf. n 40); since 
his d e f i n i t i o n of ju s t i c e and the function of government applies to any 
manner of cons t i t u t i o n , the immoralist value with which he colours the work 
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of rule extends to a l l constitutions, democratic or otherwise. 
Scholars have noted a possible inconsistency i n Thrasymachus' 
defi n i t i o n s of j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e at 344 CD. Thrasymachus1 statement, 
from o'vcwt ^ L^KptsCts > runs as follows: 
Thus, Socrates, when i n j u s t i c e i s asserted on a s u f f i c i e n t l y 
great scale, i t i s stronger, freer, more masterful than 
j u s t i c e . As I was saying from the s t a r t , i t turns out that 
j u s t i c e i s the advantage of the stronger, while i n j u s t i c e i s 
what p r o f i t s a man himself and i s for his advantage. 
Guthrie sees inconsistency i n t h i s . Thrasymachus i s contending: 
"that (a) j u s t i c e i s the interest of the ru l i n g power, . . ., but (b) 
i t i s not j u s t f o r the ru l e r to seek his own i n t e r e s t , i . e . j u s t i c e . " 
(p 94 Op.Cit. See too, Kerford, Op.Cit. note 21 to p 22, and for his 
disagreement with the thesis Guthrie supports, see pp 23 f f . ) 
I have suggested above (n 71) that i n view of Thrasymachus' 
d e f i n i t i o n of the function of government, we have no reason to suppose 
that a ruler might not act i n his subjects' i n t e r e s t . I t i s i n the ruler's 
i n t e r e s t that the subjects should obey him (exercise j u s t i c e i n respect of 
him); but government, i n addition to t h i s , i s f u l f i l l i n g i t s real end 
so long as i t maintains authority. I f a government were able to exercise 
i n j u s t i c e toward t h i s object, surely, on Thrasymachus' account, i t would 
do so. 
Thrasymachus' position i s , as we have stated, a denial of Socrates' 
conception of the sel f - r u l e d man. This i s the man who i s unwilling to do 
wrong and who, presumably, i f called upon to do wrong i n the name of the 
laws, would r e f r a i n from doing so (Cf. n 16). Such a man, f a r from being 
nominally j u s t , w i l l not accept - either i n b e l i e f or i n act - that the 
commands of government are a p r i o r i j u s t ; f o r he does not believe that 
j u s t i c e - acting with r i g h t regard toward some (be they stronger or weaker) 
ent a i l s doing wrong to others. Men who are ju s t i n Thrasymachus' sense 
(and i n Glaucon's: *J yJtp r i Wet-ttv aft*.* *AA.£ ~C #/<r^<<*/. . .: 344C. 
Cf 358E 360D) assume that i t i s j u s t to regard the rulers w e l l (the 
stronger, who make the laws) no matter what they command. A government 
(continued on page 
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At Republic 343 D f f . Thrasmyaehus s p e c i f i c a l l y refers to the l i v e s 
of j u s t and unjust men i n a democratic state. He says that when each 
holds o f f i c e , the j u s t man, because he i s j u s t ( £& fidj.m' ilvM,' 
345E) w i l l not make use of public property for his own benefit ( f£ 
$yntpt'ti/'» indeed, he w i l l win the enmity of friends and associates 
through his unwillingness to compromise his moral b e l i e f s on t h e i r behalf 
( tfrtv ^ f t r iDt'by dcftt uflVffrttV ir«yj «*• ft**t,v> • We may note that 
Thrasymachus sees tyranny to be i m p l i c i t i n democracy as he has described 
i t ; for his description of the unjust man's rise to absolute power (344 A 
f f . ) i s continuous with the picture of j u s t and unjust men he has completed. 
He has contrasted the Socratically j u s t man with his nominal counterpart, 
showing that the l a t t e r , from his a b i l i t y to convert public trusts ( S^^airtj, 
Ibid.) to his own ends, gains power and becomes the object of men's praise 
and obedience, while the former, who i s unwilling to do so, must f a i l 
i n l i f e . Thrasymachus has stated, i n sum, that Socrates i s a social 
anomaly. But he said more than t h i s . The setting he has used to make 
his point i s quite clearly, democratic Athens, a c i t y whose laws Socrates 
believed he t r u l y obeyed. I t i s f a i r to say that Thrasymachus 
73 (continued from page 150) 
that legislates i n view of Thrasymachus1 ideal paradigm w i l l be able to 
command wrong-doing and see i t achieved. I n Thrasymachus' b e l i e f , t h i s 
government, or the man who controls i t , has achieved complete i n j u s t i c e 
(348 D f f . ) ; f o r the man (or the government) has been able to achieve 
i n j u s t i c e without suffering r e p r i s a l from i t s subjects - from those who 
are weaker and who must regard the rulers w e l l i f they are to avoid 
suffering i n j u s t i c e . 
Thrasymachus has t o l d Socrates that to obey laws from any motive but 
that of the nominally j u s t man i s wide of the mark of a man's real grounds 
for regarding others w e l l {iu-t o'vcni ntppK/ : 343C. Cf n-69). His description 
of a man's rise to tyranny (344 AB) implies that at the end of the day 
in j u s t i c e rules men's l i v e s , that the successful r u l e r w i l l use any means, 
j u s t or unjust, to maintain authority. Justice, on Thrasymachus' view, 
i s a means to an end: the a b i l i t y to be unjust when i n j u s t i c e pays. Here 
we may note that,(344 C6) could denote either the man who rules or some 
tyrant i n the making. I f this man follows a man's re a l ends his object w i l l 
be self-dependence: the a b i l i t y (as Thrasymachus conceives i t ) to be unjust without making reparations. 
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seized the argument with which Polemarchus began. 74 Polemarchus and 
Socrates had not actually reached whatever p o l i t i c a l implications lay i n 
the common b e l i e f that j u s t i c e entails harming some and benefiting others. 
Thrasymachus took hold of the matter. Premising his tirade on the b e l i e f 
that i n j u s t i c e rules men's l i v e s , he converted a common b e l i e f about 
ju s t i c e i n t o a doctrine of p o l i t i c a l consent. This doctrine showed that 
the t r u l y j u s t man, the anomalous and imprudent Socrates, has no v a l i d 
grounds for obeying laws from the motive which he chooses. 
Thrasymachus, i n regarding j u s t i c e as a means to the true end of 
material s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , presents a view of the j u s t man which i s the 
antithesis of Socrates' notion. We have said that while p o l i t i c a l reformism 
i s at least i m p l i c i t i n Socrates' theory of consent, t h i s i s suppressed i n 
favour of his concept of the se l f - r u l e d man who i s the equal of other 
citizens (p 129 B " P r a ) - Socrates' theory of consent does not lay emphasis 
on forms of p o l i t i c a l c onstitution. I t rather stresses that a man's 
consent to law, i f i t i s true consent, i s a testament to his knowledge of 
what a god would require of him i n his relations with others. This concept 
entailed Socrates' b e l i e f that material i n j u r y , suffered by a man, could 
not prejudice him i n the acquisition of his true well-being. I t also 
entailed his b e l i e f that a man must become worse who acts with i n j u s t i c e 
toward others. I n opposition to th i s view, Thrasymachus has maintained i n 
the Republic that a man's well-being exists i n proportion as the man i s 
materially secure. He also held that tyrannical rule i s an ultimate form 
of l i f e for a man, that i t i s an ultimate form of p o l i t i c a l c onstitution. 
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Men's exercise of j u s t i c e implies this form of r u l e , for men regard others 
w e l l i n proportion as they are weaker than or dependent on 'other men' who are 
better and stronger than they. Such dependence i s , at least, the only v a l i d 
or prudential ground fo r the exercise of j u s t i c e . While Socrates held 
that consent to law both belongs to custom and transcends i t , Thrasymachus 
had posed a radical cleavage between the laws' injunctions to regard others 
w e l l and a man's true end. This cleavage resulted i n his view of the 
le g i s l a t o r whose end i s to maintain his authority, and whose authority 
carries such autonomy as to permit i n j u s t i c e . 
The received b e l i e f that j u s t i c e consists i n benefiting friends and 
harming enemies becomes more than a ret r i b u t a r y theory of j u s t i c e i n the 
arguments of Thrasymachus and Glaucon; f o r here, we f i n d the received 
notion i n combination with the b e l i e f that i n j u s t i c e stands sanctioned by 
the nature of p o l i t i c a l power. Polemarchus' notion about j u s t i c e had 
i m p l i c i t l y raised the question of the j u s t man's use or his value to his 
kinsmen (Cf. n 63). I t also raised the notion of prudential s k i l l ( I b i d . ) . 
The p o l i t i c a l dimension which Thrasymachus added to the discussion has 
deep implications f o r Socrates' a t t i t u d e i n the Apology to his accusers, 
men whom he regards as both ignorant and unjust. We have dealt with these 
matters at s u f f i c i e n t length i n t h i s chapter i n r e l a t i o n to the specific 
question of prudential s k i l l . I t i s hoped that what remains w i l l provide 
a s u f f i c i e n t summary of Socrates' doctrine of consent i n the Apology and 
Crit o . 
* * * 
Socrates' theory of p o l i t i c a l consent defines the a c t i v i t y of a j u s t 
man i n terms of consent from conscience and continuing consent ( p 12 supra). 
154 
His doctrine, l i k e that of Thrasymachus, sets up an ideal of the autonomous 
man. Also, l i k e Thrasyraachus's doctrine, the setting f o r Socrates' ideal 
i s democratic Athens. I n the Apology and the Cri t o , Socrates i m p l i c i t l y 
opposes his conception of a j u s t man's consent to law to the conception, 
common among the Sophists, of the discrete origins of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
Socrates' doctrine, unlike that of Thrasyraachus', does not accept as an 
i n i t i a l premise a natural d i s t i n c t i o n between rulers and ruled. I t rather 
proceeds from a view of man as subordinate, by nature, to law. Socrates 
had explained t h i s concept i n the Apology with reference to a man's 
exercise of ju s t i c e as seen through his obeying laws. Given that t h i s were 
true consent, Socrates saw i n a man's obedience his response to a god's 
requirement. He carries on with this same theme i n the Crito where he 
personifies the laws of Athens i n order to i l l u s t r a t e kinship between these 
laws and.eternal laws and the j u s t man's subordination to both. I n both 
dialogues he described a man's moral autonomy i n terms of his motive i n 
choosing to obey laws. 
Socrates describes his consent to law i n terms of a t r i p a r t i t e 
hierarchy: the god, the p o l l s , the i n d i v i d u a l . I n the Crito, the p o l l s , 
personified by the laws of Athens, i s the individual's parent. On the one 
hand, Socrates i s moved to obey the god from considerations of his interests 
we have described this as consent from conscience or reason. On the other 
hand, he i s not e n t i t l e d to disobey the laws of Athens. These laws are 
his surrogate parent, and since they are akin to divine laws so t h e i r 
commands should r e f l e c t the commands of those laws. Only by continuing to 
consent to the laws of Athens by acting i n t h e i r f u l l view can Socrates 
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both attest to his conception of action that a god would require of a man 
and to his b e l i e f that no true ha rm can b e f a l l the j u s t man. Fundamental 
to his thinking i n the Crito i s his concept of the in d i v i d u a l as the o f f -
spring, the progeny, the slave of the laws. This notion strongly underlines 
Socrates' b e l i e f s that the duty to obey the laws - p o l i t i c a l obligation -
i s natural, and that a man consents t r u l y to law i f he consents from 
conscience. A passage from Republic V I I w i l l help to i l l u s t r a t e Socrates' 
notion i n the Cr i t o , of the laws as parents. 
At Republic 537 E, a f t e r he has described the education which w i l l 
ensure the success of i n t e l l e c t u a l ( d i a l e c t i c a l ) t r a i n i n g i n the ideal 
community, Socrates reverts to the moral education i n present day Athens. 
In Book V I h e had censured the acquisitive l i f e of Athens, a c i t y whose 
habits most citizens believe to be rooted i n t r a d i t i o n a l customs. The 
Sophists, however, have explained men's allegiance to custom i n terms of 
material selfishness. This has led to wide-spread mistrust of philosophy 
on the public's part. They see the philosopher as tr a d i t i o n ' s enemy, even 
i f i t i s t h e i r own acquisitive power which Thrasymachus exhibited i n his 
speech i n Book I . Thrasymachus, and others l i k e him, have become the 
spokesmen of society's i m p l i c i t rebellion against t r a d i t i o n a l and conventional 
b e l i e f . Plato describes t h i s condition as misology, a term of broad 
application which may refer as much to the public's mistrust of i n t e l l e c t u a l s 
as to the ambitious man's d i s l i k e of the niceties of debate (336 D). I n 
Republic I I I (411 E), Socrates had described the misologist as one who 
achieves his ends by violence and who spurns persuasion (./itil yruQol y*V 
subject of misology, this time a t t r i b u t i n g i t to a man's engaging i n argument 
f u hoy ) y n In Book V I I he again takes up the 
The implications to consent which we f i n d i n Book VI w i l l be dealt 
with i n the next chapter. 
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w i t h o u t having l e a r n t the s p i r i t o f i t s d i s i n t e r e s t e d essence. He describes 
the man i l l t r a i n e d i n argument as one who has ceased to b e l i e v e i n the 
con v i c t i o n s t h a t were i n s t i l l e d i n him when young. I t i s as i f he had 
f o s t e r parents ( c£>v ^/.trtio'^Ctut/ ywturvy 538A) whom he had obeyed i n the 
years before he knew they were not h i s own. Incapable of discovering who 
h i s r e a l parents are, he becomes attached to those who f l a t t e r him and 
convince him t h a t the duty to honour those who r a i s e d him i s no longer upon 
him. Plato i s d e s c r i b i n g i n t h i s metaphor the cleavage t h a t has grown i n 
Athens between men's respect f o r custom and t h e i r desire f o r m a t e r i a l 
power. His d e s c r i p t i o n p o i n t s to the p o l i t i c s of present day Athens, a 
c i t y i n which men have ceased to be concerned about common o r i g i n s and who 
shun t h i s common i n t e r e s t i n favour of pa r t y a l l e g i a n c e s . 
The metaphor which we have j u s t noted i s not u n l i k e the Apology's 
d e s c r i p t i o n of Socrates who, though he himself professed ignorance, would 
not abandon h i s search f o r h i s 'true parents'. He would not abandon d i s -
i n t e r e s t e d enquiry. But nor would he abandon h i s duty to h i s f o s t e r parents, 
the laws of Athens. By c o n t i n u i n g to consent to the laws, even when c e r t a i n 
death w i l l r e s u l t , Socrates a t t e s t s t o h i s b e l i e f t h a t the i n j u r y which has 
been done him cannot p r e j u d i c e h i s true w e l l - b e i n g . I n t h i s , h i s stand i s 
the same as h i s r e f u s a l t o commit i n j u s t i c e when, by a l l obvious standards, 
i t was prudent t o do so (n 16). This f e a t u r e of Socrates' case e x e m p l i f i e d 
h i s consent from conscience, h i s moral autonomy. 
The C r i t o emphasizes th a t the duty to obey laws i s n a t u r a l : t h a t 
w h i l e the duty t o obey d i v i n e law precedes a man's consent to the laws of 
h i s c i t y , i t does not supersede i t . The metaphor of Republic V I I complements 
the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of the laws of Athens i n the C r i t o . Here, the laws are 
seen as Socrates' pro g e n i t o r s ( oi trfWut /tiv (•Yi*"'!''*/** "jltHi>-<-i 50D) . 
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But they are also the br o t h e r s of the laws i n Hades (54 C). We may say 
th a t they are surrogate parents, akin to the e t e r n a l laws which are the 
u l t i m a t e source o f a man's o b l i g a t i o n s . I n obeying the laws of Athens, 
Socrates must a t t e s t to h i s duty to act i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h others as a 
god would r e q u i r e . He must act from the sanctions of d i v i n e law. These 
sanctions n e i t h e r permit wrong-doing nor i t s r e q u i t a l . Socrates has been 
wronged. But i t cannot have been by any l e g i t i m a t e sanction of man t h a t 
t h i s has happened. I f men have abused laws, Socrates may not repay i n k i n d . 
By t h i s reasoning, he s t a r k l y opposed the conception of a man's worth which 
we have seen i n the t r a d i t i o n a l , r e t r i b u t a r y n o t i o n of j u s t i c e . He opposed 
the idea of k i n s h i p which underlay t h a t n o t i o n , an idea which could lead to 
the view t h a t wrong-doing could be sanctioned. 
When, i n the Apology, Socrates sa i d he would obey the god r a t h e r than 
men, i t was not w i t h a view to disobeying the laws of Athens. I t was ra t h e r 
w i t h a view to demonstrating before men what true obedience to law e n t a i l s : 
a man's e x e r c i s i n g r i g h t regard of others, through obeying laws, from the 
b e l i e f t h a t to regard others w e l l i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d . This concept-
i o n emphasized the moral aspect of Socrates' case. We have r e f e r r e d to t h i s 
as consent from conscience. The conception of 'parenthood' i n the C r i t o 
emphasizes t h a t p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s n a t u r a l . We have seen t h a t Socrates 
described the l a t t e r concept i n terms of a hier a r c h y among the gods(here 
conceived as the brothers of the laws of Athens), the p o l i s , and the 
i n d i v i d u a l . The hier a r c h y which Socrates est a b l i s h e s i n the C r i t o does not 
presume the p e r f e c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y . I t r a t h e r presumes t h a t by 
consenting t r u l y t o law a man achieves h i s true i n t e r e s t . Socrates had 
developed t h i s concept on grounds of h i s b e l i e f t h a t consent from custom 
i s the n a t u r a l e f f e c t of what reason or conscience r e q u i r e s . I n Ch IV we 
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s h a l l examine the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s concept to Plato's i d e a l p o l i t i c a l 
theory. I n the remainder of t h i s chapter we may b r i e f l y reassess Socrates' 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s c i t y and i t s r e j e c t i o n of h i s mission. 
K e r f o r d s t a t e d t h a t Thrasymachus could not have held the p o s i t i o n of 
l e g a l p o s i t i v i s m t h a t has sometimes been a t t r i b u t e d to him, f o r had he held 
t h i s p o s i t i o n then h i s admiration f o r i n j u s t i c e would have been i r r e l e v a n t . ^ 
Indeed, together w i t h Thrasymachus' approval of a man's a b i l i t y to be unju s t 
w i t h success, he erects i n j u s t i c e as an i d e a l of freedom. But t h i s concept-
i o n s u r e l y i m p l i e s t h a t the t y r a n t - whether one man or many - i s , i f the 
t r u t h were known, the u l t i m a t e source of law. I t t h e r e f o r e i m p l i e s t h a t 
a man has no source of appeal, beyond the laws which a government imposes, 
on which to base r i g h t a c t i o n . Thrasymachus allows t h a t some men are 
' t r u l y ' j u s t ( j u s t by Socrates' standard); t h a t i s to say, he does 
allow t h a t some men are j u s t from grounds other than e x t e r n a l compulsion. 7 7 
But he maintains, along w i t h Glaucon, t h a t such people have no r a t i o n a l 
ground (*tfoycos '• 360 D; 364 AB) on which t o base t h i s moral and p r u d e n t i a l 
conception. Those who agree w i t h Socrates (those who are j u s t from 
c o n v i c t i o n and who are not nominally j u s t ) w i l l b e l i e v e w i t h him both t h a t 
a man ought to obey laws, and ( i f they r e j e c t l e g a l p o s i t i v i s m ) t h a t the 
source of men's duty to regard one another w e l l i s remote from the laws 
(though c e r t a i n l y akin t o the laws) which e n j o i n men to do so. Socrates 
bases the Tightness of h i s a c t i o n s , i n the Apology, on t h i s b e l i e f ; f o r 
7 6 Op_.Cit. p 27 
7 7 I b i d . : K e r f o r d r e f e r s to t h i s f a c t to dispose of the th e s i s t h a t 
Thrasymachus' p o s i t i o n i s t h a t of psychological eogism (Cf. p 19). But 
the f a c t to which Kerfor d r e f e r s would seem to have strong a f f i n i t i e s w i t h 
what he c a l l s " p o s i t i o n 1.": that"Moral o b l i g a t i o n has no r e a l existence, 
but i s an i l l u s i o n i n men's minds ( e t h i c a l n i h i l i s m ) . " : I b i d . 
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he denies t h a t h i s c i t y can j u s t l y p r o h i b i t him from pursuing h i s mission. 
His accusers could maintain, as against Socrates, t h a t since the c i t y i s 
i t s e l f the source of law and r i g h t a c t i o n , t h a t Socrates cannot be j u s t 
and continue to pursue h i s mission, f o r he would then contravene i t s ordinance. 
I n f a c t , however, Socrates' c o n d i t i o n a l release remains h y p o t h e t i c a l . He 
invoked i t s p o s s i b i l i t y i n conjunction w i t h h i s b e l i e f that a j u s t man w i l l 
always act i n f u l l view of the laws, a t t e s t i n g before a l l c i t i z e n s to h i s 
b e l i e f t h a t h i s actions have been j u s t . Again, i t might have been from no 
more than conscientious mistake - not moral mistake - t h a t h i s accusers 
be l i e v e d Socrates g u i l t y o f wrong-doing. But Pl a t o c e r t a i n l y d i d not w r i t e 
the Apology w i t h t h i s view i n mind. Had he done so, he would not have had 
Socrates imply t h a t h i s accusers were u n j u s t men (30 D 5 ) . Plato b e l i e v e s 
that they were unj u s t men because they r e j e c t e d Socrates' mission. By i t , 
he sought to e x p l a i n what he took the grounds of r i g h t a c t i o n t o be. I n 
r e j e c t i n g h i s mission they r e j e c t h i s concept of a man's covenant w i t h others. 
The conception of a man's kinsmen which h i s accusers represent i s a t l e a s t 
t h a t of the nominally j u s t man. I n Plato's view, the accusers, despite 
t h e i r professed l o y a l t y to Athens, have acted i n ignorance of j u s t i c e and 
i n favour of the p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y they represent. I n t h i s chapter, we 
have traced the grounds of the accusation to cu r r e n t S o p h i s t i c theories 
which claim that a man can have no l e g i t i m a t e l o y a l t y t o any a u t h o r i t y other 
than the r u l i n g power. 
We have s a i d t h a t a man's co n t i n u i n g consent may be regarded as the 
outward m a n i f e s t a t i o n of h i s consent from conscience. Socrates' r e f u s a l t o 
y i e l d to C r i t o ' s advice and escape p r i s o n i s , i n one sense, simply an 
example of h i s unwillingness t o act from f e a r of death. His a t t i t u d e , w h i l e 
i n p r i s o n i s , i n one sense, simply an example of h i s unwill i n g n e s s to act 
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from f e a r of death. His a t t i t u d e , w h i l e i n p r i s o n , i s w h o l l y c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h h i s b e l i e f t h a t a man's r e a l w e l l - b e i n g i s not p r e j u d i c e d by m a t e r i a l 
i n j u r y . But h i s a t t i t u d e also r e f l e c t s an i d e a l conception of the 
i m p a r t i a l i t y of j u s t i c e . At C r i t o 51E, the laws t e l l Socrates t h a t he has, 
by h i s a c t s , entered i n t o an agreement w i t h them to do what they order. 
This means t h a t the man who approves, t a c i t l y , of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
the laws agrees i n p r a c t i c e ((py<s ) to obey them. We may say t h a t the man 
shows h i s inward agreement by h i s outward acts. Here, a man's acts are 
understood by Socrates i n the same sense as a t Apology 32 A (Cf p 123, 
n 38). His acts are a p r a c t i c a l complement to h i s conception of a man's 
i n t e r e s t s . By continuing to consent to the laws w h i l e even under sentence 
of death, Socrates i s not v i n d i c a t i n g the men who passed sentence upon 
him. Indeed, he believes t h a t t h i s sentence i s u n j u s t . But h i s stance i s 
not negative. He i s not a d m i t t i n g t h a t 'other men' are themselves the 
source of law and t h a t , by s u b m i t t i n g t o the c i t y ' s sentence, he i s merely 
accepting personal l o s s . Socrates b e l i e v e s , r a t h e r , t h a t he w i l l harm the 
s t a t e and not simply 'other men' i f he absconds; f o r he w i l l have acted 
not only i n breach of an unju s t d e c i s i o n t h a t men have made, but also i n 
breach of an i m p a r t i a l law which says t h a t the judgment of the courts w i l l 
be f i n a l (50 B). I n t h i s , Socrates may be said to obey the laws conceived 
as i n v o l v i n g the common good of s o c i e t y r a t h e r than the good of 'the other 
man' and one's own l o s s . 
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Chapter I I I 
Toward The Doctrine of Consent I n the Republic 
I n t h i s chapter I want only to c i t e two problems which u n d e r l i e 
Plato's theory of consent. I t i s hoped t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n of one, i f 
not both of these problems w i l l emerge, s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , i n the course of 
the two f o l l o w i n g chapters. The f i r s t problem concerns the o r i g i n of 
the i d e a l community. The second, which i s not unrelated t o t h i s , i s whether, 
and t o what e x t e n t , P l a t o would countenance violence as a means to the 
establishment of a s o c i e t y i n which i d e a l ends would be achieved. Both 
these t o p i c s are complementary to our understanding of sophrosune - the 
v i r t u e which, i n Plato's conception of i t , i s the mainstay of h i s theory 
of consent i n an on-going s o c i e t y . 
The hope Socrates expresses i n Republic VI t h a t s o c i e t y might consent 
to p h i l o sophic r u l e i s circumscribed by the f a c t t h a t P l a t o o f f e r s no 
programme of p o s i t i v e a c t i o n by which the i d e a l community i s to be r e a l i z e d . 
The community's o r i g i n s are apocryphal and Plato's conception of i t s 
o r i g i n s remains i m p l i c i t . I n a famous passage of the Republic (592B) P l a t o 
t e l l s us t h a t even i f the community i s a p r a c t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y , the j u s t 
man w i l l s t i l l l i v e by i t s tenets. But when Adeimantus suggested t h a t the 
philosopher would have accomplished much by ab s t a i n i n g from p o l i t i c a l 
r i v a l r i e s (496E) Socrates answered t h a t such a man w i l l have a t t a i n e d less 
than he might, f o r he w i l l not have l i v e d i n a community amenable to h i s 
nature. P l a t o never loses s i g h t of q u i e t i s m , which we may define as 
ab s t e n t i o n from a c t i v e engagement i n p o l i t i c a l reform^"; and we must 
emphasize th a t q u i e t i s m , and not a c t i v e engagement, dominates h i s t h i n k i n g . 
Cf Ch I I pp 120-129'; and n 50 p 127 . 
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But P l a t o regards as second-best the very accomplishment of which 
Adeimantus spoke. I t i s here t h a t we f i n d the s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r him of 
the community's o r i g i n , and w i t h i t , the means to the f u l f i l m e n t of the 
philosophic nature. Since P l a t o also believes t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e i s 
necessary to the p e r f e c t i o n of s o c i e t y i t s e l f , he i s w i l l i n g to s t a t e i n 
Republic VI t h a t i t i s not unreasonable to assume p u b l i c acceptance of 
phi l o s o p h i c r u l e . We should emphasize w i t h Adam t h a t Plato's v e r d i c t on 
the s o c i e t y ' s r e a l i z a t i o n (Jfiu jt/tvcot olfuMc* f t . ; 502 C) i s less than 
o p t i m i s t i c . But i f we suppose th a t the qui e t i s m of 592 B i s the sole o b j e c t 
of Plato's theory, we lose s i g h t of h i s assumption i n Book VI t h a t consent 
to p h i l o sophic r u l e i n a Greek c i t y s t a t e i s not impossible. We also lose 
s i g h t of h i s conception of the r e s t o r a t i o n of j u s t i c e to a community which 
has f a i l e d , i n the course of time, to achieve i t s n a t u r a l ends. With h i s 
b e l i e f t h a t the phi l o s o p h i c nature i s n o t r e a l i z e d i n present s o c i e t y P l a t o 
thus emphasizes t h a t philosophers have a p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n t o f u l f i l . He 
beli e v e s t h a t the p e r f e c t i o n of s o c i e t y depends on the exercise of t h a t 
f u n c t i o n . He f u r t h e r assumes t h a t we can only conceive t h i s f u n c t i o n as 
e f f e c t i v e l y r e a l i z e d i f we assume th a t philosophers have been given consent 
to r u l e . I n s h o r t , we must assume the p u b l i c ' s c o n f i r m a t i o n of the p h i l o s -
opher's n a t u r a l capacity to r u l e . We may here note t h a t Plato's conception 
of capacity, or w i l l , i s of major importance to the theory of consent: both 
of the philosopher's consent to r u l e and the consent to t h e i r r u l e of the 
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subordinate classes. 
I t w i l l be shown i n the next chapter t h a t 'capacity' ( it/v^n) 
a n d ' w i l l ' are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d concepts i n P l a t o . A c i t i z e n ' s capacity 
to do h i s proper work i s explained i n Plato through h i s concept of 
j u s t i c e (Si.£4c*(ri/i/y ) . I t i s by means of t h i s concept - j u s t i c e and 
the t r i p a r t i t e s o u l , t h a t P l a t o explains a c i t i z e n ' s consent t o do h i s 
(continued on page 163) 
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Plato assumes i n Republic VI t h a t s o c i e t y has the p o t e n t i a l a b i l i t y 
to consent to p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e . I t w i l l be u s e f u l f o r us t o discuss the 
a t t i t u d e t o the p u b l i c mind which he there expresses. Society's u n w i l l i n g -
ness to recognize the man of p h i l o s o p h i c nature, i t s r e f u s a l to d i s t i n g u i s h 
him from the p o l i t i c i a n , i s brought out c l e a r l y at 498E. Pl a t o does not 
there imply t h a t s o c i e t y i s incapable of making t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . What 
he r a t h e r says i s t h a t s o c i e t y has never experienced the d i f f e r e n c e between 
the adornments of r h e t o r i c and S o c r a t i c d i a l e c t i c , which i s uncontrived: 
nov v*R*p wv yjHrwvctk. P l a t o , or course, c o n t r i v e s the form of t h i s 
sentence to mock Gorgias (See Adam on 498E 29). But h i s i n t e n t i o n i s 
s e r i o u s , f o r he b e l i e v e d t h a t S o c r a t i c d i a l e c t i c , u n l i k e r h e t o r i c , was 
n a t u r a l and uncontrived. Furthermore, he f e l t t h a t p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c l a y 
a t the r o o t of s o c i e t y ' s unwillingness to respond to the philosopher. 
Thus, a t 493 CD P l a t o speaks harshly of the S o p h i s t s , h o l d i n g t h a t 
there i s no d i s t i n c t i o n between the Sophist who teaches t h a t the c r i t e r i o n 
of r i g h t i s what placates u n d i s c i p l i n e d p u b l i c w i l l and the p o l i t i c a n who 
acts on the assumption. I t i s not c l e a r whether, on balance, Plato's 
h o s t i l i t y i s d i r e c t e d more v i g o r o u s l y a t the p u b l i c i n general or the 
Sophists and the p o l i t i c i a n s i n p a r t i c u l a r . We must regard t h i s question 
from the p o i n t of view of a basic assumption i n P l a t o : t h a t were there 
to be p o l i t i c a l reforms o f a p o s i t i v e k i n d , these must come from above. 
P l a t o conceives reform on the basis of Socrates' analogy from techne. 
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proper work. Plato's concept of sophrosune i s e s s e n t i a l to t h i s 
n o t i o n , sophrosune being the agreement or concord of the ' p a r t s ' of 
the soul to do t h e i r proper work, and the classes of the s t a t e t o 
c o n t r i b u t e to the s t a t e s ' ends. 
Society's i n i t i a l response to p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e must derive ( i f we discount 
v i o l e n t methods) from the p r i o r exercise of p o l i t i c a l techne which would 
be found i n combination w i t h q u i e t i s m . 
With Plato's c l a i m t h a t the p o t e n t i a l l y able r u l e r i s o f t e n emasculated 
by a t t e n t i o n to p u b l i c opinion we must o f f s e t h i s claim i n Book VI t h a t 
s o c i e t y i n general might manifest s u f f i c i e n t shame (jil<rj(v()f'vCt*'- 501E) to 
recognize the d i f f e r e n c e between the philosopher and the conventional 
p o l i t i c i a n . P l a t o t h e r e f o r e suggests t h a t together w i t h our assumption of 
consent i n Book VI_ we may also assume such degree of moral reform i n the 
p u b l i c as w i l l enable the philosopher to o b t a i n r u l e . P l a t o i s saying t h a t 
the p r a c t i c a l execution of the philosopher's p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n i s a t l e a s t 
conditioned by the p u b l i c ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to be a c t i v a t e d by t r u e p o l i t i c a l 
science. 
There i s i r o n y i n Socrates' observation t h a t the Sophists and p o l i t i c -
ians regard themselves as r i v a l s {*ivCLC(-^e»9' 493A). Far from being 
opposed to one another, they i n f a c t stand on the same ground; f o r the 
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p o l i t i c i a n acquires h i s a r t from the Sophists ( o r r h e t o r s ) and c o n t r i b u t e 
to society's i n s t a b i l i t y i n h i s a c t i o n s as much as they i n t h e i r teaching. 
What i s of greatest concern to P l a t o i n t h i s matter i s t h a t r h e t o r i c 
stands as an obstacle t o t r u l y e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l science: the p o t e n t i a l l y 
able r u l e r e i t h e r succumbs to r h e t o r i c h i m s e l f , o r , i f he has s t r e n g t h 
against the ambitions t h a t r h e t o r i c enflames, he must remain of no use to 
s o c i e t y . To Plato's mind r h e t o r i c , as used by the p o l i t i c i a n s , i s an 
I t should be mentioned t h a t the Sophists b e l i e v e d t h a t v i r t u e 
could be taught. The r h e t o r s , such as I s o c r a t e s , f o r example, 
b e l i e v e d good conscience i n the p u p i l can be assumed. They taught 
the a r t of persuasion on t h a t b a s i s . One can consider Meno 95 C f o r 
a d e s c r i p t i o n of the r h e t o r ' s a t t i t u d e i n t h i s matter. 
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i n v e r s i o n of true p o l i t i c a l a r t . By means of the l a t t e r , the r u l e r would 
mould the characters of the c i t i z e n s . He would not preserve himself from 
the danger of f a l l i n g out of grace w i t h them by tending to the needs of 
u n d i s c i p l i n e d w i l l , whether h i s own w i l l f o r the f r u i t s of power, or 
t h e i r s f o r the m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s he might bestow. This thought, s t r o n g l y 
expressed i n the Gorgias (512B-13B) i s s i m i l a r t o the claim made a t 
Republic 489C t h a t i t i s not n a t u r a l t h a t r u l e r s should subserve uneducated 
or u n d i s c i p l i n e d p u b l i c demand. ( o„ z.*v Kf^vucA StTrfipit. tu>V <t{/.oue»u,\/ 
of t h i s statement we must i n t e r p r e t i t i n the l i g h t o f what P l a t o took to 
be i m p l i c i t i n S o c r a t i c d i a l e c t i c : the conception of r u l e as a techne. 
I n keeping w i t h h i s customary plea of ignorance Socrates i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s 
n e g a t i v e l y , so f a r as p o l i t i c a l reform was concerned, addressing the 
concept t o h i s n o t i o n of the s e l f - r u l e d man. But P l a t o saw i n i t the basis 
of s o c i a l reform. I m p l i c i t i n the Socr a t i c and the P l a t o n i c conceptions of 
techne i s the b e l i e f t h a t questions of moral conduct must u l t i m a t e l y reduce 
to a conception of moral p r a c t i c e based on knowledge. What was s i g n i f i c a n t 
i n Socrates' conception of moral techne was h i s b e l i e f t h a t p u b l i c men, 
the Athenian IUKOI <d.y<nooi were unable t o teach v i r t u e . Furthermore, the 
p u b l i c teachers who purported t o t r a i n men i n the persuasive use of 
language f a i l e d by t h e i r a r t t o impart moral competence. Socrates maintained 
t h i s b e l i e f to the end i n conjunction w i t h h i s own conception of the moral 
grounds of a man's consent to law. His c l a i m t h a t the Athenians could 
not impart v i r t u e , won f o r him the enmity of those who saw the t r a d i t i o n a l 
moral education as the source of the restored democracy's s t r e n g t h . 
Socrates' a t t i t u d e i n t h i s and h i s h a b i t of ab s t e n t i o n from a c t i v e p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s formed the basis of Plato's discussion of 
p o l i t i c a l science and the reformed p o l i s . 
^?A»s £j .) To understand the frr&ut, e'o ch dk*i f u l l meaning 
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At Republic 493A Socrates speaks of the Sophists' h a b i t of forming 
t h e i r knowledge of man on what they have l e a r n t of c i t i z e n s ' wants i n 
the assembly or p u b l i c gathering places. I t i s as i f one were a c q u i r i n g 
knowledge of a large and powerful animal y^lkov iu< f<r%pev ) 
so t h a t one might p l a c a t e i t , knowing what makes i t most savage or gentle 
(AtXfjra.riCr**' y vp+o'cAc»v ) • The thought i s t h a t the p u b l i c i s a l t e r n a t i v e -
l y appeased or angered by r h e t o r i c : by the base r h e t o r i c which P l a t o 
even supposes to be r e p e l l e n t to the p u b l i c (499E). But i f r h e t o r i c could 
tame the p u b l i c , so too could speaking to the p u b l i c i n the manner of 
d i a l e c t i c ( f l ^ p i / : 499E - 500A) . I n view of h i s metaphor of the great beast 
Plato cannot be sai d to have regarded the Athenian democracy as gentle or 
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m i l d . But i f he speaks of the p u b l i c i n terms of i r r a t i o n a l i t y (493A), 
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he also alludes t o i t s tCpAocyt i n terms of a capacity f o r r a t i o n a l response 
to p o l i t i c a l reform. The p u b l i c w i l l become q u i e t i f we speak i n other 
than contentious terms ^ i k o v e t t f Z x / ) , t h a t i s , i f we speak i n the manner 
of d i a l e c t i c . This i s t o assume a q u a l i t y i n the p u b l i c which i s d i s t i n c t 
from the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of the beast. I t i s to assume i n the p u b l i c a 
capacity, or a p o t e n t i a l w i l l , t o accept philosophic r u l e . I t i s the task 
of our next chapter t o e x p l a i n the connotation of the r a t i o n a l i t y of the 
subject classes' response to reform and t o ph i l o s o p h i c r u l e . 
i» Lie DQJifl mat l| frvk &v J.O ail aj-j.uoi.wu WW LUC 
*.»c*)& of the Athenian if/toi11. He c i t e s 
:4: r f tiuiGvU co7 U//0M r c l • There, 
if the people during the time of the democracy's 
4 * 
See Adam, on 500A. He says t h a t f r y r f e f i s an a l l u s i o n t o "the 
u n i v e r s a l l y admitted irp*t 
A r i s t o t l e , Pol Ath x x i i : 
A r i s t o t l e i s speaking of the" people during the time of the democracy's 
growth a t Athens. Plato's metaphor of the beast i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
h i s own d i s l i k e of democracy, w i t h whose growth (we may i n f e r ) he 
associates the people's loss of i t s customary mildness (f/Mo'cys )• 
Plato's reference t o t h i s q u a l i t y a t l e a s t suggests h i s view t h a t law, 
ra t h e r than h o l d i n g a r e c a l c i t r a n t people at bay, should r e s t o r e i t s 
customary h a b i t of m i l d submission. 
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Plato's theory of consent, then, involves not only the f a m i l i a r 
f a c t t h a t the duty of the e p i k o u r o i consists i n the p r e s e r v a t i o n of t r u e 
b e l i e f (opDy Fo$4 ) » but a l s o , t h a t consent to p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e e n t a i l s 
an i n i t i a l capacity f o r reform on society's p a r t . The p u b l i c ' s response 
to t h i s inherent capacity would be s u f f i c i e n t to the community's o r i g i n . 
I f , then, we assume th a t consent to philosophic r u l e was secured by 
r a t i o n a l means we s h a l l want to know, by way of complementing t h i s concept-
i o n , what c o n s t r u c t i o n t o place on the maintenance i n the community of 
t r u e b e l i e f - the c o n d i t i o n of mind t h a t would guarantee continued consent 
to p h i l osophic r u l e . Plato's suggestion i n Book VI t h a t the p u b l i c i s 
capable of r a t i o n a l response to philosophic r u l e should f i n d i m p l i c i t 
c o n f i r m a t i o n i n h i s conception of sophrosune. I f we can confirm t h i s then 
we s h a l l have gone f a r toward d i s p e l l i n g the view t h a t the t h i r d class i s 
moved to obedience only through fear,"* or t h a t sbphrosune, so f a r as the 
m e n t a l i t y of the t h i r d class i s concerned, i m p l i e s t h a t t h i s class would 
consent to law and would observe moral custom w i t h the same a t t i t u d e of 
mind t h a t moves men i n unreformed s o c i e t y . Here we should r e c a l l a p o i n t 
which we made i n Ch _ I I : t h a t unless sophrosune denotes true consent then 
P l a t o w i l l not have answered the s o p h i s t i c contention t h a t men's obedience 
to law conceals the f a c t t h a t j u s t i c e i s the r u l e r s ' advantage. I f the 
t h i r d class maintains t h i s b e l i e f , then the i d e a l c i t y w i l l be a community 
of two c o n f l i c t i n g minds. As Cornford assumed (O p . C i t . ) , something l e s s 
than true b e l i e f , namely f e a r , w i l l c h aracterize the consent of the t h i r d 
Francis M. Cornford, "Psychology and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e i n the 
Republic of P l a t o ' , C.Q., VI 1912, pp 246 f f . 
6 R.D. Archer-Hind, The Phaedo Of P l a t o , (London, 1883) pp 180 f f . 
We s h a l l show i n Ch IV t h a t w h i l e Archer-Hind's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was 
i n s t r u c t i v e , i t cannot be accepted w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n . 
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class. The t h i r d c l a s s 1 consent w i l l , i n t h i s case, be o s t e n s i b l e though 
not r e a l . But i f t h a t i s t r u e of i t s c o n t i n u i n g consent, what of the 
condi t i o n s t h a t marked the community's o r i g i n ? Could the t h i r d c l a s s , i f 
i t i s moved only by f e a r , suppose th a t the community had o r i g i n a t e d i n 
anything b u t men's submission t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e from f e a r of i t s 
proponents' d e c i s i v e , s u p e r i o r strength? One f u r t h e r thought may be added 
a t t h i s p o i n t : i f t e n s i o n , r a t h e r than harmony, marks the i d e a l community's 
l i f e then the order to which i t s subject classes submit cannot t r u l y r e f l e c t 
the order of the cosmos to which, i n Plato's b e l i e f , the i d e a l community 
belongs. This p o i n t b r i n g s to our a t t e n t i o n the importance of Plato's 
* r 
d o c t r i n e of necessity (Wv«yXy) i n the Timaeus. I n Ch I V we s h a l l r e f e r t o 
t h i s d o c t r i n e i n order to throw valuable l i g h t on the Republic's d o c t r i n e 
of consent. 
I n t h i s chapter I have r a i s e d the s u b j e c t of the i d e a l community's 
o r i g i n s . I have i n d i c a t e d w i t h reference t o Book VI t h a t the d o c t r i n e of 
i n i t i a l consent should a t l e a s t be consistent w i t h the docrine- of sophrosune 
i f f e a r and i r r a t i o n a l i t y are not the dominant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
consent of the t h i r d c lass. What, then, may we say a t t h i s p o i n t about 
Plato's n o t i o n of violence as a means to the attainment of p o l i t i c a l ends? 
* * * 
I have sai d i n the f i r s t s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter t h a t quietism, as 
opposed t o a c t i v e engagement i n p o l i t i c s , dominates Plato's t h i n k i n g i n 
respect of the question of o r i g i n s . I have i m p l i e d t h a t we would have 
obvious grounds f o r supposing t h a t violence marks the community's o r i g i n 
i f the great body of i t s c i t i z e n s subsequently consent to i t s laws from 
f e a r . I n th a t case, not only can we reasonably suppose t h a t violence was 
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a means t o the o r i g i n of p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e , but t h a t the f e a r of i t s assertions 
would also mark the community's con t i n u i n g l i f e . I f t h a t i s the case i n 
an on-going s o c i e t y , we have every reason to suppose t h a t the p u b l i c ' s 
c o n f i r m a t i o n of the philosophers' n a t u r a l capacity to r u l e i s no more than 
the e f f e c t of the cynicism which Glaucon, rehearsing an i n f l u e n t i a l theory 
of j u s t i c e , described i n Book I I _ . I have drawn a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s p o i n t 
i n order t o emphasize t h a t the s p i r i t i n which the community endures should 
at l e a s t be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the s p i r i t i n which i t begins. My case f o r t h i s 
derives from the evidence of Book V I , where, I b e l i e v e , we f i n d a general 
sentiment i n P l a t o t h a t i s compatible w i t h the d o c t r i n e of sophrosune i n 
Book ODV. My view of the matter i s th a t v i o l e n c e does not belong to the 
s p i r i t of Plato's i n t e n t i o n s . But h i s i n t e n t i o n s y e t i n v o l v e both l i v i n g 
and f u t u r e generations of men. While the thought of v i o l e n c e repels him 
we yet wonder what immediate force could set h i s aims of reform i n motion, 
and the r e w i t h b r i n g to f r u i t i o n the d o c t r i n e of consent i n Book IV_. I do 
not f e e l t h a t the question of i n i t i a l v i o lence - perhaps i t s e l f a form of 
necessity f o r Plato - can be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y resolved. But the question 
i s r e l e v a n t i f the i d e a l community i s the achievement i n h i s t o r i c a l time of 
n a t u r a l , human ends. I t w i l l be u s e f u l , then, to note some basic features 
of the case which are a v a i l a b l e from Plato's own t e x t s . 
P l a t o t e l l s us t h a t the i d e a l community might come i n t o being through 
the work of chance (dviyrfy ccs e* Tiy^y rrfja<t^A\y : 499B) . He associates, 
as being simultaneous w i t h the workings of chance, the c i t y ' s obedience 
to p h i l o sophic r u l e (/u* *TffktL K*c y Kot* : I b i d . ) . He describes i t s 
obedience as temperance and q u i e t submission a r i s i n g from persuasion 
(^Aj*1 Ail!/, • . . J^9pj/ii/ fly &C«vovs , . . . H * l cc jt/2\\ov uleg uSf UKooen/cfs 
trpt&vsvctt j K*i tro\'u ye- . . . ** vv^povoviru/ ,*501CD) . I n these passages 
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there i s no t a n g i b l e h i n t of a r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n , on the one hand, between 
inaugural means, and, on the other hand, ends t o be achieved. We may consider, 
i n a d d i t i o n t o these passages, Plato's d e s c r i p t i o n of the 'ship of f o o l s ' 
where we see a d i s t i n c t i o n between p o l i t i c a l science and the ' a r t ' of 
grasping the helm - a d i s t i n c t i o n which brooks no l i n k between p o l i t i c a l 
science and, at any r a t e , common methods of gaining power. On the side of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of v i o l e n t o r i g i n s we may consider the i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
Republic 541B, where Plato proposes the expulsion of the a d u l t p o p u l a t i o n 
of the present c i t y as being necessary to the achievement of a new s o c i e t y . 
We should consider, as w e l l , the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Republic 415E where P l a t o , 
i n Popper's view, i s desc r i b i n g the in v a s i o n by a w a r r i o r class of mysterious 
. . 7 
o r i g i n s . 
I n respect of Republic 488 DE, an e a r l i e r generation of scholars 
b e l i e v e d t h a t P l a t o i s speaking about two incompatible t h i n g s : a true science 
g 
of n a v i g a t i o n , and a bogus s k i l l o f s e i z i n g the helm. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the passage runs as f o l l o w s : we are to regard Athens as a ship owner 
9 
( o r master) whose crew, w i t h the exception of the one r e a l l y s k i l l e d s a i l o r 
among them, v i e w i t h one another i n persuading or compelling ( ^  TT(<t)ovtts *j 
fitiL^ Jft-i/ei. ) the owner to l e t them take the helm (jfy j*«4/oc ) . They a l l 
contemn the true s a i l o r as useless ( i j l / y o-c»v ) , not recognizing t h a t he has 
r e a l s k i l l , f o r they do not b e l i e v e t h a t h i s science i s re l e v a n t to t h e i r 
PQpper, Op.Cit. p 226 (CF sec. (d) of n 31 of Ch IV Op.Cit.) 
8 T.D. Seymour, "On Plato's Ship of Fools", C.R., XVI 1902, pp 385-387.; 
Paul Shorey, "Note on P l a t o , Republic 488D," C.R., XX 1906 pp 247-248 
Mention must also be made of Adam's notes on the passage together 
w i t h h i s Appendix 1 to Book VI P 74 F. 
Should we t r a n s l a t e \Z^MtX^/)0\) a s owner or master? The p o i n t i s t h a t 
y^uUkyPoV stands f o r the demos, the c o l l e c t i v e sovereign of Athens. See Seymoi 
p 386 (Co l . 1 ) . 
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methods of gaining c o n t r o l . ^ This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t r o n g l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
t r u e n a v i g a t i o n a l s k i l l from persuasive or compulsive methods of s e i z i n g 
the t i l l e r - methods, t h a t i s , of o b t a i n i n g Athens' consent to rule.''""'" 
More recent scholars, w h i l e not denying t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between science 
of r u l e and seizure of power, have t r e a t e d the passage as s t a t i n g e s s e n t i a l l y 
one idea: t h a t there i s a t r u e science of n a v i g a t i o n , b u t the s a i l o r s 
deny t h a t t h i s i s so because they do not recognize t h a t i t i s possible to 
12 
acquire n a v i g a t i o n a l s k i l l by means of the 'useless' s a i l o r ' s science. 
Seymour pointed out t h a t there i s a t l e a s t c o n t i n u i t y between the 
s a i l o r s ' methods and t h e i r o b j e c t i v e (n 11 supra.). Given t h a t P l a t o (on 
the q u i e t i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) would i n s i s t on a d i f f e r e n t method of o b t a i n i n g 
power, there i s no i n t r i n s i c reason f o r us to suppose t h a t he does not 
himself a n t i c i p a t e c o n t i n u i t y of method ( i . e . means of o b t a i n i n g power) w i t h 
formal a c q u i s i t i o n of consent to r u l e . At t h i s p o i n t , i t w i l l be u s e f u l to 
consider Adam's c o n t r i b u t i o n to the s u b j e c t of the 'ship of s t a t e ' . 
10 > ' »' 
At 488E Shorey read nojj(r</& f o r oio/zt-i/9*- of the MSS. I n h i s 
view, i t i s the t r u l y s k i l l e d s a i l o r who does not b e l i e v e t h a t t r u e 
n a v i g a t i o n a l s k i l l i s found i n combination w i t h a ' s k i l l ' of g a i n i n g 
c o n t r o l by v i o l e n t methods. See C.R. Op.Git, p 248 and Shorey's notes 
h, i , and j , pp 20-21 of h i s t r a n s , i n Loeb. 
11 *» " 
Seymour, against Campbell and^ Jowett,held onus upfiovn.* (488 D 1) 
to be p a r a l l e l w i t h oirta St KvptfutfrH (D 4 ) . He mentioned t h a t both 
verbs have the i n c e p t i v e force of a t t a i n power, o b t a i n c o n t r o l (p 387: 
Col. 1 ) . That i s , on h i s view, ( I b i d . ) , the s a i l o r s - though not the 
t r u e s a i l o r - b e l i e v e t h a t p o l i t i c s i s e s s e n t i a l l y an a r t of a c q u i r i n g 
power by beseeching the owner to l e t them r u l e . 
12 
Shorey b e l i e v e d t h a t the true p i l o t does not h o l d w i t h the other 
s a i l o r s ' ' s k i l l ' of g e t t i n g c o n t r o l . He took yjtt- c»vvov J^ff*-
j/irktcjv ( E - l ) to r e f e r to t h i s f a l s e s k i l l . Cornford, on the other 
hand, t r e a t s the Greek of E - l as the " i n s t r u c t i o n and p r a c t i c e " which 
provides knowledge how to s t e e r (»V<v« Si t»fit~fU^irt-t : "keep c o n t r o l 
of the helm") The s a i l o r s r e j e c t the idea t h a t t h i s knowledge i s 
compatible w i t h s k i l l of n a v i g a t i o n . See Cornford's t r a n s , p 195-96. 
See a l s o , Lees' tr a n s , i n Penguin and Grube i n Plato's Thought, p 274. 
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Adam held, as against Stallbaum and Ast, that the passage a-g 488 DE, 
eitws Si Ksptft/yrtt . . . Ufd iCui c y Ki'Ptf>"jtt*yw , does not imply two arts: 
13 
a s c i e n t i f i c a r t of pilotage ( r u l i n g i n the crew's i n t e r e s t , say) and 
a separate a r t of enforcing and maintaining authority - that i s to say, an 
art we can c a l l the art of maintaining the s a i l o r s ' w i l l i n g consent (when 
once consent had been given) . I n support of his claim that <£v r*- rt**s . . . 
£Sv c* jyy does not imply a special a r t - an a r t of maintaining control -
Adam points to Statesman 293A: . . .fuvct- f-Xovc^s <-**c* odcvvctLs . . •; and 
293C: **t tKo'itiivv *J J.m>vcw* ( c f . 296E f.) , where i t i s said that the 
consent of either patient or c i t i z e n should not be regarded as a condition 
of the r i g h t performance of medical or p o l i t i c a l science. On t h i s , Adam 
says: "The p i l o t cares j u s t as l i t t l e whether people wish him to steer as 
whether they do not: his a r t has nothing whatever to do with the sentiments 
with which the passengers regard his rule." (p 74) 
In dealing with the Republic text Adam emphasizes the p a r a l l e l of 
thought with the Statesman at the expense of the fact that s c i e n t i f i c rule 
w i l l obtain i n the f i r s t place only i f the s c i e n t i f i c r u l e r somehow acquires 
14 
consent. We may i n t e r p r e t the Statesman passage as suggesting that where 
s c i e n t i f i c rule already exists the consent of the citizens could be suspended, 
though there, the condition i n which t h i s would be true would be that of a 
purely theoretical c o n s t i t u tion and not a constitution which Plato i s proposing 
Adam does not draw th i s inference, but i t i s quite possible to 
conceive of a (Platonically) s k i l l e d r u l e r governing i n a manner that 
i s i n the citizens' i n t e r e s t , though they remain r e c a l c i t r a n t . I say 
that t h i s i s a possible construction, though I do not suppose - as I 
think Adam does - that maintaining w i l l i n g consent i s not, properly, 
part of the rulers' a r t . I t i s possible to conceive of a r i g h t minded 
ruler and unwilling subjects. But I do not f e e l that t h i s catches the 
main sense of Plato's over-all view. This subject remains for consider-
ation i n the next chapter. 
^ Adam nowhere suggests, to my knowledge, that acquisition of power 
would be v i o l e n t - or, that i s , without w i l l i n g consent. I f , however, the 
s c i e n t i f i c r u l e r cares l i t t l e whether citizens approve of his r u l e , I can 
see no reason to suppose that acquisition of power would have excluded violence. 
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for men i n h i s t o r i c a l time. In the Statesman, Plato i s making essentially 
the same suggestion that he i s making i n Republic VI about the actual 
exercise of s c i e n t i f i c rule: that the ruler would not be enslaved to the 
demands of lower appetite and therefore be i n e f f e c t i v e as a ru l e r . So 
far as Adam i s emphasizing t h i s p a r t i c u l a r point, we must agree with him. 
But suspension of consent - even i f we are thinking only i n theoretical 
terms - must at least involve i t s acquisition. This, indeed, i s i m p l i c i t 
i n Adam's suggestion, " I f others wish his services [the s c i e n t i f i c ruler's 
services] i t i s t h e i r business to apply to him, not his to sue for the 
opportunity of doing them a service", (as i s the case with government i n 
present society: Of 589 NV, 536 BC). We may agree with Adam's precise point 
that the text at A88B 7 ( i n view of irf»* o* r»vco<f fjrxpi/c** /"ft* 
i<3dHX»v f-tvti I b i d . ) does not speak of the art of steering as having two 
aspects: an ' a r t ' of r u l e , and an ' a r t ' which could be said to e n t a i l 
consent, where those who are governed so b r i d l e the ruler with t h e i r demands 
that he cannot rule e f f e c t i v e l y (as Athens i t s e l f grants anyone his day of 
power who can cajole or force i t to heed his pleas). But i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to agree that the reason for this i s §_ f o r t i o r i that the w i l l of those who 
are ruled i s irrelevant to s c i e n t i f i c r u l e . I t must be relevant to s c i e n t i f i c 
rule (on the q u i e t i s t assumption, at any rate) i f the ideal reformer does 
not beseech the public to l e t him r u l e , and yet, we assume, as Plato does 
in Book VI, that he might become r u l e r . I n order to become ruler he must 
at least have persuaded the public that they ought not, as they do now, 
contemn him as useless: 
"To begin with, then, teach t h i s parable to the man who i s 
surprised that philosophers are not honoured i n our c i t i e s , and 
t r y to convince him that i t would be far more surprising i f they 
were honoured. . . . And say to him further: You are r i g h t i n 
affirming that the f i n e s t s p i r i t s among the philosophers are of 
17$. 
no service to the multitude. But b i d him blame for this use-
lessness, not the f i n e r s p i r i t s , but those who do not know how 
to make use of them." (489B: Shorey) 
Surely, this apology implies that the philosopher must have acquired consent 
should he ever become r u l e r . 
We may say that the passage at 488 DE has to do with one a r t whose 
basic principles remain the same whether practised or not, but an a r t which 
i s always p o t e n t i a l l y practicable, and would become actually so should those 
who are to be steered seek the expert helmsman's advice and obey i t . But 
this does not exclude the true helmsman's seeking the ship's consent, even 
i f he himself spurns as useless conventional methods of gaining, and with 
i t , maintaining the peoples' consent. 
Fi n a l l y , the passage says that knowledge of the seasons, the sky, 
the winds, etc. belongs to the true science of helmsmanship. The sailors 
believe that t h i s knowledge i s useless to t h e i r purposes ( r«e <*>( 
KitP*-pVyCt*9V ov/C If**- «<V fivlt. . . t i f f y v t i * a-^i'o-i /&Ktit?0*1 . . .) and 
are i n t e n t , not on any science of navigation, but on methods of overpowering 
the owner of the ship (uvcevi i f 4vcZ «•£ vdvukypw,. Vf^Kt^Ja-^t 
St-eytfooi *m TTJtfr* tr»ie>uypcs, on** iiV trfirw c» tifi*\int ttricky' 488C). 
The 'ship of state' parable had begun with sailors imploring the master 
(or owner) - the demos - to give them the helm. I t had pictured undiscipl-
ined seamanship together with the absence of navigational science. I t s 
actual counterpart i s democratic Athens, a c i t y that lacks ef f e c t i v e 
government and i s ever won over by the influence of those who seek power -
those who reject as useless, a science which distinguishes between government 
(aiTvi f f K^^^h'^h : Adam) and present means to i t s attainment. Plato 
ends the parable (489B) by speaking, not of a ship master (the demos) being 
overpowered by i n f l u e n t i a l demands, but of the other side of this coin -
of a would-be helmsman ( u u ^ f ^ ^ t j e ^ ^ '• 489B-1) who cannot e f f e c t i v e l y 
exercise power because, rather than r u l i n g , he i s enslaved to public demand 
yif f/C« guru/ KvPtpvftfv V4i>ii*v f i t t f t t alfj/it*fai vf'tiorov: I b i d . 
(Adamwas emphasizing this aspect of the case). The parable therefore 
describes the ineffectiveness both of government and men's consent to 
government at Athens. This i s a society i n which there i s no real d i v i s i o n 
of labour (no real consensus, one could say) between government and c i t i z e n 
ship, a society which equates government with the a c t i v i t i e s of those who 
seek power and influence. The essence of the democracy, i n Plato's opinion 
was competition f o r these laurels. He has contrasted t h i s with a science 
of rule whose pr a c t i t i o n e r w i l l not be moved by these same competitive 
objects, for the l a t t e r anticipate no real d i s t i n c t i o n between rul e r and 
ruled. This very d i s t i n c t i o n i s essential to the p o l i t i c a l science that 
w i l l remain inoperative u n t i l the 'sailors' recognize the'true helmsman.' 
Plato's doctrine of consent opposes the absolute sovereignty which 
the Athenian assembly now exercises to his own concept of the sovereignty 
of the expert r u l e r . I t anticipates a di v i s i o n of function between govern-
ment and governed which, when once established, w i l l be as complete i n i t s 
d i s t i n c t i o n between rulers and ruled as the present, popular sovereignty, 
i s incomplete. I f we ask whether Plato's philosophers would effectuate 
their ideals by democratic means, and our c r i t e r i o n for these means i s 
that which Plato describes i n the'ship of state', we must answer that he 
held p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n present p o l i t i c s to be of no use toward p o l i t i c a l 
reform. We must stress that reform i s h i s object. Present means of 
gaining influence are, on his view, i n d i s t i n c t from the ends which 
p o l i t i c i a n s pursue. But i t i s j u s t as true, on the q u i e t i s t hypothesis at 
least, that Plato's means would not be ra d i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from the ends to 
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be achieved. While the 1 true helmsman' seeks reform, the other 'sailors' 
w i l l not move outside the current system of p o l i t i c s . They w i l l tolerate 
no d i s t i n c t i o n between seaman and helmsmen. We know from what we have 
seen of the 'true helmsman' that he must remain outside the system which 
w i l l not recognize this d i s t i n c t i o n . 
* * * 
Popper suggested that the ideal community would come into being by 
violence. I n one passage he refers t o , 415E, Plato lends a Spartan flavour 
to his description of the guardians' l i v e s . Here, presumably, Plato i s 
speaking both of the rulers and the a u x i l i a r i e s (epikouroi), and he i s 
concerned, i n the passage, with the suppression of rebellion ( ft Vis 
t&fkvi cot* vojfon ITit&eefoi) . He emphasizes i n this passage both an 
allegiance between rulers and a u x i l i a r i e s ( V~p0*-*yuf//ti/ fppit^/fi'UM' Tu>* 
t i 
otpjL »fCi*v ) and the security they w i l l need i n order to hold down revolt 
w i t h i n the c i t y (oBt* reus r f ^ d t a - r ' t t f jUtt/Coifr) . Adam's 
suggestion ( I b i d . ) lends some support to Popper's view i n that he allows 
that the m i l i t a r i s m we remark here would s t r i k e Athenians "as a dangerous 
and tyrannical exaggeration of Spartan usages." But there i s no clear 
evidence to support Popper's b e l i e f that Ptlato i s speaking, s p e c i f i c a l l y , 
of an invasion. Rather, his pre-occupation i s with the a u x i l i a r i e s ' work 
i n an on-going society, and along with this statement about suppression 
he also refers to the a u x i l i a r i e s ' protective role. We cannot rule out 
Popper's conception of a sudden, vio l e n t invasion. But the language Plato 
uses does not actually confirm t h i s . Indeed, t h i s i s one of those 
passages which may f a i r l y be said to raise up conjectures about origins 
rather than to provide specific answers. ( See f u r t h e r , n 39 Ch IV ) , 
There i s , however, one passage where Plato does clearly associate 
violence with the inauguration of reform. This i s at 541AB, where Plato 
of ten. We may remark that despite the obvious note of violence which 
Plato sounds here, he discusses the expulsion j u s t a f t e r r e f e r r i n g , once 
more, to the philosophers' quietism at 5*PE. Here, he recalls the d i f f e r -
ence between what philosophers honour, j u s t i c e , and what i s presently 
honoured i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The philosopher i s said to scorn these 
discussion of the'ship of state', that the honours Plato i s r e f e r r i n g to 
are those which come from seeking p o l i t i c a l power, while, at the same 
time, rejecting the philosopher's view that a l t e r a t i o n i n the composition 
of society i s i m p l i c i t i n p o l i t i c a l science. Plato says, at 5tPE, that 
j u s t i c e i s i m p l i c i t i n this science, that Justice w i l l be the philosophers' 
t<t-*KfvU}]>*l<s-u/v,cjj) t h e i r c i t y (Ibid.) ; that i s , 
when they change i t s composition. We must allow that here, Plato has 
associated j u s t i c e with radical and, indeed, violent reformative measures. 
This i s so even i f he has once again referred to the philosopher who 
remains quiet and whom society reject s , and to the p o l i t i c i a n s who compete 
for power and who win society's approval. 
We have said that the o r i g i n of the ideal community i n the Republic 
i s apocryphal. In Book I_X Plato returns to the essentially Socratic 
position that quietism i s i t s e l f an end (592A). Adam draws attention to 
this i n reply to the question of origins raised by Grote: 
"We cannot understand from whence the force i s to come, tending 
and competent to generate i t [the community 1 . But when i t i s 
once begun there i s no reason i t might not have continued." 
(quoted i n Adam, on 499G; Vol JL1 p 38). 
speaks of the expulsion KOLtTt of a l l inhabitants over the age 
honours (rv*' j/tv vvtf r<i/w* HHrtfoovymueti) We know, from our previous 
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We may answer Grote's question i n terms of Plato's assumption i n Book VI 
that the re a l i z a t i o n of the ideal state entails the consent of those who 
are to be governed; that i s to say, i t s o r i g i n i s dependent on a response 
to the ideal ruler's techne, or science of rule, that i s s u f f i c i e n t to 
the implementation of reforms that he i s capable of i n s t i t u t i n g . Since 
the origins of the community are apocryphal, Plato's conception of i t s 
origins i s continuous with his conception of the ideal reformer as r u l e r . 
This i s so because his a c t i v i t y p r i o r to becoming rul e r i s , properly 
speaking, a p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . I t i s his object to bring the ideal 
community int o being. Yet his a c t i v i t y p r i o r to becoming ruler i s at 
least to be distinguished from his a c t i v i t y as a ru l e r i n that i n the 
former case Plato i s usually s i l e n t on the question of compulsion. We 
sense stark means to bring about ends. But Plato provides us with no 
real programme. Plato's references to compulsion usually carry with them 
the assumption that consent has been given (Cf 519 CE; 520 A, on persuasion 
and compulsion). This implies a p r i o r act of the community's consent to 
his r u l e , or i t s having become aware, through the philosopher's example 
of quietism, that i t s true i n t e r e s t can be achieved by philosophic r u l e . 
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Chapter IV 
Plato's Conceptions of Sophrosiine and Eros as Bases of P o l i t i c a l Consent 
I n Chapter L I we dealt with Socrates' concept of the se l f - r u l e d man. 
We noted that t h i s concept, while i t had ideal p o l i t i c a l implications 
(n. 52), was devoted to explaining the moral grounds of a man's consent 
to law i n any society. I n Socrates' b e l i e f , i f a man consented t r u l y 
to law he practised j u s t i c e from the b e l i e f that r i g h t regard of others 
was both consonant with what a god would require and i n a man's true 
i n t e r e s t . A worthy man's observance of customary requirements (nomoi) was 
the external effect of the consent of conscience. A man's consent from 
conscience resulted from consideration of his interests and might other-
wise be called consent from reason (p 13© f • ) • 
Socrates' p o l i t i c a l philosophy does not e x p l i c i t l y distinguish (as 
Plato's does) between a man's t r u l y consenting to law and his being t r u l y 
j u s t . He had been concerned to point out the difference between worthy 
men, who consent t r u l y , and nominally j u s t men. Plato's ideal concept of 
the state, the state whose citizens would achieve t h e i r natural ends, 
envisages the true consent of a l l citizens while only the rulers of the 
state would be t r u l y j u s t men. Plato's notion of the ideal state considers 
the Socratic concept of s e l f - r u l e . I t attempts to combine this concept 
with a solution to the contemporary theory, graphically explained by 
Thrasymachus, of consent from motive of material security. 
I n his description of the t h i r d class of Plato's state, R.S. Bluck"*" 
points to one essential condition of consent to philosophic rule. 
1 R.S. Bluck, "Plato's 'Ideal State'", C.Q.N.S. IX 1959 pp 166-168, 
at p 168. Cf. nn 5,6, Ch 111 
1'80V 
"They Qthe t h i r d c l a s s ] may be t o l e r a b l y j u s t , having t h e i r 
reasoning f a c u l t y i n the ascendant, and m a n i f e s t v i r t u e of 
a k i n d ; but t h i s v i r t u e w i l l only be what P l a t o elsewhere 
d e s c r i b e s as p o l i t i c a l or c i v i c v i r t u e , based on h a b i t and 
opinion and s u b j e c t to c o r r u p t i o n through p e r s u a s i o n " . 
The ascendancy of Che reasoning f a c u l t y , of course, connotes the c o n t r o l 
by reason ( Key lira Hpv ) of a p p e t i t e ( eaiftyyC t tc*v) • That i s to say, 
'reason' must take counsel f o r the whole s o u l i f , i n P l a t o ' s way of 
d e s c r i b i n g a j u s t man i n R e p u b l i c I V , a man i s to be temperate. We 
want to show th a t a man's being temperate i s both n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t 
to h i s w i l l i n g consent to membership of the i d e a l community. Bluck 
assumes that there would be consent of a k i n d . But he a l s o seems to 
assume what many others have taken f o r granted: that consent to i d e a l 
r u l e would not be d i f f e r e n t i n a t t i t u d e of mind from the consent of 
nominally j u s t men. But i n p o i n t i n g to 'reason's' ascendancy i n the 
r u l e d , Bluck does draw a t t e n t i o n to a f e a t u r e about the t h i r d c l a s s and 
i t s consent which has not r e c e i v e d s u f f i c i e n t n o t i c e : the a t t i t u d e to 
p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e which the s u b j e c t c l a s s e s ' outward consent r e f l e c t s . 
While we wish to emphasize t h i s f a c t , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to remember that 
the t h i r d c l a s s i s not s e l f - r u l e d , t h a t i t i s not t h e r e f o r e t r u l y j u s t . 
I t i s t r u e , however, t h a t i f the t h i r d c l a s s membership e n t e r t a i n s the 
same a t t i t u d e about the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of j u s t i c e as do those of whom 
Glaucon and Adeimantus have spoken, then demotic v i r t u e , as P l a t o conceives 
i t , i s no more than a c o n t i n u a t i o n i n the i d e a l community of the contemporary 
b e l i e f s about j u s t i c e which the e a r l i e r booksLof the R e p u b l i c have d e s c r i b e d . 
I n P l a t o ' s opinion, these were time honoured a t t i t u d e s grown corrupt from 
h i s c i t y ' s e x c e s s i v e m a t e r i a l power. I f these same a t t i t u d e s dominate the 
minds of the r u l e d , then 'reason' cannot e f f e c t i v e l y r u l e t h e i r s o u l s . 
Tension, the r e v e r s e of sophrosune. w i l l mark the l i f e of the i d e a l 
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society. We have more to say about this subject. But f i r s t we must 
observe that temperance and j u s t i c e , as Plato discusses them i n Republic 
IV, are very proximate notions. We should begin t h i s chapter by 
distinguishing them. 
Before we consider t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n we may f i r s t point out that 
Plato follows Socrates i n s t i p u l a t i n g that material benefits or goods -
the 'human' goods of Apology 31B (Cf. n 47 Ch 11) - are of p r o f i t to a 
man conditional on.the man's soul being j u s t . Plato carries t h i s Socratic 
2 
conviction i n t o his concept of the t r i p a r t i t e state. I t i s important 
to note this point because while j u s t i c e and temperance pervade the whole 
state, only one class, the r u l e r s , have a specific need which i s not 
material, or s t r i c t l y p o l i t i c a l and social. These are the needs of 
i n t e l l e c t (vtvs ) . The subordinate classes, while t h e i r members w i l l be 
j u s t , f u l f i l needs which we must construe as material. The epikouroi 
f u l f i l t h e i r particular need i n p a t r i o t i c commitment to the r u l e r s 1 
direction of the state's p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Their specific need - we may c a l l 
i t the honour-loving need - may be regarded, w i t h i n Plato's hierarchy of 
needs, as material, since i t s perspectives (unlike the rule r s ' particular 
need) are social or p o l i t i c a l . The demiourgoi - the workers and craftsmen 
of the t h i r d class - supply the 'necessary goods' of the state. By so 
doing, they also f i n d f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r need. Again, this 
Cf Apology 30A 8:. I n respect of bodily goods or wealth, Socrates 
says: avu fr'« •ffifyj.c*!/ i/c-e^ y^i/i-e^i , *AA ' f$ X/nc^s /•/y/'AU, c+ AAA* 
r«ff» +\/&ftww<>it iYt.1 ^«"" *"<r ,*/*«»• t* . Similarly, at 
Republic 443E, he says of the j u s t man's pursuit of the same kind of # 
goods - external^ goods -: fj~^<rc ciucau jyeit'jrt-*<>* ti*i »*c*. ftnttui/ 
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need i s a material one. While the two lower classes do not risie above 
the f u l f i l m e n t of material needs, the craftsmen and subordinate guardians 
are yet j u s t and temperate. 
Plato's concept of sophrosune has been described by scholars as 
denoting consent, w i l l i n g acceptance,agreement: the agreement of the 
parts of the soul to do t h e i r work, the agreement of the classes of the 
3 
ideal society to perform t h e i r social function. I n Book J.V he describes 
j u s t i c e (fiti.At-eirir'i'y) as a capacity, a power, or an a b i l i t y . At 433B 
Socrates t e l l s us that i t was j u s t i c e which provided the p o s s i b i l i t y ( c^v 
lv\/*^/i/ ) for the growth and development of the other virtues ( f & f p v u v y , 
k v f f t i j . , ^fov^rtt) i n the c i t y . Also, j u s t i c e preserves these virtues so 
ft *t > M 
long as i t i s present ( fwirtTty dr . Justice i s therefore wider than 
the other v i r t u e s , and consent (here Of*fo$L*) i s designated as being one 
factor among those i t preserves by i t s presence. We may note that j u s t i c e 
i s further described as each c i t i z e n (and, indeed, women, children, arid 
slaves) doing his proper work and refraining from meddlesomeness ( #'c« C* 
tlirttv twees f<t tvv tKf>*tt«t, tut ovU ffT'AV tl[yl<f ppt/ti.: 433D) . Justice 
i s the a b i l i t y of each member of the community to do his own work ( j evl/ 
tftUircV? <r* J » t j ci uJzo~y ttftctinv Fo'nya: Ibid.) Further on (443B) 
Plato describes j u s t i c e as the power ( JvrAfti ) which furnishes men and 
c i t i e s of the kind j u s t described: men i n whom the three principles of 
the soul do t h e i r own work. This work re f l e c t s the presence of sophrosune 
which was e a r l i e r described ( 442D) as the agreement ( o f t f r f w t ) between the 
r u l i n g faculty of the soul (c£ ) and i t s two subject faculties 
Those who have drawn attention to the denotation of consent (or 
the equivalent) i n sophrosune, are: Cornford, i n his trans, p 125; 
Larson, i n his paper "The Platonic SynonymsAlK A l°ST and£g^P0£TNW " , 
American Journal of Philology, 72 1951 pp 395-414, at p 406; and Shorey. 
See Larson, 0p_. Cit. , p 396, on Shorey i n The Unity of Plato's Thought. 
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( f v Jt^jifj/Ww) that 'reason' ought to rule. Here then, we see the 
proximity of the two Platonic notions of j u s t i c e and temperance. Given 
that temperance i s a state of harmony or agreement among the parts - a 
condition of consent - and that j u s t i c e i s the present a b i l i t y or capacity 
to preserve an end, then we have a division of labour between the two which 
Plato has described i n terms of w i l l or agreement (temperance) and end 
( j u s t i c e ) . 
We may add to the above that Plato has already spoken of the c i t y 
i n which reason rules as being we l l advised ( ( f f t o i / A o t f ) and t r u l y wise ( th/ 
»»rt trvtfyv ) : 427DE. Here, he was speaking with p a r t i c u l a r reference, to 
the rulers of the state. I n v i r t u e of their r u l e , a c i t y founded on 
natural principles would be wise as a whole. The l a t e r description of 
temperance and j u s t i c e which we have j u s t examined assumes as i t s point of 
reference a c i t y i n which natural ends or a b i l i t i e s are realized. Consent, 
or temperance, i s seen to be a concomitant feature of the re a l i z a t i o n of 
these ends. 
We must now examine the importance of the notion of temperance to 
Plato's conception of i t as an external agreement between r u l i n g and subject 
classes. We s h a l l see that he regards external consent to philosophic rule 
as being a r e f l e c t i o n of the individual's b e l i e f that his interests are 
f u l f i l l e d from membership of the community. (Here, the 'individual' i s as 
much the philosopher as the subject citizen.) We s h a l l also see that unless 
Plato intended that the consent of the subject classes should be w i l l i n g 
consent that the p o l i t i c a l society which he describes i n the Republic must be 
r e c a l c i t r a n t to the wider, natural order to which the society belongs. I n 
order to develop these matters furt h e r , i t w i l l be appropriate at this point 
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to consider the basic features of the t r i p a r t i t e doctrine of the soul as 
Plato sets out this doctrine i n Republic IV. 
* * * 
At Republic 431D, Socrates emphasizes the external aspect of the 
rel a t i o n between rulers and subjects: 
And w i l l you observe i n your c i t y that the appetites 
i n the majority of the people who belong to the lowest 
rank breHtls C(- **t *Q4»hots ) are dominated by the desire 
and wisdom which are found i n the few who are best? 
T.his passage emphasizes that while the ru l i n g class i s s e l f - r u l e d , the 
4 
subject classes are ruled externally. The d i s t i n c t i o n between s e l f - r u l e 
and submission to external authority forms, w i t h i n the context of the 
ideal state, two modes of consent we have previously mentioned: consent 
from reason and consent from custom. We have indicated that i n the 
reformed society, the subjects' consent must not be a continuation of 
contemporary moral attitudes i f consent to philosophic rule - and hence 
sophrosune - i s to r e f l e c t the natural order of which the community i s 
a part. I f , at 431D, Plato were implying that 'reason' only rules the 
souls of the se l f - r u l e d then the thesis that tension (and not harmony) 
underlies the community's l i f e would have force. Those whom he designates 
as n»AAtfTf Tt HA* fdokeir ( I b i d . Cf. 431C) would be those i n whom 'reason' 
does not rule: at least the whole of the t h i r d class membership. What 
grounds do we have for rejecting this as Plato's meaning? 
4 
At 431C Socrates says that simple and moderate appetites ( Jn*4i tt-
/ut-e^l^s) are guided by consideration (^y<">>»), with the help of 
reason and r i g h t opinion. This condition i s found i n the few who are best 
educated. He i s referring to sel f - r u l e d men, philosopher rulers. He implies 
i n this passage that other men - those who belong to the lowest rank - w i l l 
never have t h i s a b i l i t y to be self-ruled. External control must always be 
a factor i n th e i r l i v e s . But t h i s does not also imply that 'reason' - given 
philosophic rule - w i l l not rule i n the souls of the subject classes. (Cf. 
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Our rejection of the above thesis must derive from consideration of 
what Plato means by the rule of reason i n the soul. He means, to begin 
w i t h , that a man i s temperate - or he consents to do his proper work -
when 'reason' takes counsel for the needs of the whole soul. We sh a l l 
understand his conception of an external agreement between rulers and 
subjects from his conception of j u s t i c e and temperance i n the soul. 
When we speak of the consent or agreement of each faculty to do i t s 
own work we sh a l l remember that each element of the soul i s ultimately 
regarded by Plato as a form of motive or desire.~* But i n order to 
distinguish each faculty of soul w i t h i n the context of sophrosune, Plato 
distinguishes between that which desires per se ( i e f f f t jftjttu»v ) and 
' 6 
that which q u a l i f i e s desire ( Co Kmr) . He also posits ' s p i r i t ' 
( r * Pyft*?**) as that which acts as 'reason's' a l l y . When sophrosune 
i s present, and 'reason' therefore rules the soul, the fac u l t i e s of the 
soul (including 'reason') consent to do t h e i r work. That i s to say, 
the i n dividual realizes h i s power or a b i l i t y to be j u s t . When 'reason' 
< 
does not rule, i t w i l l not then take counsel f o r the whole soul ( tyv viT+f 
dWVfS Cjt M^vp^t fTf*/H0*tt . 44IE ) . Rather, i t w i l l cease to perform 
i t s proper work, and ' s p i r i t ' w i l l exhort i t to pursue the ends of 
physical appetite.^ 
Cf Vlastos, i n Collected Essays, Op. Cit. p 89 n 62. 
Cf Adam's note, p 250 on 437E, and Cornford, i n "Psychology and 
Social Structure", p 260 f. n 2. 
7 I t w i l l be remembered that ' s p i r i t ' i s always conceived by Plato 
as 'reason's' a l l y . This i s true whether 'reason' i s doing i t s proper 
work or not. See Adam's appendix IV to Book JLV Vol _1. 
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We must regard consent - either true or nominal consent - as the 
result of the determinations of the ra t i o n a l part of the soul: f o r while 
Plato ascribes consciousness to 'reason' i n i t s desiderative function (as 
g 
at 441E for example), and consciousness to ' s p i r i t ' i n i t s hortatory r o l e , 
he only ascribes material impulse, which has no a b i l i t y to qu a l i f y ends, 
to 'appetite' or physical desire. Obviously, then, Plato regards 'reason' 
as providing the determinations of 'epithumetic' no less than those of 
'ra t i o n a l ' men. The difference i s that when the 'r a t i o n a l ' man determines 
ends he does so qua being rtufpuvy/ , each faculty of soul performing i t s 
proper work. This means that the r a t i o n a l man acts with the good of the 
i 
whole soul i n view, both 'reason' and ' s p i r i t ' presiding over ( iff^oi^crtcoy,^ 
physical impulse ( 445A ) . The epithumetic man, on the other hand, i s 
one i n whom 'reason', no more than any other faculty of soul, consents to 
do i t s own work. This must mean that 'reason' i n the epithumetic man 
qu a l i f i e s 'appetite 1, not i n view of the whole soul's needs, but only i n 
view of the sat i s f a c t i o n of material ends. We may understand the exchange 
i 
of functions at 443D f f . ( IT »<U i r ^ y ^ w v y ) i n this l i g h t . 
Consent, therefore, i n i t s inward sense, denotes 'reason's' 
qu a l i f i c a t i o n s of a man's ends wi t h the good of the whole soul i n view. 
When 'reason' rules - and sophrosune i s therefore present - then a man 
who i s j u s t externally w i l l be one who consents, inwardly, to the rule of 
'reason'. The consent of the epithumetic man, by contrast, could only be 
external. He would consent to law and regard others w e l l only with material 
considerations i n view. In terms of Plato's analysis of the soul, therefore, 
the t h i r d class could be correctly called epithumetic i f i t s regard f o r 
8 — A — f r r -T- v c ' ( 
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the p h i l o s o p h i c regime and i t s laws were only e x t e r n a l . Sophrosune could 
not then c h a r a c t e r i z e the s o u l s of the members of t h i s c l a s s . I n that 
case, the d i s t i n c t i o n between s e l f - r u l e and e x t e r n a l r u l e which we have 
noted i n r e s p e c t of Republic 431D must denote the su p p r e s s i o n of the 
t h i r d c l a s s r a t h e r than i t s w i l l i n g consent. I n terms of P l a t o ' s conception 
of j u s t i c e i n Book IV t h i s would mean that the t h i r d c l a s s , though i t 
consented outwardly to p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e , would be a c l a s s c o n s i s t i n g of 
u n j u s t men; f o r s i n c e i t l a c k e d sophrosune i t would t h e r e f o r e a l s o l a c k 
the a b i l i t y to achieve the ends of j u s t i c e . That i s to say, the members 
of the t h i r d c l a s s would not be inwardly j u s t . 
To t h i s point i n our d i s c u s s i o n we have i n d i c a t e d t h a t the r u l e of 
reason i n the s o u l guarantees t h a t a man w i l l a c t i n view of the good 
of the whole s o u l . We have p r e v i o u s l y noted P l a t o ' s s t i p u l a t i o n that 
m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t i s of p r o f i t to a man c o n d i t i o n a l on the s o u l ' s being 
j u s t . We noted, along w i t h t h i s , that the needs or "human goods" which 
the subordinate c l a s s e s f u l f i l a r e m a t e r i a l needs. We have a l s o noted t h a t 
e x t e r n a l r u l e must always be a f a c t o r i n the l i v e s of the s u b j e c t s . T h i s 
r a i s e s the s u b j e c t of the two modes of consent: consent from reason arid 
consent from custom. The former marks the consent of the r u l e r s who are 
t r u l y j u s t men; the l a t t e r , the consent of the s u b j e c t c l a s s e s who, w h i l e 
they a r e able to r e a l i z e the ends of j u s t i c e and (we are arguing) achieve 
inward consent, are not themselves t r u l y j u s t men. 
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We showed i n Ch 1 t h a t we f i n d an i d e a l v e r s i o n of the s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t theory i n the R e p u b l i c . I n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s of t h i s chapter 
we s h a l l c o n s i d e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p among the i d e a l community's c l a s s e s w i t h 
Ch _1 pp 30) f f esp. p33 
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f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s n o t i o n . F i r s t , we s h a l l i n t r o d u c e f e a t u r e s 
o f P l a t o ' s d o c t r i n e o f e r o s i n the Symposium w h i c h have i l l u s t r a t i v e 
b e a r i n g on t h e R e p u b l i c ' s t h e o r y o f c o n s e n t . The e r o s d o c t r i n e , t o g e t h e r 
w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e o f sophrosune d i s c u s s e d above, w i l l f u r n i s h t h e grounds 
f o r o u r f i n a l t r e a t m e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c ' s t h e o r y o f c o n s e n t . I n the 
f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r , t h e n , t h e r e l e v a n c e o f t h e e r o s d o c t r i n e 
w i l l be s t a t e d i n g e n e r a l terms. F o l l o w i n g t h a t , we s h a l l g i v e reasons 
f o r r e j e c t i n g t h e view t h a t t h e t h i r d c l a s s o f t h e i d e a l s t a t e i s moved 
by f e a r i n i t s obedience o f t h e laws. I n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n o f t h e c h a p t e r 
we s h a l l show how our r e j e c t i o n o f t h a t v i e w i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h P l a t o ' s 
concepts o f sophrosune and e r o s as bases o f p o l i t i c a l consent. 
* * * 
A t R e p u b l i c 495B P l a t o d e s c r i b e s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c n a t u r e i n terms 
t h a t r e c a l l t h e ascent o f e r o s i n the Symposium (210A-212A) . H i s 
concepts o f c o n s e n t f r o m reason and custom can be u s e f u l l y s t u d i e d i n 
l i g h t o f the g r a d u a l i s m he d e s c r i b e s there.., For now, we s h a l l o n l y 
o u t l i n e t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h i s d o c t r i n e on the t h e o r y o f p o l i t i c a l consent. 
I n b o t h t h e Symposium and t h e R e p u b l i c s e c t i o n j u s t c i t e d P l a t o d e s c r i b e s 
the n o t i o n o f a s c e n t as a c h a n e l l i n g o f d e s i r e w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Arguments from t h e g r o w t h o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s o u l , c o n c e i v e d i n terms o f 
the Symposium d o c t r i n e , t o s o c i e t y ' s own p r o g r e s s t o p e r f e c t i o n must t h e n 
be a n a l o g i c a l . But i f , as we e x p l a i n e d i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r , P l a t o tends 
t o e n v i s a g e s o c i e t y ' s p r o g r e s s f r o m i t s p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n t o i t s r e f o r m 
i n terms t h a t remain s i l e n t on t h e q u e s t i o n o f v i o l e n c e , the d o c t r i n e 
o f e r o s a t l e a s t serves t o i l l u s t r a t e the s p i r i t o f t h i s c o n c e p t ; t h e 
d o c t r i n e s e r v e s t o i l l u s t r a t e i n s u b s t a n t i v e terms t h e a f f i l i a t i o n P l a t o 
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w o u l d seem t o want between t h e r u l i n g and s u b j e c t c l a s s e s o f the R e p u b l i c . 
P l a t o a l s o w i s hes t o a c h i e v e a f f i l i a t i o n by means o f a myth o f common 
o r i g i n s . We s h a l l examine the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the myth i n t h e f o u r t h 
s e c t i o n o f the c h a p t e r . The a s c e n t o f e r o s i s germane t o P l a t o ' s p o l i t i c a l 
d o c t r i n e i n the R e p u b l i c p r e c i s e l y because t h e l a t t e r i s an o r g a n i c t h e o r y 
w h i c h P l a t o i n f e r s f r o m h i s c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e as i t i s p r e s e n t w i t h i n o r 
absent f r o m t h e s o u l o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . F i n a l l y , t h e d o c t r i n e e n t a i l s 
c o o p e r a t i o n between p h i l o s o p h e r and respo n d e n t . The l a t t e r , i n t h e p o l i t i c a l 
a n a l o g y , w i l l be seen i n a b r o a d b u t r e a l sense t o u n d e r l i e c o o p e r a t i o n 
t o g e t h e r w i t h m u t u a l achievement o f ends between r u l e r and s u b j e c t . The 
ob v i o u s substance o f the a n a l o g y , t h e n , w i l l be seen i n the gro w t h w i t h i n 
s o c i e t y i t s e l f o f one c l a s s w i t h i n i t t o w a r d t h e achievement o f s e l f - r u l e , 
w h i l e t h e c o o p e r a t i o n between r u l i n g and s u b j e c t c l a s s e s i s e s s e n t i a l f o r 
t h i s achievement. I n a w i d e sense, t h e n , t h e d o c t r i n e o f e r o s w i l l be seen 
t o a p p l y t o t h e achievement o f t h e i r own ends by t h e s u b o r d i n a t e c l a s s e s . 
For a l l these reasons we s h o u l d be a b l e t o draw some i n f e r e n c e s f r o m t h e 
e r o s d o c t r i n e t o P l a t o ' s concept o f t h e community's o r i g i n . 
We s a i d i n the l a s t c h a p t e r t h a t we w o u l d need t o e x p l a i n what was 
denoted by the r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s u b j e c t c l a s s e s ' response t o r e f o r m 
and t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e . We may emphasize a t t h i s p o i n t i n our d i s c u s s i o n 
t h a t t h e e r o s d o c t r i n e has an i m p o r t a n t b e a r i n g on t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e 
s u b j e c t c l a s s e s . Some g e n e r a l remarks on t h e s u b j e c t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t 
h e r e . We sug g e s t e d we w o u l d f i n d c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t c l a s s e s ' 
r a t i o n a l i t y i n P l a t o ' s d o c t r i n e o f sophrosune. We have seen i n t h i s 
c h a p t e r t h a t t he presence o f sophrosune i n t h e s o u l denotes t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
i n w a r d consent t o the r u l e o f r e a s o n . By d e s c r i b i n g t h e p u b l i c ' s consent 
t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e as r a t i o n a l , we s h a l l mean, t h e n , t h a t 'reason' r u l e s 
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i n t h e s o u l s o f those who c o n s e n t w i l l i n g l y t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e . We 
a r e a r g u i n g i n t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t t h e t h i r d c l a s s , w h i l e i t s members a r e 
n o t s e l f - r u l e d , a r e y e t d e s c r i b e d b y P l a t o as b e i n g i n w a r d l y j u s t . T h a t 
t h e i r c o n s e n t i s r a t i o n a l means, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e y a r e i n w a r d l y j u s t 
men, men i n whom reason takes c o u n s e l f o r the good o f t h e w h o l e s o u l . 
Thus, when P l a t o speaks o f t h e s o u l ' s g r o w t h i n the Symposium, o r o f 
t h e c h a n e l l i n g o f d e s i r e i n t h e R e p u b l i c , a t 485B, he i s s p e a k i n g o f men 
who have t h e p o t e n t i a l a b i l i t y t o a t t a i n knowledge ( f f f f i y / ^ ) . B u t w i t h 
s u ch men, as w i t h j u s t s u b j e c t s i n a r e f o r m e d community, 'reason' must 
t a k e c o u n s e l f o r t h e w h o l e s o u l ' s needs. B o t h t h e s e l f - r u l e d man - t h e 
p h i l o s o p h e r r u l e r - and t h e s u b j e c t who i s r u l e d e x t e r n a l l y - must a t l e a s t 
s h a r e t h i s common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i f t he co n s e n t o f t h e l a t t e r t o p h i l o s o p h i c 
r u l e i s t o be r a t i o n a l i n the sense e x p l a i n e d . R a t i o n a l c o n s e n t , t h e r e f o r e , 
d e n o t e s t h e presence o f sophrosune i n t h e s o u l and t h e w i l l i n g c o n s e n t o f 
t h e s u b j e c t c l a s s e s . Moreover, i t a l s o denotes t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s ' consent 
t o r u l e t h e s o c i e t y . I t denotes a man's consent t o membership o f t h e i d e a l 
community f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e whole s o u l ' s needs. So f a r as a man's 
c o n s e n t t o t h e o r d e r o f t h e s o c i e t y d e r i v e s f r o m t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , h i s 
c o n s e n t i s r a t i o n a l . S i n c e t h i s c o n c e p t i o n denotes a common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
b e t w e e n r u l e r s and r u l e d ( g i v e n t h a t s u b j e c t s a r e i n w a r d l y j u s t men) t h e n 
r a t i o n a l c o n s e n t - c o n s e n t from t h e r u l e o f reason i n t h e s o u l - w i l l 
d e n o t e any c i t i z e n ' s w i l l i n g c o n s e n t t o t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s - e i t h e r t h a t 
o f s u b j e c t o r r u l e r - f o r w h i c h h i s l i f e i n t h e community i s b e s t s u i t e d . 
A:, c i t i s e n ' s r a t i o n a l o r w i l l i n g c o n s e n t w i l l f u r t h e r d e n o t e h i s 
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e p l a c e w h i c h he o c c u p i e s i n t h e s o c i e t y i s 
s u f f i c i e n t t o h i s a t t a i n m e n t o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r n e e d ' o f h i t ? s o u l * 
The n o t i o n o f r e c i p r o c i t y i n h e r e n t t o t h i s , c o n c e p t i o n w i l l - "be- -
d e a l t w i t h - o r e f u l l y i n t h e f i n a l s e c t i o n o f t h e c h a p t e r . 
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We have a l s o remarked t h a t P l a t o d e s c r i b e s t h e movement o f e r o s i n 
the Symposium i n terms o f a c o n t i n u o u s a s c e n t . We have suggested t h a t the 
c o n t i n u i t y he e n v i s a g e s t h e r e has i l l u s t r a t i v e b e a r i n g on h i s c o n c e p t i o n 
o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m p r e s e n t t o r e f o r m e d s o c i e t y . The a s c e n t we observe 
i n t h e Symposium i s a c o n t i n u o u s movement o f the s o u l f r o m r e c o g n i t i o n o f 
/CuA pu i n p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , t h r o u g h laws and customs, t h r o u g h t o t h e 
branches o f l e a r n i n g , and, f i n a l l y , t o p e r c e p t i o n o f n o b i l i t y and f a i r n e s s 
(e t f f 0 to Kd.\»y ) i n i t s own r i g h t , i n d e p e n d e n t o f m a t e r i a l o r s o c i a l 
r e f e r e n c e . S c h o l a r s have d i s a g r e e d about t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n we s h o u l d p l a c e 
on D i o t i m a ' s words t o S o c r a t e s i a t 209E: 
"And y o u , a l s o , S o c r a t e s , m i g h t be i n i t i a t e d i n t o these 
a s p e c t s o f e r o s . But I wonder i f you c o u l d apprehend t h e 
h i g h e s t m y s t e r i e s f o r whose sake these s t a g e s [ t h e s t a g e s o f 
the s o u l ' s i n i t i a l g r o w t h w h i c h are p r e p a r a t o r y t o the 
h i g h e s t m y s t e r i e s ] a r e t h e same f o r one who approaches t h e 
m y s t e r i e s i n t h e r i g h t frame o f mind." 
C o r n f o r d b e l i e v e d t h e sentence s i g n a l e d a d e m a r c a t i o n by P l a t o o f t h e l i m i t 
S o c r a t e s had reached i n h i s own p h i l o s o p h y . ^ He a t t r i b u t e d t h i s t o t h e 
f a c t t h a t , " S o c r a t e s ' p h i l o s o p h y was a p h i l o s o p h y o f l i f e i n t h i s w o r l d 
w h i l e P l a t o ' s was c e n t r e d i n a n o t h e r w o r l d and t h i s (209E) i s t h e p o i n t 
where t h e y p a r t company." B u t the o t h e r w o r l d o f w h i c h C o r n f o r d spoke 
n o t o n l y s i g n a l s P l a t o ' s m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y , i t i s a l s o t h e p o i n t o f 
r e f e r e n c e f o r h i s r a d i c a l t h e o r y o f p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m . I t was p e r s o n a l 
r e f o r m , r a t h e r t h a n p o l i t i c a l , t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d S o c r a t e s ' theory.''""'' 
We may t h e r e f o r e agree w i t h C o r n f o r d t h a t w h i l e the Symposium a s c e n t i s 
an i d e a l t r i b u t e t o S o c r a t e s , i t i s a l s o a d e p a r t u r e p o i n t f o r P l a t o ' s 
own c o n c e p t s . W h i l e S o c r a t e s ' n o t i o n o f consent was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by 
"The D o c t r i n e o f Eros i n P l a t o ' s Symposium", i n V l a s t o s , Qp.Cit. , 
Modern S t u d i e s , 1 1 , p 125. 
1 1 Cf n 52, Ch 1 1 . 
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'ignorance' l e a d i n g t o c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge, P l a t o ' s concept e x p l i c i t l y 
assumes p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e . 
W h i l e C o r n f o r d ' s v i e w o f t h e passage, and t h e o p i n i o n o f o t h e r 
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s c h o l a r s , d w e l l on D i o t i m a ' s o p e n i n g words i t may be suggested t h a t t h e 
n o t a b l e d e p a r t u r e o c c u r s a t t h e t h i r d p r e p a r a t o r y s t a g e o f the a s c e n t 
(210E f f . ) where S o c r a t i c q u e s t i o n - a n d - a n s w e r , l e a d i n g t o c o n f e s s i o n o f 
i g n o r a n c e , merges i n t o P l a t o ' s t h e o r y o f Knowledge. I have suggested t h a t 
t h e c o n t i n u i t y w h i c h we observe i n t h e g r a d u a l a s c e n t w h i c h t h e Symposium 
p i c t u r e s i s a t l e a s t analogous t o P l a t o ' s concept o f the o r i g i n o f t h e i d e a l 
community and t o t h e c o n t i n u i n g c o n s e n t o f i t s c l a s s e s t o t h e regime he 
d e s c r i b e s i n t h e R e p u b l i c . We may complete t h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e c h a p t e r by 
f u r t h e r b r o a d e n i n g o u r n o t i o n o f t h e analogy's b e a r i n g on consent. The 
p o i n t s h e r e r a i s e d w i l l be seen, i n t h e f i n a l s e c t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r , t o 
b e a r on t h e consent o f a l l c l a s s e s . 
S o c r a t e s ' t h e o r y o f c o n s e n t i n the Apology and t h e C r i t o was, t o use 
C o r n f o r d ' s t h o u g h t , a p h i l o s o p h y f o r t h i s w o r l d . H i s t h e o r y o f consent was 
based on h i s concept o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge. T h i s was b o t h a m o r a l and 
a p r u d e n t i a l c o n c e p t w h i c h grew f r o m h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o n f e s s i o n o f 
i g n o r a n c e and h i s b e l i e f , as r e p o r t e d i n t h e A p o l o g y , t h a t he must encourage 
h i s kinsmen i n t h i s same c o n f e s s i o n . We saw i n Ch JLL (p 121) t h a t S o c r a t e s , 
i n t h e A p o l o g y , d i s c u s s e d t h e n o t i o n o f techne i n terms o f p r u d e n t i a l s k i l l , 
i n terms, t h a t i s , o f the b e n e f i t he i m p a r t e d t o t h e god f r o m t h e p u r s u i t o f 
h i s m i s s i o n , w h i l e he, i n t u r n was b e n e f i t e d by the god f r o m t h e knowledge 
t h a t a t r u l y j u s t man c o u l d s u f f e r no r e a l harm. We see t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t 
o f t h i s d o c t r i n e i n S o c r a t e s ' c o n v i c t i o n t h a t w h i l e he w o u l d obey t h e laws 
he must, f i n a l l y , c o n s e n t t o h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o m p t i n g s . The r e s u l t o f 
t h i s c o n v i c t i o n was c o n s c i e n t i o u s knowledge: t h e c o n s e n t o f c o n s c i e n c e and 
12 
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and S o c r a t e s ' concept o f t h e s e l f - r u l e d man. Such a man w o u l d be a t r u e 
kinsman t o h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s i n any s t a t e he b e l o n g e d t o . 
We have seen t h a t t h e Symposium marks a t r a n s i t i o n f r o m S o c r a t i c 
t o P l a t o n i c t h o u g h t . The n o v i c e o r i n i t i a t e o f the d e s c r i p t i o n a s p i r e s t o 
knowledge. Here, knowledge ceases t o be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c o n f e s s i o n 
o f i g n o r a n c e as b e i n g i t s e l f an end. Knowledge i s now p o s i t i v e . O b v i o u s l y , 
t h e a n a l o g y we have p o i n t e d t o between t h e a s c e n t o f eros i n the Symposium 
and t h e p r o g r e s s t o r e f o r m i n t h e R e p u b l i e must e n t a i l t h i s f a c t . We 
n o t e d above t h a t r a t i o n a l , o r w i l l i n g , c o n s e n t , as d e t e r m i n e d f r o m t h e 
d o c t r i n e o f sophrosune, was common as between r u l e r s and r u l e d i n t h e 
R e p u b l i c . Given t h a t 'reason' r u l e s i n t h e s o u l s o f the s u b o r d i n a t e c l a s s e s 
o f t h e R e p u b l i c , then t h e c h a n e l l i n g o f d e s i r e w h i c h S o c r a t e s d e s c r i b e d 
a t 485B ( t h o u g h he was o b v i o u s l y r e f e r r i n g t o d e s i r e i n t h e man who seeks 
knowledge) w i l l encompass t h e r e g i m e n t a t i o n o f d e s i r e i n t h e s u b o r d i n a t e 
c l a s s e s . 
We s a i d a t t h e end o f t h e l a s t c h a p t e r t h a t t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e 
p h i l o s o p h e r p r i o r t o becoming r u l e r i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Given o u r 
assum p t i o n o f w i l l i n g c onsent t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e , i t i s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s 
purpose t o e f f e c t a c o n v e r s i o n f r o m c o n t e m p o r a r y v a l u e s t o a r e f o r m e d 
p r u d e n t i a l b e l i e f - a f o r m o f b e l i e f t h a t i s consonant w i t h t h e p h i l o s o -
p h e r ' s m o r a l knowledge. What i s common t o t h i s concept and t h e Symposium 
d o c t r i n e i s t h e p i c t u r e w h i c h t h e y b o t h f u r n i s h o f t h e o r i e n t a t i o n o f 
d e s i r e t o w a r d a h i e r a r c h y o f n a t u r a l ends. I n t h e i d e a l s t a t e P l a t o 
d e s c r i b e s i n t h e R e p u b l i c , a l l t h e s e ends must be s a t i s f i e d i f t h e s o c i e t y ' s 
members consent w i l l i n g l y t o t h e regime imposed upon them. 
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The a s c e n t o f ero s i n t h e Symposium i s an i d e a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e 
g r o w t h o f an i n d i v i d u a l s o u l i n i t s q u e s t f o r knowledge. The Symposium 
g i v e s us a p o s i t i v e s t a t e m e n t o f S o c r a t i c e l e n c h t i c . I n t h e R e p u b l i c , 
P l a t o must r e n d e r c o m p a t i b l e t h e needs o f i n t e l l e c t w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t s . Our a n a l o g y between t h e Symposium a s c e n t and s o c i e t y ' s t r a n s -
i t i o n t o r e f o r m may seem p r o t r a c t e d a t t h i s p o i n t . But i n the e a r l i e r 
d i a l o g u e , as i n the l a t e r one, P l a t o i s concerned w i t h numerous d e s i r e s , 
n o t j u s t t h e one, i f h i g h e s t d e s i r e - d e s i r e f o r knowledge. He i s concerned 
w i t h d e s i r e on the m a t e r i a l p l a i n , on t h e p l a i n o f honour and prowess, and, 
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f i n a l l y , on t h e p l a i n o f i n t e l l e c t . We a r e a r g u i n g t h a t t h e i d e a l 
movement o f e r o s i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l - i t s a s c e n t t o knowledge - has, as i t s 
p o l i t i c a l a n a l o g y , t h e movement o f s o c i e t y t o t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f the t h r e e 
needs we have mentioned h e r e ( C f p l 8 3 L f ) . I n t h e R e p u b l i c , e r o s i s s a i d 
14 
t o be d e s i r e f o r knowledge i n a l l i t s forms. But t h e Symposium shows us 
t h a t eros has a w i d e r d e n o t a t i o n t h a n t h i s . There, e r o s i s d e s c r i b e d i n 
i t s w i d e s t a s p e c t as e v e r y d e s i r e o f good t h i n g s and d e s i r e f o r h a p p i n e s s 
and f u l f i l m e n t g e n e r a l l y ( to yt* UJLf tt'w f V c t tr***. >j c*>» AfA^Zv 
i f ) 4 u t*i> (vf*Lf * *?f : 205D) . E r o s , t h e n , i s a g e n e r i c term ( Co 
UAftkAtev) . Anyone i s p r o p e r l y c a l l e d a ' l o v e r who pursues some a c t i v i t y 
f r " " T«- " » ' c ' * _ e a l o u s l y : a*- J * /t*.ru f f O (rttos <evC<rS MUi t-o-fiovOtHOCt-t Co nv 
z 
<*, " " . ' » . * »» ektv »vep* i o r f o v r ^ ^ i v t i . T« A M t-ftf M M fflLrM. I b i d . 
13 » The ends o f e r o s a r e g i v e n a t Symposium 205D, as A/r* ^ d r i ' y ^ 
tj lUrd., {fA Of J^i/t.* cutf 'j lUr* f >koJ'*<n'*if • Cf. R e p u b l i c 581C: At* c*vc*t 
<gtAi'fi,itf s f / A S i ' t ;. I n the R e p u b l i c s e c t i o n j u s t c i t e d , P l a t o i s 
s p e a k i n g o f t h e t h r e e k i n d s o f needs t h a t w i l l be f o u n d i n t h e i d e a l 
community: ' £ JT H f y vrttt-f rr'<Us> • • • ^*-^/*/fe*t c f * * e , f y *<"M580D). 
/ . f r * } * " " »»«/Cfc r«/i we*.^*^ <tr< j/« c*/f »«/ i yt'/Wjf Mit'CAt 
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The passage a t R e p u b l i c 485B i s , i n e f f e c t , a s h o r t s t a t e m e n t o f 
the Symposium a s c e n t . We s h o u l d n o t e h e r e t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h i c n a t u r e i s 
s a i d t o be u n w i l l i n g t o n e g l e c t any p a r t o f knowledge, w h e t h e r i t s l e s s e r 
o r g r e a t e r , i t s l e s s v a l u a b l e o r more v a l u a b l e p a r t s . S i m i l a r l y , t h e 
i n i t i a t e i n t h e Symposium w i l l move upward w i t h i n a h i e r a r c h y o f o b j e c t s 
c o n v e n t i o n a l l y j u d g e d t o be b e a u t i f u l o r n o b l e - ctL H * X m . <ru/f*c* ; Co tv 
r*i» v*j/ets KJLi (tw<f}t*>f>tri lUAev. But w i t h i n each l e v e l o f t h e h i e r a r c h y 
he w i l l d i s c o v e r the t y p e o r k i n d o f o b j e c t w h i c h i s t r u l y v a l u a b l e as an 
i n s t a n c e o f b e a u t y i t s e l f {*t»cc c» **A»i'), t h e h i g h e s t member o f t h e 
h i e r a r c h y . I n t i m e , he w i l l c o n t e m p l a t e t h i s h i g h e s t member. E r o s , as 
que s t f o r knowledge, w i l l have a t t a i n e d i t s g o a l . P l a t o ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
the a s c e n t o f e r o s i s an i d e a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f an u l t i m a t e 
need, - i n t e l l e c t u a l need. B u t we see t h a t e r o s i s a l s o a g e n e r i c term 
w h i c h a p p l i e s t o human d e s i r e i n g e n e r a l - men's d e s i r e f o r good t h i n g s 
and w e l l - b e i n g o r h a p p i n e s s . Eros t h u s c o n c e i v e d i s b o t h an i d e a l and a 
s o c i a l c o n c e p t . I t moves i n i t s c o u r s e t h r o u g h s o c i e t y ' s t a n g i b l e needs 
to t h e a b s t r a c t needs o f i n t e l l e c t . 
S o c r a t e s says a t R e p u b l i c 421C t h a t each c l a s s i n t h e s t a t e s h o u l d 
r e c e i v e the s h a r e o f ha p p i n e s s w h i c h i s i t s n a t u r a l due ( f-otc^v e>7T<v* 
(tL+rCats cAs tBvtO't.i/ *j f o ' r u jfrtfiiwrt Cav ^ftd^^vni/ . 
He r e p e a t s t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n more e m p h a t i c a l l y a t 519E, where he says t h a t 
i t i s n o t t h e f u n c t i o n o f law t o be concerned w i t h t h e h a p p i n e s s o f one 
c l a s s i n t h e s t a t e b u t r a t h e r , t o produce t h i s c o n d i t i o n i n t h e whole c i t y . 
J u s t b e f o r e t h i s , Glaucon had s a i d i t w o u l d n o t be j u s t t o compel p h i l o s o p h e r s , 
who a r e a b l e t o e n j o y a l i f e t h a t i s s u p e r i o r t o p o l i t i c a l l i f e , t o t a k e 
charge o f t h e community. Glaucon i s r e f e r r i n g h e r e t o t h e need t h a t i s 
p e c u l i a r t o p h i l o s o p h i c n a t u r e - t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e . S o c r a t e s says t h a t 
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p h i l o s o p h e r s cannot be p e r m i t t e d t h e u n i n t e r r u p t e d p u r s u i t o f t h i s i n t e r e s t . 
They have a p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n t o p e r f o r m . Were they a t l i b e r t y t o 
d i s s o c i a t e themselves f r o m p o l i t i c a l l i f e i t w o u l d be because they had 
grown s p o n t a n e o u s l y (^f»/*f»i : 520B) and owed no debt t o t h e s t a t e . 
B u t , as i t i s , t h e s t a t e has n u r t u r e d t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s b o t h f o r t h e i r own 
ends and f o r those o f i t s o t h e r members ( I b i d . ) . I n consequence o f t h i s 
f a c t , t h e y must sh a r e the l a b o u r s and honours ( irouivv ((• **» 519E) 
o f those whom they w i l l r u l e . They w i l l s h a r e t h e honours and l a b o u r s o f 
these men r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r r e l a t i v e v a l u e (fece <£4»A» c t-p<i 6-tct-
o-n»vS*tt>c). Here, P l a t o i s c l e a r l y r e f e r r i n g t o t h e t h r e e needs 
whose f u l f i l m e n t t h e r e f o r m e d community makes p o s s i b l e . Two o f these needs 
do n o t t r a n s c e n d m a t e r i a l o r p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The p h i l o s o p h e r ' s need - a 
need t h a t i s b e t t e r than t h e p o l i t i c a l l i f e ( *ifH"»v' 519E) - i s y e t 
dependent f o r i t s achievement on t h e e d u c a t i o n t h e s t a t e has p r o v i d e d 
(520C) and on the f u l f i l m e n t , by t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s , o f a p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n . 
I n these passages, P l a t o i s moving i n t h e ambit o f h i s p r e v i o u s d e s c r i p t i o n 
o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s a s c e n t f r o m t he cave (514A f f . ) . I n sympathy w i t h 
t h a t metaphor he d e s c r i b e s t h e honours and l a b o u r s w h i c h p h i l o s o p h e r s must 
share as i d o l s o r images (£ff<*A* : 520C) . The p h i l o s o p h e r s , however, w i l l 
be r e t u r n i n g t o a cave w h i c h r e c e i v e s them w i t h o u t h o s t i l i t y (Cp 517A). 
B e l o n g i n g t o t h e cave metaphor, t h e n , i s P l a t o ' s t a c i t a s sumption o f 
consent t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e . 
I f t h e consent the p h i l o s o p h e r s r e c e i v e i s t r u e consent - t h e r a t i o n a l 
o r w i l l i n g consent o f men i n whom 'reason' r u l e s - t h e n t h e images cannot 
be b a r r i e r s a g a i n s t t h e c i t i z e n s ' c o n s e n t . They must, r a t h e r , be t h e b a s i s 
o f t h e community's i m p l i c i t o r i g i n and i t s c o n t i n u a t i o n . They must be the 
b a s i s o f t h e c i t i z e n s ' consent f r o m custom, and t h e y must be f a s h i o n e d i n 
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c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e t r u e a r c h e t y p e s o f j u s t i c e and good w h i c h t h e p h i l o s o -
p h e r s know and upon w h i c h t h e y base t h e i r own conse n t t o t h e community. 
The images must s e r v e , t h e n , as a l i n k between t h e p o l i t i c a l l i f e and i t s 
needs, and t h e b e t t e r l i f e w h i c h b r i n g s f u l f i l m e n t t o t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s . 
They must r e p r e s e n t b e l i e f s , o p i n i o n s , o r customs w h i c h are consonant w i t h 
t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s ' knowledge. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s ' 
r e t u r n t o a cave w h i c h a c c e p t s t h e i r r u l e p r o v i d e s us w i t h a s y n t h e s i s o f 
the i d e a l and s o c i a l a s p e c t s o f e r o s t h a t we have d e s c r i b e d . 
On what grounds, complementary t o o u r a s s u m p t i o n o f w i l l i n g c o n s e n t , 
can we base t h i s s y n t h e s i s ? S o c r a t e s had d e s c r i b e d t h e honours o f t h e cave 
i n terms o f t h e i r r e l a t i v e w o r t h ( f < r > ^ J L v i a c ( t r t r6o*fd.iort-p*.t. : 
519E). E a r l i e r , when he had spoken o f t h e c h a n n e l l i n g o f d e s i r e a t 485B 
(Cf n 14) he s t a t e d t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e drawn t o ( ^ f i u / f i v ) t h e l e a r n i n g 
w h i c h makes essence o r b e i n g p l a i n t o them ( f c y s 0WI»A* Ujt dt-i 
ewtjs ) . Moreover, p h i l o s o p h e r s do n o t n e g l e c t any p a r t o f t h i s l e a r n i n g , 
w h e t h e r i t s g r e a t e r o r i t s l e s s e r , i t more v a l u a b l e o r i t s l e s s v a l u a b l e 
a s p e c t s . L a t e r , when he speaks o f the p h i l o s o p h e r s ' r e t u r n t o t h e cave 
(520C) he t e l l s us t h a t they w i l l know b e t t e r t h a n those who l i v e t h e r e 
( Vi>v ) what each o f t h e i d o l s i s and o f what i t i s a semblance 
( S h o r e y ) : JU< y V¥>r+v *<r (*CA.o-C4 « «><r/Ait drrx (ax*- juit . The reason 
i s t h a t t h e y have a c q u i r e d t r u e knowledge (5wi l'd.^f6y (u/frttit-VAt) 
o f t h i n g s w h i c h a r e n o b l e , j u s t and good ( tid^h/v Cf. tut icU^i^u a*i 
*Lf4¥w* i r t p t ) . S i n c e they have t h i s knowledge, i t i s t h e i r t a s k t o r u l e : 
t o e s t a b l i s h i n the community c o n v e n t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g j u s t i c e and good 
(C f . 484D). 
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We have n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y ( p l ' 8 l , n 2) t h a t S o c r a t e s had spoken o f 
the j u s t man's p u r s u i t o f e x t e r n a l goods. The goods w h i c h he mentioned 
(443E) a r e , t y p i c a l l y , t he o c c u p a t i o n s w h i c h w o u l d engage c i t i z e n s i n any 
community i n c l u d i n g an i d e a l one: t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f w e a l t h , tendence o f 
the body, p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . ^ He i m p l i e d t h e r e t h a t g i v e n t h a t a man 
was temperate he was f i t t o pursue such a c t i v i t i e s . T o g e t h e r w i t h h i s 
p u r s u i t o f e x t e r n a l goods, a man who i s te m p e r a t e w i l l r e g a r d the j u s t and 
n o b l e a c t i o n as t h a t w h i c h tends t o p r e s e r v e t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e s o u l w h i c h 
sophrosune denotes: a man's i n w a r d c o n s e n t o r t h e r u l e o f reason i n h i s s o u l . 
We have seen t h a t P l a t o l a t e r d i s c u s s e s the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s concern f o r t h e 
' p a r t s ' o f l e a r n i n g - i t s g r e a t e r and l e s s e r a s p e c t s ( 4 - 8 5 B ) ; he a l s o s a i d 
t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s w i l l share t h e l a b o u r s and honours o f t h e c a v e - d w e l l e r s , 
f o r t h e c i t y ' s law seeks t o b r i n g about t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f the whole community. 
The goods w h i c h the c a v e - d w e l l e r s p u r s u e , t h e l a b o u r s w h i c h occupy them, 
f i g u r e i n t h e l i s t o f needs and i n t e r e s t s - what we have c a l l e d e x t e r n a l 
goods - t h a t S o c r a t e s p r o v i d e s a t 443E, where he speaks o f those who pursue 
these goods as b e i n g j u s t men. These a r e t h e c i t i z e n s , w h e t h e r r u l e r s o r 
s u b j e c t s , o f t h e i d e a l community. The p h i l o s o p h e r s ' concern f o r t h e goods 
w h i c h o t h e r men d e s i r e i s marked by t h e i r e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f c o n v e n t i o n s 
c o n c e r n i n g j u s t i c e . These c o n v e n t i o n s produce men who a r e temperate - men 
whose b e l i e f s a b out j u s t i c e w i l l be consonant w i t h t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s ' 
knowledge o f j u s t i c e . 
P o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( trokt ctU0* ct) would o b v i o u s l y be an e x t e r n a l 
good - an i n t e r m e d i a r y b e n e f i t - t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y minded c i t i z e n s . 
Since such a c t i v i t y w o u l d consume the l i v e s o f t h e e p i k o u r o i o f P l a t o ' s 
i d e a l c i t y , i t w o u l d be t h e i r p r i m a r y good. We may f u r t h e r n o t e t h a t t h e 
a c q u i s i t i o n o f w e a l t h (X?y?*e'V ncy'rii/ ) > as h e r e d e s c r i b e d , i s n o t s p e c i f i c 
t o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f power t h r o u g h w e a l t h . I n d e e d , i t c o u l d n o t be, i f 
the man who t u r n s t o Xfirtcd, i s sophron. 
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I m p l i c i t i n t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s a t t a i n m e n t o f knowledge i s h i s awareness 
o f i t s g r e a t e r and l e s s e r p a r t s - h i s awareness o f i t s forms ( f t f y ) , and 
i t s t r u e i n s t a n c e s among t h e m a t e r i a l and p o l i t i c a l concerns o f men. He 
cannot a t t a i n h i s own ends u n l e s s , f r o m h i s knowledge o f j u s t i c e ( a n d hence 
h i s knowledge o f good) , he can s a t i s f y t h e needs o f o t h e r c i t i z e n s even i f 
these needs a r e o f l e s s w o r t h t h a n h i s own p u r s u i t s . B ut w h i l e he s a t i s f i e s 
t h e s e needs, h i s r u l e must n o t be d i s p u t e d o Given t h a t t h e c i t i z e n s a r e 
i n w a r d l y j u s t men they w i l l p u r s u e t h e goods t h a t b r i n g them f u l f i l m e n t ; b u t 
a t t h e same t i m e , t h e y w i l l a c c e p t t h e c o n v e n t i o n s and b e l i e f s about m o r a l 
v a l u e w h i c h t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s w i l l e s t a b l i s h . I f t h e y do n o t a c c e p t t h e 
p h i l o s o p h e r s ' c o n v e n t i o n s about m o r a l v a l u e , t h e y a r e n o t j u s t men even 
though they o u t w a r d l y s u b m i t t o t h e o r d e r t h e p h i l o s o p h i c regime e s t a b l i s h e s . 
I n t h a t case, sophrosune, so f a r as i t denotes the agreement o f the c l a s s e s 
as t o what c l a s s o f men ( o v r c c i / A ) ' 431E) s h o u l d r u l e i n t h e s t a t e , denotes 
an e x t e r n a l agreement o n l y . The s u b j e c t c l a s s , t h e t h i r d c l a s s , i s t h e n 
r u l e d f r o m m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o n l y ; ' r e a s o n ' , i n t h e s o u l s o f i t s 
members, cannot t a k e c o u n s e l f o r the whole s o u l ' s needs, and t h e t h i r d c l a s s 
must o n l y be n o m i n a l l y j u s t . E r o s , i n i t s i d e a l a s p e c t , c o u l d n o t t h e n 
encompass the s u b j e c t c i t i z e n s ' c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e i r needs as b e i n g f u l f i l l e d 
f r om membership i n t h e r e f o r m e d community. I n t h e Symposium, P l a t o has t o l d 
us t h a t i n o r d e r f o r 'reason' t o r e a l i z e i t s own ends, ero s i n t h e s o u l 
must f i r s t pass f r o m what i s n o b l e or f a i r i n m a t e r i a l f o r m , t h r o u g h t o i t s 
presence i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l f o r m ( c' tot» Vfj/»?s *«u t»7> A f t -
<j i <r* M-^ko¥ : 210C) , t h e n f i n a l l y , t o i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l f o r m s . The 
p o i n t o f a n a l o g y w i t h t h e R e p u b l i c ' s s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i s 
t h a t t h e p e c u l i a r need o f t h e r u l e r s - i n t e l l e c t u a l need - cannot be 
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e f f e c t i v e l y r e a l i z e d u n l e s s s o c i e t y ' s two o t h e r needs a r e r e a l i z e d as w e l l . 
* * * 
The concept o f a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , so f a r as i t a p p l i e s i n an i d e a l 
sense t o P l a t o ' s t h o u g h t i n t h e R e p u b l i c , i s based on a concept o f c o o p e r a t i o n 
among the t h r e e c l a s s e s o f c i t i z e n s . I n t h e p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n o f t h i s 
c h a p t e r we have n o t e d i n a g e n e r a l way c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s o f P l a t o ' s e r o s 
d o c t r i n e w h i c h have a b e a r i n g on h i s s o c i a l and m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . We want 
t o i n d i c a t e i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l how t h i s d o c t r i n e can be a p p l i e d t o h i s 
concept o f the o r i g i n o f consent t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e and t o t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n 
o f c onsent i n t h e i d e a l s t a t e . 
We s h a l l show i n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n o f t h e c h a p t e r how t h e g r o w t h o f 
eros i n t h e s o u l has, as t h e c l i m a x t o i t s p o l i t i c a l a n a l o g y , t h e g r o w t h 
o f one c l a s s i n th e i d e a l s t a t e t o w a rd the c o n d i t i o n o f s e l f - r u l e . T h i s 
c o n d i t i o n i s e n t a i l e d by the achievement o f t h e i r n a t u r a l end by t h e members 
o f t h e r u l i n g c l a s s . The c o n d i t i o n o f s e l f - r u l e w o u l d o b t a i n , i n P l a t o ' s 
v i e w , g i v e n the achievement o f t h e h i e r a r c h y o f n a t u r a l ends t h e R e p u b l i c 
a n t i c i p a t e s . H i s t o r y , however, i n no way gu a r a n t e e s t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e 
i d e a l s t a t e . Men, t o g e t h e r w i t h chance (499B, p 169 s u p r a ) , must a c t t o 
b r i n g t h e s t a t e i n t o b e i n g . As we n o t e d i n Ch 111 ( I b i d * ) , i f a f f i l i a t i o n 
r a t h e r than antagonism o b t a i n s among t h e c l a s s e s o f t h e i d e a l s t a t e , t h e n 
we have no reason t o suppose t h a t t h e s p i r i t i n w h i c h t h e s t a t e b e g i n s i s 
no t c o n t i n u o u s w i t h i t s o n - g o i n g l i f e . W i t h t h i s a s s u m p t i o n , however^ we 
must keep i n view o u r a d m i s s i o n t h a t we cannot e l i m i n a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f v i o l e n c e as a means t o t h e s t a t e ' s o r i g i n . I t s o r i g i n , and t h e means 
to i t s o r i g i n , a r e a p o c r y p h a l . We have, t h e n , t h r e e q u e s t i o n s t o d e a l 
w i t h : u l t i m a t e l y , t h e concept o f ero s w h i c h , i n i t s p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t , 
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u n d e r l i n e s t h e g r o w t h o f one c l a s s t o t h e c o n d i t i o n o f s e l f - r u l e , b u t 
w h i c h a l s o u n d e r l i n e s t h e p e r f e c t i o n o f a l l c l a s s e s ; r e l a t e d t o t h i s , 
the d o c t r i n e o f sophrosune, w h i c h p o i n t s t o t h e w i l l i n g consent o f t h e 
s o c i e t y ' s members t o t h e regime imposed upon them. To b e g i n w i t h , t h e r e 
i s the q u e s t i o n o f o r i g i n s : h e r e we s h o u l d emphasize t h a t d e s p i t e t h e 
u n c e r t a i n o r i g i n o f t h e s t a t e , t h e r e i s no l o g i c a l h i a t u s between i t s 
e x i s t e n c e and t h e p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n o f man. Though t h e s t a t e ' s emergence 
w o u l d r e p r e s e n t a r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e f r o m the course o f r e c o r d e d h i s t o r y , 
i t s emergence w o u l d a l s o b r i n g t o f r u i t i o n ends t h a t a r e n a t u r a l and 
p o t e n t i a l . However u n c e r t a i n and u n l i k e l y t h e s t a t e ' s o r i g i n , b o t h i t s 
p o s s i b l e o r i g i n and i t s c o n t i n u i n g l i f e a r e i m p l i e d by P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n 
o f t h e t h r e e n a t u r a l c l a s s e s o f men. I n l i g h t o f t h i s f a c t , we s h o u l d 
be a b l e t o i n f e r some c o n n e c t i o n between t h e d o c t r i n e o f e r o s and t h e 
community's o r i g i n . We may t u r n t o t h i s q u e s t i o n f i r s t . 
From P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e i d e a l c i t y ' s o r i g i n s , we must i n f e r 
t h a t he r e j e c t e d the v i e w e x p r e s s e d by Glaucon t h a t f e a r o r m i s t r u s t a re 
t h e e s s e n t i a l m o t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f men's p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i c e and so, 
a l s o , o f t h e i r consent t o law. To Glaucon's view t h a t men are moved by 
f e a r t o be j u s t , Adeimantus opposed t h e vi e w - P l a t o ' s own v i e w - t h a t i t 
i s m u t u a l need o f one a n o t h e r t h a t compels men t o l i v e under law (372 A. 
Cf. 369C). What s u b s t a n t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n does e i t h e r see between, on t h e 
one hand, f e a r , and, on t h e o t h e r , t h e need w h i c h t h e members o f a s o c i e t y 
have o f one a n o t h e r ( Q t v c A * C**CH,I/ ffi*t* tt»i ry cy M dlXyAevf I b i d . ) ? 
T h i s q u e s t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l t o o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f 
the r e a l t i o n s between t h e c l a s s e s o f t h e i d e a l c i t y : our answer t o i t 
s h o u l d b e g i n w i t h our c o n s i d e r i n g P l a t o ' s v i e w o f ' a p p e t i t e ' - t h a t i s , 
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economic o r m a t e r i a l need - i n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t y . Of p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e 
i s h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f economic need as f o r m i n g t h e m a t e r i a l b a s i s on w h i c h 
e i t h e r p h i l o s o p h i c o r t y r a n n i c a l e r o s must r e s t . Upon h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f 
economic need, t h e n , P l a t o b u i l d s h i s t h e o r y o f c o m p e t i t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n 
i n s o c i e t i e s and the d e t r i m e n t and the b e n e f i t t h a t each, r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
i m p a r t s ; upon the same ground he a l s o b u i l d s h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f the e v o l u t i o n 
w i t h i n s o c i e t y o f s e l f - r u l e d men and men e n s l a v e d t o a p p e t i t e , o r s e l f -
d e t e r m i n e d m e n,^ 
A t R e p u b l i c 367A, Adiemantus proposed t h a t i f we c o u l d prove t h a t 
j u s t i c e was an advantage t o t h e s o u l , and i n j u s t i c e a d i s a d v a n t a g e , then 
we s h o u l d each be o u r own b e s t g u a r d i a n and s h o u l d n o t have t o guard a g a i n s t 
one a n o t h e r ' s i n j u s t i c e . " ^ We s h o u l d r a t h e r f e a r t h e presence o f i n j u s t i c e , 
r e g a r d i n g i t an e v i l . Glaucon had s a i d a few pages b e f o r e (360D) t h a t o u r 
f e a r o f i n j u s t i c e ( a n d , i m p l i c i t l y , o u r d e s i r e f o r i t ) moves us t o p r a c t i s e 
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t h e d e c e i t o f p r a i s i n g j u s t i c e . The two c o n t r a s t i n g v i e w s o f f e a r t h a t 
we see here a r e t h e S o c r a t i c : what i s t r u l y t o be f e a r e d i s i n j u r y t o the 
19 20 s o u l ; and the " c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t " : n a m e l y , t h a t o n l y f e a r o f m a t e r i a l 
I s h a l l use the e x p r e s s i o n s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d man t o denote the 
a n t i t h e s i s o f P l a t o ' s s e l f - r u l e d man. The a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h i s 
e x p r e s s i o n w i l l become a p p a r e n t l a t e r i n the c h a p t e r . 
17 J* ** » . ' > »' t . i i • * i ' » ' -
(i \/4p 9vCu/s f\t.yf.c» . . . *</K d* 4AkfAt»» f-f•'Ajtrcovti/ y>, +litc*vf , 
'.»»• » » ' ~ i ** »' i c c r * » /r. ^ ~ *AA «< l/r«» tifC*V *»V t-Kd + C*S J f i r COS <*AeCJ. Jf-d«u« ** dttttntv Cut 
18 ftu Jrfiv Cf. pp IT© f f . s u p r a 
Cf. Ch. 11 on PP 104 f f -
Cf. Ch. 11 n 5 and Ch 1JL pp 136 f f 
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d e p r i v a t i o n moves men t o p r a c t i s e j u s t i c e , t h a t r e g a r d f o r a man's 
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m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g i s s u f f i c i e n t t o i t s p r a c t i c e . Here, we must n o t e 
t h a t i n t h e R e p u b l i c , t h e t h i r d o l a s s * s p a r t i c u l a r need i s t h a t o f m a t e r i a l 
f u l f i l m e n t . B ut we must remark t o o t h a t t h i s c l a s s cannot be j u s t i f f e a r 
and d e c e p t i o n a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f i t s consent t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e . Of 
g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e f o r our c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e n , i s P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t o f t h e 
f u l f i l m e n t o f the m a t e r i a l or economic need and i t s p o s s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n 
w i t h t r u e c o n s e n t . ( We s h a l l r e c a l l , h e r e , t h a t t h e members o f t h e t h i r d 
c l a s s cannot be t r u l y j u s t s i n c e t h e y are e x t e r n a l l y r u l e d . ) 
P l a t o ' s concept o f t h e p l a c e o f m a t e r i a l need i n s o c i e t y w i l l be 
seen t o d e r i v e , i n i t i a l l y , f r o m h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p r i m i t i v e c i t y i n 
the R e p u b l i c (371B - 372D). Here, h i s vi e w o f j u s t i c e a t t h e l e v e l o f 
economic need s e r v e s as a c o u n t e r t o Glaucon's c o n c e p t i o n . P l a t o , o f 
c o u r s e , w i l l t e l l us t h a t economic s a t i s f a c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y though n o t 
s u f f i c i e n t t o s o c i e t y ' s w e l l - b e i n g . B u t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e , even 
a t i t s most p r i m i t i v e e x p r e s s i o n - a t the l e v e l where i t i s t o be seen 
c l e a r l y o n l y i n e x t e r n a l , economic r e l a t i o n s among men - advances f r i e n d s h i p , 
and n o t f e a r , as t h e dominant m o t i v e i n men's p r a c t i s i n g j u s t i c e . Our 
t r e a t m e n t , t h e n , o f P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e i d e a l s t a t e ' s o r i g i n must 
e n t a i l as i t s most i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e t h e c o n t r a s t he sees between f e a r and 
m u t u a l need. T h i s c o n t r a s t , we have s a i d , i s e s s e n t i a l t o h i s c o n c e p t i o n 
o f t h e r e l a t i o n s among t h e c l a s s e s o f t h e i d e a l s t a t e . We s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e 
expand! somewhat on our accoun t o f t h e p r i m i t i v e o r h e a l t h c i t y o f R e p u b l i c 
11 i n o r d e r t o a p p r e c i a t e the c o n t r a s t P l a t o makes t h e r e between m u t u a l 
need and f e a r . 
W h i l e the l a t t e r c o n c e p t i o n does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d t o im m o r a l i s m 
i n t h o u g h t , i t can be a s p r i n g - b o a r d t o i t , as, f o r example, when we 
r e g a r d j u s t i c e as d e c e p t i o n . ( C f . l a s t n o t e , and Cf. Ch M nn 61-63-
204. 
I n Ch 1 (pp 5 f f . ) we i n d i c a t e d t h a t i n the Republic and the Laws 
(676A f f . ) P l a t o i s not d e p i c t i n g a golden age or a time of innocence. 
Indeed, both at Republic 371E - 72A and a t 372E, Socrates asks whether our 
method of a n a l y s i s i s going to demonstrate the o r i g i n both of j u s t i c e and 
i n j u s t i c e i n c i t i e s . Our f i r s t quoted reference has the p r i m i t i v e c i t y 
i n view, the second, the fevered or l u x u r i o u s c i t y . I n the former, P l a t o 
i s l o o k i n g f o r j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e , o r , simply, the q u a l i t y of moral value 
as i t e x i s t s i n m a t e r i a l l y p r i m i t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . The healthy or p r i m i t i v e c i t y , 
i s , then, conceivably h i s t o r i c a l . L i k e the extensive and spec u l a t i v e p i c t u r e 
of h i s t o r y which the Laws depicts (p 9 supra), the p i c t u r e the Republic gives 
us of the p r i m i t i v e c i t y i s not m y t h i c a l . There, P l a t o wishes to describe 
the nature of moral value i n a s o c i e t y which, u n l i k e the fevered c i t y , i s not 
capable of m a t e r i a l excess. We s a i d i n Ch 1^  t h a t the p r i m i t i v e c i t y i s j u s t 
i f only because the cause of i n j u s t i c e cannot there be instanced (p 11). 
The j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e of which P l a t o here speaks i s conditioned by 
exchange of goods, or, t h a t i s , by economic need; since the c i t y , a t t h i s 
p r i m i t i v e stage of i t s development depends f o r i t s s u r v i v a l on cooperation 
among c i t i z e n s , i t s l i f e i s not y e t char a c t e r i z e d by autarky ( m a t e r i a l s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y : 369B) i n which P l a t o sees a p r i n c i p l e cause of i n j u s t i c e - the 
cause of i n j u s t i c e he i s loo k i n g f o r . With autarky must u l t i m a t e l y come the 
moral outlook which emphasizes men's independence from one another (. . . n«tt 
trp+cc+ti/ ; 370A Cf 464CD) . So long as t h a t a t t i t u d e i s l a c k i n g , s o c i e t y 
22 
i s subject t o and not master of i t s m a t e r i a l circumstances. Then, too, 
By mastery of m a t e r i a l circumstances we mean, here, a p o t e n t i a l l y 
u n l i m i t e d a b i l i t y to acquire wealth. (Cf. 374D)'. 
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i t s moral outlook w i l l be t r a d i t i o n a l and not r a d i c a l ( *cf< loaf 
B*6\tss MJ fi'uii Ji/f»i"tf liklykeif , . . . 372BC) . Friendship, and not 
h o s t i l i t y , w i l l be seen to be the general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the i n h a b i t a n t s ' 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h one another. With t h i s , P l a t o i s saying as w e l l t h a t given 
man's i n a b i l i t y to achieve excessive m a t e r i a l power, the moral a t t i t u d e 
t h a t regards m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y as a good end w i l l also be l a c k i n g . 
We should make two f u r t h e r p o i n t s about the p r i m i t i v e c i t y : f i r s t , the 
c i t i z e n s ' s i m p l i c i t y and t h e i r goodness are conditioned by the e x t e r n a l , 
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m a t e r i a l circumstances of t h e i r l i v e s , and do not transcend these. 
So long as i t s c i t i z e n s ' l i v e s are conditioned by such circumstances 
( t o g e t h e r w i t h a moral t r a d i t i o n t h a t accompanies these circumstances: 
372 BC) r a t h e r than by knowledge of moral ends, then they are powerless to 
prevent and, indeed, would regard as n a t u r a l l y b e n e f i c i a l (372C f f . ) the 
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growth of wealth. Secondly, P l a t o regards the autonomy of the s e l f - r u l e d 
man - the philosopher - as a p o t e n t i a l , i f i d e a l , s o c i a l end. But the 
autonomy P l a t o seeks, w h i l e i t i s a n a t u r a l end, cannot grow d i r e c t l y from 
the p r i m i t i v e c i t y . I t s growth toward wealth and luxury are i n e v i t a b l e , 
w h i l e the consumation of the end which P l a t o seeks w i l l r e q uire t h a t 
s o c i e t y be purged of i t s excesses. The p r i n c i p l e t h a t 'one man i s f i t t e d 
f o r one task' which e x i s t e d by nature i n the healthy c i t y must be restored 
(374A) before the autonomy P l a t o seeks can be achieved. Thus Pl a t o 
introduces the class of guardians at 374E and proceeds t o examine the 
Cf. F.V. Merriman, "The Rise And F a l l Of The P l a t o n i c K a l l i p o l i s " , 
Mind, N.S. XXIV, 1915, pp 1-14, a t p 10. 
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The lack of knowledge about moral ends i s e x e m p l i f i e d by Cephalus 
and Polemarchus whose a t t i t u d e s about wealth and j u s t i c e r e f l e c t the 
healthy c i t y ' s i n a b i l i t y to stem the t i d e of m a t e r i a l excess and the 
moral a t t i t u d e t h a t accompanies i t (Cf. n 21 supra). 
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f u n c t i o n (c» t^ir ^ U^wt« : I b i d . ) t h a t t h i s class w i l l perform toward 
the maintenance of t h i s p r i n c i p l e . We should here consider h i s statements 
about fear and a f f i l i a t i o n so f a r as the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the guardian class 
e l i c i t s these tempers f o r our examination. When we have completed t h i s 
t o p i c , enough should then have been sai d about the community's o r i g i n so 
th a t we may see an i m p l i c i t a s s o c i a t i o n between t h i s subject and the d o c t r i n e 
of eros. We have already broached the subj e c t of the c i t i z e n s ' f e a r of the 
r u l e r s i n Ch 111 (pp 1-68—169 ) • We may consider the issue i n f u r t h e r d e t a i l 
here i n respect of the guardian class and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the t h i r d 
c l ass. We may begin w i t h Plato's conception of a myth of brotherhood (414 C 
f f . ) as being means toward achieving a f f i l i a t i o n among the classes. 
To begin w i t h , what do we l e a r n from the myth about Plato's concept 
of o r i g i n s ? F i r s t , i t i s necessary t h a t the c i t i z e n s accept t h e i r d i v i s i o n 
i n t o classes i f the p r i n c i p l e c i t e d a t 374A i s to be r e s t o r e d ; and P l a t o 
supposes t h a t the class d i v i s i o n does i n f a c t conform to n a t u r a l d i s t i n c t -
ions (423D, 428E) . But he also wishes to i n t e r p r e t these d i s t i n c t i o n s . , 
m y t h i c a l l y , i n order to secure i n the c i t i z e n s , by way of b e l i e f , a sentiment 
of common o r i g i n s or brotherhood (414E) . This sentiment, he supposes, w i l l 
secure them i n the b e l i e f t h a t the d i v i s o n of f u n c t i o n among them, since 
they w i l l b e l i e v e i t to be in h e r e n t to t h e i r ancestry, also conforms t o 
nature (416D). The purpose of the myth, then, i s t o ensure acceptance among 
the c i t i z e n s of the class d i v i s i o n and, a t the same time, t o i n s t i l i n them 
a sense of common o r i g i n . We have observed t h a t P lato regards m a t e r i a l 
need (the only need the healthy c i t y f u l f i l l e d ) , whether i n the healthy c i t y 
or the reformed c i t y , as being wholly governed by e x t e r n a l agency: i n the 
healthy c i t y i t i s guided and c o n t r o l l e d by nature; i n the reformed c i t y , 
where i t coexists w i t h s o c i e t y ' s two other needs, from the knowledge of the 
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r u l e r s . Where m a t e r i a l or economic l i f e has moved beyond the bonds of 
n a t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n (Cf n 22 supra) i t s ends, i n Plato's view, are l i m i t e d 
n e i t h e r by knowledge (Cf n 24 supra) nor by nature alone. The moral 
ignorance which thus ensues and which sees m a t e r i a l ends as men's only 
ends i s marked by an immoralist i n d i v i d u a l i s m (Cf n 20 supra) t h a t i s 
f o r e i g n both to the p r i m i t i v e c i t y and to the reformed community. The 
sentiment of common o r i g i n , along w i t h men's acceptance of the d i v i s i o n 
i n t o classes which the myth promotes, t h e r e f o r e l i n k s the reformed and the 
p r i m i t i v e communities together. There, what e x i s t e d by nature - the 
p r i n c i p l e of the d i v i s i o n of labour - i s restored i n the form of the class 
d i s t i n c t i o n s and by way of the knowledge of moral ends which permit the 
f u l f i l m e n t of society's two other needs: the p a t r i o t i c and the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
needs. I t i s as i f the i d e a l community had i t s e l f grown n a t u r a l l y from 
the p r i m i t i v e community i n which P l a t o sees the seeds of i t s growth. I t 
would seem, then, to be Plato's i m p l i c i t hope t h a t the myth, promoting as 
i t does the c i t i z e n s ' acceptance of the p r i n c i p l e of the d i v i s i o n of labour, 
would come to be regarded by them as d e s c r i b i n g t h e n a t u r a l course of the 
society's e v o l u t i o n (416D). But we must admit t h a t the myth of brotherhood 
assumes and cannot obviate the p u r g a t i o n of s o c i e t y ' s m a t e r i a l excesses. 
Along w i t h t h i s , i t assumes the i n t r o d u c t i o n of r i g i d class d i v i s i o n s t h a t 
had not e x i s t e d b efore. These are needed, i n Plato's view, to ensure the 
r e a l i z a t i o n of n a t u r a l ends which h i s t o r y w i l l not of i t s e l f ensure. 
P l a t o had founded the l i f e of the p r i m i t i v e community on conceivable 
h i s t o r i c a l grounds (p 204 snpra). I t s growth to excess was also conceived 
as h i s t o r i c a l l y i n e v i t a b l e . I n h i s t o r y ' s course, Plato saw loss of 
a f f i l i a t i o n among men; he saw t h i s loss e x e m p l i f i e d i n S o p h i s t i c theories 
of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l l i f e , t h eories t h a t assumed that i n d i v i d u a l i s m 
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and f e a r , as opposed t o mutual need and cooperation, formed the e s s e n t i a l 
grounds f o r men's p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e . The myth of brotherhood e x e m p l i f i e s 
cooperation and mutual need. I t t h e r e f o r e r e f l e c t s a q u a l i t y t h a t i s found 
i n society's e a r l i e s t s t a t e and whose loss P l a t o abjures. But there i s an 
important and obvious respect i n which the myth has no l i n k w i t h h i s t o r y : 
i t assumes class d i v i s i o n s and the c o n t r o l and guidance of economic need 
by moral knowledge. The sense of a f f i l i t a t i o n t h a t the myth aims a t promot-
ing t h e r e f o r e assumes a r i g i d class h i e r a r c h y which a f f i l i a t i o n , and not 
fea r , u n d e r l i e s . We have already noted (p 202 supra) t h a t P l a t o sees 
economic need as the m a t e r i a l basis on which philosophic or t y r a n n i c a l eros 
must r e s t . We sai d ( I b i d . ) t h a t t h i s conception i s of p a r t i c u l a r importance 
to our understanding of the d i s t i n c t i o n he makes between fe a r and the need 
society's members have of one another. We have now seen t h a t the myth of 
brotherhood w i t h which Plato wishes to j u s t i f y the class d i v i s i o n s t o the 
c i t i z e n s aims at promoting a f f i l i a t i o n among them. The c i t i z e n s , indeed, 
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are to b e l i e v e t h a t the e v o l u t i o n of the three classes i s n a t u r a l . Here 
we should emphasize t h a t t h i s b e l i e f would have an important l i n k w i t h 
f a c t u a l h i s t o r y on Plato's view of i t : the c i t i z e n s ' b e l i e f marks t h e i r 
acceptance of the statement Socrates makes at 373B,D t h a t m a t e r i a l p u r s u i t s 
must not exceed the l i m i t s of necessity i n s t a t e s . And i t i s t r u e of the 
2 6 . > T ' • ' » •» ' ' " N 
t h a t the best educated c i t i z e n s - the philosophers - would cease to b e l i e v e 
the myth. But they w i l l b e l i e v e i t i n t h e i r youth (414D). I f , as he 
wishes, the myth d i d become a p a r t of the community's customary b e l i e f , 
then i t should at l e a s t r e f l e c t and not conceal ends of which the philosopher 
r u l e r s w i l l have knowledge. Here, the end i n question i s cooperation, a 
c o n d i t i o n which Sophistic t h i n k e r s had seen as concealing the f a c t s of 
human nature (Cf on ii^&ttUt (-£0^*1/0? : Ch 11 p 13? ) , but which P l a t o 
sees as t r u e to nature and as e x h i b i t e d among h i s three classes as also i n 
the work of the pa r t s of the s o u l . 
f at jt*«/» £ ru> wpZtc** ft!/ *.Jcc»s 
rtV *AA^i/ r*Af'- 414D. Plato i m p l i e s (414C) 
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p r i m i t i v e or healthy c i t y t h a t nature indeed ( i f only f o r a time) h e l d 
society's m a t e r i a l or economic capacity w i t h i n the l i m i t s of necessary wants. 
Given the r e s t o r a t i o n of t h i s n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n through the agency 
of moral.knowledge P l a t o b e l i e v e s t h a t society's two other needs could be 
r e a l i z e d . That w i l l mean t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c and not t y r a n n i c a l eros would 
grow from society's m a t e r i a l base. With these matters i n mind, what f u r t h e r 
statements should we make about Plato's conceptions of fea r and a f f i l i a t i o n 
i n respect of the bearing t h a t these have on the reformed society's o r i g i n ? 
We may answer t h i s question by f i r s t p o i n t i n g out t h a t Adeimantus 
has i m p l i e d what P l a t o w i l l l a t e r confirm" (573 f f . ) , th a t f e a r i s the 
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t y r a n t ' s companion. On the S o p h i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of j u s t i c e , i t i s fear 
t h a t leads men to i t s p r a c t i c e i n the f i r s t place. But i t s p r a c t i c e , f a r 
from e l i m i n a t i n g f e a r , i s r e a l l y a dec e i t which the prudent man converts 
to h i s advantage; the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e had r e a l l y meant b e n e f i t i n g the 
power stronger than y o u r s e l f and i n j u r i n g the weak, were t h a t consonant w i t h 
28 
serving the strong. F i n a l l y , the t y r a n t , perhaps paradoxically,was the 
29 
man who had the greatest cause f o r f e a r (Cf. n 27). We observed i n Ch ^Ll 
that P l a t o supplies the formula ' b e n e f i t i n g friends,harming enemies' 
(being gentle to f r i e n d s and f i e r c e t o enemies: 375C) to the guardians' 
a t t i t u d e i n t h e i r work. We s h a l l now consider f u r t h e r h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of 
t h i s stock n o t i o n to h i s own p r o j e c t e d reforms. I n doing t h i s , we s h a l l 
develop h i s conception of autarky^, or independence, to which we have already 
27 
28 
29 
Republic 365B: 
Cf nn. 20, 21 supra and n. 7 Ch 1. 
N. 17 p 71 Ch 11. 
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b r i e f l y r e f e r r e d i n connection w i t h m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y (p 204 supra). 
Our consideration of these matters w i l l complete our treatment of Plato's 
conception of o r i g i n s , w h i l e i t w i l l also serve as a bridge toward our f i n a l 
treatment of Plato's a p p l i c a t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of eros t o p o l i t i c a l 
consent. 
At Republic 369B Socrates r e f e r s t o autarky i n the sense of m a t e r i a l 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . What he there condemns as an end (370A) i s the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
quest f o r m a t e r i a l independence from others. ( L a t e r , a t 387D, he r e f e r s 
w i t h approval to a man's independence from others. But there, he i s speaking 
of independence i n the sense of moral steadfastness - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
face of death. There, the a u t a r k i c man i s one whose moral outlook w i l l be 
less dependent than t h a t of most on purely m a t e r i a l concerns, and when 
Socrates says t h a t the a u t a r k i c man has l e a s t need of anybody else he means, 
i n the s p e c i f i c context of the passage , t h a t the independent man, the good man 
tyij/t)/ . . . ijytj'irirc+i. ' 387D) w i l l be less concerned than others a t the loss to 
him of a f r i e n d ' s p h y s i c a l person. I m p l i c i t l y , then, the f r i e n d ' s t r u e 
value does not cease w i t h h i s death. (Cf. p 72 f . ) . Therefore, a t 369B 
autarky r e f e r s to economic independence - the m a t e r i a l independence of 
i n d i v i d u a l s from one another. P l a t o disapproves of t h i s . At 387D he speaks 
of the moral s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y of the good man, the man who does not b e l i e v e 
t h a t a l l values end i n m a t e r i a l wants. Here, P l a t o approves of independence. 
He praises a man's steadfastness i n the face of death, h i s b e l i e f t h a t death 
i s not a t e r r i b l e t h i n g ( Q J kkivev '• I b i d . ) . We should observe t h a t between 
h i s two references to autarky P l a t o has begun h i s discussion of the guardian 
c l a s s , and t h a t h i s approval of moral constancy (387D) c e r t a i n l y has s p e c i a l 
reference to that class (387C). Economic dependence of men upon one another, 
which once e x i s t e d n a t u r a l l y , has now been r e s t o r e d ; the economic f a c t o r , 
once unable to exceed l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by nature, i s now once again 
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e x t e r n a l l y c o n t r o l l e d . Plato's approval of autarky at 387D does not 
ther e f o r e a b o l i s h , but r a t h e r supplements the sense of autarky - m a t e r i a l 
independence - which he c r i t i c i z e s a t 370A. 
The question might be asked: could P l a t o , at 387D, be speaking about 
constancy among a l l h i s c i t i z e n s ? The moral constancy of which he speaks 
there i s preparatory to the independence of the s e l f - r u l e d man whose growth 
toward independence i s a main purpose of the i d e a l s t a t e to achieve. Moral 
independence could not, i n Plato's view, have e x i s t e d i n the p r i m i t i v e c i t y ; 
f o r t h e r e , a man's goodness could only have been determined from e x t e r n a l 
l i m i t a t i o n s to m a t e r i a l power together w i t h h i s response to e s t a b l i s h e d moral 
custom. The independence of which Socrates speaks at 387D w i l l e x i s t only 
i n germ, i n the form of courage, i n the guardian young. (The moral independ-
ence which P l a t o wishes to develop i n some of h i s c i t i z e n s has no precedent 
i n h i s view except i n the phenomenon of Socrates. Cf. Adam's note on 387D 
25, p 133 Vol. 1 ) . Their courage, since they are not themselves s e l f - r u l e d 
men must, l i k e the a p p e t i t e of the t h i r d c l a s s , be su b j e c t to e x t e r n a l 
c o n t r o l ; i t too must be subject to moral custom. But the p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t y 
of which P l a t o speaks at 387D i s the courage of men upon whose lack of f e a r 
the s t a t e ' s s u r v i v a l - at l e a s t i t s p h y s i c a l s u r v i v a l - depends. Their 
freedom from f e a r , t h e i r courage, i s v i t a l to the p r o t e c t i v e f u n c t i o n they 
serve. I f t h i s q u a l i t y e x i s t e d i n any of those whom they r u l e d and pro t e c t e d 
i t would have to be o t i o s e , since the c i t y ' s s u r v i v a l does not depend on 
freedom from f e a r e x i s t i n g i n t h i s class. The freedom from f e a r of which 
Plato speaks cannot, on h i s view, e x i s t i n the t h i r d class membership. I f 
i t d i d , then the q u a l i t y of moral independence would also e x i s t a t l e a s t i n 
germ i n t h i s class as w e l l as i n the guardian class. This cannot be so, f o r 
Plato holds t h a t m a t e r i a l l i f e i n a morally good s o c i e t y i s always subject 
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to e x t e r n a l order: e i t h e r an order imposed by nature and immemorial custom, 
or an order imposed by knowledge and a revived custom. Conceivably, we may 
d i v i d e h i s c i t i z e n s i n t o those i n whom moral courage i s e s s e n t i a l , since i t 
i s a stage (a dependent stage) i n the growth toward s e l f - r u l e or moral 
independence ( I n others, courage i s a p a t r i o t i c end i n i t s e l f . ) ; and those 
i n whom the q u a l i t y i s i n e s s e n t i a l and not t o be found. I f i t could be 
found i n them P l a t o could not, on h i s own terms of the d i s t i n c t i o n he makes 
between knowledge and customary b e l i e f , make any f a i r d i s t i n c t i o n between 
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the m a t e r i a l need and the honour l o v i n g and i n t e l l e c t u a l needs. 
The q u a l i t y of courage, then, which leads t o moral independence, does 
not characterize the t h i r d class membership. I t i s yet tr u e on our account 
of Plato's thought t h a t f e a r i s not the t h i r d class's dominant motive i n 
obeying the laws. Nor can we imagine t h a t they are moved to the p r a c t i c e 
of j u s t i c e through d e c e i t . What f u r t h e r references, i n a d d i t i o n to the myth 
of brotherhood, can we make to the Republic t e x t to show t h a t t h i s i s so? 
We have seen that P l a t o abjures one form of independence, m a t e r i a l s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y , and sanctions another, moral s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . We s h a l l best 
understand h i s use of the stock n o t i o n , t h a t j u s t i c e consists i n h e l p i n g 
f r i e n d s and harming enemies, with"reference to t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . I n doing 
t h i s we s h a l l determine how the i m p o r t a t i o n of t h i s concept i n t o the customary 
b e l i e f of the reformed s t a t e a f f e c t s the t h i r d class's a t t i t u d e to the 
r u l e r s . When t h i s i s done we s h a l l have completed our discussion of fe a r 
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Plato's d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and b e l i e f was perhaps i n s u f f i c i e n t l y 
n o t i c e d by Demos, "Paradoxes i n Plato's Doctrine of the I d e a l S t a t e " , C.Q., 
N.S. V I I pp 164 f f . I f , as Demos holds, the r u l e r s ' p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
i s d i r e c t e d only a t the c i t y ' s outward regimen (p 171) w h i l e the subject i s 
l e f t " f u l l a u t h o r i t y to fashion the inner c i t y " ( I b i d . ) then, i t seemed to 
Demos, the subject should be ( p o t e n t i a l l y , a t any rate?) as complete and 
j u s t a man as the r u l e r . But i f t h a t i s so, why can he not q u a l i f y as 
ru l e r ? 
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as i t r e l a t e s t o p o l i t i c a l consent. 
30 (continued from p 212) 
I f the r u l e r s ' s p e c i a l i z e d or p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n p e r t a i n s only to governing 
the s t a t e , w h i l e reason, other than i n i t s non-specialized sense, i s spread 
among a l l c i t i z e n s , i t seems t o me t h a t t h i s f a c t i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r 
the claim Demos makes t h a t non-rulers are as complete men as r u l e r s . I f 
they were as complete then, presumably, philosophers would have no need to 
mould the c i t i z e n s ' characters i n conformity w i t h t h e i r knowledge (Republic 
501B) . We are maint a i n i n g t h a t w h i l e the subjects consent t r u l y , and w h i l e 
reason r u l e s t h e i r souls and w h i l e they are inwardly j u s t men, they cannot 
be t r u l y j u s t (p 180); f o r t h e i r response t o the r u l e r s ' regimen l i e s i n the 
conformity of t h e i r b e l i e f to the r u l e r s ' knowledge. This means t h a t the 
subjects' being j u s t men i s wh o l l y dependent on the r u l e r s ' knowledge. The 
f a c t t h a t reason r u l e s t h e i r souls i s not then s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e i r possess-
i n g , even p o t e n t i a l l y , the moral independence Socrates discusses a t 387C,D. 
(Cf. Demos on 'courage', p 172.). I f i t were s u f f i c i e n t , then P l a t o has 
none but completely a r b i t r a r y grounds f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between r u l e r and 
subject. F i n a l l y , the t h i r d class c i t i z e n may have courage of a k i n d (Cf 
Demos I b i d . ) . But i t cannot be the k i n d of courage t h a t leads to moral 
independence, o r , t h a t i s , t o the k i n d of Socratic freedom from fear of 
m a t e r i a l loss t o which P l a t o r e f e r s a t 387D. Only i f a man had knowledge 
could he have freedom from t h i s f e a r . 
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I t i s u s e f u l t o i n d i c a t e a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t i n h i s discussion of 
autarky i n P l a t o , Popper t e l l s us t h a t the reference a t 387D 11 i s one of 
the few s c a t t e r e d passages i n the Republic reminiscent of Socr a t i c teaching; 
. . .". The d o c t r i n e r e f e r r e d to i s t h a t of moral s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . He 
f u r t h e r says ( I b i d . ) t h a t 387D d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t s the Republic's main 
d o c t r i n e . I n saying t h i s , he p o i n t s t o 369B,C f f . where Plato's discussion 
of dependence t y p i f i e s as against Socrates, the main d r i f t ot the Republic's 
argument. But s u r e l y no c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s t o be seen between the two passages 
(Cf. p 210 f . supra). I t would be more c o r r e c t to say t h a t P l a t o b e l i e v e s 
t h a t the r e a l i z a t i o n or r e s t o r a t i o n of m a t e r i a l dependence i s a necessary 
c o n d i t i o n of the achievement of the moral independence discussed at 387D. 
The r e s t o r a t i o n of m a t e r i a l dependence comes i n the form of the e x t e r n a l 
c o n t r o l of soc i e t y ' s economic or m a t e r i a l f a c t o r . The class which f u l f i l s 
i t s need i n m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t y i s dependent on the guardians f o r p r o t e c t i o n . 
They, i n t u r n , are dependent on the t h i r d class f o r 'necessary' sustenance. 
I t i s t h i s conception, r a t h e r than a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n Plato's t h i n k i n g , 
which l i e s behind the " s p i r i t u a l n a t u r a l i s m " which, i n Popper's view, 
marks h i s thought. Cf OSE n. 25 to Ch V, p 240; Ch V, pp 75-79. 
What Popper detests ( h i s t e x t , I b i d . ) i s the p o l i t i c a l cleavage P l a t o 
makes between those whom he sees as ( c a t e g o r i c a l l y ) dependent - the t h i r d 
c l a s s , and those who are not - the promising young and the r u l e r s . Socrates 
would seem to have f e l t t h a t moral s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y was a t t a i n a b l e by any 
man (p 106 supra). Yet he does not seem to have f e l t t h a t he was m a t e r i a l l y 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . At Apology 36D,E he says, i f somewhat f a c e t i o u s l y , t h a t a 
s t a t e benefactor such as himself should receive a grant of f r e e meals from 
the s t a t e he b e n e f i t e d ! I s there not something here of the cleavage P l a t o 
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As Adelmantus had rehearsed the r e l i g i o u s and customary l o r e which 
r e s u l t e d by i t s e v o l u t i o n i n t o secular form i n the Sophistic theory of 
j u s t i c e (Cf. p 136 supra), so i t i s w i t h him t h a t Socrates discusses the 
reformed community's primary education (377-411). The education i n music 
and gynmastic w i l l , Socrates hopes (416B), be proof against the guardians' 
becoming b r u t a l , to the t h i r d class's detriment, and against t h e i r e x e r c i s i n g 
violence from t h e i r p o s i t i o n of greater s t r e n g t h ( I b i d . ) . P l a t o shows a 
tendency i n Book 111 to regard as enemies h o s t i l e forces e x t e r n a l to the 
s t a t e , to regard the classes w i t h i n the s t a t e as f r i e n d s : we observe at 
414B an i m p l i c i t tendency to regard the a u x i l i a r i e s - the s t a t e ' s ' s p i r i t ' -
as f r i e n d s of the people, the s t a t e ' s ' a p p e t i t e ' . This i m p l i c a t i o n i s 
confirmed at 463B. Thus, sophrosune i n soul and s t a t e are not wholly 
analogous. While Socrates w i l l say i n h i s discussion of the s o u l t h a t 
' s p i r i t ' never makes common cause w i t h ' a p p e t i t e ' , w h i l e he w i l l emphasize 
tha t ' s p i r i t ' i s always 'reaon's' a l l y , we should n o t i c e h i s i n s i s t e n c e i n 
respect of the society's e x t e r n a l j u s t i c e - the r e l a t i o n s among the classes-
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t h a t the a u x i l i a r i e s w i l l be f r i e n d s both t o the r u l e r s and t o the people. 
The p o i n t s we have r a i s e d here w i l l be our main p o i n t s of reference i n 
regard to Plato's theory of independence (autarky) and the r e l a t i o n s among 
the classes. 
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makes between moral dependency (Athens) and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y (Socrates)? 
P l a t o p o l i t i c i z e s S o c r a t i c personalism, and there he disagrees w i t h 
Socrates t h a t moral s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i s a t t a i n a b l e by any man. But he does 
not c o n t r a d i c t Socrates i n supposing t h a t there i s a d i f f e r e n c e between 
m a t e r i a l dependency and moral independence. 
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P l a t o i m p l i e s i n Book 111 (416A,B) t h a t so long as ignorance d i d not 
dominate the r u l e r s ' souls the a u x i l i a r i e s must always be helpers and not 
enemies of the poeple. The meaning of 'helping' or of 'being an a l l y t o 1 
i s broader i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to the s t a t e than to the s o u l where, P l a t o 
i n s i s t s , we never f i n d ' s p i r i t ' making common cause w i t h ' a p p e t i t e ' . 
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The primary education has, as a major aim, the e l i m i n a t i o n of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f t h a t gods are complaisant to entreaty. With the e l i m i n -
a t i o n of t h i s b e l i e f , the n o t i o n that j u s t i c e i s another's good and one's own 
l o s s , w i l l have no place i n the s o c i e t y (392B) . The poets w i l l not be allowed 
to u t t e r i t ( I b i d . ) . The guardians must be constant i n t h e i r sense of 
f r i e n d s h i p f o r one another (387C,D, 386A) and toward t h i s o b j e c t a l l poetry 
t h a t suggests the complaisance of gods t o i n j u s t i c e or t h e i r changeableness 
w i l l not be allowed. What p a r t w i l l the t h i r d class have i n t h i s education? 
The question i s imp o r t a n t , f o r we want to know what i s i m p l i e d by the presence 
of sophrosune i n t h i s class. We do know t h a t i t i s not t h e i r nature to be 
mora l l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . Moreover, i t i s apparent t h a t P l a t o regards the 
a c t i v e e l i m i n a t i o n of fea r as necessary to s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y : the e a r l y 
education i s to be a time of t e s t i n g (412E - 414B) ; understandably, absence 
of f e a r i n those who guard and r u l e w i l l be a d i f f e r e n t matter from i t s 
absence i n those who do not go to war and whose p r i n c i p a l need i s m a t e r i a l 
s e c u r i t y . Let us say, i n the hope of proving i t , t h a t Plato wishes h i s 
t h i r d class t o be f r e e from f e a r i n the passive sense t h a t no cause f o r i t 
w i l l be placed before them. A guardian must be brought before f e a r t o 
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(Cf. p 185 and n. 7 supra). The two cases of sophrosune - i t s existence 
i n soul and s t a t e - are not wh o l l y analogous because ' a p p e t i t e ' i s the soul's 
i r r a t i o n a l f a c t o r , w h i l e the t h i r d class membership i s r u l e d by 'reason' 
(which conforms to the r u l e r s ' reason) i n t h e i r souls. The f a c t t h a t the 
a u x i l i a r i e s w i l l help the people t h e r e f o r e allows f o r r e c i p r o c i t y among the 
three classes of the s t a t e (Cf n. 31), r a t h e r than between only two f a c t o r s 
as i n the soul . The two cases would seem to be analogous, though, i n t h a t 
i n the event t h a t ignorance {Jxro <?*«>/U(ri/t# 7 Ai/»»«7 "if UJOS Zklov Axx»5) 
d i d n o t dominate the r u l e r s ' s o u l s , the a u x i l i a r i e s would a i d them i n 
de s p o i l i n g the people (416A,B): Plato i s saying t h a t should unrest come i t 
must come from above - from f a i l u r e of reason i n the r u l e r s ' souls; he 
i m p l i e s , on analogy w i t h the d o c t r i n e of the s o u l , t h a t unrest would not 
come from c o l l u s i o n (Cf. £911/<4rti/c*. ; 440B) between a u x i l i a r i e s and t h i r d 
c l a s s . This note provides a t l e a s t a p a r t i a l answer to ob j e c t i o n s t o Plato's 
class d i v i s i o n s r a i s e d i n Adam's note on 416B 9 (p 198 Vol. 1.). 
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develop both the courage t h a t t h i n k s l i t t l e of m a t e r i a l l oss and the sense 
of f r i e n d s h i p which does not aim a t m a t e r i a l advantage or independence 
(Cf. on 387D. p 210 supra). I t i s toward these ends t h a t P l a t o emphasizes 
t h a t the e a r l y education must induce comradeship among the guardians. We 
have observed h i s s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t the guardians w i l l also be f r i e n d s of 
the people (p 214 ,15 ) . But we have noted now a temperamental d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the guardians' sophrosune and the t h i r d class's. Our assessment 
of the f r i e n d s h i p of the two classes depends on our being able to define the 
d i s t i n c t i o n e x a c t l y . Toward t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n we may f i r s t consider the 
poss i b l e e f f e c t of the musical education upon the t h i r d class membership. 
When we have done t h i s we s h a l l be i n a p o s i t i o n to assess how Plato sees 
the education of the t h i r d class as complementing the r e s t o r a t i o n both of 
the m a t e r i a l dependence and of the f r i e n d s h i p t h a t w i l l mark the l i f e of the 
reformed s o c i e t y . We s h a l l make t h i s assessment i n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of 
the chapter. 
The education of the t h i r d class presents d i f f i c u l t problems of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . We can only deal here w i t h those matters t h a t t e l l us some-
t h i n g about the t h i r d c l ass membership's a t t i t u d e of mind. We may begin by 
drawing a t t e n t i o n to a p o i n t we made e a r l i e r . I n Plato's view, i f ambition 
f o r p o l i t i c a l power i s not an end coincident w i t h the a c q u i s i t i o n of 
wealth, then those who f u l f i l t h e i r own end (together w i t h the s t a t e ' s 
m a t e r i a l needs) by economic a c t i v i t y can be temperate (Cf. n. 15 and t e x t , 
p 198) . The separation of the p u r s u i t of m a t e r i a l ends from the exercise 
of p o l i t i c a l power i s of f i r s t importance to P l a t o . The moral l a x i t y or 
ignorance (of KfA+irtAj) of which Socrates speaks a t 416A f . would a r i s e from 
f a i l u r e of good education i n the guardians (. . ., (t ct* e'rcc K^Xtvf 
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Vfff ^ i J w ^ w t ; ;416B) . Such f a i l u r e must b l i n d them t o the f u n c t i o n 
of r u l i n g and guardianship which they would understand to end i n the 
a c q u i s i t i o n of wealth (. . . ,rtf*c<wr< ye- > • • • ov /Pf/ett<rc vols ' 415E). 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e i n the union of power and wealth t h a t P l a t o sees the r i s e 
of tyranny and the complete loss of temperance (Cf n. 32). But economic 
a c t i v i t y can embody temperance so long as those who engage i n i t n e i t h e r 
have nor desire p o l i t i c a l power. These presuppositions r e s u l t i n the f a c t 
t h a t w h i l e the whole of Plato's s o c i e t y w i l l be m a t e r i a l l y dependent ( t h e 
two upper classes, f o r sustenance; the lowest c l a s s , f o r s e c u r i t y ) , only 
one c l a s s , the r u l e r s , i s morally s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . The p o i n t s rehearsed i n 
t h i s paragraph are e s s e n t i a l t o our understanding of the i n f l u e n c e upon the 
t h i r d class of the s t a t e ' s e a r l y education. 
We have cha r a c t e r i z e d the a c t i v i t y of the t h i r d class as economic 
a c t i v i t y . But i t i s not e x c l u s i v e l y so. Numbers of Plato's craftsmen w i l l 
be poets and a r t i s t s . The s t a t e ' s m a t e r i a l goods, which the t h i r d class w i l l 
supply, are not a l l 'necessary' goods. Indeed, many of these goods - those 
produced by craftsmen i n a r t and poetry - w i l l have a c r u c i a l moral i n f l u e n c e 
upon the guardian young. The p o i n t i s s t r o n g l y made at 401B f f . , a s e c t i o n 
of the Republic t h a t has important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r our understanding of 
the t h i r d class. The s e c t i o n shows, as does no other i n the Republic, t h a t 
the t h i r d class p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the musical education. I t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
must be more than i n c i d e n t a l , f o r at l e a s t a r t i s t s and poets c o n t r i b u t e 
p o s i t i v e l y to the education. We should devote some a t t e n t i o n to t h i s f a c t . 
While doing so we s h a l l r e c a l l t h a t a major q u a l i t y which the e a r l y education 
begins t o i n s t i l - moral courage - i s unnecessary i n the t h i r d class member-
ship (pp 211, 212 and n 30), f o r i t i s not i n t h e i r nature to be morally 
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s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . We are arguing, r a t h e r , t h a t they w i l l be f r e e from f e a r ; 
but t h i s freedom i s passive, i t i s not a c t i v e l y acquired. Their freedom 
involves n e i t h e r t e s t i n g f o r constancy of b e l i e f i n the face of psychological 
grounds t o change one's mind (413 C), nor t e s t i n g f o r gross f e a r alone 
( I b i d . ; 413D,E. Cf. 467D- 468A). Plato t h e r e f o r e seems to see the i n f l u e n c e 
of music upon them as an inducement t o a passive, not an a c t i v e , d i s p o s i t i o n 
to v i r t u e . At the same time, gymnastic w i l l have no apparent i n f l u e n c e at 
a l l . We may note a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t the quoted s e c t i o n we are about to 
discuss involves Plato's conception of the movement of eros toward philosophy's 
ends (403B). The passage t h e r e f o r e b r i n g s t o our a t t e n t i o n h i s conception of 
eros as i t r e l a t e s t o the classes of the s t a t e . 
Socrates t e l l s us th a t only those craftsmen (and poets) w i l l be permitted 
to p r a c t i s e t h e i r a r t who, by n a t u r a l s k i l l (f*<( Vwl '• 401C) , can tra c k out 
the nature of beauty and elegant form ( f i / a - j L t f y p u e i : I b i d . ) . His a t t r i b u t i o n 
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of t h e i r a b i l i t y to n a t u r a l s k i l l r a i s e s the ques t i o n i n what way P l a t o under-
stands t h a t a craftsman w i l l acquire h i s s k i l l . C e r t a i n l y , those, whether 
poets or a r t i s a n s , who cannot impose the image of good character (c^p . . . 
cats trot^tpArw : 401B) upon t h e i r work w i l l be forbidden ( tUutwAvce-n,) 
from p r a c t i s i n g t h e i r a r t i n the community. Indeed, the r u l e r s must superin-
tend the craftsmen and compel them i n these matters. I s Plato's statement, 
here, i n the form of a general i n j u n c t i o n to the craftsmen or i s he saying 
Shorey gives "happy g i f t of nature" f o r <ru<( ; Lindsay, "happy 
g i f t " ; Cornford, " i n s t i n c t " . These renderings seem to me to give the 
r i g h t sense. Davies' and Vaughn's "by the power of genius", Jowett's 
" g i f t e d to discern the true nature of the b e a u t i f u l and g r a c e f u l " , seem 
excessive. Cf. Lees, whose rendering also seems excessive. 
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they w i l l be d i r e c t l y supervised? When seen i n conjunction w i t h what he 
has c a l l e d the n a t u r a l s k i l l of given a r t i s t s to do good work, h i s statement 
suggests t h a t i n h i s view a r t i s t s w i t h d e s i r a b l e a b i l i t y w i l l grow up 
spontaneously and be able to f o l l o w the r u l e r s ' canons i n t h e i r work. Their 
conception of the moral good of t h e i r work, then, though by i t they make a 
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c r u c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n , w i l l be as i n s e n s i b l e (Shorey, Archer-Hind ) or as 
f a r removed from knwoledge (fiii <i9»s • • • k*»$*V{f ' 401D) as w i l l be i t s 
r e c e p t i o n by those t h a t i t a f f e c t s , the guardian young. Later i n the 
Republic (467A) Plato's a t t i t u d e to craftsmen would seem to f i l l out the 
view expressed about t h e i r t a l e n t s at 401B,C: the guardians' education w i l l 
be supervised d i r e c t l y by the r u l e r s , w h i l e craftsmen w i l l l e a r n by 
apprenticeship to t h e i r parents. P l a t o , then, seems to concede some measure 
to chance i n a craftsman's a c q u i s i t i o n of des i r a b l e s k i l l , w h i l e he implies 
( I b i d . ) t h a t the r u l e r s must concede no such l a t i t u d e i n the guardians' 
education^' H fov £-«(-/t/0fs • • XJtJf C»\/ J/6fC**v, 6 f f ,tt'y . 
While good craftsmen, w i t h t h e i r i n s e n s i b l e a b i l i t y , seem to be on the same 
'musical' f o o t i n g as those f o r whom t h e i r f i n e works are made, P l a t o would 
seem to hold t h a t the r u l e r s ' s u p e r v i s i o n of the craftsmen can be v i c a r i o u s , 
w h i l e supervision of the young of the r u l i n g classes must be d i r e c t . The 
craftsmen's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the education, w h i l e t h e r e f o r e r e a l , i s i n d i r e c t . 
Archer-Hind, 0p_. C i t . p 154. 
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At 467A Socrates i s speaking about craftsmen g e n e r a l l y . At 401B f f . , 
one could almost t h i n k t h a t he i s making a s p e c i a l case of craftsmen i n f i n e 
a r t . But there i s no reason why what he says there does not apply t o c r a f t s -
men i n general. This i s s u r e l y suggested by h i s statement a t Republic 434A 
t h a t i t i s of l i t t l e account whether members of the t h i r d class exchange 
t h e i r occupations. That a t l e a s t i n d i c a t e s t h a t P l a t o cannot, w i t h o u t g i v i n g 
more explanation than he does, see any degree of d i f f e r e n c e i n the value t o 
so c i e t y of the exercises of one pro f e s s i o n among the t h i r d class membership 
over any other i n t h a t class. So long as occupations t h a t end i n m a t e r i a l 
products do not cease to be dependent f o r t h e i r value on e x t e r n a l l y imposed 
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A c r a f t s m a n can do no more, i n P l a t o ' s v i e w , t h a n e x e m p l i f y m o r a l and 
a e s t h e t i c canons i n m a t e r i a l f o r m by means o f n a t u r a l o r i n s t i n c t u a l s k i l l . 
He does n o t have knowledge o f t h e canons he obeys. 
The i n s t i n c t f o r good, when p r e s e n t i n a r t i s t s , has grown up spontaneous-
l y . T h e i r i n s t i n c t i v e response t o what i s f a i r and t o e l e g a n t f o r m i s 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e m o r a l dependence w h i c h P l a t o b e l i e v e s must mark the 
t h i r d c l a s s , f o r the a r t i s t s respond by n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n t o e x t e r n a l 
d i r e c t i v e s w h i c h e s t a b l i s h m o r a l canons w i t h i n w h i c h t h e y must work. So 
l o n g as a r t i s t s and p o e t s remain w i t h i n these canons t h e work t h e y do must 
i n f l u e n c e p o s i t i v e l y t h e g u a r d i a n young f o r whom i t i s i n t e n d e d . W h i l e , t h e n , 
t h e t h i r d c l a s s membership i s dependent, t h e m a t e r i a l sphere w i t h i n w h i c h i t s 
members w o r k , i s o f p o s i t i v e v a l u e t o t h e s o c i e t y ' s w e l l - b e i n g . We have s a i d 
t h a t P l a t o w o u l d seem t o concede some measure t o chance i n t h e c r a f t s m a n ' s 
a c q u i s i t i o n o f h i s s k i l l s . B u t o b v i o u s l y , he w o u l d remove as many o f t h e 
causes t h a t i n d u c e bad work as c o u l d be removed. The c r a f t s m a n ' s i n s t i n c t , 
so f a r as i t can g i v e no account o f t h e p r o d u c t s i t produces, has no f i r m e r 
g u a r a n t e e o f c o n s i s t e n c y t h a n has r i g h t b e l i e f i n m o r a l a c t i o n . The r u l e r s 
must be v i g i l a n t i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r canons i f maximum good, and no e v i l , 
i s t o come o f m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n s . B u t t h e t e s t s and inducements t o s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y t h a t are necessary i n the g u a r d i a n s ' e d u c a t i o n ( p 217) a r e o f 
no use i n t h e l i v e s o f t h o s e whose i m p u l s e s f o r good can be no more t h a n 
i n s t i n c t i v e . T h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t y , s i n c e i t cannot become s e l f - o r d e r i n g , 
w o u l d be t o o g i v e n , i f l e f t t o i t s e l f , t o t h e v a g a r i e s o f chance n o t t o be 
c o n s t a n t l y s u b j e c t , f o r i t s c o n t i n u e d p r o d u c t i o n o f good, t o e x t e r n a l canons. 
I t i s under the i n f l u e n c e o f such d i r e c t i o n t h a t t he c r a f t s m e n ' s i n s t i n c t i v e 
35 ( c o n t i n u e d f r o m page 
o r d e r s , t h o s e who f u l f i l m a t e r i a l ends can exchange t h e i r o c c u p a t i o n s 
w i t h o u t i n j u r y t o t h e s t a t e . 
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spontaneous a b i l i t i e s w o u l d grow. L e f t e n t i r e l y t o chance, t h e r e c o u l d be 
36 
no g u a r a n t e e o f t h e i r c o n t i n u e d u s e f u l n e s s . 
We have shown w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e c r a f t s m e n i n a r t s t h a t t h e i n f l u e n c e 
o f music upon t h e t h i r d c l a s s i s r e a l , f o r t h e c r a f t s m e n a r e a b l e by 
i n s t i n c t i v e response t o m o r a l and a e s t h e t i c good t o f u l f i l t h e r u l e r s ' canons 
on t h i s s u b j e c t . For t h i s r e a s o n , t h e y a r e a b l e t o make a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i -
b u t i o n t o the community's l i f e . We s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h i s f a c t when we complete 
our s t u d y o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e eros d o c t r i n e upon P l a t o ' s p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y . 
What i s t r u e o f t h e c r a f t s m e n i n a r t i s a l s o t r u e o f o t h e r members o f t h e 
t h i r d c l a s s ( n . 3 5 ) . W i t h t h e c r a f t s m e n ' s i n s t i n c t i v e a b i l i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e 
t o t h e s o c i e t y ' s needs we must a s s o c i a t e t h e i r p a s s i v e tendency t o w a r d v i r t u e . 
We s h a l l r e c a l l t h a t we see i n t h i s tendency t h e main b a s i s o f d i s t i n c t i o n 
between t h e g u a r d i a n s ' sophrosune and t h a t o f t h e t h i r d c l a s s ( p 216 ) : 
we a r e m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t w h i l e b o t h c l a s s e s w i l l be f r e e f r o m f e a r , t h e t h i r d 
c l a s s w i l l have no cause f o r i t and t h e g u a r d i a n s w i l l overcome i t ( I b i d . ) . 
We have now seen t h a t t h e m u s i c a l e d u c a t i o n p e n e t r a t e s t o t h e t h i r d c l a s s . 
Owing t o t h i s , t h e members o f t h i s c l a s s s h o u l d be a b l e , as i n w a r d l y j u s t 
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men , t o i m p a r t b e n e f i t t o t h e s o c i e t y t o w h i c h t h e y b e l o n g . T h e i r 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e m u s i c a l e d u c a t i o n s u r e l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e y share i n 
P l a t o seems t o a n t i c i p a t e some degree o f d e t e r i o r a t i o n (Sc«&ltf'oVfvo*) 
i n t h e c r a f t s m e n when he sa y s , a t 421A, t h a t such d e t e r i o r a t i o n as d i d t a k e 
p l a c e w o u l d cause no i n j u r y t o t h e s t a t e so l o n g as i t d i d n o t t a k e p l a c e 
among g u a r d i a n s . We m i g h t t a k e him t o mean t h a t t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f d e t e r i o r -
a t i o n c o u l d be e x p e c t e d i n p r o p o r t i o n as a c r a f t s m a n ' s ( o r any o t h e r s u b j e c t ' s ) 
a b i l i t i e s were i n s t i n c t i v e and n o t c a p a b l e o f becoming s e l f - o r d e r e d and t h a t 
we w o u l d h e r e f i n d t h e c h i e f s o u r c e o f r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t t h e l a w s . B u t i t i s 
n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r w h e t h e r , i n f a c t , P l a t o does mean t h i s . R i g h t o p i n i o n , 
w h i l e i t i s i n s t i n c t i v e , s h o u l d be a c o n s t a n t g u a r a n t e e o f w i l l i n g obedience 
among t h e t h i r d c l a s s g i v e n , o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e i r r i g h t o p i n i o n i s en-
gendered by e x t e r n a l r u l e . See f u r t h e r , pp 253 f f . and n 54 i n f r a . 
3 7 Cf. pp 187, 198 su p r a . 
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r i g h t b e l i e f . L e t us r e t u r n , t h e n , t o P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e f r i e n d s h i p 
t h a t e x i s t s between the g u a r d i a n s and t h e p e o p l e o f t h e community. T h i s 
c o n c e p t i o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h what we have s a i d a bout t h e t h i r d c l a s s ' s p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n i n t h e p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n , w i l l complete our s t u d y o f t h e t h i r d c l a s s ' s 
p a s s i v e response t o the p o l i t i c a l o r d e r o f t h e community. 
P l a t o can o n l y suppose t h a t t h e t h i r d c l a s s i s i n w a r d l y j u s t i f he 
m a i n t a i n s t h a t f e a r o f t h e g u a r d i a n s w i l l n o t c h a r a c t e r i z e t h i s c l a s s ' s 
a t t i t u d e o f mind i n t h e i r p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i c e . H i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e t h i r d 
c l a s s as b e i n g i n c l u d e d i n the r e s t o r a t i o n t o s o c i e t y o f m a t e r i a l dependence 
and o f t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f m u t u a l needs i n d i c a t e s t h a t he does n o t b e l i e v e 
t h a t f e a r t y p i f i e s t h e b e l i e f s o f t h a t c l a s s ' s members. These c o n c l u s i o n s 
a r e i n d i c a t e d by P l a t o ' s a p p l i c a t i o n t o h i s s o c i e t y o f t h e s t o c k p h r a s e 
' g e n t l e t o f r i e n d s , f i e r c e t o enemies': by ' f r i e n d s ' he i n t e n d s those who a r e 
and those who are n o t m o r a l l y dependent, t h e r u l e r s and s u b j e c t s o f t h e 
s t a t e ; w h i l e 'enemies' must u s u a l l y mean e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s o r s , i t may a l s o 
i n d i c a t e r e b e l l i o u s f o r c e s w i t h i n the s t a t e . We s h o u l d c o n s i d e r the p l a c e s 
i n P l a t o ' s t e x t where t h e s t o c k phrase and t h e n o t i o n b e h i n d i t demonstrate 
h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s among h i s c l a s s e s . We s h a l l want t o c o n s i d e r 
414B, 415E, 417AB. A l s o , we s h o u l d c o n s i d e r 412CD, 463B, and 464AD. A 
s u c c i n c t a p p r a i s a l o f t h e s e passages w i l l c omplete our s t u d y o f t h e p a s s i v e 
c h a r a c t e r o f the t h i r d c l a s s and w i l l c o n f i r m o u r v i e w t h a t f e a r does n o t 
c h a r a c t e r i z e i t s members' p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i c e . We s h a l l d e a l w i t h t h e t h r e e 
l a t t e r passages more f u l l y i n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n o f t h e c h a p t e r . 
The community's o r i g i n e n t a i l s t h e r e s t o r a t i o n t o s o c i e t y o f t h e 
m a t e r i a l dependence w h i c h P l a t o c o n c e i v e s as once h a v i n g e x i s t e d n a t u r a l l y 
(pp 204 f f . ) . F r i e n d s h i p , and n o t f e a r ( • I b i d . ) . had been t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
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m o t i v e i n men's p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i c e u n t i l , w i t h g r o w t h i n m a t e r i a l power, 
they had come t o see m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y as a good ( I b i d . ) . T o g e t h e r 
w i t h t h i s , t h e y had come t o b e l i e v e t h a t f e a r was men's m o t i v e i n the 
p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i c e (pp 202, 209 ) . E l i m i n a t i o n o f f e a r s h o u l d t h e n come 
w i t h t he r e s t o r a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l dependence, s i n c e m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t y w o u l d 
once more be e x t e r n a l l y c o n t r o l l e d - now by knowledge r a t h e r t han b y 
n a t u r e . A l s o , t h e r e s t o r a t i o n s h o u l d have p r o v i d e d a m a t e r i a l b a s i s f o r 
the g r o w t h o f p h i l o s o p h i c eros ( C f . pp 202 , 208 , 209 ) • Toward e s t a b l i s h -
i n g these two i d e a s we have c o n s i d e r e d t h e myth o f b r o t h e r h o o d , n o t i n g i t s 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h J P l a t o ' s v i e w o f f a c t u a l h i s t o r y ( 208 ) ; we have m a i n t a i n e d 
t h a t t h e t h i r d c l a s s responds p a s s i v e l y t o t h e regime, t h a t f e a r i s n o t 
p l a c e d b e f o r e t h i s c l a s s ( p 215) ; we have c o n s i d e r e d t h e i r share i n t h e 
p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n and we have suggested t h a t P l a t o sees i t s e f f e c t on them 
as an inducement t o a p a s s i v e d i s p o s i t i o n t o v i r t u e ( p 2 1 8 ) . Our examin-
a t i o n o f t h e R e p u b l i c s e c t i o n s q u o t e d above w i l l c o n f i r m t h a t f r i e n d s h i p , 
and n o t f e a r , c h a r a c t e r i z e s the r e l a t i o n between t h e t h i r d c l a s s and t h e 
g u a r d i a n s . I t w i l l a l s o e s t a b l i s h , as f a r as i s p o s s i b l e , t h e c o n n e c t i o n we 
want between P l a t o ' s concept o f o r i g i n s and eros (pp 206 , 2 1 0 ) . 
The presence o f f r i e n d s h i p a t 414B i s c l e a r l y seen t o i n v o l v e t h r e e 
c l a s s e s ( C f . n. 32 supra) and we have n o t e d t h a t t h e passage conveys t h e 
i d e a o f r e c i p r o c i t y ( I b i d . Cf. p 1 9 0 ) . I f t h e n o t i o n o f r e c i p r o c a l h e l p 
i s more t h a n an i s o l a t e d i d e a , i t ought t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t 
S o c r a t e s makes a t 415E where he says, upon c o m p l e t i n g h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e 
myth, t h a t t h e g u a r d i a n young o r a u x i l i a r i e s w i l l have t h e t a s k o f s u p p r e s s i n g 
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r e b e l l i o n w i t h i n t h e s t a t e and o f r e p e l l i n g a g g r e s s i o n f r o m o u t s i d e . We 
ccs 
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b r i e f l y r e f e r r e d t o t h i s s t a t e m e n t i n Ch 111 (p 176 ) as b e i n g a s t a t e m e n t 
t h a t c o u l d a l l u d e t o v i o l e n t o r i g i n s . The a l l u s i o n w o u l d be p e r t i n e n t t o t h e 
s u b j e c t s ' c o n s e n t i n an o n - g o i n g s o c i e t y i n p r o p o r t i o n as t h e s t a t e m e n t 
r e f l e c t e d a c o n t i n u o u s c o n d i t i o n o f h o s t i l i t y - a s t a t e o f f e a r - between 
s u b j e c t and r u l i n g c l a s s e s . What grounds do we have f o r r e j e c t i n g t h e view 
t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t c o n t a i n s t h i s i m p l i c a t i o n ? F i r s t , we s h a l l r e c a l l P l a t o ' s 
b e l i e f t h a t s h o u l d u n r e s t a r i s e i n t h e s t a t e , t h e a u x i l i a r i e s w i l l always 
a s s i s t t h e r u l e r s ( n . 3 2 ) . A l s o , i n t h e e v e n t t h a t 'reason' s h o u l d f a i l 
i n t h e r u l e r s , t h e y w i l l cease t o know t h e i r own good and w i l l suppose t h a t i t 
l i e s i n w e a l t h . ( C f . 415E - 16A and 417B). B u t i t i s p l a i n t h a t t h e s t a t e 
c o u l d n o t s u r v i v e s h o u l d t h e r u l e r s become thus i g n o r a n t (417AB). I t i s a l s o 
p l a i n t h a t where the r u l e r s a r e i g n o r a n t o f t h e i r own good, f e a r dominates 
b o t h them and t h e s u b j e c t s ( I b i d . ) . I n t h e passages under r e v i e w P l a t o devotes 
h i s main a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f e a r and h o s t i l i t y w h i c h he supposes must a r i s e when 
the r u l e r s s h o u l d see w e a l t h as t h e i r end ( C f . p 216 ) . What, t h e n , a r e we 
t o say about r e b e l l i o n among t h e s u b j e c t s w h i c h P l a t o m e n t i o n s a t 415E? 
We s h o u l d f i r s t observe t h a t t h e r e b e l l i o n he t h e r e speaks o f w o u l d n o t 
be f a t a l t o t h e s t a t e ' s s u r v i v a l . What i s f a t a l t o i t s s u r v i v a l i s f a i l u r e 
o f ' r e a s o n ' i n the r u l e r s . The u n r e s t P l a t o speaks o f a t 415E t h e r e f o r e has 
a d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e . I t i s a f o r m o f u n r e s t t h a t w o u l d n o t i n j u r e t h e s t a t e 
and w h i c h w o u l d a r i s e among s u b j e c t s . Since t h e a u x i l i a r i e s n e v er make common 
cause w i t h t h e t h i r d c l a s s a g a i n s t t h e r u l e r s ( n . 3 2 ) , we know t h a t P l a t o i s 
here s p e a k i n g o f r e b e l l i o n among the t h i r d c l a s s . We have s a i d t h a t P l a t o 
a l l o w s f o r a degree o f d e t e r i o r a t i o n among the t h i r d c l a s s membership ( n . 3 6 ) . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a t 415E he i s t h i n k i n g o f t h i s as a cause o f r e b e l l i o n . 
(See, however, n. 54 i n f r a . ) The passage does n o t suggest however t h a t 
a n y t h i n g l i k e a c o n t i n u o u s s t a t e o f f e a r o r h o s t i l i t y c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e 
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r e l a t i o n s between r u l e r s and p e o p l e . Moreover, P l a t o i s n o t t h e r e t h i n k i n g 
o f t he t h i r d c l a s s as a whole. H i s language s u g g e s t s t h a t he i s t h i n k i n g 
o f i n d i v i d u a l s who r e b e l , n o t o f a whole c l a s s t h a t r e b e l s ( C f . n. 3 8 ) . He 
i s a d m i t t i n g t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be r e b e l l i o n among some i n d i v i d u a l s f r o m t i m e 
t o t i m e . P l a t o does speak o f t h e s u b j e c t s as a whole a t 414B where he says 
t h a t t h e l a t t e r w i l l n o t w i s h t o work harm a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e (. . . Of 
j"f faAy^w • ' ' tU-OJpffrlt > • • • ) • C ould he mean by t h i s t h a t t h e 
s u b j e c t s w i l l be u n w i l l i n g t o d i s o b e y the r u l e r s f r o m f e a r ? I f t h a t were 
P l a t o ' s mind t h e n t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l dependence w h i c h t h e regime 
b r i n g s c o u l d n o t e n t a i l t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f f e a r as a dominant m o t i v e i n t h e 
p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , no c l e a r meaning c o u l d a t t a c h t o P l a t o ' s 
s t a t e m e n t ( I b i d . ) t h a t r u l e r s and p e o p l e a r e f r i e n d s . I n v i e w o f these f a c t s , 
the r e c a l c i t r a n c e P l a t o m e n t i o n s a t 415E does n o t c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e s u b j e c t s 
g e n e r a l l y . S h o u l d t h e r e be r e c a l c i t r a n c e among the t h i r d c l a s s membership 
i t must come f r o m i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n t h e c l a s s , b u t n o t f r o m t h e c l a s s as a 
who l e . T h i s i s what we must t a k e P l a t o t o mean a t 415E. The r u l e r s w i t h t h e 
h e l p o f t h e a u x i l i a r i e s w o u l d suppress r e b e l l i o n when i t a r o s e . B ut r e b e l l i o u s -
ness does n o t c h a r a c t e r i z e as a w h o l e t h e c l a s s i n w h i c h i t w o u l d a r i s e . I f 
we r e a d 414B w i t h 415E we see t h a t w h i l e f r i e n d s h i p c o u l d be d i s r u p t e d 
between the r u l e r s and some o f t h e t h i r d c l a s s i t i s y e t t h e dominant 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w h i c h marks r e l a t i o n s between t h e c l a s s e s . We s h o u l d make 
f u r t h e r m e n t i o n , a t t h i s p o i n t , o f Popper's view o f R e p u b l i c 415E (OSE p 2 2 6 ) . 
The c o n t i n u i t y o f o u r t e x t w i l l remain c l e a r e r i f we c o n f i n e what we w i s h t o 
say t o a n o t e . 
We cannot r a i s e a l l o f Popper's p o i n t s h e r e , b u t t h e f o l l o w i n g remarks 
s h o u l d be made. F i r s t , t h e r e i s a problem o f sequence a t 415E. Popper was 
( c o n t i n u e d on page 226) 
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a b l e t o make ample use o f t h i s . The t r a n s i t i o n f r o m S o c r a t e s ' c o m p l e t i o n o f 
the myth t o t h e g u a r d i a n s ' e n t r y i n t o t h e c i t y i s sudden. S o c r a t e s has a l s o 
a d m i t t e d t h a t i t w o u l d r e q u i r e a t l e a s t one g e n e r a t i o n b e f o r e t h e c i t i z e n s 
b e l i e v e d t h e myth (414D). Thus we have a p r o b l e m i n sequence o f e v e n t s . 
The p r o b l em p o i n t s t o p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f v i o l e n c e i n the community's o r i g i n , 
t o d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t r a n s i t i o n f r o m p r e s e n t t o f u t u r e . W h i l e we a d m i t t h i s , 
i t i s q u i t e c l e a r f r o m P l a t o ' s t e x t t h a t t h e myth emphasizes t h e c i t i z e n s ' 
common o r i g i n (p 206 f . s u p r a ) ; and w h i l e i t s acceptance by a l l o f them 
assumes t h a t some f o r m o f p u r g a t i o n has t a k e n p l a c e ( p 2 s u p r a ) , i t i s by 
no means c l e a r t h a t t h e p u r g i n g f o r c e came f r o m o u t s i d e the s t a t e . S o c r a t e s 
d e c l a r e s q u i t e a b r u p t l y t h a t we s h o u l d arm these sons o f the e a r t h ( Zoucovi 
tairf fyyt*6?t'- 415E) . Popper's t r a n s l a t i o n i s n o t a c c u r a t e . He r e f e r s t o 
" t h e e a r t h b o r n " and t e l l s us t h a t t h e y are one r a c e who conquer a s e d e n t a r y 
p o p u l a t i o n . He t r a n s l a t e s the Greek as i f P l a t o c l e a r l y had n o t meant 
those men among the c i t i z e n s who a r e t o be a r arms, b u t r a t h e r , a s i n g l e 
c o n q u e r i n g war h o r d e . ( C f . J.A. F a r i s , " I s P l a t o ' s a Caste S t a t e , Based on 
R a c i a l D i f f e r e n c e s ? " , CQ, XLIV, 1950, pp 3 8 - 43, a t p 42.) But P l a t o ' s 
language c l e a r l y p o i n t s t o t h e g u a r d i a n s o f t h e myth. I t i n no way s u g g e s t s 
t h a t those whom he w i l l arm are o f a l i e n o r i g i n . 
The myth d e s c r i b e s common o r i g i n s . The g u a r d i a n s ' e n t r y i n t o t h e c i t y 
i s n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s . What 415E does show i s t h a t r e c a l c i t r a n c e 
among the t h i r d c l a s s membership i s p o s s i b l e . We have d e a l t w i t h t h i s i n 
the t e x t above. F u r t h e r m o r e , a t 415E P l a t o does have something s p e c i f i c 
t o say about f o r e i g n a g g r e s s i o n . But i t h a r d l y c o n f i r m s Popper's t h e s i s . 
Should an a l i e n f o r c e come i t w i l l be as a w o l f coming a g a i n s t t h e f o l d . 
A t 416AB P l a t o uses t h e metaphor o f t h e w o l f t h a t p r e y s upon the f o l d and 
the dog t h a t p r o t e c t s i t . Here, r u l e r s and a u x i l i a r i e s who d e s p o i l t h e 
pe o p l e a re l i k e n e d t o w o l v e s Op*u*9^i/n. . ) . P l a t o seems t o be 
i m p l y i n g t h a t s h o u l d t h e r u l e r s become i g n o r a n t o f t h e i r own ends t h e i r 
r u l e w i l l a p p r o x i m a t e t h a t o f a l i e n a g g r e s s o r s . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
n o t i m p r o b a b l e ; f o r a t 4J.6B, P l a t o t e l l s us t h a t the r u l e r s must take 
e v e r y p r e c a u t i o n ( ^ i/^HC^ffV iTdvCi TfiofC** ) a g a i n s t t h e a u x i l i a r i e s becoming 
f e r o c i o u s m a s t e r s i n s t e a d o f b e n e v o l e n t a l l i e s . I n terms o f h i s metaphor, 
the a u x i l i a r i e s must be l i k e dogs ( a s s i s t a n t s o r a l l i e s : S ^ / / y t > i ^ v ) , n o t 
wolves o r f i e r c e ( a l i e n ? ) masters {$t<rvoc4ti ofypt'ou ) . I n any case, 
P l a t o i s c l e a r l y c o n t r a s t i n g t h o s e who a s s i s t the weaker and who are t h e i r 
f r i e n d s w i t h w o l v e s who a r e enemies - even a l i e n enemies. The i n j u n c t i o n 
a t 416C t h a t g u a r d i a n s must be ' g e n t l e t o f r i e n d s ' i m p l i e s , i n t h e c o n t e x t , 
t h a t 'enemies' w o u l d e i t h e r be f o r e i g n a g g r e s s o r s o r t h a t t h e y w o uld be l i k e . 
f o r e i g n a g g r e s s o r s . Our t h e s i s t h a t P l a t o h e r e l i k e n s i g n o r a n c e i n r u l e r s 
t o t h e f e r o c i t y o f a l i e n c o n q u e r o r s i s a t e m p t i n g one i n view o f Popper's 
t h e s i s t h a t t h e i d e a l community i t s e l f o r i g i n a t e s i n conquest• 
We have s a i d t h a t t h e myth i m p l i e s p u r g a t i o n and p o s s i b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s 
o f t r a n s i t i o n . But i t s dominant theme i s t h e c i t i z e n s ' common o r i g i n and 
t h e i r a f f i l i a t i o n . Our v i e w o f the myth i s b o r n e o u t by P l a t o ' s t e x t . Our 
vie w i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f r e f o r m as t h e r e s t o r a t i o n 
t o a s o c i e t y o f m u t u a l dependence among i t s p e o p l e . The n o t i o n o f o r i g i n 
by conquest i s n o t c l e a r l y b orne out by 415E. Nor does t h a t n o t i o n have 
any c l e a r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h P l a t o ' s concept o f r e s t o r a t i o n . 
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I n n o t e 39 we r e a f f i r m e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f v i o l e n t means t o the 
community's o r i g i n . B u t o u r d i s c u s s i o n o f 415E has a l s o g i v e n us grounds 
f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t P l a t o does n o t see f e a r as c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e t h i r d 
c l a s s ' s c o n t i n u e d c o n s e n t . We need now t o make o u r l a s t remarks about 
t h e i r p a s s i v e n a t u r e and t h e i r absence o f f e a r : we need f i n a l c o n f i r m a t i o n 
t h a t w h i l e t h i s c l a s s ' s members f u l f i l t h e i r ends i n m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t y t h e y 
a r e , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , i n w a r d l y j u s t and consent t r u l y t o the community's 
laws. To complete these m a t t e r s we need t o c o n s i d e r more f u l l y what i s 
i m p l i e d by r e c i p r o c i t y among t h e c l a s s e s . I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s m a t t e r we 
s h a l l r e c a l l t he a s s o c i a t i o n we have made between t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l 
dependence and t h e g r o w t h o f p h i l o s o p h i c e r o s (p 223) . 
A t R e p u b l i c 412CD S o c r a t e s proposes t h a t t h e b e s t g u a r d i a n s a r e those 
i i 
t h a t w o u l d be most r e g a r d f u l o f the s t a t e ( f>vkd.i(<u/CtLC0<>s Veltts) • H i s 
s t a t e m e n t e n t a i l s h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e m a t e r i a l dependence o f the c l a s s e s 
and t h e m u t u a l o r r e c i p r o c a l a i d they f u r n i s h one a n o t h e r . Here, and a t 
464D, we mark P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f c o o p e r a t i o n . H i s developed n o t i o n o f 
c o o p e r a t i o n o r m u t u a l dependence proceeds f r o m r e l a t i o n s among c l a s s e s , n o t 
i n d i v i d u a l s . He f i r s t p u t h i s b e l i e f t h a t m u t u a l need and n o t f e a r i s t h e 
e s s e n t i a l ground o f j u s t i c e when he d i s c u s s e d the h e a l t h y o r p r i m i t i v e c i t y . 
Though t h e c o o p e r a t i o n we see t h e r e i s among i n d i v i d u a l s ( 3 7 0 D ) , t h e s o c i e t y ' s 
members b e l o n g t o one c l a s s , f o r t h e y engage i n one f o r m o f a c t i v i t y -
economic o r m a t e r i a l l y p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y . The r e s t o r a t i o n b o t h o f m a t e r i a l 
and m o r a l dependence, i n P l a t o ' s v i e w , e n t a i l e d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f two new 
c l a s s e s - a u x i l i a r i e s and p h i l o s o p h e r r u l e r s . The i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e 
g u a r d i a n c l a s s i s d i s c r e t e ; f o r though i t s presence ensures t h e a t t a i n m e n t 
o f n a t u r a l ends, a s o c i e t y ' s a t t a i n m e n t o f these ends i s n o t gua r a n t e e d by 
h i s t o r y ( Cf. p 207 s u p r a ) . I n P l a t o ' s v i e w , h i s t o r y i s w i t n e s s t o the 
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g r o w t h o f independence as d e s c r i b e d a t 370A where we see independence i n 
t h e f o r m o f m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . The t h e o r y o f c o o p e r a t i o n he p u t s 
a t 412CD and 464D d i s p l a c e s i n d i v i d u a l i s m ( 3 7 0 A ) . I t s e t s i n i t s p l a c e a 
t h e o r y o f c o o p e r a t i o n among c l a s s e s . I t assumes t h a t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n 
o f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e i n g happy i s t h a t he b e l o n g t o t h e c l a s s a p p r o p r i a t e 
t o h i s n a t u r e . 
I s t h i s a l s o a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n ? For t h e s e l f - r u l e d man ( t h e 
p h i l o s o p h e r ) , occupancy o f a p l a c e w i t h i n t h e g u a r d i a n c l a s s i s a t l e a s t a 
n e c e s s a r y means t o h a p p i n e s s . Since no o t h e r c i t i z e n has a l i f e b e t t e r 
t h a n t h e p o l i t i c a l l i f e ( 5 2 0 A ) , i t w o u l d seem f o r the r e s t o f P l a t o ' s 
c i t i z e n s t h a t b e l o n g i n g t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c l a s s ( a u x i l i a r y c l a s s o r economic 
c l a s s ) , t o g e t h e r w i t h b e i n g t e m p e r a t e , w o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t f o r h a p p i n e s s . 
S i n c e , t h e n , t h e i r l i v e s a r e completed w i t h i n the c l a s s t h e y b e l o n g t o , and 
s i n c e t h a t denotes t h a t t h e i r l i v e s b e g i n and end i n membership o f a p o l i t i c a l 
community, we can o n l y speak o f t h e i r h a p p i n e s s as b e i n g r e a l i z e d by t h e i r 
occupancy o f the c l a s s e s t o w h i c h t h e y b e l o n g . They have no ' h i g h e r ' h a p p i n e s s . 
For them, moreover, h a p p i n e s s e n t a i l s t h e i r s u b m i s s i o n t o e x t e r n a l r u l e . We 
s h a l l d e a l a g a i n w i t h t h e s e m a t t e r s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n o f t h e c h a p t e r . 
For now l e t us observe t h a t t e x t u a l grounds f o r P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n s o f c l a s s e s 
and i n d i v i d u a l h a p p i n e s s a r e s u p p l i e d by h i s d o c t r i n e t h a t s h o u l d 'reason' 
0 
f a i l i n t h e r u l e r s , f e a r must t h e n dominate s o c i e t y . When t h a t happens a l l 
men see t h e i r ends r e s t i n g i n m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y , i n power t o g e t h e r w i t h 
w e a l t h . I t i s P l a t o ' s o b j e c t t o p e r f e c t t h e m a t e r i a l need, a n a t u r a l end 
f o r most c i t i z e n s . B u t t h i s r e q u i r e s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f two o t h e r c l a s s e s 
whose needs he assumes t o be n a t u r a l . H i s s t a t e m e n t s about t h e s o c i e t y ' s 
h a p p i n e s s a t 420B, 519A can have no meaning i f n o t premised on h i s b e l i e f 
t h a t t h e r e a r e n a t u r a l c l a s s e s o f men and t h a t t h e I n d i v i d u a l ' s h a p p i n e s s 
40 
depends on h i s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e r i g h t c l a s s . 
A t R e p u b l i c 412CD S o c r a t e s r e f e r s t o t h e g u a r d i a n s ' a t t i t u d e t o t h e 
b e n e f i t t h e y d e r i v e f r o m membership o f t h e community: t h e y w i l l b e l i e v e t h a t 
41 
when t h e i r s o c i e t y p r o s p e r s , t h e y t o o w i l l p r o s p e r . The n o t i o n o f conc e r n 
i 
f o r o r r e g a r d f o r o t h e r s {MfCftCC ) t h a t we observe h e r e t h e r e f o r e e n t a i l s 
t h e achievement by t h e g u a r d i a n s o f t h e i r own need. Here a l s o , the t e s t i n g 
o f t h e g u a r d i a n ' s sense o f p a t r i o t i s m i s i m p l i c i t i n t h e p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e i r 
need ( C f , 413A f f . ) . A g u a r d i a n ' s l o v e o f t h a t w h i c h b e n e f i t s h im i s 
t h e r e f o r e complemented by h i s m o r a l courage, o r h i s a c t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n t o 
v i r t u e ( C f . p 217 s u p r a ) . I t i s s p e c i f i e d by myth o f b r o t h e r h o o d t h a t t h e 
t h i r d c l a s s r e c i p r o c a t e s t h e g u a r d i a n s ' f r i e n d s h i p . T h i s i s emphasized 
40 
W h i l e i n the p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t y t h e r e was o n l y one c l a s s - t h e economic 
c l a s s - P l a t o a p p l i e s t h e concept o f one-man-one-job as r e a d i l y t o t h a t 
s o c i e t y as t o h i s r e f o r m e d s o c i e t y (Cf 423D). I n the f o r m e r , c o o p e r a t i o n 
c o u l d o n l y be among i n d i v i d u a l s . But t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s a l r e a d y b e l o n g t o 
one o f P l a t o ' s c l a s s e s . They b e l o n g t o one c l a s s i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y 
have a common end, m a t e r i a l f u l f i l m e n t , and t h e y cannot l i v e beyond 
necessary means. The presence o f t h e two o t h e r c l a s s e s i s n e c e s s a r y t o 
t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f P l a t o ' s d o c t r i n e o f t h e s o u l . B ut P l a t o i s a l s o d e a l i n g 
w i t h an h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r ; f o r these c l a s s e s cannot a r i s e w i t h o u t t h e 
p r i o r g r o w t h o f power and w e a l t h . ( C f . Merriman, I b i d . ) . U n t i l s o c i e t y i s 
purged o f t h e s e , t h e v i r t u e s o f courage and wisdom and t h e c l a s s e s i n 
w h i c h these a r e f o u n d cannot b e g i n t o e v o l v e w i t h any success. They cannot 
e v o l v e f r o m t h e h e a l t h y c i t y because, i n d e e d , i t e f f e c t i v e l y l a c k s these 
v i r t u e s . A t any r a t e , i t cannot p r e v e n t t h e g r o w t h t o excess. The h e a l t h y 
c i t y must f i r s t become a f e v e r e d c i t y where men a r e n o t d i v i d e d i n t o 
n a t u r a l c l a s s e s b u t a r b i t r a r i l y ( i n P l a t o ' s v i e w ) by w e a l t h and p o v e r t y . 
41 
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a g a i n a t 463B. I t i s i m p l i e d a t 420B t h a t t h e t h i r d c l a s s w i l l be happy. 
T h e r e f o r e , t h e i r sense o f a f f i l i a t i o n a l s o e n t a i l s t h e achievement by them 
o f t h e i r p e c u l i a r need. But t h e i r a t t i t u d e o f mind cannot be marked by 
m o r a l courage. T h e r e f o r e , r e c i p r o c i t y o f f e e l i n g among t h e c l a s s e s i s 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d b o t h by m o r a l dependence and by t h e courage t h a t l e a d s t o 
m o r a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . The a t t i t u d e o f mind p r e p a r a t o r y t o t h e l a t t e r i s 
d e s c r i b e d by S o c r a t e s a t 464D. The d e s c r i p t i o n he g i v e s t h e r e o f t h e 
g u a r d i a n s ' sense o f p a t r i o t i s m i s t o be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e sense o f i n d i v i d -
u a l i s m , o r m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , he d e s c r i b e s a t 370A. P l a t o ' s 
c o n c e p t i o n o f the i m p a r t i n g o f b e n e f i t and o f t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f ends w h i c h 
we have observed h e r e i n g e n e r a l terms p o i n t s t o t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f o u r s t u d y 
o f t h e temperamental d i s t i n c t i o n between g u a r d i a n s and t h i r d c l a s s . ( C f . pp 
216, 221 s u p r a ) . I t a l s o b r i n g s t o g e t h e r t h e d o c t r i n e s o f sophrosune and 
e r o s . We s h a l l b e g i n t h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e c h a p t e r by c o m p l e t i n g what we need 
t o say about R e p u b l i c 463B - 464D. 
P l a t o ' s concept o f f r i e n d s h i p i n v o l v e s t h e r e q u i t a l o f good w i l l and 
the a t t a i n m e n t o f m u t u a l i n t e r e s t s . H i s c o n c e p t i o n as expressed a t 412CD 
and 463B i n v o l v e s good w i l l among c l a s s e s , w h i l e t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s h a p p i n e s s 
depends on h i s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c l a s s . We s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d 
R e p u b l i c 464D as i m p l y i n g f u r t h e r c r i t i c i s m o f t h e n o t i o n o f m a t e r i a l s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y S o c r a t e s r e j e c t s a t 370A. I t i s a l s o an a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h a t 
n o t i o n . We s h a l l d i s c u s s t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e b e l ow. R e p u b l i c 463B complements 
the concept o f f r i e n d s h i p among t h e c l a s s e s w h i c h S o c r a t e s d i s c u s s e s a t 414B. 
R e p u b l i c 464D c o u n t e r s t h e n o t i o n o f m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y and t h e sense 
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o f m a t e r i a l egoism (.tr^i-ffv^t'j) t h a t accompanies i t . B o t h s e c t i o n s s t r o n g l y 
emphasize P l a t o ' s concept o f t h e o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f the s t a t e (462C f f . ) . I t 
i s i n t h i s o r g a n i c c o n c e p t i o n t h a t we f i n d t h e main i n f l u e n c e o f t h e eros 
d o c t r i n e , i t s i n f l u e n c e upon s o c i a l c o h e s i o n . We have seen t h a t t he t r a n s i t i o n 
f r o m p r e s e n t t o r e f o r m e d s o c i e t y c o u l d n o t be smooth even i f i t was P l a t o ' s 
hope t h a t subsequent g e n e r a t i o n s o f c i t i z e n s s h o u l d b e l i e v e t h a t t h e i r 
o r i g i n was n a t u r a l . Though t h e community c o u l d n o t have e v o l v e d f r o m an 
e a r l i e r s o c i e t y , i t w o u l d y e t r e f l e c t and r e s t o r e a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f an 
e a r l i e r t i m e : t h e m a t e r i a l dependence o f men upon one a n o t h e r and hence 
t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p . W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e l a t t e r , we have y e t t o assess P l a t o ' s 
n o t i o n o f the e d u c a t i o n o f t h e t h i r d c l a s s ( C f . p 216 s u p r a ) . Here, we have 
g i v e n grounds f o r a c c e p t i n g t h a t t h e t h i r d c l a s s p a r t i c i p a t e s p a s s i v e l y i n 
the p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n (pp 216-221 s u p r a ) . A l s o , we have emphasized t h a t f e a r 
does n o t g e n e r a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e i t s members' consen t t o l a w . B o t h t h e s e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , absence o f f e a r i n the t h i r d c l a s s and i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
t h e e a r l y e d u c a t i o n e n t a i l t h e eros d o c t r i n e . We s h a l l p r e s e n t l y assess t h e 
e d u c a t i o n o f t h e t h i r d c l a s s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s d o c t r i n e . 
The c o n d i t i o n s o f m a t e r i a l dependence and f r i e n d s h i p must be p r e s e n t 
i f e r o s i s t o t a k e the course P l a t o wants i t t o t a k e . R e p u b l i c 463B-464D 
has i t s g r e a t e s t i n t e r e s t f o r us a t t h i s p o i n t . We see t h e r e t h a t community 
o f p r o p e r t y among t h e g u a r d i a n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f u r n i s h i n g o f wages and 
sustenance (^rttof/eicj C6 KJU Cf^t*s- 463B. Cf 464C) by t h e t h i r d c l a s s 
p r o v i d e t h e m a t e r i a l b a s i s f o r t h e community's s u r v i v a l and f o r a f f i l i a t i o n 
among i t s c l a s s e s . So f a r as t h a t i s t r u e , t h e y p r o v i d e t h e m a t e r i a l b a s i s 
f r o m w h i c h p h i l o s o p h i c e r o s can grow. The community o f w i v e s and c h i l d r e n 
and t h e common owne r s h i p o f p r o p e r t y a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e c o n d i t i o n s o f 
f r i e n d s h i p between g u a r d i a n s and p e o p l e (464AB, 464D. Cf 417AB). The 
communism o f t h e r u l i n g and a u x i l i a r y c l a s s i s , S o c r a t e s s a y s , t h e cause o f 
common f e e l i n g among a l l c i t i z e n s (463E, 464A). Expressed i n a n o t h e r way, 
S o c r a t e s i s s a y i n g t h a t i f we p r o h i b i t g u a r d i a n s f r o m p o s s e s s i n g p e r s o n a l , 
m a t e r i a l w e a l t h , we t h e n s e p a r a t e the e x e r c i s e o f power and i t s ends f r o m 
t h e d e s i r e f o r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y ; t h e l a t t e r becomes d e s i r e f o r s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y and w e a l t h when i t ceases t o be e x t e r n a l l y governed, o r , i n the 
case o f t h e r u l e r s o f t h e i d e a l s t a t e , when they s h o u l d become i g n o r a n t o f 
t h e i r own end. The d e s i r e f o r s e c u r i t y , t h e n , must n o t be p r i m a r y among 
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those who e x e r c i s e power. S i n c e communism i s n o t a p p l i e d t o t h e t h i r d 
c l a s s membership, i t must be P l a t o ' s b e l i e f t h a t t h i s same d e s i r e i s p r i m a r y 
among them. T h i s i s w h o l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s b e l i e f t h a t o n l y among t h e 
g u a r d i a n c l a s s i s t h e a c t i v e e l i m i n a t i o n o f f e a r n e c e s s a r y t o a man's b e i n g 
j u s t . A g a i n , the l a c k o f f a m i l y a t t a c h m e n t among t h e g u a r d i a n s w o u l d t e n d , 
i n P l a t o ' s v i e w , t o w a r d d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s i n a g u a r d i a n ' s sense o f r e g a r d 
f o r o t h e r s . Lack o f f a m i l y a f f i l i a t i o n , i n h i s v i e w , w i l l promote t h e 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d courage he d e s i r e s i n t h e g u a r d i a n c l a s s . P l a t o b e l i e v e s t h a t 
i n p r o p o r t i o n as a young g u a r d i a n o r an a u x i l i a r y sees h i s own ends as un-
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s a t i s f i e d i n m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y o r i n p e r s o n a l a f f i l i a t i o n , w o u l d h i s r e g a r d 
f o r o t h e r s be t h e l e s s r o o t e d i n m a t e r i a l m o t i v e o r , t h a t i s , i n the d e s i r e 
P l a t o o u t l i n e s t h e s o c i e t y ' s m i l i t a r y p o l i c y a t 422D-23A. I t i s 
a p o l i c y o f d i v i d e and conquer, o f t a k i n g advantage o f w e a l t h and p o v e r t y 
i n o t h e r s t a t e s when t h i s w o u l d be good p o l i c y f o r t h e i d e a l s t a t e ' s 
s u r v i v a l . T h i s p o l i c y w i l l be n e c e s s a r y , S o c r a t e s s a y s , f o r a s t a t e 
whose armed f o r c e w i l l be r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l . I n these passages he speaks 
o n l y o f e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s , and t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t m i l i t a r i s m , 
o r power f o r i t s own sake, c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e g u a r d i a n s ' r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
t h o s e wbm th e y p r o t e c t . 
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We mean by p e r s o n a l ' a f f i l i a t i o n , a f f i l i a t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f 
m a t e r i a l f u l f i l m e n t o r m a t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l o n e . 
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f o r s e c u r i t y and p o s s e s s i o n o f e x t e r n a l goods. I n d e e d , t h e i r e d u c a t i o n 
45 must, i f i t i s t o be e f f e c t i v e , w h o l l y e l i m i n a t e t h i s m o t i v e f o r s e c t i o n . 
None o f t h i s t y p i f i e s t h e t h i r d c l a s s membership. But we have s a i d 
t h a t i t s members a r e n o t g e n e r a l l y t y p i f i e d by t h e m o t i v e o f f e a r , t h e 
m o t i v e w h i c h the S o p h i s t s b e l i e v e d t o be common t o a l l who p r a c t i c e j u s t i c e 
( n n 20, 21 s u p r a ) . W h i l e d e s i r e f o r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y t hus c o n s t i t u t e s 
t h e t h i r d c l a s s ' s m o t i v e f o r p r a c t i s i n g j u s t i c e , t h e y do n o t f e a r t h e 
g u a r d i a n s . Nor, i f t h e y a re i n w a r d l y j u s t and consent t r u l y t o t h e r e g i m e , 
can t h e y d e s i r e power o r w e a l t h . W h i l e the g u a r d i a n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e 
a u x i l i a r i e s , possess power t h e y do n o t suppose t h a t i t s end r e s t s i n m a t e r i a l 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , n o r i n s e c u r i t y f o r themselves (Cp 370A and 464D. Cf n. 43 
s u p r a ) . W h i l e , t h e n , t h e g u a r d i a n s as w e l l as t h e t h i r d c l a s s a r e m a t e r i a l l y 
dependent, b o t h c l a s s e s have d i s t i n c t d e s i r e s : t h e g u a r d i a n s , f o r p a t r i o t i s m 
and knowledge, t h e t h i r d c l a s s , f o r s e c u r i t y . 
The f a c t s j u s t s t a t e d u n d e r l i e P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t o f t h e f r i e n d s h i p t h a t 
o b t a i n s between s u b j e c t and r u l i n g c l a s s e s . H i s concept seeks t o r e n d e r 
c o m p a t i b l e consent f r o m m a t e r i a l m o t i v e , w h i c h we have elsewhere c a l l e d 
consent from custom (Ch 11, p 133. )» and consent f r o m r e a s o n . The f o r m e r 
cannot be n o m i n a l c o n s e n t (Ch 11 pp 9 7 f f . ) , f o r u n l i k e t h e l a t t e r i t 
must i n some way a t l e a s t r e c o g n i z e a b a s i s f o r consent d i s t i n c t f r o m i t s 
own m o t i v e . Here, i t w i l l be i m p o r t a n t t o assess P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e 
Guardians w i l l be p r a i s e d o r d i s p r a i s e d f o r g r e a t a c t s o f b r a v e r y 
o r f o r a c t s o f cowardice t h a t do n o t t y p i f y t h e i r c l a s s ( 4 6 8 A ) . 
O u t s t a n d i n g b r a v e r y i s even s u f f i c i e n t f o r posthumous e l e v a t i o n f r o m 
th e ' s i l v e r ' i n t o t h e ' g o l d ' c l a s s (468E). P a t r i o t i s m , w h i c h i s s t r o n g l y 
c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e g u a r d i a n s ' communism, i s , i n P l a t o ' s v i e w , t h e v e r y 
o p p o s i t e temper o f the i n d i v i d u a l i s m . t h a t t y p i f i e s m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . 
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t h i r d c l a s s ' s e d u c a t i o n . B o t h m o t i v e s f o r consent must, i f f r i e n d s h i p i s t o 
o b t a i n between t h e c l a s s e s , s i g n i f y consent f r o m a man's t r u e i n t e r e s t , o r 
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t r u e consent. Yet i t i s o n l y t h e consent g i v e n f r o m t h e l a t t e r o f t h e s e 
m o t i v e s t h a t can s i g n i f y t h e consent o f t h e s e l f - r u l e d man. T h i s man, t h e 
p h i l o s o p h e r , has an end t h a t t r a n s c e n d s membership o f one o f t h e s t a t e ' s 
c l a s s e s ( C f p 228 ) . We s a i d e a r l i e r (p 189 ; Cf p 200 ) t h a t i t i s h e r e 
t h a t we f i n d t h e substance o f t h e analogy between the a s c e n t o f ero s and 
the R e p u b l i c ' s p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e . W h i l e P l a t o ' s concept o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
o r i g i n o f t h e s o c i e t y has no p o i n t o f analogy w i t h t h e e r o s d o c t r i n e , t h e 
myth o f t h e b r o t h e r h o o d w i t h i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e common o r i g i n o f t h e 
c l a s s e s p r o v i d e s us w i t h t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y b a s i s t h e analogy needs. The 
n o t i o n s o f a s c e n t and o f t h e s o u l ' s g r o w t h , w h i c h t h e e r o s d o c t r i n e p r o v i d e s 
have as t h e i r p o l i t i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t , t h e g r o w t h o f one c l a s s w i t h i n t h e 
i d e a l s o c i e t y t o w a r d t h e c o n d i t i o n o f s e l f - r u l e . Necessary t o t h e a c h i e v e -
ment o f s e l f - r u l e i s c o o p e r a t i o n between s u b j e c t and r u l i n g c l a s s e s . 
Expressed i n a n o t h e r way, we may say t h a t f r i e n d s h i p among c l a s s e s whose 
ends a r e d i s t i n c t i s e s s e n t i a l t o the g r o w t h o f p h i l o s o p h i c e r o s . I t s 
o p p o s i t e , t y r a n n i c a l e r o s , i m p l i e s an u n n a t u r a l and a r b i t r a r y d i v i s i o n o f 
men a l l o f whom see m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y as t h e i r end, a d i v i s i o n o f men i n t o 
t h e r i c h and t h e poor , t h e p o w e r f u l and t h e weak (Cf 423A). 
S o c r a t e s proposes t h a t we know o f no g r e a t e r e v i l f o r a s t a t e t han 
t h a t w h i c h d i v i d e s i t (/&<prj: 462B) , making i t many; n o r any g r e a t e r good 
t h a n t h a t w h i c h b i n d s i t t o g e t h e r (.fwfjj : I b i d . ) , making i t one. I f we 
compare 464D w i t h 370A i t i s c l e a r t h a t t he e v i l he speaks o f i s t h e d e s i r e 
f o r m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ; t h e good, m a t e r i a l dependence and f r i e n d s h i p . 
We have s a i d t h a t P l a t o wants t o i m p l a n t a sense o f d i s i n t e r e s t e d courage _ 
Cp t h e S o c r a t i c c o n c e p t i o n , p 97 Ch 11. S o c r a t e s ' c o n c e p t i o n o f 
consent d i d n o t presume c l a s s e s ( p 1 2 8 ) . 
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i n t h e g u a r d i a n s , t h a t t h e i r e d u c a t i o n must e l i m i n a t e m a t e r i a l ends as 
t h e i r own m o t i v e s t o a c t i o n ; t h e g u a r d i a n s must n o t see t h e i r own ends 
as s a t i s f i e d i n m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y o r i n p e r s o n a l a f f i l i a t i o n . These ends, 
when they move those who have power, i n t r o d u c e t h e p l e a s u r e s and p a i n s o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s ( ^f0/J.s r« KA eiAyyJWx, 6f>«nv*c+> tSiJv *'««'f ^SUt t: 4 6 4 D ) 
and t h e r e f o r e t e n d toward d i s u n i t y . P l a t o means t h a t t h e se ends w o u l d m i l i t a t e 
a g a i n s t the g u a r d i a n s ' end o f p a t r i o t i s m and a g a i n s t t h e d i v i s i o n o f men i n t o 
n a t u r a l c l a s s e s . Common owner s h i p o f p r o p e r t y , t h e n , i s a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e 
achievement o f t h e i r end. I f we t h i n k i n terms o f t h e e r o s d o c t r i n e , we see 
t h a t t h e d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s o f t h e g u a r d i a n s , t h e i r eschewing m a t e r i a l ends 
on t h e i r own b e h a l f , r e f l e c t t h e a s c e n t o f e r o s as s e t o u t i n t h e Symposium. 
S o c r a t e s says a t R e p u b l i c 403C t h a t l o v e o f f a i r n e s s and n o b i l i t y i s 
the end o r purpose o f t h e m u s i c a l e d u c a t i o n ( 2>Ci 7t»if CfAli/rWf Cot 
fti/rnA f i t £4 C»v f/Aktv IfwCliCi ) • What we have s a i d above i n r e s p e c t o f 
th e g u a r d i a n s ' d i s i n t e r e s t e d a t t i t u d e i n r e g a r d t o m a t e r i a l ends i s c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h t h e Symposium's c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f f * f^fk*i/ a t t h e l e v e l 
b o t h o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and customary p r a c t i c e s ( c«< (-a i ) • We 
s h o u l d comment on t h i s s u b j e c t . B u t we need o n l y do so t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t 
we a r e s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e a s c e n t o f e r o s i n t h e Symposium i s analo g o u s , a t 
t h e s e e a r l y s t a g e s , t o the R e p u b l i c ' s e d u c a t i o n i n music and g y m n a s t i c . Of 
e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e t o us i s P l a t o ' s n o t i o n o f t h e e f f e c t o f t h e e d u c a t i o n i n 
music upon t h e t h i r d c l a s s whose n a t u r a l end forms t h e m a t e r i a l b a s i s f o r 
th e g r o w t h w i t h i n s o c i e t y o f p h i l o s o p h i c e r o s . 
P l a t o has i n d i c a t e d t h a t s h o u l d f e a r g e n e r a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e the t h i r d 
c l a s s ' s a t t i t u d e o f mind i t w o u l d be because the g u a r d i a n s had come t o see 
m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y t o g e t h e r w i t h w e a l t h as c o m p r i s i n g t h e i r own ends ( C f . n 32; 
R e p u b l i c 417AB). The ends o f b o t h c l a s s e s w o u l d t h e n be the same. T h e r e f o r e , 
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the class d i v i s i o n of the i d e a l s t a t e would no longer e x i s t ; f o r f e a r from 
the want of s e c u r i t y , and w i t h i t the desire f o r power, would dominate a l l 
c i t i z e n s . Men would be d i v i d e d a r b i t r a r i l y i n t o r i c h and poor, not as by 
nature, i n t o classes t h a t have d i s t i n c t ends. Here, the class d i v i s i o n s 
of the Republic are seen to comply w i t h the eros d o c t r i n e . While eros 
embraces the three needs of men (Cf p 194 f . and n 13 supra), the class 
d i v i s i o n s are r e f l e c t e d i n the ascent by the f a c t t h a t p e r c e p t i o n of f a i r n e s s 
and n o b i l i t y a t the ascent's e a r l y stages r e f l e c t s the Republic's conception 
of the guardians' ends: the regard f o r others t h a t i s n e i t h e r rooted i n 
m a t e r i a l motive nor s a t i s f i e d by possession of e x t e r n a l goods (Cf. Republic 
387D, p 210 supra). The common ownership of property among the guardians, 
which promotes t h i s a t t i t u d e , i s a complement i n terms of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -
ship t o the Symposium's l o g i c a l and moral d o c t r i n e : namely, i n t h a t the 
i n i t i a t e of the ascent learns to value n o b i l i t y , not i n i t s manifold 
instances; r a t h e r , he values i t as being common to classes of o b j e c t s , to 
p h y s i c a l beings and to moral customs. Eros i s de s i r e . I t s r e a l i z a t i o n as 
i n t e l l e c t u a l d e s i r e , leading to knowledge of the forms (Cf Republic 485B) 
and the desire to beget v i r t u e (Cf. Republic 500D - 501A) i s dependent on 
the e a r l i e r t r a i n i n g i n moral a t t i t u d e which the Republic's d o c t r i n e about 
music and gymnastic describes. The ascent of eros i n the guardian young 
t h e r e f o r e e n t a i l s the q u a l i t y of t h e i r regard f o r others. The ascent i s 
only possible i f t h e i r regard f o r others e n t a i l s a sense of s e l f - r e g a r d 
t h a t i s i m p a r t i a l to one's own m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g , t h a t i s i m p a r t i a l to 
p a r t i c u l a r m a t e r i a l ends. 
I t i s cle a r then t h a t the ascent of eros i n i t s e a r l y stages has as 
i t s s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l counterpart the education of the guardian young i n 
music and gymnastic. We have s a i d t h a t eros embraces the three needs of men. 
But i t s ascent i s only c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d i n the l i v e s of the guardian young 
and the a u x i l i a r i e s ; f o r indeed, i t s ascent only begins w i t h the growth of 
the b e l i e f t h a t considerations of one's m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g are not the only 
bases f o r the p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e , f o r the p u r s u i t of one's end and i n t e r e s t . 
Love of n o b i l i t y i n moral a c t i o n , moral courage - must also be a ba s i s . But 
the t h i r d class w i l l suppose t h a t m a t e r i a l considerations are s u f f i c i e n t 
bases (Cf.p 211 supra) . We have emphasized i n respect of t h i s t h a t the 
t h i r d class p a r t i c i p a t e s v i c a r i o u s l y i n the i d e a l s t a t e ' s education. We have 
also seen t h a t i f f e a r , the motive of the nominally j u s t man, broadly characte 
i z e d the consent of i t s members, th a t t h i s would c o n t r a d i c t the very basis of 
Plato's class d i v i s i o n s : f e a r and d i s u n i t y w i l l a r i s e when 'reason' f a i l s 
the r u l e r s ; the preventive against these i s the a l l o c a t i o n of c i t i z e n s i n t o 
the classes t h a t complete t h e i r needs. Such a l l o c a t i o n produces f r i e n d s h i p . 
How, then, s h a l l we assess Plato's view of the education of the t h i r d class? 
How i s t h e i r education e n t a i l e d by the eros doctrine? 
We have observed that moral courage i s i n e s s e n t i a l i n the members of 
the t h i r d c l a s s . But i t was our c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the t h i r d class as a whole 
are inwardly j u s t . We have now seen t h a t i f they feared the r u l e r s t h a t 
would c o n t r a d i c t Plato's conception of class d i v i s i o n s . To consent from 
f e a r or to p r a c t i s e j u s t i c e from f e a r i s to act as does the nominally j u s t 
man. Socrates proposes a t Republic 430C t h a t the guardians' r i g h t o pinion 
about things t o be feared and not be feared cannot develop w i t h o u t education. 
Right opinion which i s not based on education i s , he says, the r i g h t o p i n i o n 
of a beast or a slave. Plato's concept of the classes' f r i e n d s h i p f o r one 
another prevents us from a l l o w i n g t h a t he could be r e f e r r i n g here, w i t h 
consistency to the d o c t r i n e of f r i e n d s h i p , to the consent of the t h i r d c l a s s ; 
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f o r then, the t h i r d class must be nominally j u s t men. They must be men who 
are not inwardly j u s t but who p r a c t i s e j u s t i c e from f e a r . Therefore, when 
Socrates c a l l s the guardians' courage c i v i c courage, or a c i t i z e n ' s courage 
( n »A« ctttf'tf ) » n e cannot be implying t h a t the demotic or popular m o r a l i t y 
of the reformed s o c i e t y i s , by c o n t r a c t w i t h c i v i c courage, e i t h e r s l a v i s h 
or l a c k i n g i n education. That would mean t h a t the t h i r d class are nominally 
j u s t . He says t h e i r v i r t u e i s i n s t i n c t i v e (Cf p 218 supra). Whatever he 
means by t h i s - and we are not sure h i s meaning can be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y shown -
he cannot mean t h a t the t h i r d class are nominally j u s t . We s h a l l show t h i s 
i n what f o l l o w s . 
Socrates says t h a t the r u l e r s w i l l fashion demotic v i r t u e i n accordance 
w i t h t h e i r knowledge (..,. * J ^ fhk t - t j m f*'s jv&fivvtV 4'^ 
c£)t $yf*CK4yt tt/**ry*ji 500D) . P l a t o must then b e l i e v e t h a t the r i g h t o pinion 
t h a t w i l l t y p i f y the s o c i e t y ' s popular b e l i e f s . and p r a c t i s e s w i l l be compatible 
w i t h the r u l e r s ' knowledge. This means t h a t he knows t h a t j u s t i c e excludes 
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wrong-doing; and as he w i l l conform to t h i s f a c t , so the members of the 
t h i r d class w i l l b e l i e v e t h i s f a c t and conform to i t . I f t h i s means nothing 
more than t h a t the r u l e r s ' demiurgic power only produces outward conformity 
to law, then the t h i r d class w i l l f e a r the r u l e r s , and Plato's concept of 
f r i e n d s h i p w i l l be anomalous. We have s a i d t h a t the r e c i p r o c i t y among the 
classes i n d i c a t e s t h a t the analogy between soul and s t a t e i s not w h o l l y 
exact (n 32). But we also showed t h a t i t i s q u i t e exact i n respect of the 
f a c t t h a t the s t a t e ' s 'reason' and the s t a t e ' s ' s p i r i t ' w i l l always be a l l i e s -
even when 'reason' should f a i l . I n the l a t t e r case, f e a r and d i s u n i t y 
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r e s u l t . A llegiance cannot then l a s t f o r long, f o r the t r i p a r t i t e s t a t e 
w i l l soon cease to e x i s t . But i f , w h i l e the s t a t e s u r v i v e s , i t s ' a p p e t i t e ' 
i s fundamentally r e c a l c i t r a n t t o i t s 'reason' and i t s ' s p i r i t ' , then the 
analogy between so u l and s t a t e i s very flawed. The fl a w i s completely 
apparent i f we assume that the t h i r d class i s nominally j u s t . But despite 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Plato's conception of the t h i r d class's response to p h i l o s o -
phic r u l e , we s h a l l see t h a t P l a t o cannot e a s i l y be convicted of such a flaw 
i n h i s analogy. 
I n h i s u s e f u l discussion of demotic v i r t u e , Archer-Hind was of the 
opini o n t h a t the v i r t u e Socrates discusses a t Republic 500D has s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
the same connotation as t h a t which he discussed i n the Phaedo a t 69AB and 82A. 
For reasons we s h a l l give below, we are i n agreement, though not w i t h o u t 
r e s e r v a t i o n s , w i t h the view Archer-Hind put. Our general acceptance of h i s 
p o s i t i o n w i l l lead us t o the conclusion t h a t the e l i m i n a t i o n of f e a r from 
the t h i r d class membership i s e s s e n t i a l to the ascent of eros we have discussed 
above: the ascent begins w i t h b e l i e f i n a higher motive f o r the p r a c t i c e of 
j u s t i c e than i s e x e m p l i f i e d i n considerations of one's m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g ; 
but the ascent also i m p l i e s the classes' f r i e n d s h i p f o r one another. I t 
impl i e s the r e s t o r a t i o n of m a t e r i a l dependence and the r e a l i z a t i o n by each 
class of i t s p e c u l i a r need. 
I n order to reach our conclusion, we must r e t u r n t o Plato's substantive 
d o c t r i n e of the t h i r d class's education, h i s d o c t r i n e of the t h i r d class's 
r i g h t o p i n i o n . F i r s t , two s c h o l a r l y opinions which disagree w i t h our own. 
Cornford held that c o n v i c t i o n about things t o be feared, the r i g h t and 
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l a w f u l b e l i e f about such t h i n g s , could not t y p i f y the t h i r d class member-
ship. They are moved to obedience only by fear of punishment. Cornford's 
th e s i s must r e j e c t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n we have given above of 500CD. His 
4 8 '»'$7» : 429C; fefyt Offyj : 430B. Cf 430c. 
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t h e s i s i m p l i c i t l y maintained t h a t the t h i r d class's conformity to the r u l e r s ' 
knowledge i s no more than e x t e r n a l ; they would b e l i e v e , since they consented 
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from f e a r , t h a t i n j u s t i c e could be p r o f i t a b l e . Consequently, t h e i r consent 
or t h e i r p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e must only r e f l e c t the intemperance and i n d i s c i p l i n e 
9 , 
G/leAArt*) of t h e i r inner natures. More r e c e n t l y , J. Malcolm has h e l d i n 
reference t o Plato's d o c t r i n e of l i n e and cave, th a t the "value p a r t i c u l a r s " 
t h a t the o r d i n a r y , uneducated man accepts corespond to the shadows on the 
cave w a l l . He holds, on the basis of Republic 430C, t h a t t h i s man could have 
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no share of the education i n music and gymnastic. I t i s our b e l i e f t h a t 
the o r d i n a r y man so described - the s l a v i s h man of 430C - e x i s t s i n small 
numbers i n the i d e a l s t a t e (Cf n 36 supra). But h i s type does not characterize 
the t h i r d c lass. As we have seen, Plato's concept of f r i e n d s h i p gives us 
strong evidence f o r r e j e c t i n g Cornford's view and f o r r e j e c t i n g the view 
t h a t the m o r a l i t y of the cave w a l l t y p i f i e s Plato's t h i r d class. The 
temperamental d i s t i n c t i o n between the guardians and the t h i r d class does not 
t u r n on the i m p o s i t i o n upon the t h i r d class by the guardians and a u x i l i a r i e s 
of an order to which i t s members are inwardly and by nature r e c a l c i t r a n t . 
I f they were, then they must be temperate from fear or from an outward 
' 5 1 
r e s t r a i n t t h a t corresponds to a want of sophrosune i n t h e i r souls \ol*»k<kri.j ) . 
Archer-Hind said t h a t Republic 500D-501A describes demotic v i r t u e as 
being: 
"(1) formed by the philosophers f o r the m u l t i t u d e , 
(2) not on u t i l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s , (3) w i t h knowledge of the 
good, but (4) accepted by the m u l t i t u d e on u t i l i t a r i a n 
p r i n c i p l e s and w i t h o u t knowledge of good."5Z 
"Psychology and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e " , p 251. 49 
John Malcolm, "The Line and the Cave", Phronesis, Vol. 6-7, pp 38-45. 
See esp. pp 43 f f . 
Phaedo 68E: iLU'A^^'n ccw «" w' ** fr«cr«.y. ; 69A ct*-* Sua?™ <r<n*ppi> 
The Phaedo of P l a t o , p. 154. 
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I t i s Plato's hope,he says, ( I b i d . ) , t h a t the demotic v i r t u e as set out 
at Republic 500D-501A would supersede that set out at 554C, where Plato 
describes the moral a t t i t u d e of the o l i g a r c h i c man. This man supposes t h a t 
i n j u s t i c e could be p r o f i t a b l e (. . . \ufit'e(fct cov *£iwte?v ) • He p r a c t i s e s 
j u s t i c e through the s e l f - r e s t r a i n t t h a t a r i s e s from fear f o r the loss of 
m a t e r i a l wealth (. . . p°fi<f rrt/>< cys u\\<js cpiju,Ui/y. 544D) . Such a 
man i s outwardly j u s t . I n him, 'reason' does not take counsel f o r the whole 
soul's needs (<&2 Trr-fOcM , <*ct. aim ~ijvctisois , evfr kcyiv , Z\\1 M^y^y 
iu<~ t{ofii<> . . . I b i d . ) . Rather, i t r u l e s only w i t h a view to ' a p p e t i t e ' and 
i t s d e s i re f o r m a t e r i a l wealth (ovri/. ) . C l e a r l y , the moral a t t i t u d e 
Socrates describes at 554C i s s i m i l a r t(T~the s l a v i s h r i g h t o p i n i o n (Ji/SpjnoSusfy ) 
he describes a t 430C (Cf 430C: o/i'fw lUif <«j Yf-fovuT* vt ; 554B ad f i n . : 
ry io J q A t T (. v 1/ ) . At 430C, Socrates inveighs against s l a v i s h r i g h t o p i n i o n , 
saying t h a t i t i s happenstance, unabiding ( t/tpvi/ ) • (Or, w i t h o u t conformity 
to law, i f we read ^ o ' ^ ) . At Phaedo 69B, he declaimed agains-t the same 
s l a v i s h a t t i t u d e , saying i t had no h e a l t h or t r u t h i n i t ( . . . ce m*- ouSts 
yytt-s ooo c/y . . .) . I n e i t h e r case, i t i s only an e x t e r n a l show of 
j u s t i c e . The man whom i t t y p i f i e s lacks sophrosune. 
We may w e l l agree w i t h Archer-Hind t h a t the demotic v i r t u e Socrates 
describes at Republic 500D-501A i s meant to supersede t h a t discussed at 
554CD where he describes the a t t i t u d e of nominally j u s t men. I s t h i s not 
t r u e r to Plato's meaning than Cornford's view where v i r t u e w i l l be t h a t 
of men who are jus.t only from f e a r and e x t e r n a l regimen (Cf n 49)? Yet 
Archer-Hind supposs t h a t t h i s v i r t u e i s a r e f i n e d form of UnoK /.jr< ^  . 
Can we accept t h i s view1? Indeed, he sa i d t h a t t h e i r v i r t u e w i l l be f a r 
more r e f i n e d than that described a t 554CD. Since, however, they lack 
knowledge of good, they only accept the e t h i c a l code of the r u l e r s because 
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they have convinced them (on u t i l i t a r i a n grounds) t h a t i t i s advantageous 
f o r them t o do so (p 152): 
"As they h o l d [the code] , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s u t i l i t a r i a n ; as 
he conceives i t , not so: thus they are s t i l l , though i n 
a f a r more r e f i n e d sense, SL * A«lir< «u/ 9*-ri*Jpoinr *t!vo t •" 
( I b i d . ) . r 
We s h a l l grant t h a t the t h i r d class accepts the code on u t i l i t a r i a n 
grounds. Here, the force of ' u t i l i t a r i a n ' must be t h a t they accept the 
code from considerations of t h e i r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y . So f a r as t h a t i s 
so, t h e i r a t t i t u d e i s u t i l i t a r i a n . But we need to know i n j u s t what sense 
t h e i r temperance i s a r e f i n e d form of t h a t described a t 554CD; we need t o 
know whether i t i s r e a l l y accurate to say t h a t t h e i r a t t i t u d e i s , a t the 
end of the day, simply a form of U » A Aire* . While i t has m a t e r i a l 
s e c u r i t y i n view, i t cannot i n v o l v e deception, or 'seeming j u s t i c e ' ( fv 
ol* «vSo«ifi2 SovZ* Si'ujtes tfTi/*t , . . • 554C ad f i n . ) . The l a t t e r t y p i f i e s 
nominal j u s t i c e . Archer-Hind might have observed t h i s when he i m p l i e d t h a t 
the t h i r d class's moral a t t i t u d e would be a r e f i n e d form of d^-eKi? n (p 151 
f . ) . The refinement must e n t a i l the d o c t r i n e of the t r i p a r t i t e s oul and the 
r u l e of 'reason 1; and sophrosune, when seen i n co n j u n c t i o n w i t h the d o c t r i n e 
of f r i e n d s h i p , e n t a i l s the inward j u s t i c e of the members of the t h i r d class; 
i t e n t a i l s t h e i r absence of f e a r . This f a c t , i n t u r n , i m p l i e s the absence 
i n them of desire f o r wealth or power (Cf p 233 supra). Where these desires 
are l a c k i n g , a man may be j u s t from motive of m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y b ut i f the 
man i s also temperate i n Plato's sense, h i s j u s t i c e cannot be an e f f e c t 
of i n d i s c i p l i n e w i t h i n the s o u l . (Cf p 187, supra). Does h i s j u s t i c e c o n s i s t , 
then, i n an i n s t i n c t i v e , passive acceptance of the code, an acceptance we 
> f 
must s t i l l regard as a form of t L A Xir< ^ . This i s closer to the mark. But 
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we have d i f f i c u l t y i n supposing t h a t t h e i r v i r t u e , as being i n s t i n c t i v e , 
would not be "from the philosopher" (p 153) ; f o r Socrates t e l l s us at 
Republic 401BC tha t the a b i l i t i e s of good a r t i s t s and poets w i l l be 
i n s t i n c t i v e ( CofuZs : Cf pp 219-221 supra) . Yet these a b i l i t i e s w i l l s u r e l y 
grow w i t h i n the environment the p h i l o s o p h i c s t a t e provides. They cannot grow 
up as i f e n t i r e l y by chance, as i f l a c k i n g any cause. They w i l l grow spontan-
eously. Yet when they do appear, they w i l l appear i n response to the p h i l o -
sophic code and regimen ( I b i d . ) . The t h i r d class w i l l not be able to f u r n i s h 
an account of t h e i r v i r t u e or i t s companion a b i l i t i e s . These w i l l be based 
on r i g h t o p i n i o n . But they w i l l come from the environment the philosophers 
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provide, not from d i v i n e dispensation as they do i n present s o c i e t y . 
F i n a l l y , we may ask what degree of d i f f e r e n c e there i s between the u t i l i t a r i a n 
conception of the t h i r d class and the apparently n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n conception 
of the philosophic r u l e r s . Our treatment of these matters w i l l complete our 
study of the t h i r d class. I t w i l l also f u r n i s h the conclusions we want i n 
regard to the t h i r d class and the eros d o c t r i n e (Cf p 239 supra). These 
matters w i l l b r i n g us t o the end of our study of Plato's n o t i o n of the 
consent of the governed. 
Archer-Hind i m p l i e d t h a t the t h i r d class's consent would be a r e f i n e d 
form of UuoAj.ru . His t h e s i s has i t s most probable basis i n the statement 
we made e a r l i e r about the healthy c i t y (p 205) • We said that the c i t y was 
powerless to prevent the growth of l u x u r y , t h a t i t would welcome i t s growth. 
We also said t h a t i n both the healthy and the reformed communities m a t e r i a l 
need i s subject to e x t e r n a l c o n t r o l , i n the one case by nature, i n the ot h e r , 
by knowledge. The question whether the t h i r d class's consent i s a refinement 
of cLMoAtfLA takes i t s main s i g n i f i c a n c e from the connotation t h a t attaches 
Cp Republic 500D-501A w i t h Meno 99E (Archer-Hind's s e l e c t i o n no. v, 
p 150 Op.Cit. 
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to e x t e r n a l c o n t r o l . I f the d o c t r i n e of f r i e n d s h i p has meaning, the l a t t e r 
must connote no l e s s than the inward consent of the t h i r d class. I t must 
th e r e f o r e connote t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t t h e i r own i n t e r e s t i s compatible w i t h 
t h a t of the r u l e r s and the a u x i l i a r i e s ; i t must mean that consent from 
motive of m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y i s compatible w i t h the motives of p a t r i o t i s m 
and i n t e l l e c t u a l need. That w i l l be t r u e no matter how great the g u l f 
between the philosophers' and the t h i r d class's conceptions of m o r a l i t y 
(Cf Archer-Hind, p 152). The two m o r a l i t i e s are not sundered from one 
another (see I b i d . ) . But they would be sundered i f the g u l f between them 
was t h a t between moral ignorance (what we u s u a l l y mean by <J H» i\4vn ) and 
knowledge or r i g h t o p i n i o n based on knowledge. Were t h a t the case, then 
the ascent of eros, w h i l e i t begins w i t h the education of the guardian 
young, could not encompass the consent of the t h i r d class. The t h i r d class 
could not then have the share of happiness t h a t was i t s n a t u r a l due (Cf pp 215, 
245 and n 42 supra). 
We have s a i d t h a t P l a t o would seem to a n t i c i p a t e some degree of de t e r -
i o r a t i o n among the t h i r d class membership (n 36 supra). He says t h a t such 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n as would take place would be no danger to the s t a t e . Socrates 
speaks of d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n terms of a man's e f f e c t i n g a semblance of j u s t i c e 
( irpovir*<.tfp+jJifvo<. f w < yt-y e'i/Ct-t 1To\n ov$iv f t f o v : 421A) . The semblance 
of j u s t i c e or deception t h a t we note here s u r e l y i m p l i e s b e l i e f i n the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .of i n j u s t i c e . (The s t a t e w i l l be destroyed i f guardians should 
seem t o be j u s t . I b i d . ) . The man who has such b e l i e f cannot be happy; f o r 
the s o c i e t y r u l e d by such b e l i e f i s not a happy one (. . . Coo* <T etltHv KJU 
> r- -
<>JtJ.Lj/oi/<.-i\t , . . I b i d . ) . Where happiness i s absent, deception and outward 
regimen are a man's only signs of j u s t i c e . P l a t o b e l i e v e s t h a t deception and 
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outward regimen must mark some members of the t h i r d class. Those who are 
thus characterized cannot be happy. I t i s of these r e c l a c i t r a n t c i t i z e n s 
t h a t P lato i s speaking at 415E (Cf n 38 supra); f o r he holds t h a t f r i e n d s h i p 
i n f a c t dominates the r e l a t i o n s h i p between r u l i n g and s u b j e c t classes, t h a t 
each class must have i t s share of happiness. I n the case of the s u b j e c t s , 
of course, happiness must in c l u d e the desire to be r u l e d ; f o r i t i s obvious 
t h a t r e b e l l i o u s subjects cannot be happy. I t i s these s u b j e c t , not the 
t h i r d class as a whole, who are sundered from the philosopher. This i s so, 
because i t i s t h e i r moral a t t i t u d e and not t h a t of the m a j o r i t y , t h a t i s not 
compatible w i t h the philosophers'. I t i s these subjects upon whom the 
society's education has no l a s t i n g e f f e c t . These subjects are nominally 
j u s t men. But i t i s perhaps not enough to say t h a t they are simply members 
of the t h i r d c lass. We need a more precise statement of t h e i r o r i g i n . We 
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s h a l l confine t h i s statement to the f o l l o w i n g note. 
We have sa i d t h a t there are d i f f i c u l t i e s i n e x p l a i n i n g the t h i r d class's 
i n s t i n c t f o r j u s t i c e - the t h i r d class's r i g h t o p i n i o n (p 238). Obviously, 
the explanation must f i n a l l y t u r n on the d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge, 
the a b i l i t y to give an account, and the lack of t h i s a b i l i t y , r i g h t o p i n i o n . 
I n a t h e s i s which deals w i t h Plato's p o l i t i c a l philosophy, we cannot deal 
e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h h i s epistemology. The two subjects are c e r t a i n l y r e l a t e d ; 
f o r the class d i v i s i o n s of the s t a t e f i n a l l y t u r n on the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the s e l f - r u l e d man, the man who has moral knowledge, and the e x t e r n a l l y r u l e d 
who do not. I n t h i s note we s h a l l make no attempt t o deal f o r m a l l y w i t h 
the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n . Rather, we s h a l l deal w i t h a s u b j e c t 
immediately r e l e v a n t to the d o c t r i n e of consent t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n r a i s e s : 
what d i f f e r e n c e does P l a t o see, i f any,between those who are members of the 
t h i r d class by o r i g i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n and those who, as i s s t a t e d at 468A, 
f a i l to e x h i b i t courage? This problem i s important because i t raises the 
f u r t h e r question: what i s the source of r e b e l l i o n against the laws which the 
s t a t e i s able to w i t h s t a n d (Cf n 36)? We s h a l l not attempt to provide a 
complete answer to t h i s question. But the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s should be made. 
Provided t h a t any cause f o r f e a r i s removed from those whose n a t u r a l 
desire was always seen to r e s t i n m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y , they w i l l p r a c t i s e 
j u s t i c e w i t h o u t deception. Mere i n s t i n c t i v e response to the s o c i e t y ' s moral 
environment w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e i r doing so. I t i s not a t a l l obvious 
t h a t such c i t i z e n s as these (those who, throughout t h e i r l i v e s have been 
members of the t h i r d class) could ever be a source of r e b e l l i o n . I s i t , then, 
246. 
56 (continued from page 
a surd remainder from w i t h i n t h i s c l a s s ; or i s the source those who have 
been proven to be f i t members of t h i s class r a t h e r than the class of 
a u x i l i a r i e s t o which they were o r i g i n a l l y assigned? 
The question i s not e a s i l y answered. F i r s t , we must take i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n Plato's tendency to compare, unfavourably, the a u x i l i a r i e s ' 
l i f e w i t h t h a t of the a r t i s a n s (421AB, 466B) . But beside t h i s comparison, 
we must place Socrates' oftenrepeated claim t h a t the c i t y i s not founded f o r 
the e s p e c i a l ( f u f t f v t v s : 420B) happiness of any one :class (420B, 421C, 
519E, 466A, 590A). The end desired by the t h i r d class i s valued less by 
Plato than the ends desired by the other two classes; but t h a t does not 
mean the t h i r d class does not receive the share of happiness t h a t i s i t s 
n a t u r a l due (.(•Actev e>ntvs . . . f u J w ^ ^ s : 421C) . Secondly, we must 
appreciate Plato's b e l i e f t h a t no e v i l or good of consequence a r i s e s from 
small natured men (491D, 495B). With t h i s sentiment, we must note h i s 
statement t h a t degenerate craftsmen ( Su><( c *cu: 421C) are no great danger 
to a s t a t e . F i n a l l y , we must r e c a l l Plato's tendency to equate i r r a t i o n a l i t y 
(o(.KeAeCiri'*. ) w i t h 'reason's' f a i l u r e i n p o t e n t i a l l y strong-natured men 
(Cf. 491D, 495B). The man who w i l l i n g l y accepts e x t e r n a l r u l e i s , i n 
degree of j u s t i c e , second only to the s e l f - r u l e d man (590E). Since he i s 
temperate ( I b i d . ) , he i s not i r r a t i o n a l or m o r a l l y i g n o r a n t . Among whom, 
then, do we f i n d the r e b e l l i o u s residue i n the s t a t e , the i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t 
would r e b e l (415E. Cf n 38)? C l e a r l y , they w i l l be assigned to the t h i r d 
class. But must they have o r i g i n a t e d w i t h i n t h i s class? I s an unproven 
i n s t i n c t f o r j u s t i c e a more n a t u r a l source of r e b e l l i o n than i s f a i l u r e to 
overcome f e a r and, w i t h i t , the f a i l u r e to acqiure moral courage? 
Beside Plato's sentiment t h a t no great good or e v i l can come from small 
natured men we need to set the statement we made e a r l i e r (p 2.04-) t h a t the 
c r u c i a l cause of e v i l to s o c i e t y - the desire f o r m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y -
i s not present i n the healthy or p r i m i t i v e c i t y . I f i t i s not present t h e r e , 
nor should i t be present among the t h i r d class when m a t e r i a l dependence i s 
r e s t o r e d . Socrates' statements a t 421B, 466B imply the .gradations i n the 
value of ends which P l a t o applies to the three l i v e s of the community: the 
smallest natured c i t i z e n s , the t h i r d c l a s s , w i l l c e r t a i n l y be those whose 
l i v e s end i n m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y . But when we consider the value gradations, 
beside the s e p a r a t i o n of class f u n c t i o n s t h a t i s v i t a l to the s t a t e ' s s u r v i v a l , 
we see t h a t P l a t o i s r e f e r r i n g at l e a s t as much to separation between the 
exercise of power and the desire f o r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y , as he i s t o the f a c t 
t h a t i t does not endanger the s t a t e i f some a r t i s a n s - small natured men -
should degenerate. The case of the reduced a u x i l i a r y i s d i f f e r e n t . F a i l u r e 
to acquire v i r t u e i n one who was being t r a i n e d t o lead s u r e l y i m p l i e s desire 
f o r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y i n the same man. I t i s here t h a t we must look f o r 
p o t e n t i a l i n d i s c i p l i n e i n the s t a t e . I t i s the combination of these ends 
tha t must, p o t e n t i a l l y , r u i n the s t a t e . I t i s the appearance of the combination 
of these desires t h a t the guardians must suppress. I t seems more l i k e l y t h a t 
such desires would appear i n one whose capacity f o r v i r t u e had been t r i e d and 
found wanting, r a t h e r than i n one whose i n s t i n c t i v e v i r t u e had never been t e s t e d . 
Socrates says t h a t degeneracy among the l a t t e r occurs. But i t s occurrence 
must be anomalous. Why, indeed, i f the motive of f e a r has been removed .from 
the t h i r d class would some of i t s members degenerate? Plato has not f u r n i s h e d 
a precise answer to t h i s question. Their degeneracy, a t any r a t e , must be 
less a source of a c t u a l r e b e l l i o n than that of. a u x i l i a r i e s which, though the 
s t a t e can w i t h s t a n d i t s appearance i n i n d i v i d u a l s , must none the l e s s be 
suppressed. I t must be suppressed because i t s presence i n i n d i v i d u a l s , r a t h e r 
than degeneracy i n the a r t i s a n s , i m p l i e s the p o t e n t i a l r u i n of the s t a t e . 
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Since the nominally j u s t man of Plato's s t a t e would b e l i e v e t h a t 
i n j u s t i c e could be p r o f i t a b l e , then 'reason' cannot r u l e h i s s o u l . Even 
i f such men obeyed the laws h a b i t u a l l y , they would not be temperate i n the 
Republic's sense where the presence of temperance e n t a i l s harmony of the 
p a r t s of the so u l . The ' r i g h t o p i n i o n 1 of such c i t i z e n s - which conceals 
t h e i r r e a l b e l i e f - w i l l be t h a t of beast or slave. Archer-Hind h e l d t h a t 
the r i g h t opinion of the t h i r d class would be a refinement of t h i s . The 
moral code would be h e l d by them on a u t i l i t a r i a n b a s i s ; t h e i r r i g h t o p i n i o n 
would grow, as we have seen, from i n s t i n c t i v e response t o the p h i l o s o p h i c 
environment. Yet, f o r Archer-Hind, t h i s was s t i l l a form of oiuokj-ira ; 
P 153: " [ t h e y would be] j u s t , temperate, e t c . . . . not because they choose 
[ v i r t u e ] as being b e t t e r , [ b u t ] because v i r t u e i s more n a t u r a l and t h e r e f o r e 
more easy and pleasant to them [than v i c e ] . Therefore . . . they must be 
classed w i t h e< $c ' Uxok*.<rM <ri<r*v(pe>"* t y t f * * " . I f the d i f f e r e n c e between the 
nominally j u s t man and the usual t h i r d class c i t i z e n i s only a d i f f e r e n c e of 
degree (a r e f i n e m e n t ) , then 'reason's' obeying ' a p p e t i t e ' w i l l t y p i f y the 
t h i r d c l a s s . "Reason' w i l l n ot r u l e the souls of i t s members. But t h a t 
denies Plato's statements i n the Republic t h a t 'reason' does r u l e the souls 
of the s u b j e c t s , t h a t t h e r e f o r e , the subjects are j u s t and temperate.^ W i l l 
the t y p i c a l members of the t h i r d c l a s s , then, have an a t t i t u d e of mind t h a t 
3 I 
i s d i s t i n c t from a r e f i n e d form of «<«»A^ iri* ? Or i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
t h i s form of JueA+trt-t and the temperance of the t h i r d class only a v e r b a l one? 
For reasons we s h a l l now give we must see more than a v e r b a l d i s t i n c t i o n i n 
the d i f f e r e n c e . 
Archer-Hind's reason f o r regarding a man's i n s t i n c t i v e preference f o r 
j u s t i c e as a form of <L*> <r , l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t the man does not 
Cf p 203 supra on Republic 433D; p 205 and n 4 on Republic 389D; p 207 
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choose to be j u s t . That means t h a t h i s preference f o r j u s t i c e comes from 
no e f f o r t of h i s own ( j k b t &c-t* jwtp*. . . O'IS 2V ntCf><*y<y^ycu.i : Meno 99E) . 
Such men no more choose v i r t u e than do the men at Republic 554CD convince 
themselves t h a t v i r t u e i s pr e f e r a b l e t o i t s opposite ( ov wtt&ivv , oc< o»K 
U/ut-ivov j e'uf * ^ f/tpi*^ ho^u/ ) . The ' i n s t i n c t i v e ' man simply has, unaccountably, 
a preference to be j u s t . The man l a c k i n g t h i s preference i s j u s t from 
compulsion and f e a r g^t fofiw ' I b i d . ) . The question of choice i s 
important, and we s h a l l deal w i t h i t p r e s e n t l y . F i r s t we need to answer the 
f o l l o w i n g question: can we e a s i l y t h i n k of o/m» A (tv-t a i n any form as excluding 
the b e l i e f t h a t i n j u s t i c e could be p r o f i t a b l e ? The t h i r d class cannot be 
happy i f they e n t e r t a i n t h i s n o t i o n . Nor, then, can they be temperate. 
> i 
Archer-Hind assigned I<><I>A/•>-(*, t o the ' i n s t i n c t i v e ' man because he does 
not choose t o be j u s t ; he simply i s j u s t . He f i n d s i t more pleasant to be 
so. I f , as Archer-Hind says, such a man only values m a t e r i a l ends,"'*' what 
substantive d i f f e r e n c e could there be between t h i s ' i n s t i n c t i v e ' man and the 
man who believes t h a t i n j u s t i c e could be p r o f i t a b l e ? C e r t a i n l y , t h e ' i n s t i n c t -
i v e ' man so described p r e f e r s j u s t i c e on no r e a l grounds of temperance. I f 
we say t h a t h i s case i s one of drivAj-r*.* , then 'reason' cannot r u l e h i s soul. 
The only d i f f e r e n c e would seem t o be t h a t the one man w i l l c o u r t i n j u s t i c e to 
achieve h i s ends (. . . AnijSr-ir^wi ecu ^ia-t^v : 554CD) ; the other, presumably, 
f i n d s i t unpleasant to do so. He would not choose i n j u s t i c e f o r h i m s e l f ; but, 
i f he i s not r u l e d by 'reason' i n h i s s o u l , w i l l he deny, i f asked, t h a t 
i n j u s t i c e can p r o f i t a man? I f he were to deny t h i s , he must at l e a s t b e l i e v e , 
i m p l i c i t l y , t h a t the unju s t man would be b e t t e r o f f i f he escaped d e t e c t i o n ; 
f o r , t h e i n s t i n c t i v e l y j u s t man, on Archer-Hind's account of him, only values 
" ... we observe . . . th a t the v i r t u e which these 9(n*i f o l l o w . . . 
i s the ord i n a r y u t i l i t a r i a n v i r t u e . " p 153. 
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e x t e r n a l ends. Such a man must admit t h a t i n j u s t i c e could p r o f i t a man.-
We have s a i d t h a t i n h i s preference f o r j u s t i c e , the man recognizes none 
but m a t e r i a l ends. I f t h a t i s so, h i s r i g h t o p i n i o n i s t h a t of beast or 
slave. Such a man i s ^ KaA^cesbecause h i s preference f o r j u s t i c e does not 
r e s u l t from 'reason's' r u l e i n the s o u l . Indeed, the man even lacks the 
promptings of a b e t t e r p a r t w i t h i n him (Cf. on the man described at Republic 
554CD: fnitt*e*t c(vt euvtoo pi* Ujtce/.c-i J\Ms KJteds tntffyrus (uoVMS) . 
How,then, are we to understand the a t t r i b u t i o n to the t h i r d class of a 
r e f i n e d i n d i s c i p l i n e ? Can they be happy i f they recognize no needs b u t 
t h e i r own? We have wanted to show t h a t i f t h e i r v i r t u e i s only a form of 
i n d i s c i p l i n e and i s also i n s t i n c t i v e (Cf on Republic 401BC, p 243 supra), 
then the t h i r d class must lack temperance; the a t t r i b u t i o n of the t r i p a r t i t e 
d o c t r i n e to them can then have no meaning. They must recognize none b u t 
m a t e r i a l ends and they must e n t e r t a i n the b e l i e f t h a t i n j u s t i c e could p r o f i t 
a man. On e i t h e r count, t h e i r b e l i e f opposes the philosophers' knowledge of 
i d e a l j u s t i c e . 
We say t h a t they w i l l recognize needs other than t h e i r own and t h a t 
they are inwardly j u s t , or temperate, men (Cf pp 248, 49 supra). The compati-
b i l i t y we see ( I b i d . ; pp 25 7, 58 supra) between consent from m a t e r i a l need 
(consent from custom) and consent from reason takes i t s meaning from these 
claims; so, too, the f a c t t h a t 'reason' r u l e s the souls of the members of 
t h i s class. Our basis f o r these claims l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t P l a t o says 
t h e i r r i g h t o pinion i s i n the track of the philosophers' knowledge (. . . 
0^/". evp-f tut ce»> ttyvutt i>uo* f/a/*vs CJ(I/tvt-ii/ cy? cot/ IIJLAOV ct it-4.t 
bJVfi*j/o\/tf <£i/'vc? . . . 401C) . But i f the t h i r d class's r i g h t o p i n i o n i s only 
a form of i n d i s c i p l i n e then they cannot be temperate. While they obey the 
5 7 Cf Ch 11 pp 140 f f and nn 61 - 63. 
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philosophers, they w i l l e n t e r t a i n the b e l i e f t h a t i n j u s t i c e could p r o f i t a 
man. Their response to the philosophers' code would not grow spontaneously; 
i t would not be i n s t i n c t i v e . I t could only e x h i b i t a preference founded on 
f e a r . I n unreformed s o c i e t y , they might have a n a t u r a l preference f o r j u s t i c e . 
But since t h e i r preference i s incompatible w i t h r e c o g n i t i o n of ends other 
than t h e i r own, they cannot consent w i l l i n g l y to the philosophers' r u l e . P l a t o 
t e l l s us, however, t h a t the poets and a r t i s t s of the i d e a l s t a t e w i l l do f i n e 
work by i n s t i n c t alone. So a l s o , then, w i l l they be j u s t men by i n s t i n c t . 
For P l a t o , the e f f e c t upon the s o u l of the i d e a l s t a t e ' s environment must 
r e s u l t i n i t s a s s i m i l a t i o n to j u s t i c e and n o b i l i t y . The a s s i m i l a t i o n a f f e c t s 
a l l classes of the s t a t e : Cf. 500D: C M C A . . . dfoftxoltr&*<• ( s a i d of the 
philosophers. Cf n 47 and t e x t to note, p 238); 401E: 4ts cy' i^i/f^v . . . 
P*Avs f f H*yA#os ( s a i d of the guardian young); e»fuu/$ dvv*f/ivo*s t/L^WUv 
lyv coo iU-Aov . . . <^t>«rif ( s a i d o f the a r t i s t s and poet s ) . Common to the 
a r t i s a n s ' i n s t i n c t i v e r i g h t o p i n i o n and the guardians' knowledge i s the 
a s s i m i l a t i o n of both j u s t i c e and n o b i l i t y . Archer-Hind s a i d t h a t there i s a 
g u l f between knowledge and r i g h t o p i n i o n . But the concept of a s s i m i l a t i o n 
s u r e l y suggests t h a t the philosophers w i l l know t h a t wrong-doing cannot p r o f i t 
a man, the a r t i s a n s w i l l b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s i s so. The concept also suggests 
— i 
the o r i e n t a t i o n of desire toward mutually b e n e f i c i a l ends (519E): TCOILOV 
r r ' > i I ' . - ' i ' t« «* * v r s <T 
u/ftrKto* . . .) and the attainment of t h e i r ends by a l l classes. 
F i n a l l y , we need to consider the choice Plato's c i t i z e n s make i n obeying 
the philosophers' code, the choice both of subjects and r u l e r s . Here, we 
need to remember t h a t h i s c i t i z e n s respond to a hi e r a r c h y of ends, t h a t he 
does not at t a c h equal value t o these ends. We s h a l l understand Plato's 
conception of choice and the su b j e c t s ' response to ph i l o s o p h i c r u l e by consider-
in g Socrates'statement from Republic 500C to 502A. We s h a l l see, i f we 
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r e l a t e t h i s s e c t i o n to h i s statements about happiness at Republic 420B, 
519E, 520C, t h a t the conception of choice e n t a i l s conformity between the 
r u l e r s ' knowledge and the s u b j e c t s ' b e l i e f . The conformity i t s e l f e n t a i l s 
a . d i s t i n c t i o n among ends t h a t i s based on a hierarchy o f values. This 
d i s t i n c t i o n e l i m i n a t e s o p p o s i t i o n of ends so f a r as p o s s i b l e . The conform-
i t y e n t a i l s the presence of sophrosune (inward consent) among a l l classes 
and the r e a l i z a t i o n of class ends. These f a c t s e n t a i l the d o c t r i n e of eros 
which we the r e f o r e see as a s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l conception. We need to 
make the f o l l o w i n g f i n a l remarks on these subjects. 
Socrates proposes t h a t i f the philosopher should be compelled {t/vOv 
3 / / 
d*>tfH<j y (-UIJCM : 500D) t o fashion both himself and the r e s t of s o c i e t y 
( I b i d . ) i n conformity w i t h h i s knowledge ( £/ ) , we must suppose t h a t 
he w i l l be a good craftsman of demotic v i r t u e . We may understand the idea 
of compulsion as f o l l o w s : the philosopher i s compelled by h i s knowledge of 
good to regard the other c i t i z e n s w e l l , t h a t i s , to be a j u s t man (Cf 520E) . 
By p r a c t i s i n g j u s t i c e (here, forming the characters of c i t i z e n s as w e l l as 
h i s own), the philosopher makes the attainment of h i s own end p o s s i b l e 
(520E, 521A). We have s a i d t h a t the subj e c t s ' b e l i e f i s i n conformity w i t h 
the philosophers' knowledge. We mean by t h i s t h a t the choice which they 
make i s , i n most cases, i n s t i n c t i v e . I t i s an i n s t i n c t f o r r i g h t o p i n i o n 
based on the philosophers' knowledge; i t i s a preference they do not desire 
to j u s t i f y . While a man's knowledge must compel him to p r a c t i s e j u s t i c e , 
P l a t o says i t i s both by persuasion and compulsion t h a t philosophers ( t h e 
law the philosophers impose: 519E) w i l l attempt t o achieve the happiness 
( I b i d . ) which every class shares. We have seen t h a t there w i l l be some degree 
of r e c a l c i t r a n c e . Where i t e x i s t s , compulsion from e x t e r n a l agency w i l l be 
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a p p l i e d . Where such compulsion d i d not lead to inward consent, i t s aim must 
be mere obedience, the obedience of the nominally j u s t man; f o r the most 
p a r t , persuasion leading t o r i g h t o p i n i o n , w i l l u n d e r l i e the r u l e r s ' o b j e c t 
i n m aintaining consent. This i s so i f f r i e n d s h i p , and not h o s t i l i t y , 
g e n e r a l l y characterizes the r e l a t i o n s h i p between subject and r u l i n g classes. 
Right o p i n i o n which i s engendered by persuasion, w i l l , l i k e the compulsion 
of knowledge, e n t a i l a man's p r a c t i s e of j u s t i c e from the b e l i e f t h a t he may 
only a t t a i n h i s t r u e i n t e r e s t i f he regards others w e l l . By means of the 
i d e a l s t a t e , Plato would hope to achieve t h i s a t t i t u d e i n those whose 
p e r f e c t i o n l i e s i n the achievement of m a t e r i a l ends (p 228). The d o c t r i n e 
o f eros a s s i s t s us i n understanding t h i s conception. Through the eros 
d o c t r i n e we may understand Plato's conception of a h i e r a r c h y of ends t h a t 
are unopposed though of unequal value.. 
A man's b e l i e f t h a t he a t t a i n s h i s true i n t e r e s t through the p r a c t i c e 
of j u s t i c e and t h a t wrong-doing cannot p r o f i t him w i l l be expressed at 
three l e v e l s o f d e s i r e : the d e s i r e f o r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y ; f o r p a t r i o t i c 
f u l f i l m e n t ; f o r knowledge. P l a t o a t t r i b u t e s value to these desires i n two 
senses: f i r s t , i n p r o p o r t i o n as they are d i s i n t e r e s t e d i n regard to personal, 
m a t e r i a l w e l l - b e i n g and exemplify, to t h a t e x t e n t , the l i f e of moral s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y . The morally s u f f i c i e n t , or s e l f - r u l e d , man, has a l i f e b e t t e r 
than the p o l i t i c a l l i f e (521A). His l i f e i s the s t a t e ' s h i g h e s t achievement. 
Complementing t h i s n o t i o n i s Plato's b e l i e f t h a t the state's s u r v i v a l depends 
on the f u l f i l m e n t by each class of i t s f u n c t i o n . We know, from what we have 
sa i d about f e a r and the consent of the t h i r d c l a s s , t h a t f e a r must move men 
to obedience when 'reason' f a i l s the r u l e r s . Then, the n a t u r a l ends of men -
t h e i r p e r f e c t i o n together w i t h t h e i r happiness - w i l l not be r e a l i z e d . I t 
would not be s u r p r i s i n g , Socrates says to Glaucon, i f the philosophers were 
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the happiest men of the s t a t e (Cf n 42) . On the one hand, they are 
happiest because t h e i r l i v e s are the most complete; they are m o r a l l y 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t men. But i t i s not our purpose, he says,that any one 
class should be surpassingly happy ( t)U$c-f>e>i/Cn>f : I b i d . ) . C l e a r l y , the 
happiness o f one class of men must not exclude t h a t of any o t h e r . I n 
other words, 'happiness' cannot complement the exercise of the three 
f u n c t i o n s unless each class receives happiness i n p r o p o r t i o n to the work 
i t achieves i n making the p h i l o s o p h i c , independent l i f e p o s s i b l e . The 
achievement of t h i s end i m p l i e s the e l i m i n a t i o n of f e a r and the attainment 
of happiness, o r p e r f e c t i o n , by the three classes. I t also i m p l i e s t h a t a 
scale or h i e r a r c h y of values must char a c t e r i z e the s t a t e ' s l i f e . This scale 
comprises the g r e a t e r and the l e s s e r p a r t s of ' n o b i l i t y 1 , i t s higher and 
lower forms of expression (Cf pp 193-197 supra). 
We have sa i d t h a t two of the s t a t e ' s ends do not transcend m a t e r i a l 
or p o l i t i c a l l i f e (p 215); we have also s a i d t h a t the ascent of eros begins 
w i t h the education o f the guardian young,, w i t h the exercise of t h e i r f u n c t i o n 
by the a u x i l i a r i e s . While t h i s education, together w i t h the a u x i l i a r i e s ' 
f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r end, does not transcend p o l i t i c a l l i f e , both induce 
i m p a r t i a l i t y of f e e l i n g i n the agent i n h i s considerations of h i s m a t e r i a l 
w e l l - b e i n g (p 236.) . To the e x t e n t t h a t the agent i s i m p a r t i a l , the end 
he desires i s of greater value than the end of m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y . But we 
have shown t h a t the a s s i m i l a t i o n of the three classes of c i t i z e n s t o j u s t i c e 
and n o b i l i t y includes the t h i r d class's r e c o g n i t i o n of ends d i s t i n c t from 
t h e i r own (p 250 ) . They d i f f e r from the nominally j u s t man i n t h a t they 
recognize as l e g i t i m a t e , ends th a t are not m a t e r i a l (Cf p 198; pp 215-17). 
Owing to t h e i r a b i l i t y to make such r e c o g n i t i o n , the ascent of eros, through 
society's h i e r a r c h y of ends, i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the d o c t r i n e o f f r i e n d s h i p 
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among the classes. I t i s also c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n P l ato made 
i n the Phaedo between a r e a l or t r u e cause \Cc (-rci co dicto* OI/CL : 
99B), and t h a t w i t h o u t which the l a t t e r would never have o s t e n s i b l e expression 
(j*** o'v co eueiev ffi/< /r^r* c'cy e/lttar : I b i d . ) . I n the Republic, the 
'necessary' cause - the m a t e r i a l cause - i s the law and custom from which 
the philosopher moulds demotic v i r t u e r«"> wri»y otsjtic*/* : 501B) . Law 
and custom, together w i t h men's i n s t i n c t i v e a b i l i t y t o be j u s t , serve as 
'necessary' bases f o r the conversion of eros i n s o c i e t y from m a t e r i a l s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y t o m a t e r i a l dependence and moral s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . Moreover, 
i t i s from law and custom t h a t t y r a n n i c a l eros might also grow. I t i s i n 
the p o t e n t i a l i t y of eros f o r good or e v i l t h a t we f i n d Plato's d i s t i n c t i o n 
between s e l f - r u l e d and self-determined men ( n 16 supra). Here, as w i t h , 
f r i e n d s h i p between r u l i n g and subject classes, an indispensable c o n d i t i o n 
whether of s e l f - r u l e or self-determinancy, i s the separation from or the 
union of p o l i t i c a l power w i t h , wealth and m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y . 
I t i s from the separation of power and s e c u r i t y t h a t we f i n d the i m p l i c i t 
meaning of the q u i e t submission ( npdc'cys : 493A Cf p 166 Ch 111 and n 4) 
of the subj e c t class t o p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e . Here, too, we f i n d Plato's 
conception o f the m a t e r i a l , or 'necessary', b a s i s , from which moral s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y can grow. The law and custom w i t h which Plato's r u l e r works, 
since i t induces f r i e n d s h i p among h i s classes, i s amenable to the t h i r d class's 
perception o f j u s t i c e . They value j u s t i c e because i t s p r a c t i c e b r i n g s 
m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y . But they recognize as v a l i d the ends of the other two 
classes. For these reasons, the t h i r d class i s n o t , as a whole, r e c a l c i t r a n t 
to the r u l e of the philosophers: t h e i r p r a c t i c e of j u s t i c e need not be 
motivated from f e a r f o r the loss of m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y ; f o r the desire f o r 
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power has been removed from those whose need ends i n m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y . 
We have said t h a t the philosopher i s a s e l f - r u l e d man. Socrates says 
t h a t we should be imposing j u s t commandments on j u s t men ( £i*t*f/ y ^ P 
Sue*{„is t-mc*Jo//f : 520E) when they hear th a t they must go down 
( id-tdfcActov : 520C) i n t o the cave - t o share the burdens of r u l i n g the s t a t e . 
( 5i^»ir«i'*** & c£ n»/U/ : 520D) . The commandment imposed on the philosophers 
i s consonant w i t h the knowledge o f j u s t i c e and n o b i l i t y t h a t compels them to 
regard t h e i r f e l l o w c i t i z e n s w e l l (500D). So f a r as they w i l l a c t i n accord 
w i t h the commandment t h a t they must r u l e they are s e l f - r u l e d men, men who 
impose the duty of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n upon themselves. By descending i n t o 
the cave, they show t h e i r w i l l i n g s u b j e c t i o n t o the law of the s t a t e which 
b i d s t h a t they r u l e . Again, i n accordance w i t h t h i s law, they secure the 
means t o t h e i r own true i n t e r e s t : to lead the l i f e which i s b e t t e r than 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e . We f i n d here Plato's f i n a l answer to Thrasymachus who 
claimed t h a t j u s t men - men who obey law - cannot be s e l f - r u l e d . By obeying, 
such men serve an i n t e r e s t that i s n o t , f i n a l l y , t h e i r own (p 145 supra). 
With the d i f f e r e n c e between Socrates' and Thrasymachus 1 p o i n t s o f view we 
f i n d Plato's d i s t i n c t i o n between s e l f - r u l e d and self-determined men. 
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Though they value j u s t i c e because i t b r i n g s m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y , P lato 
i s f a r from supposing t h a t t h e i r a t t i t u d e i s one of ignorance (df*0i*. : 
444A). Indeed, such men w i l l - r e g a r d the j u s t and noble a c t i o n ( O(«.U'AV j/t-t/ 
ILAI HJ-A<(f (tf*$ti/ ' 443E. Cf p 198 supra) as t h a t which induces sophrosune, 
a c o n d i t i o n of the soul t h a t they w i l l value. Plato's d o c t r i n e o f a s s i m i l -
a t i o n (p 250 supra) i s consistent w i t h t h i s conception only i f we assume 
(as we" have, sai d i n our e x p o s i t i o n ) t h a t the i n s t i n c t i v e r i g h t opinion 
( (•ixgi/us '• I b i d . ) of the t h i r d class denotes the presence of sophrosune i n 
t h e i r souls and does not denote a form (however r e f i n e d ) of JlKpAtvi* 
Can we, f o r t h i s reason, be sympathetic w i t h Demos' approach t o the subject 
class (n 30 supra); namely, t h a t the subj e c t can be as complete and j u s t a 
man as the r u l e r " ? Plato's d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and opi n i o n gives h i s 
own grounds f o r why t h i s i s not so. But i s there so obvious a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the a r t i s a n and a u x i l i a r y ? What degree of d i f f e r e n c e i s there between 
the a u x i l i a r y who i s i m p a r t i a l t o personal m a t e r i a l ends, and the a r t i s a n , whose 
soul i s temperate?: We >have t r i e d to show t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n a r i s e s from the 
a c t i v e and passive e l i m i n a t i o n of fea r i n men. This may s a t i s f y the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between a r t i s a n s and guardians who become r u l e r s . But i t i s not c l e a r t h a t 
the d i s t i n c t i o n i s proven as between a r t i s a n and a u x i l i a r i e s . 
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I n order to achieve the good or the e v i l ends of eros r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
both men must have p o l i t i c a l power. But i n the one case, power i s j o i n e d 
w i t h the desire f o r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y ; i t recognizes no need b u t t h i s one. 
I n the other case, power i s exercised on behalf of the three n a t u r a l needs 
of men. Here, those whose desire ends i n m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y recognize needs 
other than t h e i r own. They do so because they are temperate. 
There w i l l be vest i g e s of nominal j u s t i c e i n the i d e a l s t a t e . Men 
who are nominally j u s t do not w i l l i n g l y respond to the e x t e r n a l commands of 
the s t a t e , nor do they recognize t h e i r v a l i d i t y ; , f o r these men s u f f e r ignorance. 
I n Plato's view, they are self-determined men. They recognize no e x t e r n a l , 
moral law. Such men desire to exceed others i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of m a t e r i a l 
ends ( tr A tovtitct-Tit : 349C) . I n the p r o v i s i o n of h i s ends, the self-determined 
man supposes t h a t wrong-doing can be of advantage to him ( rrA f j f t ? t i i / : 359C) . 
Plat o has described s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n terms of m a t e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . 
The l a t t e r i s the end which the nominally j u s t man seeks. I t i s the admitted 
presence of t h i s d e s ire i n t h e i d e a l s t a t e t h a t must form i t s r e s i d u a l , r e c a l c i -
t r a n t element. We have attempted to show i n t h i s chapter t h a t r e c a l c i t r a n c e , 
so d e f i n e d , does not t y p i f y Plato's t h i r d class. While such r e c a l c i t r a n c e as 
does e x i s t must be assigned to the t h i r d class w h i l e the s t a t e s u r v i v e s , i t 
i s the power of thought i n the soul t h a t exercises a f a r more potent force 
f o r good or e v i l (518E). The st a t e ' s r u i n w i l l come from p o t e n t i a l l y g i f t e d 
natures, not from those who are simply amenable to the i m p o s i t i o n of v i r t u e 
from an e x t e r n a l source, from the m i n i s t r a t i o n s of p h i l o s o p h i c r u l e . I n such 
men, v i r t u e should e a s i l y grow from h a b i t and custom ( (^>fT'<-(-i^^^<. t-Ot-rJ cf-
«<*.iv J.<rkf<rcoiv'' I b i d . ) . We have wanted to show t h a t the ends of Plato's 
c i t i z e n s , whether or not they graduate from customary h a b i t t o knowledge, are 
amenable to one common view t h a t i n j u s t i c e does not p r o f i t a man. The 
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d o c t r i n e of f r i e n d s h i p , together w i t h the concepts of sophrosune and eros 
i n d i c a t e the broad presence of t h i s view among Plato's three classes. 
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E r r a t a : 
Two pages are numbered 61. The pages are to 
be read consecutively. 
Re p 32: the sentence beginning four l i n e s 
from l a s t l i n e of text should read as follows: 
Together with t h i s , he saw the most important 
p r i n c i p l e s of the s o c i a l contract theory embodied 
i n P l a t o ' s p o l i t i c a l thought. Lewis held, moreover, 
that P l a t o ' s c h i e f concern was 11 p o l i t i c a l f r e e -
dom " ( I b i d . ) , h i s concept of a c i t y composed 
of " a l l i e s and helpers " , not r u l e r s and s l a v e s . 
Re p 76: eleven l i n e s from l a s t l i n e of t e x t : 
read of between condition and h i s . 
Re p 89: eleven l i n e s from f i r s t l i n e of t e x t : 
read he between that and was • 
Re p 131: the sentence beginning s i x l i n e s fran 
a s t e r i s k s should read as follows as f a r as the 
f i r s t bracket: The S o c r a t i c d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the s t r i c t l y s o c i a l and e x t e r n a l grounds of a 
man's consent and i t s moral, or i n d i v i d u a l grounds 
Re p 211: seven l i n e s from f i r s t l i n e of 
t e x t : read' i t between independence and i s • 
Re p 233: two l i n e s from f i r s t l i n e of t e x t : 
read a c t i o n f o r s e c t i o n . 
Re p 234$ ten l i n e s from f i r s t l i n e of t e x t : 
read out the • 
Re ( l ) above: i n t h i s volume only, the two pages 
numbered 61 became reversed due to a binder*s 
e r r o r . Read the second of these pages so as to 
follow page 60j read the f i r s t so as to follow 
the second. 
B i b l i o g r a p h y 
259 
Books 
ADAM, James ed., The Republic of Plato. I n t r o d u c t i o n and notes by 
by D. A. Rees. 2 v o l s . 2nd ed. Cambridge'., U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
1963. 
ARCHER-HIND, R.D., ed. The Phaedo of P l a t o . 2nd ed. London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1894. 
BARKER, S i r Earnest,Greek P o l i t i c a l Theory, P l a t o and His Predecessors. 
London: Methuen, 1918. 
BARKER, S i r Earnest, Ed., Soci a l Contract, Essays by Locke, Hume 
and Rousseau. I n t r o d u c t i o n by S i r Earnest Barker. London, 
Oxford, New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press. 
BURNET, John ed., Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, And C r i t o . 
Edited w i t h notes by John Burnet. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970. 
BLUCK, R.S. Ed., Plato's Meno. I n t r o d u c t i o n and Commentary by 
R. S. Bluck. Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961. 
CROSSMAN, R.H.S., Plato Today. London: Unwin Books, 1963. 
GOUGH, J.W., The So c i a l Contract, A C r i t i c a l Study of I t s Development. 
2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957 
GOUGH, J.W., John Locke's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy, Eight Studies. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. 
GUTHRIE, K.W.C., The Sophists. Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971. 
GIERKE, Ott o , P o l i t i c a l Theories of the Middle Age. I n t r o d u c t i o n and 
T r a n s l a t i o n by F. W. Maitland. Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
1968. 
GRUBE, G.M.A., Plato's Thought. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
HOOKER, R., Of the Laws of E c c l e s i a s t i c a l P o l i t y . I n t r o d u c t i o n by 
Christopher M o r r i s . 2 v o l s . London, New York: Dent, Dutton, 
1969. 
HACKFORTH, R., The Composition of Plato's Apology. Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y 
Press, 1933. 
KOYRE, Alexandre, Discovering P l a t o . Translated by L.C. Rosenfield, 
New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1945. 
260 
A r t i c l e s 
BLUCK, R. S., "Plato's ' I d e a l State'". C l a s s i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 
N.S. IX (1959), 166 - 168. 
C0RNF0RD, F.M., "Psychology and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e i n Plato's Republic", 
C l a s s i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , VI (1912), 246-265 
DEMOS, Raphael, "Paradox I n Plato's Doctrine of The I d e a l S t a t e " , 
C l a s s i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , N.S. V I I (1957), 164 - 174. 
FARIS, J.A., " I s Plato's A Caste STate, Based On Racial Differences?", 
C l a s s i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , XLIV (1950), pp 38-43. 
FOSTER, M.B., "Some I m p l i c a t i o n s of a Passage I n Plato's Republic" 
Philosophy (1936), 3 0 1 - 308. 
KERFORD, G.B., "The Doctrine of Thrasymachus I n Plato's Republic", 
Durham U n i v e r s i t y J o u r n a l , X I : i x (1947 48 ) , 19 - 27. 
LARSON, C u r t i s W.R., "The P l a t o n i c Synonyms, A1 KA IOZTNHAnd 
American Journal of P h i l o l o g y , 72 (1951), 395 - 414. 
LEWIS, H.D., "Plato and The S o c i a l Contract", Mind (1939), 78- 81. 
MERR'IMAN,! F.V., "The Rise And F a l l o f The P l a t o n i c K a l l i p o l i s " , 
Mind, N.S. XXIV (1915), 1-15. 
SEYMOUR, T.D., "On Plato s ' Ship of Fools", C l a s s i c a l Review XVI 
(1902),385 - 387. 
SHOREY, Paul, "Note on P l a t o , Republic 488D" C l a s s i c a l Review XX 
(1909) , 247-248. 
VLASTOS, Gregory, " J u s t i c e and Happiness i n The Republic", i n 
Modern Studies i n Philosophy, P l a t o . A C o l l e c t i o n of 
C r i t i c a l Essays, 11; E t h i c s , P o l i t i c s , And Philosophy of 
A r t And R e l i g i o n , ed., Gregory Vlastos. Garden C i t y , 
New York: Doubleday and Company I n c . , 1971. 
261 
LOCKE. John, The Second T r e a t i s e of Government, Edited w i t h 
I n t r o d u c t i o n by Thomas P. Peardon. New York: The L i b e r a l 
A r t s Press, 1956. 
POPPER, K.R. , The Open Society and I t s Enemies. 2 v o l s . 4 t h ed., 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962. 
PRICHARD, H.A., Moral O b l i g a t i o n and Duty and I n t e r e s t , Essays and 
Lectures. I n t r o d u c t i o n by J.O.Urmson, London, Oxford, 
New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press. 
RAWLS, John, A Theory of J u s t i c e . London, Oxford, New York: Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973. 
RANKIN, H.D., Plato and the I n d i v i d u a l . London: Methuen and Co. L t d . 
SAUNDERS, Trevor J., P l a t o , The Laws. Translated and w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n 
by Trevor J. Saunders. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books L t d . 
SKEMP, J.B., Plato's Statesman. A T r a n s l a t i o n of the P o l i t i c u s of 
Pl a t o . I n t r o d u c t o r y Essays and Footnotes by J.B. Skemp. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
TREDENNICK, Hugh, P l a t o , The Last Days of Socrates. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books. 
TAYLOR, A.E., P l a t o , The Hand And His Work. London: Methuen & Co., L t d . 
LEYDEN, W. Von, ed., John Locke, Essays On The Law of Nature. Oxfrod: 
Clarendon Press. 
